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Counterfactual, prevention and causal thinking about  
workplace slip and trip accidents: 
A study of Safety Professionals, Managers and Accident Subjects. 
 
Abstract  
Counterfactual thinking typically follows an unexpected event and involves the 
mental simulation of an alternative outcome which can be either better or worse 
than the original one. In general, exceptional and controllable events are selected 
for change over those that are routine and uncontrollable, and actions are likely to 
be changed over inactions. Importantly an individual’s social role is thought to be 
critical in determining what is changed and how. Counterfactual thoughts have 
been associated with causal thinking and more recently with missed opportunities 
to prevent an unwanted outcome.   
Accidents at work are unwanted outcomes and are likely to generate 
counterfactual thoughts. As slips and trips continue to cause a significant number 
of injuries they are the focus of this research. Safety Professionals, Managers and 
Accident Subjects are most commonly involved in accident investigations and the 
study asks whether their different social roles or the type of accident influences 
how they use counterfactual, prevention and causal thoughts.    
612 respondents were recruited representing Safety Professionals, Managers and 
Accident Subjects. After reading a slip or trip scenario they completed a 
counterfactual, prevention and causal sentence and these were analysed against 14 
structural dimensions, seven of which were used for the first time in this study.   
The respondent’s job group and the type of accident were found to influence 
certain structural dimensions of the counterfactual, prevention and causal thoughts 
more than others. The respondent’s job group strongly influenced counterfactual 
  
direction, and the addition or subtraction of antecedents based on actions or 
inactions, whilst the type of accident strongly influenced the temporal location of 
the antecedent.   
Norm Theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) proposed that exceptional antecedents 
were selected for counterfactual change and a categorisation of types of 
exceptional events has been developed and applied in this study.  
The implications of these types of thoughts by Safety Professionals, Managers and 
Accident Subjects are considered. 
  
 
Statement of Objectives 
 
 The purpose of the current research was: 
1. To identify how the seven structural dimensions of the counterfactual 
sentence identified in previous research were used in the specific setting 
of a slip or trip accident. 
2. To establish how the seven new structural dimensions of the counterfactual 
sentence were used in the specific setting of a slip and trip accident.  
3. To identify how the 13 sentence dimensions were used in the prevention and 
causal sentences in the specific setting of a slip and trip accident.  
4. To examine the effect of accident type (slip or trip) on the structure of 
counterfactual, prevention and causal sentence sentences.       
5. To examine the effect of job type (Safety Professionals, Managers and 
Accident Subjects) on the structure of counterfactual, prevention and 
causal sentences. 
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Occupational slip and trip accidents continue to be a significant cause of personal 
injury and lost time to the UK economy, despite high profile campaigns and 
prevention programmes such as ‘Shattered Lives’ run by the Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE) in 2012 (HSE, 2012a). 
In 2011/12 30,059 occupational slip and trip accidents were reported to the HSE or 
local authorities, under the provisions of the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and 
Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995 (HMSO, 1995). Two of these were fatal, 
8,929 caused major injuries (defined in the regulations, including fractured arms 
and legs) and 21,130 resulted in absences from work lasting more than three days. 
(HSE, 2013a).  Slip and trip accidents accounted for 40% of all reported major 
injuries and 24% of over three day absences. HSE estimate that each slip or trip 
accident resulting in a major injury costs the UK economy approximately £17,900 
and each accident resulting in an over three day absence costs £330, so the total 
annual cost for major injury accidents is in the region of £160 million and the total 
annual cost of over three day accidents is approximately £70 million (HSE, 2013b). 
There is a substantial body of research and published literature on various aspects of 
slip and a trip accidents which has tended to focus on the foot / floor interface, 
addressing matters such as friction coefficients, the type of flooring and footwear. 
However the psychology of slip and trip accidents has received scant attention in 
the past, so I undertook a research project as part of my Masters Degree which 
identified that accident subjects and their managers had differing perceptions as to 
causal responsibility for slip and trip accidents (Lehane, 1998 & 2001). In the 
current study, the concept that people’s roles influence their perspectives on slips 
and trips is developed further through the use of counterfactual thinking, which is 
triggered by surprising, negative and unwanted outcomes such as an injury 
following an occupational slip or trip.  
Counterfactual thinking is often described as ‘if only…’ thoughts and in this study 
the basic structure of those thoughts are recorded and analysed after respondents 
from three populations associated with slip or trip accidents (Safety Professionals, 
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Managers and Accident Subjects) had read a scenario and completed an ‘if only…’ 
sentence.  The analysis applied to the counterfactual sentences was also applied for 
the first time in this study to the respondents’ preventative and causal thinking, 
which was recorded at the same time as their counterfactual thoughts. I anticipated 
that differences in the perceptions held by Safety Professionals, Managers and 
Accident Subjects about slips and trips would present themselves through their 
different counterfactual, prevention and causal thoughts.  
I will review the counterfactual thinking literature in detail in the following section 
but in summary, counterfactual thinking seeks to establish a mental representation 
of an alternative outcome to that which actually occurred. 
Early research on counterfactual thinking established an understanding of basic 
rules by examining the thoughts of respondents on a number of dimensions, which 
included: the direction of the outcome, being either better or worse than the actual 
outcome; whether the alternative outcome was achieved by making a change to an 
action or inaction; whether an antecedent was added or removed from the sequence 
of events; whether a routine or exceptional antecedent was changed; the temporal 
position of the antecedent; the locus of control over the antecedent; and whether the 
antecedent was dynamic or static.  
These dimensions were tested in various ways but in the main research relied on 
undergraduate psychology students as respondents, using three main approaches 
including scenarios, games of chance / anagram tests and recalling personal 
experiences. 
Respondents’ counterfactual responses varied across these dimensions depending 
on many factors including the reason they were engaging in counterfactual 
thinking, which can be influenced to a significant degree by respondents’ social 
role.  
Counterfactual thinking has been applied to a range of research-based situations 
some of which have involved accident type outcomes or at least involved injury, 
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negligent or criminal behaviour. In the main, the setting of the scenario has been of 
secondary interest to the researchers, simply providing a situation and outcome 
which would generate counterfactual thought which was the primary purpose of the 
research. No previous study has attempted to combine research into counterfactual 
thought with a specific relevant social situation and compared the counterfactual 
thoughts of respondents with a personal, emotional, physical or professional 
interest in it. This study seeks to do just that by examining the ways that Safety 
Professionals, Managers and Accident Subjects use counterfactual thinking 
associated with an occupational slip or trip accident. In recent years the Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE) have undertaken targeted campaigns seeking to reduce the 
incidence of slip and trip accidents but these have been resistant to interventions 
and the rate of incidents has remained largely unaltered.  
A general understanding of counterfactual thinking was initially established by 
identifying its various structural dimensions and then applying this knowledge to 
more complex aspects of people’s cognitions. This study returned to those basic 
building blocks of counterfactual thinking, utilised an approach in which the 
respondent’s social role was critically important, and ascertained how this affected 
the structure of their counterfactual thoughts following a socially relevant outcome. 
In summary, this study sought to compare the structural dimensions of 
counterfactual thoughts generated by Safety Professionals, Managers and Accident 
Subjects following a scenario-based occupational slip or trip accident. Seven 
previously identified structural dimensions of counterfactual thought were used 
along with seven new ones identified during this study. The different social roles of 
the three respondent groups were expected to influence their reasons and 
motivations when they engaged in counterfactual thinking, and this was expected to 
influence the structure of their counterfactual thoughts generated in response to the 
accident scenario. 
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One of the main social determinants is expected to be the respondents’ knowledge 
of occupational safety law and how that frames the counterfactual responses of 
Safety Professionals especially. 
Counterfactual thinking has been associated with causal and prevention thinking 
and in this study the structural dimensions that have been identified for 
counterfactual thinking are also applied to the respondents’ causal and prevention 
thoughts. This was a novel approach and allowed the three types of thinking to be 
compared across the same structural dimensions for a single incident. 
I will review relevant literature relating to counterfactual thinking and relate it to 
occupational accidents in general and specifically to slips and trips. I will also touch 
on how the legal framework established by statute may influence the respondents’ 
approach to counterfactual, prevention and causal thinking. 
After describing the approach I took in this study, I will report the results and 
discuss their implications in the light of current knowledge and what it might mean 
for occupational accidents generally, and slips and trips specifically.  
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Literature Review 
What is Counterfactual Thinking?  
Counterfactual means ‘contrary to the facts’ and counterfactual thinking usually 
starts with an actual outcome which is surprising, unexpected or unwanted. The 
sequence of events (antecedents) leading up to the outcome is mentally explored 
and one of those antecedents is selected and changed (mutated) in a way which is 
designed to bring about a different (counterfactual) outcome. The antecedent 
selected and changed may only differ from the actual one by a small amount, but 
that difference is either sufficient and / or necessary to bring about the desired 
outcome (Roese & Olsen, 1995). 
Counterfactual thinking has been studied by philosophers (e.g. Lewis, 1973; 
Stalnaker, 1968) and psychologists (e.g. Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1982) and has been shown to play a role in a range of cognitive processes 
such as causal judgements (e.g. Roese & Olson, 1997), deductive reasoning (e.g. 
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) and creativity (e.g. Hofstadter, 1985).  
Counterfactual thinking has also been shown to have a range of affective 
consequences including feelings of regret and elation (e.g. Gilovich & Medvec, 
1994; Landman, 1987). Negative emotions such as regret or guilt can be generated 
by upward counterfactual thoughts when the counterfactual alternative is better than 
the actual outcome (e.g. Roese, 1994; Roese & Olson, 1995), whilst positive 
emotions such as relief may result from downward counterfactuals comparing the 
actual outcome with a worse alternative (Sherman & McConnell, 1996). The 
prospect of being able to achieve a desired better outcome revealed through 
counterfactual thinking is said to be motivational (Smallman & Roese, 2009). 
Aboulnasr and Sivaraman (2010) found that people who engaged in upward 
counterfactual thinking were more highly motivated to read and take notice of 
nutritional information on foods after a negative heath event and suggested that 
counterfactual thinking was a valuable public policy instrument that can be used to 
aid the success of food labelling change. 
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Counterfactual thoughts tend to focus on actions rather than failures to act 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) at least in the short term (Byrne & McEleney, 1997) 
and on exceptional rather than routine events (Kahneman & Miller, 1986, but see 
Davis, Lehman, Wortman, Silver, & Thompson, 1995 for an exception) and 
dynamic rather than static events (Kahneman & Varey, 1990), and controllable 
rather than uncontrollable events (Girorro, Legrenzi, & Rizzo, 1991). 
The focus of people’s counterfactual thoughts is influenced by the order of events 
and their relationship to each other. In a causal chain, people tend to change the first 
event (Wells, Taylor, & Turtle, 1987) whereas it tends to be the last event in an 
independent chain of events (Miller & Gunasegaram, 1990). 
Kray, George, Liljenquist, Galinsky, Tetlock and Roese (2010) proposed that 
counterfactual thinking helped individuals to derive meaning from life’s pivotal 
events and relationships and created the sense that they were ‘meant to be’ by 
establishing causal connections among otherwise discrete events with both positive 
and negative outcomes. They suggest this approach applies to a broad spectrum of 
personal turning points, but not a single one and not whilst an event is fresh or raw. 
It is an interesting idea that an occupational accident causing a significant injury 
could over time become integrated in to someone’s life in a positive way which 
helps them find meaning and purpose. However, in the immediate aftermath of a 
traumatic event such as an accident, counterfactual thoughts can also be associated 
with insomnia (Schmidt & Ven der Linden, 2009) and post-traumatic stress disorder 
(El Leithy, Brown, & Robbins, 2006). 
Occupational accidents are set against an employer’s legal duty to identify and 
manage risk and protect employees. Whilst this duty is placed on the employer it is 
commonly discharged by individuals within the organisation on behalf of the 
employer. When an accident occurs, individuals who hold this responsibility on 
behalf of the employer may feel blame, or indeed be blamed, for the accident and 
we know from the work of Creyer and Gurhan (1997), Catellani and Milesi (2001), 
and Branscombe, Owen, Garstka and Coleman (1996) that counterfactuals have a 
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role in blame assignment by highlighting the availability and salience of a better 
outcome ‘if only...’ someone had done something different. In situations where 
people feel personally at risk of being blamed upward counterfactuals have also 
been found to play a role in excusing failure by shifting the blame to unstable 
factors (McCrea, 2008) and are used in a self-protective way (McCrea, 2007). 
Similarly counterfactual thoughts have also been associated with denial of 
responsibility (Markman & Tetlock, 2000), lower future expectations (Sanna, 
Chang, & Meier, 2001) and used to suggest that external factors rather than internal 
factors prevented a better outcome (Goerke, Moller, Schultz-Hardt, Napiersky, & 
Frey, 2004). 
The difference between ‘what is’ and ‘what could have been’, the factual and the 
counterfactual, can range from small to large and between life and death. Teigen, 
Kanten and Terum (2011) reported that about half of the people who were asked to 
consider how their lives could have been different considered not only how it might 
have been better or worse but went to the other extreme and suggested the complete 
opposite of what they had attained or experienced. They suggested that this could 
indicate a more general tendency in people’s counterfactual thinking to be 
conceived as polar opposites rather than just minor modifications of reality, and that 
this arises from a more abstract or schematic mind-set that activates a prototypical 
outcome over the more mixed outcomes that actually arise from day to day living, 
arguing that this is consistent with construal theory (Trope & Liberman, 2003). 
Teigen et al. (2011) tested the idea that counterfactual thinking was more schematic 
because it relates to more distant or hypothetical events than those that have 
actually happened. In a series of experiments, they tested whether predicted 
consequences of counterfactual events were judged to be more extreme, and 
extreme consequences of counterfactual events were more likely, than 
corresponding judgements of factual events. They made an interesting comment 
relating to situations involving life and death, observing that people seemed to be 
willing to go a long way in constructing counterfactuals that are not even close to 
reality, partly because so much is at stake, observing that in the world of 
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counterfactual thinking there seems to be some truth in the saying that opposites 
attract. Their first experiment showed that spontaneous counterfactuals drawn from 
people’s own lives have a tendency to be constructed as polar opposites, with 
highly positive events having highly negative counterfactuals and moderately 
positive events having moderately negative counterfactuals. 
The idea of being lucky or unlucky is intimately associated with counterfactual 
thoughts and Teigen (1995) considered that luck was essentially determined by a 
comparison between the factual and counterfactual outcome, with good luck being 
experienced where the factual outcome is better than the counterfactual alternative 
and being unlucky where the factual outcome is worse than the counterfactual 
alternative. Teigen and Jenson (2011) describe research with families exposed to 
the tsunami disaster of December 2004 and point out that situations that are not 
merely dangerous but where an accident has actually occurred, allow for both 
upward and downward counterfactuals as the accident could still have been 
prevented but could still have been worse, and clearly occupational accidents fall in 
to this category. The literature relating to counterfactual thinking following trauma 
shows that it can lead to self blame, ruminations and counterfactual thoughts about 
how it could have been avoided and almost always report the use of upward 
counterfactual thoughts pointing to a better world, but these thoughts can become 
maladaptive. Further details can be found in Branscombe, Wohl, Owen, Allison and 
N’Gbala (2003) who reported on rape victims, Callander, Brown, Tata and Regan 
(2007) who examined responses to recent miscarriages, and Parker, Middleton and 
Kulik (2002) who considered the failure of silicone breast implants. 
After something unwanted or unexpected occurs, such as a slip or trip accident at 
work, people are inclined to think about it and these thoughts are often directed 
towards how a different outcome might have been brought about (counterfactual 
thinking), how it might have been prevented and what the cause was. 
Counterfactual thinking is usually illustrated by the phrase ‘If only X then Y’, 
where ‘X’ represents a changeable (mutable) event occurring before the actual 
outcome and ‘Y’ represents the different outcome. For example, after slipping on a 
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spillage of milk on a supermarket floor an accident subject might think ‘If only a 
warning sign had been put out then I would not have walked in the milk and 
slipped’. 
Ross and Nisbett (1991) considered the social setting in which counterfactual 
thinking is performed as being important in defining the conditions under which 
counterfactuals are brought to mind, as well as influencing their specific content.  
They also considered the goals and motivations of individuals within a particular 
social setting, along with their individual interpretation of those situations, to be 
important in shaping the counterfactual worlds they create. Occupational slip and 
trip accidents occur in a specific social setting, that of work, and equally important 
in the context of this research are the legal responsibilities and duties imposed on 
employers and employees by the Health & Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (HMSO, 
1974) and a range of regulations made under the act.  
People in a social situation rarely make absolute judgements but require comparable 
situations against which to make judgements. These usually take the form of other 
people in similar circumstances or similar events, but in cases where there are no 
readily available comparisons people may mentally manufacture such events using 
counterfactual thinking. In the context of this research individuals do not have to 
create a counterfactual alternative world as they have a real one against which to 
make a comparison when a slip or trip accident occurs. People do not commonly 
slip or trip at work so they use their everyday non-accident experiences as the basis 
against which to compare an accident. This non-accident condition becomes the 
norm and the desired state of the world, against which an accident can be judged. 
Counterfactual thinking is a central element in Kahneman and Miller’s (1986) 
Norm Theory which describes the psychology of surprise. After an event has 
occurred and been judged as unexpected or surprising, a comparison is made 
between the actual outcome and the expected outcome. The expected outcome is 
referred to as the norm and forms the cognitive anchor against which comparisons 
are made. When the expected outcome (norm) is similar to the actual outcome there 
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is no element of surprise and little further cognitive processing is undertaken, 
however when the norm and actual outcome are different, there is an element of 
surprise and further cognitive processing follows. The purpose of constructing a 
counterfactual world is to convert an unwanted or unexpected outcome back to its 
expected value (norm) by changing mutable antecedents. Mutable antecedents are 
generally considered to be something which was exceptional, unusual or missing, so 
an outcome is more likely to be undone by the alteration of a mutable aspect of the 
circumstances leading up to it than by altering a routine antecedent (Kahneman & 
Miller, 1986; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). 
Norm Theory predicts that when people engage in counterfactual thinking an 
exceptional item is selected from the antecedents and changed into one that is more 
routine. Kahneman and Miller (1986) suggested that there was a fundamental 
tendency to create counterfactual simulations that re-establish normality and 
illustrated this in their study in which Mr. Jones was killed in a car accident after 
either leaving work early or taking a different route home. After reading the 
scenario respondents were asked to complete an ‘if only...’ sentence and they 
focused their attention on changing the time Mr. Jones left work or his route home 
more than other options which would have brought about a different outcome. A 
slightly different approach was suggested by Gavanski and Wells (1989) who 
proposed that changing exceptional events towards more routine ones only occurred 
in response to more exceptional outcomes and that this was based on a 
correspondence heuristic in which exceptional outcomes follow exceptional 
antecedents. They also showed that normal outcomes were mutated by changing 
both normal and exceptional antecedents. 
Roese and Olsen (1995) suggested that counterfactuals were generated in a two-
stage process. In the first stage the possibility of a different outcome had to be made 
available and once this had been activated the actual content of the counterfactual 
was then determined in the second stage. 
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The availability of a counterfactual alternative is determined by social and 
motivational factors including the desirability of the actual outcome (outcome 
valance), how close the actual outcome came to another outcome, and the degree of 
personal involvement with the outcome.  
At a basic level an unwanted outcome could threaten the safety or survival of an 
individual or at a higher level it might mean failing to achieve something that was 
being positively pursued. Negative or unwanted outcomes are undesirable and 
signify a problem or threat to the individual or that the environment was not 
properly understood, and they produce more active and directed cognitive activity 
resulting in enhanced processing, concentrating on avoiding repeating the same 
error in the future (Roese & Olsen, 1995). 
How close an individual believes an actual outcome was to an alternative one can 
also stimulate the generation of counterfactuals. Miller, Turnbull and McFarland 
(1990) suggested that counterfactual closeness was “a function of the intuitive 
implicit mental models of the world and its operation, and these models give rise to 
what have been labelled as explicit expectances. The ease with which the 
parameters of a mental model may be revised determines the availability of 
counterfactual representations”. Small changes to parameters are more realistic and 
plausible and lead to counterfactual alternatives being more readily available, 
whereas large changes to the parameters of a model are les realistic and plausible 
and counterfactual alternatives are less available so less readily generated.  
Kahneman and Tversky (1982) illustrated the concept in their scenario involving 
Mr. Crane and Mr. Tees. Mr. Tees was perceived to be more disappointed missing 
his flight by five minutes than Mr. Crane who missed his by 30 minutes, because it 
is more plausible to have arrived five minutes earlier than 30 minutes earlier. 
Meyers-Levy and Maheswaran (1992) commented that being personally involved in 
an unwanted outcome is also likely to prompt counterfactual thinking and influence 
its content. An outcome which directly affects an individual is more relevant and 
provides a greater urgency to resolve than one which does not. At a basic functional 
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level if an outcome places an individual at risk of harm, instinctive self-preservation 
demands that the situation needs to be understood so that it can be avoided in the 
future. Motivational needs are said to influence the availability of counterfactual 
thinking (Ross & Nisbett, 1991; Seelau, Seelau, Wells & Windschitl, 1995) and an 
individual’s motivation is influenced by their role in the context of a particular 
social setting and their involvement with the actual outcome. Counterfactual 
thinking may be undertaken from a personal or public perspective (Markman, 
Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1995). A personal perspective involves the 
consideration of the event and the generation of counterfactual alternatives from the 
viewpoint of the person who was actually involved with and experienced the 
outcome and in this study is probably limited to the Accident Subject. The degree of 
personal involvement decreases as the respondent’s role becomes more distant from 
the event itself, so witnesses, supervisors, managers, employers, safety officers and 
lawyers would adopt a more public perspective. Following an occupational accident 
relatively few people will adopt a personal perspective to their counterfactual, 
prevention and causal thinking, whereas a wider range of people are likely to adopt 
a public approach and a significant range of affective responses are likely to be 
based on their different roles, motivations and involvement with the event itself. 
The second stage of counterfactual generation (Roese & Olsen, 1995) determines 
the content and structure of the counterfactual thought and this is linked to the 
specific properties of the antecedent event selected for change (mutation). They 
suggest that the content of the counterfactual is related to exceptionality, salience, 
control, dynamics and serial position.  
The structure of counterfactual thoughts has previously been described with respect 
to seven individual dimensions. One of these, counterfactual direction, refers to the 
nature of the alternative outcome whilst the other six relate to the antecedent that 
has been selected and changed to bring about the alternative outcome.  
The alternative outcome is described as having a directional quality whereby it can 
be upward, leading to a better outcome, or downward where the alternative outcome 
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is worse than the actual outcome. The other dimensions relate to the antecedent 
itself and are: its normality or exceptionality; describe whether the antecedent was 
added to or subtracted from the original sequence of events; whether the antecedent 
is an action or inaction; whether it is static or dynamic; whether is it under the 
control of the person thinking about it; and where it was located in the temporal 
sequence of events leading to the outcome. These seven dimensions will be 
described in more detail later and are the focus for this research along with seven 
new dimensions which were identified as being particularly relevant to occupational 
accidents. These were to identify the specific subject of the counterfactual thought 
and its ‘domain’ (was it a behaviour, process / procedure or the physical 
environment); was the scenario actor spontaneously identified; did the 
counterfactual refer to a personal or situational antecedent; was the counterfactual 
expressed specific to the scenario or was it more generally framed; was the 
counterfactual based on details known to the respondent or inferred by the 
respondent to have existed; and lastly to which of the scenario actors did the 
counterfactual relate. 
Slip or trip accidents involving an injury provide the necessary negative outcome 
which has been identified as the most common reason to engage in counterfactual 
thinking (Gavanski & Wells, 1989; Gleicher et al., 1990). The injury brings an 
alternative outcome to mind and this makes the counterfactual available to the 
person who is thinking about it and fits the description of the first stage of 
counterfactual generation suggested by Roese and Olsen (1995). The second stage 
of counterfactual generation determines the specific content of the counterfactual 
thought and this is what I refer to as the counterfactual structure. This research 
focused on the structure of the counterfactual thoughts generated in response to slip 
and trip accidents by three different respondent groups – Safety Professionals, 
Managers and Accident Subjects. In this study the structure of the sentences is 
defined by the 14 dimensions (seven old and seven new) referred to previously. 
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The Function of Counterfactual Thought. 
Roese (1994) proposed that counterfactual thoughts were functional in that they 
could be used to prepare for the future and this is especially relevant to situations 
where the individual is likely to be exposed to a similar outcome again (McMullen, 
Markman, & Gavanski, 1995), alternatively people might use counterfactuals to 
make themselves feel better about their current situation by comparing it in a 
positive light to a less desirable outcome (Kasimatis & Wells, 1995; Miller & 
McFarland, 1986; Roese & Olsen, 1995). 
Epstude and Roese (2008) published an updated account of the functional theory of 
counterfactual thinking and proposed that counterfactual thoughts influenced 
behaviour by one of two routes, either a content-specific pathway involving specific 
informational effects on behavioural intentions which then influences actual 
behaviour, or a content neutral pathway involving indirect effects such as affects, 
mind-sets or motivation.   
Ferrante, Girotto, Straga and Walsh (2013) suggested that thinking counterfactually 
about the past and thinking about the future (prefactual thinking) might be different 
and that counterfactual thinking is not as helpful in preparing for the future as had 
been suggested by previous research. They point out that counterfactual thoughts 
are more frequently generated after negative outcomes and that they improve reality 
more effectively when people are expecting to encounter the similar situations again 
in the future and therefore people should produce similar thoughts when they 
imagine how the past and future could be improved, however they highlight the 
work of Van Boven, Kane and Mc Graw (2009) who proposed that the two types of 
thought may differ because reality concerns constrain future thoughts more than 
past ones, and go on to suggest their own opposing hypothesis in which they 
propose that the possibility to realise a future outcome may constrain mental 
simulation of the future more than the past. After failing to solve a task an 
individual thinking about how the past could have been better can change the 
features which constrained their performance including those rules which govern 
the situation, for example time limits or their own ability, and this challenges the 
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common view that counterfactuals only involve minimal departures from reality 
(Byrne, 2005). If the same individual then thinks about improving future 
performance the same constraints still exist in the future scenario and they have to 
switch to changing more personally controllable features such that there are more 
future-based goal-orientated thoughts than there were when changing the past.  
When an individual thinks about achieving a better outcome in the future (an 
upward counterfactual) this has the effect of highlighting the distance between the 
actual outcome and the desired outcome and may make people feel less satisfied 
with the current situation, but this engenders hope for a better future (Roese & 
Olsen, 1995). However when people are faced with a one-off event which has led to 
an unsatisfactory outcome, generating a plan for the future is unhelpful so people 
may instead use counterfactuals to make a comparison to an even worse outcome 
(downward counterfactual comparison) which can help them feel better about the 
actual outcome. For example Medvec, Madey and Gilovich (1995) demonstrated 
that Olympic bronze medallists were more satisfied than silver medallists where the 
alternative of coming in fourth place would have meant missing a medal altogether.      
The consequences of upward and downward counterfactuals  can be reversed 
according to Markman and McMullen (2003), and Markman, McMullen, Elizaga 
and Mizoguchi (2006) who proposed the Reflection Evaluation Model (REM) in 
which focusing individuals’ thoughts on the counterfactual alternative (reflection) 
rather than on the comparisons of the alternative with the actual outcome 
(evaluation) leads to more positive affect. REM predicts that upward evaluation 
should give rise to stronger motivation than upward reflection, because it is more 
likely to specify implementation strategies that allow one to evaluate the observed 
consequences of actions and implement novel strategies, whereas upward reflection 
is much more like a positive fantasy. The divergence between REM and other 
functional approaches is even more evident in downward counterfactuals. 
Downward reflection should enhance motivation in achievement domains because it 
raises an individual’s awareness of the possibility that a negative goal state could 
have occurred, whereas downward evaluation should produce a more complacent 
Page | 16  
 
approach because it suggests that a negative goal state has been successfully 
avoided.  
According to Regulatory Focus Theory (Higgins, 1998) promotion orientated 
individuals focus on growth, achievement and accomplishment, tending to follow 
strategies that achieve these outcomes, whereas prevention orientated individuals 
focus on protection, safety and responsibility and tend to follow strategies designed 
to avoid undesirable outcomes. In the context of counterfactual thinking, promotion 
focused individuals should be seeking to achieve outcomes that are more favourable 
than actual outcomes (upward counterfactuals) and those individuals with a 
prevention focus are more likely to seek to avoid less favourable outcomes or 
downward counterfactuals (Markman & McMullen, 2006).     
Regulatory fit theory proposes that when people engage in decisions or make 
choices that sustain their preferred regulatory orientation (promotion or prevention) 
they ‘feel right’ about what they are doing and that transfers to subsequent choices 
and decisions. As a consequence, motivational strength is enhanced when people 
work towards a goal that sustains their regulatory orientation and this should 
improve their efforts towards achieving their goal. Initially Markman and 
McMullen (2003) predicted that under their REM theory upward counterfactuals 
should be more closely associated with promotion goals and downward 
counterfactuals, particularly downward reflection counterfactuals, should be more 
closely associated with prevention goals. Refining their theory, Markman & 
McMullen (2006) suggested that upward evaluation counterfactuals (comparing 
reality to an imagined better outcome) may be associated with both promotion and 
prevention goals by showing how a negative outcome could be avoided in the 
future, as well as highlighting a route to a better future outcome.     
Affective counterfactuals have an impact on how we feel and their corresponding 
emotions include relief, regret, guilt and blame. Affective counterfactuals operate 
through two principal mechanisms which are contrast effects and emotional 
amplification. Ben-Ze’ve (1996, 2000) claims that all emotions are basically of a 
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comparative nature because they arise when we compare our current situation to our 
prior state, to our goals and expectations, to other people’s conditions and to purely 
imagined counterfactual outcomes. 
Creyer and Gurhan (1997) found that providing information which directed 
attention towards an individual, resulted in greater mutability of that individual’s 
actions and a slight increase in the amount of blame assigned to them.  In two 
studies involving a road traffic accident scenario respondents generated more 
counterfactuals (study 1) and assigned greater blame to the driver of the car when 
their attention was drawn toward the driver for not wearing a seat belt, than when it 
was not (study 2) and this tendency was also referred to by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1982) when they proposed the simulation heuristic. In the context of the current 
study it is interesting to consider how the structure of a typical accident report, 
which focuses on the actions of the accident subject, could increase the availability 
of their actions for mutation and they could subsequently be held more responsible 
for the accident and have greater blame attributed to them. 
Counterfactual thinking is also associated with the experience of luck. Perceptions 
of luck are generated after an event has happened and when it is compared to what 
could have happened in the circumstances (Kahneman & Miller, 1986). A single 
outcome can be described as either lucky or unlucky depending on the 
counterfactual that is activated. It is not uncommon for an accident victim to 
describe themselves as being unlucky one moment and lucky the next (Teigen, 
2005). For example a person may express feelings of being unlucky to have been 
involved in an accident at all, but also having been lucky not to have been more 
seriously injured in the circumstances. Equally somebody may feel doubly unlucky 
where they are both unlucky to have been involved in an accident at all and to have 
received a more serious injury than would have been expected in the circumstances. 
Teigen (2005) also suggests that the structure of the narrative can have an important 
role in deciding whether a story appears to convey good or bad luck. Good luck is 
generally conveyed by starting with the bad news and ending up with the good 
news, whereas reversing this order tends to imply bad luck.  Accident reports 
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typically end with the accident (bad news) and may therefore imply that the 
outcome was bad luck. The details of an accident are usually recorded in a written 
report of some kind and typically describe the events leading up to the accident and 
its outcome with an inevitable focus on the role and fate of the accident subject. The 
focus of the report narrative on the role of the accident subject has been found to 
increase the likelihood that they will be the subject of subsequent counterfactual 
thoughts because they are the focal point and are more counterfactually available as 
a result (Creyer & Gurhan, 1997). Accident reports often end with the accident and 
injury being described and this narrative structure could result in the reader 
concluding that the accident subject was to blame for the bad luck and that there is 
little benefit to be gained investigating the accident.  
Not all counterfactual thinking is functional and its positive aspects can be 
undermined if it becomes dysfunctional. Sherman and McConnell (1995) suggested 
dysfunctional counterfactual thinking can lead to the identification of the wrong 
cause, resulting in unnecessary negative affect, or making costly changes to 
behaviour. Davis et al. (1995) found that people who had lost loved ones under 
tragic circumstances tried to change aspects of the situation involving their own 
behaviour even though their behaviour had no causal role in the outcome. The 
constant searching for an alternative world following such terrible events can lead 
people to change their own behaviour which Janoff-Bulman (1979) suggested 
helped the individual achieve a sense of control but could lead to dysfunctional self-
blame, despair and depression. 
Constraining Counterfactual Thinking 
A factual outcome can be mentally undone by altering almost any prior event or 
condition, although there are some psychological rules which constrain people’s 
consideration of which events or conditions are changed. A counterfactual 
constraint is a mechanism that precludes entire sets of events or conditions from 
being considered for mutation, even though their mutation would undo the factual 
outcome. 
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Seelau, Seelau, Wells and Windschitl (1995) suggested that counterfactual 
generation was constrained in three ways through natural law constraints, 
availability constraints and purpose constraints. In addition Catellani and Milesi 
(2001) proposed a Social Context Model in which counterfactuals were constrained 
by an exceptionality effect which was influenced by abnormality in the sense that 
the outcome violates an intrapersonal norm. They also suggested the 
Nonconformity Effect in which people under specific circumstances would be 
especially inclined to focus counterfactuals on actor’s behaviours that do not 
conform with social norms. 
The world operates according to the rules of natural laws which include those of 
physics, motion, time, biology and causality. People learn about these as they 
develop and gain experience and they rarely express counterfactuals based on the 
mutation of these rules, although they could be changed to bring about a different 
outcome, but they would result in non-lucid counterfactuals (Seelau et al., 2005). 
Counterfactuals are more acceptable when they are based on alterations of specific 
matters as opposed to negations of general laws (Rescher, 1964) and this was 
confirmed by Revlis, Lipkin and Hayes (1971) and Revlis and Hayes (1972) who 
stated that counterfactuals maintained consistency with general laws of the world.  
Counterfactual thinking is normally constrained by people’s knowledge and 
understanding of the natural laws that govern the world around them (Gleicher et 
al., 1990), for example people do not negate the laws of gravity when thinking 
about slips and trips.  
Availability constraints limit the selection of events by making certain aspects of a 
situation less available for mutation. Events that are chosen tend to be conceptually 
and operationally correlated and are influenced by factors such as the perceiver’s 
knowledge, whether they are normal or abnormal, are acts of commission or 
omission, or are in the foreground or background. Actions are likely to be reported 
as part of any description of how an outcome occurred and become part of the 
reader’s factual knowledge; actions are more salient, evoke greater attention and 
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tend to appear more in the foreground than do inactions and are more commonly 
changed to bring about a different outcome.  
Purpose constraints arise from the roles people play in a situation and are likely to 
influence counterfactual thoughts and what people publically express. Seelau et al. 
(1995) assumed that when people engage in counterfactual thinking they have a 
reason or purpose to do so and that this motivational aspect operates as a constraint. 
The judicial system is a good example of a situation in which people’s roles are 
fixed (defendant, victim, lawyer and juror) and so are the goals they pursue. A 
person’s reasons for generating counterfactuals may eliminate entire subsets of 
alternatives that would generally undo the outcome but which are inappropriate or 
counter to the required purpose (non-lucid counterfactuals). People may be 
motivated to engage in counterfactual thinking for a number of possible reasons, 
including assessing the cause, controlling future outcomes or preventing the same 
outcome from happening again, assigning blame or consoling others. 
Counterfactual thoughts which do not support the thinker’s purpose would be 
constrained by the social situation and the role of the thinker in that situation.  
Affective Responses and Emotional Amplification  
Affect is a function of the specific counterfactual generated in response to an 
outcome. A comparison is made between the counterfactual outcome and the actual 
outcome and affect is amplified or attenuated to the extent that the counterfactual 
results in an outcome that is different from or similar to the actual outcome. When 
the counterfactual has an outcome opposite to the actual event and when the 
counterfactual can be easily simulated (it is likely, has a high probability or comes 
to mind easily) emotional affect will be amplified. However when the 
counterfactual fails to alter the event, there will be a minimal influence on affect or 
it may even be blunted because of the apparent inevitability of the outcome. 
Emotional amplification is a feature of Norm Theory which predicts that the 
affective response to an outcome would be enhanced if its causes are considered to 
be abnormal. An outcome is judged worse if the counterfactual anchor (norm) is 
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more desirable but an outcome would be judged to be better if the counterfactual 
anchor (norm) is less desirable (Gleicher et al., 1990). Markman and McMullen 
(2003) proposed that counterfactuals work on a mechanism of affective contrast in 
which evaluations based on downward comparisons make us feel better whilst 
upward comparisons make us feel worse.  
The Structure of Counterfactual Thoughts 
In the following section I will review relevant literature focusing particularly on 
seven previously identified structural dimensions of counterfactual thinking starting 
with counterfactual direction, which is outcome based, before going on to review 
the six existing antecedent based dimensions, which are: action or inaction; addition 
or subtraction; normality; temporal position; control; and dynamic or static. After 
this I will comment on the seven new antecedent based dimensions, which are: 
specific or general; known or inferred; personal or situational; was the scenario 
actor spontaneously identified; who was the scenario actor; the specific subject of 
the sentence; and its domain (physical item, behaviour or procedure / process). 
These are not reviewed against any existing literature as they have not been used 
before in connection with counterfactual research but I will make some general 
observations about their relevance. Lastly I will review aspects of accident 
investigation and the framing effects of the law on occupational accidents.  
Previously Identified Structural Dimensions 
Outcome based structural antecedents 
Counterfactual direction relates to the alternative outcome and I will review 
literature relating to that dimension first before moving on to review the six 
antecedent based structural dimensions.  
Counterfactual direction 
Kahneman and Miller (1986) noted that an actual outcome could be changed in one 
of two directions when thinking about an alternative. A better alternative outcome 
was described as having an upward direction, whereas a worse alternative outcome 
was referred to as having a downward direction.  
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Upward counterfactuals are most commonly generated following negative or 
unwanted outcomes in situations where individuals expect the experience to be 
repeated (Catellani & Moore, 2000; Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 
1993) and are generally considered to be involved in preparing for the future 
because they provide strong sign-posting to the individual how to achieve the 
desired outcome under similar circumstances. McMullen et al. (1995) reported that 
upward counterfactuals were linked to increased feelings of personal control. 
However, upward counterfactuals showing how a better outcome could have been 
achieved or was narrowly missed can generate negative feelings if they are 
compared to the actual outcome. Landman (1987) reported that upward 
counterfactuals led to increased feelings of regret as they provided a relevant 
comparison against which to compare one’s current position. For example Medvec 
et al. (1995) found that Olympic silver medallists were disappointed with their 
performance when compared to the counterfactual of a gold medal, but bronze 
medallists were more positive about their performance when they compared it to the 
worse downward alternative of not winning a medal at all. 
If an event is likely to be experienced again there is a functional aspect to 
generating upward counterfactuals with a view to improving future performance. 
However if the event is a one off there is no purpose in generating a strategy for the 
future and it makes sense to console oneself that it could have been worse and this 
is usually achieved by generating downward counterfactuals (Markman et al., 
1993). Downward counterfactuals illustrate how an outcome could have been worse 
and by highlighting that difference can have a positive affective function, for 
example people feel relief when judging how the outcome could have been worse. 
Downward counterfactuals can also be used to provide consolation by making 
people feel better about the current outcome by drawing attention to having avoided 
a worse situation (Roese & Olsen, 1995; Seelau et al., 1995). 
It is not known how people respond to real life occupational accidents by either 
generating upward or downward counterfactuals. Counterfactual direction may be 
related to the frequency of exposure to the hazard and the expected outcome. 
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Following an unwanted outcome (accident), if someone knows they will be 
regularly exposed to a significant risk of serious personal injury then an upward 
counterfactual would be most beneficial (functional) because it prepares a person 
for the future by indicating a clear and specific means to avoid the accident. 
However if they are unlikely to be exposed to a similar hazardous situation again 
then downward counterfactuals might be more likely to be generated. 
Counterfactual thinkers are free to choose whether to bring about a better (upward) 
or worse (downward) alternative outcome; however the social situation, motivation 
of the individual and perceptions of closeness to the alternative outcome can all 
play a part in making one direction more likely than the other. For example, 
imagine two different outcomes from the same event and how these might prompt 
different directions to subsequent counterfactual thoughts. Consider a builder 
working on a wet pitched roof who slips and falls 30 feet. In the first instance he 
falls on to soft grass and receives relatively minor injuries to his ankle and knee, but 
knowledge of similar falls from such a height would lead us to expect a much more 
serious injury (a counterfactually close alternative) making that outcome more 
highly available. In such circumstances the builder may well generate a downward 
(worse counterfactual) outcome comparing the possible more serious injury with his 
now lucky escape and feeling of relief, but leaving him no better prepared as to how 
to avoid the same situation in the future as downward counterfactuals do not 
necessarily identify specific routes to achieve a better outcome. Hopefully other 
cognitive strategies would be brought into play so that the builder goes on to think 
that he might not be lucky again and the close counterfactual, or near miss, 
highlights the hazard and he will use some suitable fall arrest equipment in the 
future!  
In the second instance the builder falls on to a stone patio and sustains a broken leg, 
he also hits his head suffering a loss of consciousness. As a result he might well 
have generated an upward counterfactual thought ‘If only I had used a scaffold and 
not worked from a ladder, I would not have fallen off the roof and broken my leg 
and not be able to work’.  
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Kray, George, Liljenquist, Galinsky, Tetlock and Roese (2010) identified that 
downward counterfactual thoughts were associated with increased perception of the 
meaning of life’s events in the longer term and asked whether upward versus 
downward counterfactual comparisons moderated whether functional or 
dysfunctional consequences emerged. In a similar vein, Teigen and Jensen (2011) 
also reported that survivors of the tsunami on 26 December 2004 were ten times 
more likely to have used downwards counterfactuals  than upward counterfactuals 
in interviews held in the Autumn of 2005.  
Antecedent based counterfactual structural dimensions  
Six existing dimensions relating to the counterfactual antecedent have been 
identified as being most relevant to this study, these will be briefly reviewed and 
they are: action or inaction; addition or subtraction; normality; temporal position; 
controllability; and dynamic or static.  
Following this I will comment on the seven new antecedent based dimensions 
developed and used in this study (specific or general; known or inferred; personal or 
situational; was the scenario actor spontaneously identified?; who was the scenario 
actor?; the specific subject of the sentence; and its domain (physical item, 
behaviour, procedure / process). 
Any antecedent that is selected to be changed will be counterfactually 
multidimensional, and will exhibit characteristics of all these dimensions. 
Antecedent based dimensions - Action or inaction 
The antecedent selected for change may represent either an action or inaction by 
someone. Some literature refers to actions as being commissions and inactions as 
omissions. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1982), Kahneman and Miller (1986) and Landman (1987) 
all identified that actions were more likely to be changed than inactions.  Kahneman 
and Tversky (1982) suggested this was because it was easier to imagine the 
subtraction of an action that had been performed rather than adding in an action that 
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had not been performed, whilst Kahneman and Miller (1986) explained that actions 
were inherently abnormal and because people are more likely to change abnormal 
antecedents they are more likely to generate an alternative outcome by changing an 
action which was performed rather than by adding in actions that had not been 
performed. These explanations are rooted in Norm Theory which suggests that 
inaction is more common (normal) than actions. However, a later explanation by 
Landman (1993) suggested that this pattern of mutation is better accounted for by 
the greater salience of actions than inactions. 
The predictions of Norm Theory and laboratory based research were not confirmed 
by Davis et al. (1995) who reported on people’s real life experiences of 
counterfactual thinking following sudden infant deaths (study 2). They reported that 
only 20% of respondents sought to change actions whereas 66% of respondents 
changed things that they had not done (inactions).  Roese and Olsen (1993a, 1993b) 
also failed to find evidence to support the predictions of Norm Theory in which 
actions were changed more frequently than inactions and explained this in terms of 
people’s desire and active planning for success which, like McGill (1989), was seen 
to come from actions. When the expected success is not achieved it is assumed to 
come from the absence of these intended actions and therefore when the alternative 
outcome is changed it is done so through the addition of actions. Roese and Olsen 
(1995) went on to suggest that undoing success should involve removing an action 
whereas the undoing of a failure should be accomplished by the addition of a new 
antecedent, and proposed that the expectation for action versus inaction is linked to 
specific social situations. In the case of occupational slip and trip accidents because 
there is a general legal and moral position which seeks to prevent accidents and 
requires positive steps to achieve this, it is more likely that failures to act (inactions) 
will be selected for mutation and this tendency is predicted in Tables 1, 2 and 3 for 
all respondent groups. 
Gilovich and Medvec (1994) reported that when people were asked to reflect on 
their lives their long-term regrets focus on their inactions but short-term regrets 
focus more on their actions. 
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The theory of Regulatory Focus differentiates between promotion and prevention 
goals and is linked to the selection of an action or inaction to bring about a different 
outcome (Roese, Herr, & Pennington, 1999). In a promotion focus people are 
concerned with the acquisition of desired goals and are sensitive to omissions so 
when people fail to gain their desired outcome they generate counterfactuals 
specifying the addition of some omitted action, whereas in a prevention focus 
people are concerned with maintaining the status quo and failures to achieve this are 
based on removing that element which played a role in the failure. 
In the light of Regulatory Focus theory, is an occupational slip or trip accident seen 
through the eyes of a promotion or prevention goal? And how might Regulatory 
Focus influence counterfactual thinking after a work-related slip or trip accident?  I 
suggest that occupational safety is approached from a prevention standpoint. People 
do not usually go out with the conscious goal to avoid accidents, that is taken to be 
the norm and maintaining the status quo is compatible with a prevention focus 
which implies that actions are mutated. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1982) showed that reasoners judged that scenario actors 
would regret their actions more than their inactions, which Byrne and McEleney 
(2000) called the Agency Effect. However, in the long term this pattern of regret 
reverses and inactions are more regretted than actions (Gilovich & Medvec, 1994, 
1995) but Byrne and McEleney (2000) proposed that this reversal only occurred 
under very specialised circumstances and that actions were more often mutated than 
inactions, except when the imagined consequences of the mentally undone inaction 
are possibly better than the real consequences of the inaction (and the imagined 
consequences of the mentally undone action are the same as the real consequences 
of the action). 
Antecedent based dimensions - addition or subtraction 
The easiest counterfactual change that can be made to an exceptional antecedent is 
to simply remove it from the outcome sequence, and this is known as a subtractive 
counterfactual. If an antecedent is missing the event sequence can be changed by 
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adding the expected one to it and this is known as an additive counterfactual. The 
substitution of an antecedent is probably a third option, but as it involves both the 
subtraction of an antecedent and its replacement (addition) by another antecedent 
these are probably included in the addition category of counterfactual thinking, 
although this has not been addressed specifically in earlier research.  
A typical subtractive counterfactual takes the form of ‘If not X then Y’ where X is 
an existing antecedent. This form of counterfactual simply deletes an antecedent 
from the sequence of events and no more. An additive counterfactual takes the form 
of ‘If X then Y’ where X is a new antecedent which was not part of the original 
sequence of events. Additional counterfactuals are considered to be more creative 
because they allow antecedents to be freely changed in individual and inventive 
ways whereas subtractive counterfactuals are limited to the existing set of facts and 
actual antecedents (Roese & Olsen, 1993b). Additional counterfactuals are also 
considered more likely to serve a preparatory function by generating specific 
counterfactuals that result in relatively more efficient plans of action and lead to 
greater success in the future. Whilst additional counterfactuals are more highly 
creative they are nevertheless constrained in ways described by Seelau et al. (1995). 
Mandel and Lehman (1996) stress that negating necessary causes and adding 
possible preventors is unrelated to the concept of additive and subtractive 
counterfactuals. 
Based on previous studies, inactions have been found to be more readily mutated 
under promotion focus situations, whereas actions have been changed in prevention 
focused situations. If this were to apply to occupational slip or trip accidents which 
I have suggested are viewed from a prevention focus it should lead to them being 
mutated by making changes to actions via subtractive counterfactuals, however I 
suggest in Tables 1, 2 and 3 that this will not be the case and that in the social 
setting of an occupational slip or trip accident respondents will be more likely to 
use additional counterfactuals because of the strong implication established by the 
framing of the law that actions are expected to be taken to ensure compliance. I 
propose that the action / inaction effect will be the stronger determinant of the 
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counterfactual structure than the addition / subtraction effect. Once an inaction is 
identified as being the mutable antecedent an additional counterfactual is most 
likely to follow. 
Antecedent based dimensions - normality of the antecedent 
Norm Theory proposed that an outcome generates it own specific norm which is 
then compared to the actual outcome. Where the two are similar there is no element 
of surprise and there is little need for further cognitive processing, however where 
the actual event and its corresponding norm are different there is an element of 
surprise and people are then more likely to think about what made that difference 
and seek to mentally return things to the expected normal state. This is done 
through counterfactual thinking in which an antecedent is selected and changed in 
order to restore normality. Norm Theory predicted that the antecedent selected 
would be exceptional, unusual or missing and outlined a number of factors which 
they believed influenced the availability of certain aspects of an event (antecedents) 
to be changed. These included exceptional and routine events, ideals and violations, 
causes and effects, focal and background actors. Whilst discussing these factors 
Kahneman & Miller (1986) make some interesting comments which are particularly 
relevant to occupational accidents. 
Exceptional and routine antecedents 
Real life outcomes arise from complex interactions of antecedents, combining 
routine and exceptional events, but it is the exceptional events that evoke 
contrasting normal alternatives rather than routine events evoking exceptional 
alternatives, making changes to exceptional events more likely. There is no 
suggestion in Norm Theory that what is considered by one person to be an 
exceptional antecedent will be universally recognised as such by every person who 
engages in counterfactual thought, and it seems reasonable to suggest that this will 
be the case following an occupational accident. Indeed Kahneman and Miller 
(1986) proposed that there would be perspective differences, with different people 
thinking about an accident bringing to mind different exceptions based on many 
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factors including their degree of personal involvement, their role in relation to the 
accident and their experience and knowledge. It is reasonable to expect that Safety 
Professionals, Managers and Accident Subjects will select different antecedents 
which they consider to be exceptional to change because they have different 
perspectives on the accident.  
The antecedents presented by Kahneman and Miller (1986) in their Mr. Jones 
scenario were not truly exceptional or even highly unusual as the respondents were 
told that Mr. Jones left the office early on occasions either to undertake chores or 
take an alternative route when he wanted to enjoy the view on clear days. In both 
cases we know that these options were changed most commonly to bring about a 
different outcome but it would be hard to say that leaving the office early or taking 
a different route were strictly causes of his accident, but they were sufficient to have 
prevented his death had they not been taken on that day. Other studies have 
presented more genuinely exceptional antecedents in their studies, for example the 
shooting of a customer in a robbery when he visited a store for the first time (Miller 
& McFarland, 1986) or the collapse of a scaffold (Macrae, 1992) or the collapse of 
a storm damaged bridge (Wells & Gavanski, 1989).  
Few outcomes can be as traumatic as the loss of a child through SIDS (Sudden 
Infant Death Syndrome) and Davis et al. (1995) reported a study in which the 
counterfactual thoughts of parents who had experienced the death of a child were 
recorded. Against the expectations of both Norm Theory and the Correspondence 
Heuristic, 67% of parents reported trying to undo the death of their child by 
changing routine or normal events.  
In comparison to the death of a child an occupational slip or trip accident is not so 
traumatic but is nevertheless still an unwanted event as far as the accident subject is 
concerned. This is sufficient to prompt the consideration of an alternative outcome 
through counterfactual thinking, but which antecedent is likely to be identified as 
being exceptional? After someone knows that a slip accident has occurred the 
presence of a wet floor is to be expected, and indeed it is relatively common to find 
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spillages and wet floors in a supermarket. Because a wet floor is both expected after 
a slip accident and is commonly found in a supermarket Norm Theory would 
suggest that this type of event was not exceptional and therefore less likely to be 
selected for change than some other event, in fact the outcome almost demands the 
presence of a wet floor and it would be more surprising (exceptional) if the floor 
was not wet! So it remains to be seen what respondents in the current study identify 
as being exceptional and select for change to bring about a different outcome. 
In another departure from Norm Theory, Teigen and Jensen (2011) reported that the 
survivors of the 26 December 2004 tsunami in South East Asia did not produce 
counterfactual thoughts about normality and reflections on how the situation could 
have been better or avoided were conspicuously absent, and they speculate that 
events on this scale are simply too big to be undone and in the nearest other world 
there would still be a tsunami but with no lucky escape. 
Norm Theory offers a simple view of what is normal or exceptional, presenting it as 
a dichotomous variable such that an antecedent is either normal or exceptional. 
However there must be degrees of normality and exceptionality and this is 
suggested by Gavanski and Wells (1989) in their Correspondence Heuristic which 
suggests that the more exceptional an outcome is the more exceptional the 
antecedent will be that needs to be changed to return to normality.  
A wet floor, leaving the office early or taking a different route home may not be 
truly exceptional antecedents, but are sufficiently different to be selected for a 
counterfactual change. The types of events that people chose to select to change 
when undertaking counterfactual thinking are perhaps more subtle in their variation 
from the norm than is originally suggested by Norm Theory but are not so normal 
or routine as reported by Davis et al. (1995). The results of the counterfactual 
thoughts recorded in the current study suggest it is possible to refine the 
understanding of what is normal or exceptional and I have developed a 
categorisation of five sub-types of exceptional antecedents. I will refer to these as 
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‘orders of exceptionality’ to maintain some consistency with the language of Norm 
Theory and these will now be outlined. 
The scenario exceptional event – first order of exceptionality 
This research employed a scenario with a specific exceptional event included in it, 
in this case it was Mary’s decision to cover for her friend’s holiday and work on a 
day that she would not usually have worked and it was on this day that she slipped / 
tripped and was injured. Where respondents select the specific exceptional event 
presented in the scenario for counterfactual change I have referred to this as being a 
the ‘scenario exceptional event’ or the first order exception. 
Exception to an existing rule – second order of exceptionality  
In some social situations our behaviour can be guided by implicit and unwritten 
rules, whereas in other types of social situation it can be subject to more explicit 
and even documented rules or procedures. In the specific context of occupational 
health and safety, the legal requirement to have undertaken risk assessments and 
developed written procedures and established specific behaviours become the norm 
used as the cognitive anchor for counterfactual thinking. This is expected to be 
particularly relevant for Safety Practitioners, but what about Managers and 
Accident Subjects? Do they base their counterfactual thinking on the same set of 
rules or do they have a different set by which they assess outcomes? 
Exceptions to an existing rule arise where social situations or conventions create an 
expectation that a particular condition exists (norm), but has not been met. For 
example a workplace procedure may require that an absorbent material is placed 
over a spillage, but if this were not done it would be selected for change as being an 
exception to an existing rule. 
New rule exception – third order of exceptionality 
In some instances the person thinking counterfactually has to establish a new rule 
(norm) to bring about their desired outcome. A previous set of rules may have 
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become redundant or inappropriate for many reasons, such as the introduction of 
new technology or working practices, or an unwanted outcome has identified a 
completely new situation and no existing rule (norms) exists.  
Improving an existing rule – fourth order of exceptionality   
An existing rule is changed and improved with the intention of making the desired 
alternative outcome more likely to be achieved. An example of this might be to 
introduce a quicker response time for the Cleaner to attend a spillage and to provide 
more appropriate equipment. 
Normal or routine exception – fifth order of exceptionality  
Used when something completely normal or routine is changed to bring about the 
alternative outcome. These are probably unusual because Norm Theory predicts that 
what is selected to be changed is at least minimally unusual so the decision to select 
something completely routine or normal may be largely constrained either because 
it produces a non-lucid counterfactual, conflicts with the purpose of the situation or 
role, or else conflicts with a natural law.  
Causes and effects 
Kahneman and Miller (1986) proposed that alternatives to the effect would be more 
available than alternatives to the cause and that alternatives that are recruited should 
mainly consist of cases in which the same cause is followed by variable effects.  
This observation might lead to the possibility that counterfactual thoughts whilst 
undoing the outcome leave the cause unchanged and therefore that counterfactuals 
are more closely associated with missed opportunities to prevent an outcome than 
they are to identifying the cause. 
Focal and background actors 
Norm Theory proposed that the mutability of any aspect of a situation increases 
when attention is drawn to it and this helps to explain why the actions of a focal 
individual are more mutable and they are therefore assigned an unreasonable degree 
of responsibility for their fate when they are the victims of violence. One can only 
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assume that the same bias would also affect someone who has an accident at work 
because their actions often become the focus of an investigation. 
 Temporal Position  
Counterfactual literature generally refers to two types of antecedent sequences.  
One type comprises a chain of independent events, and the other a causal chain in 
which one stage is the cause of the next (which in turn causes the next stage to 
occur). 
The temporal order effect describes the tendency to change the last event in a chain 
of independent events, and this was first explored by Kahneman and Miller (1986) 
who found that when people were asked to change a letter in a two letter sequence 
(xf) they changed the f more than the x. Then Miller and Gunasegaram (1990), 
using two consecutive coin tosses, reported that people changed the second toss so 
it matched the first where the winning criteria was to have both heads or tails. This 
pattern of responses was also found by Segura, Fernandez-Berrocal and Byrne 
(2002), who discovered that the temporal order effect occurred in four event 
sequences as well as the two events sequence. In both cases the last event was 
selected for change more frequently than the first, however in the longer sequence 
the fourth (last) event was not the most frequently selected one and this put a 
slightly different slant on the interpretation of the temporal order effect, suggesting 
that it is not the last event that is especially mutable but the first event that is 
essentially immutable. 
Segura and McCloy (2003) examined the temporal order effect in everyday life 
situations involving longer chains of mundane antecedents and reported finding the 
temporal order effect in nine event sequences, but not in six or three event 
sequences. They also found evidence that an exception to a social norm affected the 
temporal order effect. They presented respondents with nine mundane tasks that 
Maria did before leaving the house and being involved in a car accident, one of 
these actions was selfish (reading a magazine) whilst the other eight were selfless. 
Respondents were asked how her accident might have been avoided and selected 
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reading the magazine (selfish action) when it was last in the sequence and when it 
was first. They argued that the temporal order effect was negated by an exception to 
a social norm when it was placed at the beginning or end of an independent chain, 
but less so when it was in the middle of a chain. This effect could have an influence 
on people’s choice of antecedent in an accident situation if someone’s actions were 
found to be an exception to an expected social norm. An employer is required by 
the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (HMSO, 1974) to establish safe 
systems of work, these set out how people should undertake their work and behave 
safely and thus become established as the social norm for that particular workplace. 
If a member of staff breaches that social norm by not following established working 
practices, their conduct may become more available for counterfactual selection and 
change if their actions are first or last in a temporal sequence of events, even if their 
behaviour was not directly causal of the outcome. For example, if someone spilt 
milk in a supermarket there might be an expectation that they should report it or 
clear it up. If it was known that they had not behaved in this way their behaviour 
might be more available for mutation than other more effective antecedents. 
The temporal order effect can lead to counterfactuals being dysfunctional (Sherman 
& McConnell, 1995) if for instance the last person in the chain of events were to be 
blamed for an unwanted outcome merely because they were associated with the last 
event, when there was another and better causal explanation. It may be that in these 
circumstances the last stage represents the final but missed opportunity to prevent 
the outcome. 
In a causal chain the first antecedent triggers the second, which in turn triggers the 
third which triggers the fourth etc, etc. Where such chains arise the later events 
appear to be more highly constrained and less mutable than the initial ones and this 
has been referred to as the ‘primacy effect’. People have been shown to perceive 
events occurring early in a causal chain to have a greater impact and to be more 
changeable than later events (Brickman, Ryan, & Wortman, 1975; Wells, 1987). 
Research has indicated that people tend to choose events over which they believe 
they have control when seeking to bring about an alternative outcome and Johnson, 
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Ogawa, Delforge and Early (1989) found that subjects perceived less power to 
prevent an injury when the cause had been influenced by a prior event i.e. was part 
of a causal chain. They also found that judgements of negligence decreased when 
the event was second in the chain rather than first, because they had to some extent 
been predetermined by earlier events. 
In real life, unwanted outcomes arise from sequences of events where the 
relationship between those events is a mixture of both independent and causal. This 
has been reflected in the design of this study. Table 18 presents the sequence of 11 
events used in this study which led up to Mary’s accident and the temporal 
relationship between them is set out in Table 72. 
Control 
The antecedent which is selected for change may be something which the 
counterfactual thinker has control over or something which is uncontrollable. From 
a functional perspective counterfactuals are at their most effective when they focus 
on matters over which the individual seeking to bring about the different outcome 
has control over and this was the general finding of Miller et al. (1990) and Girotto, 
Lengrenzi and Rizzo (1991), who reported that antecedent events directly under the 
control of the scenario actor were most commonly selected for change. Perceptions 
of personal control are enhanced when people use self-focused upward 
counterfactuals which successfully undo the outcome (McMullen et al., 1995). 
Walsh and Byrne (2002) also reported that counterfactual thoughts followed certain 
regularities, with most people thinking ‘if only’ about controllable events rather 
than uncontrollable ones. 
It makes sense that if an individual is thinking about bringing about a different 
outcome from a personal perspective that they select an antecedent over which they 
have direct control to maximise the prospect of achieving the desired outcome. 
Equally it should follow that when someone looks at an outcome from a public 
perspective they will also select an antecedent which is under the direct control of 
an appropriate person, to do otherwise would be dysfunctional. Under a public 
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counterfactual perspective it is not clear whether the counterfactual thinker selects 
the person who they believe should have been able to exercise control over the 
outcome and then attributes the controllable antecedent to them, or selects an 
available and controllable antecedent and then links it to a person who should have 
or could have had control over it. 
This line of thinking has particular implications in respect of accident 
investigations, where the control of previously identified hazardous antecedents is 
expected through risk assessment processes leading to the preparation, 
implementation and monitoring of safe working procedures. A person may come to 
mind first (be counterfactually available) where the thinker has social expectations 
based on someone’s role. These expectations form the norm, against which the 
actual behaviour is compared. For example, the counterfactual thinker may know 
that an organisation’s procedure for a spillage requires the person discovering it to 
remain with it until the Cleaner arrives to clear it up. If it is discovered that their 
behaviour is not as expected based on the procedure, their conduct is likely to be 
selected as being exceptional and changed and they may be held as responsible and 
blamed. In this instance the behaviour is more likely to be perceived as being one 
that failed to prevent the accident, but it is easy to see how other controllable 
behaviours could be seen as more causal, for instance the behaviour of the person 
who spilt the liquid. The other way that control may influence the counterfactual is 
through the selection of an exceptional antecedent and associating it to people who 
had or could have had control over it. Depending upon its position in the antecedent 
sequence, that antecedent and its associated person might be seen to be the cause of 
the accident or as having missed the opportunity to have prevented the accident. 
Teigen and Jensen (2011) reported that controllable antecedents were more closely 
associated with upward counterfactuals than were uncontrollable ones, and that this 
was consistent with the functional perspective of counterfactual thinking. Where 
people were exposed to the December 2004 tsunami there was no possible control 
that they could exert so they reverted to the use of downward counterfactuals.  
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Dynamic or static antecedents 
Girotto et al. (1991) noted that factors that change in the real world were more 
easily altered in mental representations, and Roese and Olsen (1995) suggested that 
this was based on Kelley’s (1967) model of attributional thinking as factors which 
are dynamic and changing are more likely to be seen to co-vary with an outcome, 
and be perceived as being more causally linked, than are unchanging factors. They 
also suggest that salience may be the underlying factor in the dynamic versus static 
effect, with processes that are in motion drawing more attention than processes that 
are at rest. In terms of Norm Theory static antecedents would be perceived as 
routine or normal, whilst it is the changing or dynamic circumstances which are 
selected for mutation. Dynamic antecedents are also described as being in the 
foreground and passive antecedents as being in the background.  
Many dynamic antecedents may also be perceived as being more controllable 
because they change over time; there is a perception that they can be influenced by 
human behaviour, whereas static antecedents are more constant and unchanging and 
may be less controllable. Although other literature has not addressed the point 
directly, dynamic antecedents are probably also directly observable or capable of 
being detected by the senses as the antecedent sequence unfolds, whereas static 
antecedents are not. This wider concept of a dynamic antecedent being directly 
observable / detectable and a passive antecedent not being so is used in the present 
study.  
In the context of an occupational slip or trip accident the presence of a contaminant 
on the floor would be a dynamic antecedent, as it is in the foreground, changes over 
time and could be seen, whereas the existence of a written system of work to deal 
with a spillage cannot be directly observed at the time of the accident, is a 
background factor and so would be static.  
New antecedent based dimensions used in this study 
In the course of reading the counterfactual literature for this study and thinking how 
it might apply to the specific situation of an occupational accident seven new 
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dimensions came to mind as being as being relevant and these are briefly 
introduced below. 
 
Specific or general antecedents 
This dimension was suggested by the proposal that Safety Professionals’ 
counterfactual thoughts would be significantly influenced by the legal requirements 
of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (HMSO, 1974), which sets out 
goals for employers to achieve but not the detail on how to meet them. If Safety 
Professionals chose to bring about a different outcome by making a change to an 
antecedent to comply with a common duty they are likely to express that in a more 
general way, for example by saying ‘If only the Employer had undertaken risk 
assessments the accident would not have happened’, whereas  they could have 
expressed the change to the antecedent more technically and thus specifically such 
as ‘If only the floor had had a higher coefficient of friction Mary would not have 
slipped’. Managers and Accident Subjects being less constrained by the law might 
select specific antecedents rather than more general ones.  
Known or inferred antecedents  
The idea that respondents might select an inferred antecedent came from the work 
of Woodcock (1996) who proposed that Safety Professionals used causal schema 
when investigating accidents, suggesting that after classifying an accident they 
adopt a stereotype representing its typical origin, cause and approaches to 
prevention, even if these facts have not been highlighted or made explicit, such that 
the antecedent selected to bring about a different outcome, prevent it or be the cause 
could be one that they have inferred exists in keeping with the causal scheme 
adopted. There may also be a relationship between the use of general antecedents 
and their being inferred and specific antecedents being known. 
Personal or situational antecedents 
Counterfactual thinking is undertaken from either a personal or public perspective 
depending on the thinker’s relationship with the outcome. 
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People who are intimately involved with an outcome are said to adopt a personal 
perspective, whereas others who are less intimately involved are said to adopt a 
more public perspective. In the context of this study an accident subject is more 
likely to adopt a personal perspective, whilst a safety professional is more likely to 
adopt a public perspective. Irrespective of whether the thinker adopts a personal or 
public perspective, the actual antecedent that is selected and changed can be one 
that relates to a personal aspect of the actor (his or her personality or disposition) or 
to the situation that they found themselves in. There is a parallel in these positions 
to the well known ‘actor / observer’ effect (Jones & Nisbett, 1971) in which the 
actor seeks to explain his / her behaviour in terms of the situation he / she was in, 
whereas observers seek to explain the actor’s behaviour in terms of his / her 
personality. 
Was the scenario actor identified in the sentence? 
For a counterfactual thought to be functional it needs to offer a specific and 
unambiguous route to the alternative outcome and one way that this can be 
achieved is to be very clear to whom the counterfactual thought refers. This is 
especially so where the thinker has adopted a public perspective and their 
thoughts do not then refer to themselves. There should be a control based 
relationship between the antecedent selected and the person who is associated 
with it. It is difficult to speculate whether the respondent’s job group will have an 
effect on this dimension; their motivation for engaging in counterfactual thinking 
is likely to be a key factor. If they are seeking to avoid personal responsibility or 
attribute blame or responsibility to others then it is likely that they will identify an 
actor. It is possible that prevention sentences will refer to the actor more than 
causal sentences because they are said to offer a missed opportunity to prevent the 
outcome, and these are more likely to be dynamic and associated with the action 
or inaction of an individual, whereas the cause may be more static and 
independent of someone’s action or inaction. 
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Which scenario actor was associated with the sentence? 
Piloting of the questionnaire indicated that about 50% of respondents did not 
identify a scenario actor in their sentences, so an additional question was added 
asking respondents to select from a list of scenario actors the one most closely 
associated with their sentence. From a practical occupational safety perspective, 
who is being associated with what type of accident and antecedent might be helpful 
in better understanding the social psychology of this type of accident and influence 
future interventions.  
What was the specific subject of the sentence? 
Understanding which specific antecedents were being identified by different 
respondent groups or for different types of accident as being capable of bringing 
about a counterfactual outcome, preventing the accident or being causally linked 
to it should be relevant to those with a professional or academic interest in slip 
and trip accidents and offers an opportunity to gain a better understanding of how 
they are related. 
The domain of the specific antecedent 
The specific antecedents were found to fit one of four broader classifications 
which I have called domains in this study. They related to physical items, 
behaviours, attitudes, procedures or processes. 
Counterfactuals and causal thinking  
The current study asked respondents to complete a causal sentence, so I will briefly 
review key works relating to the relationship between counterfactual and causal 
thinking. The idea that a counterfactual is closer to missed opportunities to prevent 
the outcome is advanced by Mandel and Leman (1996) and their work will be 
referred to. 
Since undoing an exceptional or unusual antecedent leads to a different outcome a 
causal relationship is established between the two. The exact nature of this 
relationship is beyond the scope of this research but further details can be found in 
the works of Hart and Honore (1985), Mackie (1974), Mandel and Leman (1996),  
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Spellman and Kincannon (2001), Spellman, Kincannon, and Stose (2005), Wells 
and Gavanski (1989), and several major attribution theories have been proposed by 
Hilton and Slugoski (1986), Heider (1958), Kelly (1967, 1972),  Jones and Davis 
(1965) and Weiner (1974). Interestingly Lipe (1991) suggested that the social 
psychology of these various attribution theories were all based on the single and 
important notion of counterfactual reasoning.   
 
In brief, counterfactuals introduce a false antecedent and thereby establish a causal 
relationship with the actual outcome and in doing so create the necessary 
requirements for Mill’s (1872) Method of Difference. This is the main technique by 
which scientists infer causation and it is recognised that, where true experiments are 
not capable of being undertaken, counterfactual simulations can represent a proxy 
experiment to the extent that the two outcomes differ only in the presence or 
absence of a particular antecedent which is inferred to be causal. Mackie (1974) 
proposed that causation was tied to counterfactual questions, arguing that when we 
are able to imagine or observe instances of the effect without the proposed cause 
causality cannot be inferred. However when we are unable to imagine or observe 
alternative situations the proposed causal link is established. Mackie (1974) 
proposed that counterfactuals tested whether an antecedent was a cause of the 
outcome by testing whether the cause was a necessary cause of the effect. This is 
done by constructing a counterfactual in which the causal antecedent is removed, 
and the easier it is to imagine the effect not happening the stronger the belief that 
the causal antecedent was a necessary cause of the effect.  
Egan, Frosch and Hancock (2008) reported that people generated counterfactual 
thoughts about the enablers of outcomes more than they did about the causes of 
outcomes and asked if there was something special about enablers or were they just 
perceived as being more controllable. They manipulated the controllability of 
causes and enablers in eight scenarios and found that people generated 
counterfactuals based on the enabling conditions except when the cause was 
controllable and the enabler was uncontrollable. In general, enablers shared certain 
features including being constant, normal and conversationally non-relevant, which 
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raises a question as to why enablers should be selected for counterfactual change 
when the general thrust of counterfactual literature has identified that antecedents 
selected tended to be variable and exceptional. Causes were described as being 
inconsistent, exceptional and conversationally relevant which should have made 
them more highly available for counterfactual mutation.  
MacMullen and Markman (1994) said “counterfactual generation results in 
individuals feeling that they have a better understanding of the causal structure of 
life events and through this, feelings of greater control”. Wells and Gavanski (1989) 
showed counterfactual assessments were influential in causal judgements and that 
for an antecedent to be judged as causal it must be changeable and must undo the 
outcome. They noted that an antecedent’s causal potential was influenced by 
whether or not changing it altered the outcome. In two studies they showed that 
respondents attributed greater causal significance to an event where its 
counterfactual alternative would have brought about a different outcome, than 
where the counterfactual alternative brought about the same outcome. In experiment 
1 they presented a scenario in which Karen was taken out to dinner by Mr. Carlson, 
her boss, to celebrate her promotion. Karen suffered from a rare hereditary disease 
where drinking wine can cause a severe allergic reaction. The scenario was 
presented in two versions. Mr. Carlson was unaware of Karen’s allergy and in one 
version of the scenario he ordered a dish containing wine after first considering one 
that did not. In the second version both dishes that Mr. Carlson considered 
contained wine. Karen ate the dish chosen by Mr. Carlson and suffered a severe 
reaction and died.  
In the second experiment they presented a scenario in which Eugene and Tina were 
refused a lift by a taxi they had ordered because they were both wheelchair users 
and the driver was concerned that there was insufficient space in his cab. They had 
to drive themselves and both died after a bridge that had been weakened by a storm 
the night before collapsed. In one version of the scenario the taxi driver safely 
crossed the bridge before it collapsed, while in the alternative version the taxi driver 
drove off the collapsed bridge in to the river but managed to get out of his vehicle 
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and survived. As with the Karen study (experiment 1) respondents rated the event 
where the counterfactual alternative brought about a better outcome, as being more 
highly causal, than where the counterfactual event brought about the same event. 
The taxi driver’s refusal to take Eugene and Tina was rated as being more highly 
causal where he safely drove across the bridge before its collapse than where his car 
also plunged in to the river. Whilst the driver survived, the scenario implied that 
had Eugene and Tina been picked up by the taxi driver they would have drowned in 
the river as they were wheelchair users and would not have been able to get out of 
the taxi. I suggest that the structure of both scenarios is flawed and unconvincing 
and I will refer to their lack of ecological validity later. 
Counterfactuals can be used to look back over a sequence of events to help identify 
the cause of the outcome, which Lalljee and Albeson (1983) referred to as 
backward causal inference. This is very much the usual way in which 
counterfactuals are used, following an unwanted outcome people are prompted to 
look backwards at the sequence of events leading up to the outcome and identify 
one of those events which if changed would have resulted in a different outcome. 
Norm Theory predicted that the most accessible features of an event would be 
changed. However accessibility of a feature is not a function of its frequency nor is 
it a good indicator of its causality (Sherman & McConnell, 1995), yet the mutation 
of this feature suggests it is a primary cause as changing it leads to a different 
outcome.  
Counterfactuals can also be used in a forward looking direction, which Einhorn and 
Hogarth (1986) referred to as forward causal inference and starts with the selection 
of an antecedent and using a simulation heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) its 
causal potential can be explored. Forward causal inference is also known as 
antecedent contrastive processing by McGill and Kline (1993). The use of 
backward and forward looking counterfactuals in the simulation of possible 
outcomes will be considered later in the review of the legal requirements in context 
of undertaking risk assessments and accident investigation.  
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A degree of pre-existing causal knowledge is necessary for both backward and 
forward causal inference. The reasoner must know whether changing an antecedent 
would change the consequences because without a basic understanding of the 
relationship between the two the counterfactual generated would be ineffective or 
non-lucid, and for this reason N’gbala and Branscombe (2003) proposed that 
attributional thinking was more likely to precede counterfactual thinking than vice 
versa. Without an understanding of the causal relationship between an antecedent 
and an outcome counterfactual thinking could be dysfunctional and lead to the 
selection of an inappropriate antecedent or blame being attributed to the wrong 
person. 
The psychological literature suggests that counterfactuals represent a method for 
testing the plausibility of various hypothesised causes by assessing the 
counterfactual probability of the target effect still occurring if the causal candidate 
did not occur. Mandel and Lehman (1996) considered that there would be a 
considerable variability of results in that a sizable proportion of the counterfactuals 
people construct would not undo the outcome. However counterfactuals are usually 
expressed and experienced as compelling possibilities from the moment they 
become the focus of attention (Hofstadter, 1979) and they have the quality of a 
confirmation more than that of a test. 
Wells and Gavanski (1989) found evidence that counterfactuals influenced causal 
ascriptions in their Eugene and Tina scenario. However N’Gbala and Branscombe 
(1995) did not find this effect in their version of the Eugene and Tina scenario, 
arguing that people focused on necessary causes when undoing an outcome through 
a counterfactual mutation, but on sufficient causes when ascribing fault. 
The assumption that counterfactuals were associated with causation was challenged 
by Mandel and Leman (1996) who proposed a prevention focus account suggesting 
that people use ‘negate X’ counterfactuals as explanations of sufficient but missed 
ways in which the effect might have been prevented. They reported that the 
completion of ‘if only...’ sentences more closely reflected participants’ own listings 
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of how the effect could have been prevented as opposed to how the effect was 
caused.  
Mandel and Leman (1996) considered the relationship between causal thought and 
counterfactual thought was based on facilitative and inhibitory causes referring to 
the work of Kelley (1971, 1973). In everyday language, facilitative causes are 
causes and inhibitory causes are preventors and point out that logically the negation 
of a necessary cause can be reinterpreted as a sufficient preventor, citing the 
example of oxygen as being a necessary cause of fire, which is logically the same as 
saying the absence of oxygen is sufficient to prevent fire. However in psychological 
terms causes and prevention may focus on different dimensions, proposing that 
causal ascriptions were most likely guided by co-variation whereas prevention and 
counterfactual thinking were most likely guided by controllability criteria.  
To test their hypotheses Mandel and Lehman (1996) undertook three studies. The 
first was based on a variation of the Mr. Jones unusual route home from work 
scenario used by Kahneman and Tversky (1982). Respondents were told that Mr. 
Jones left work at his normal time but took a different more scenic route home as it 
was a clear day. Mr. Jones was seriously injured when he was involved an accident 
when a young man (Mr. Smith) who was drunk ran a red light and collided with 
him.  Respondents were assigned to one of six conditions considering the outcome 
from Mr. Jones’ or Mr. Smith’s perspectives and focusing on how the outcome 
could have been different (counterfactual), how the incident could have been 
prevented and on the cause, and were asked to write down their thoughts. The 
results supported their hypothesis that counterfactuals and prevention sentences 
focused on antecedents that were controllable by either Mr. Jones or Mr. Smith. For 
example, Mr. Jones could have taken his usual route home, whereas causal 
sentences focused more on antecedents that co-varied with the focal outcome i.e. 
driving whilst drunk is associated with accidents. 
In study two Mandel and Lehman (1996) used a study based on Mr. and Mrs. 
Wallace. Mr. Wallace booked a flight to attend a business convention. It was his 
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first flight as he usually drove or took the train. Mrs. Wallace was not happy with 
the decision to fly and knew he would change his plans if she pleaded with him but 
she didn’t ask. Mr. Wallace took the flight but was killed when the engine 
malfunctioned and the plane crashed. Respondents were asked to complete an ‘if 
only...’ sentence imagining how Mrs. Wallace might be thinking. Following this 
they were asked from Mrs. Wallace’s perspective how Mr. Wallace’s death could 
have been prevented and what was the cause. Respondents were then asked to rate 
on a scale between 1 (not at all controllable) to 7 (totally controllable) a) how 
controllable was the engine malfunction, b) how controllable was Mrs. Wallace’s 
decision not to plead with her husband and c) how controllable was Mr. Wallace’s 
decision to fly. They found that the counterfactual and prevention statements were 
rated more highly controllable than were causal statements.  
Study three refined the study two scenario by manipulating the mutability of both 
Mr. Wallace’s decision to fly (high mutability and low mutability) and Mrs. 
Wallace’s decision not to plead with her husband (high mutability and low 
mutability) and found that the mutability manipulation had no significant effect on 
any of the three causal ratings.  
The law, counterfactual thinking, and slip and trip accidents  
The legal system in England and Wales can be broadly described as having a 
criminal and a civil component. Criminal law relates to punishment for wrong 
doings, where people have either done something they should not have done or not 
done something they should have done. These expected behaviours are set out in 
statutory law (Acts of Parliament and Regulations) and can become norms against 
which counterfactual comparison are made. This is particularly likely to be the case 
for Safety Professionals who are intimately familiar with the law and most likely to 
use it as a framework against which to assess compliance, by comparing the actual 
unwanted outcome against the counterfactual outcome by changing a legally non-
compliant antecedent with one that complies with the law. Civil law is more 
associated with the compensation for losses incurred in various ways including 
those arising from an occupational accident for loss of earnings or pain and 
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suffering. This area of law is not relevant to the current study but the influence of 
counterfactual thinking has been assessed on how mock jurors award compensation 
(Bothwell & Duhon, 1994). 
The role of counterfactuals in a legal context has been considered by legal 
philosophers such as Hart and Honore (1985) but outside that philosophical 
consideration there has been some relatively limited research which has used 
counterfactuals in a criminal law setting, examples of this include Weiner et al. 
(1994) who explored determinations of negligence and  Branscombe et al. (1996),  
Miller and McFarland (1986), and  Turley, Sanna and Reiter (1995) who have  
presented findings as to how counterfactual thinking has been used in rape cases 
where the victim was  judged as being more responsible when her own actions 
before the rape were unusual. In many of these studies the legal context was used 
more to give the appropriate scenario setting to illustrate the counterfactual effect 
being tested, rather than as pure research on the influence of counterfactual thinking 
on the working of the legal system. 
The theory of Regulatory Focus (Roese et al., 1999) differentiates between 
promotion and prevention goals and is linked to the selection of an action or 
inaction to bring about a different outcome. In a promotion focused situation people 
are concerned with the acquisition of goals and are sensitive to omissions, and when 
people fail to gain their desired outcome they generate additive counterfactuals, 
whereas in a prevention focused situation people are concerned with maintaining 
the status quo and when people fail to achieve this counterfactuals are based on 
subtracting the action that played the role in the failure. 
It is likely that most aspects of occupational safety are approached with a 
prevention focus in which people seek to prevent accidents from occurring and 
maintaining the non-accident condition (status quo). Unless someone is deliberately 
walking on ice people do not go out with the objective to avoid falling over, that is 
taken to be the norm and to that extent maintaining the status quo is compatible 
with a prevention focus. Roese et al. (1999) identified that actions were most likely 
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to be changed in prevention focused situations, whereas inactions have been found 
to be more readily mutated under a promotion focus. If this applies to an 
occupational setting then accidents should be mutated by subtracting actions from 
the antecedent chain, however this may be confounded by the specific social and 
motivational aspects involved in slips and trips which are introduced by the 
presence of legal duties. Roese and Olsen (1995) proposed that the expectation for 
action versus inaction will be linked to specific social situations. In the case of 
occupational slip and trip accidents, because there is a general legal and moral 
position which seeks to prevent accidents, it is more likely that failures to act will 
be selected for mutation. 
Counterfactual thinking can be used both proactively by running a forward causal 
simulation and reactively using a backward causal simulation. Occupational 
accidents occur in social situations where the norm is established through 
compliance with various statutory requirements, including undertaking risk 
assessments, which lead to the development and maintenance of safe working 
procedures. These can be described as being proactive in that they should be 
undertaken and implemented before work is started in order to actively manage and 
prevent an accident from arising and the causal potential of an antecedent can be 
assessed by putting it in a forward causal simulation (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986). 
After an accident has happened an investigation is undertaken and this is a reactive 
response in which counterfactual thoughts are used to assess the potential cause or 
missed opportunity to have prevented the accident through the use of backward 
causal simulation (Lalljee & Ableson, 1983). 
When an occupational accident occurs, a range of individuals both within and 
outside the organisation will be affected by it, they will have different roles and will 
be viewing the incident from different perspectives, have different degrees of 
involvement (psychological distances) and motivation. This research sought to 
explore the structure of the counterfactual thinking which was generated following 
such an incident and focused on three groups, namely Safety Professionals, 
Managers and Accident Subjects. It is easy to appreciate how different their motives 
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could be when they each think about how a different outcome could have been 
achieved. A Safety Professional might think about how the accident could have 
been avoided if legal requirements had been met, and associated with this might be 
judgements of responsibility set against legal duties. A Manager might think about 
why it took so long for the spillage to be cleaned up and undertake counterfactual 
thinking with a view to finding someone to blame as much as shifting blame away 
from themselves. The Accident Subject might think that they should have been 
more observant of the floor conditions.  
Section 2 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (HMSO, 1974) establishes 
a duty on employers to “protect, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health, 
safety and welfare of their employees”. This creates a forward looking and on-going 
duty to prevent accidents and ill health to their staff. This general duty is then 
underpinned by various other statutory provisions (regulations) and of particular 
relevance to this research are the Management of Health and Safety Regulations 
1999 (HMSO, 1999). The management regulations establish a further duty on 
employers to undertake a risk assessment in order to identify hazards, establish 
whether they are adequately controlled and if not to implement the necessary 
measures. This process is likely to use counterfactual thinking through forward 
causal inference involving a simulation heuristic. Looking at an occupational slip 
risk through the process of forward causal inference might involve the assessment 
of risk associated with the type of flooring material. Some understanding of the 
causal relationship between antecedent events and outcomes is necessary to 
undertake this process. For example the effect of replacing a smooth highly 
polished floor with a rougher surface can be run through a forward causal 
simulation heuristic and the level of risk can be assessed with the objective of 
minimising people slipping over. Equally, after an accident has occurred it would 
be possible to apply a backward causal inference process and change parameters so 
that they meet legal standards and evaluate whether they would have brought about 
a difference outcome.   
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Kahneman and Tversky (1982) used counterfactuals in a different way when 
proposing their simulation heuristic. In Norm Theory counterfactuals are used to 
bring about a change to an actual outcome by making an alteration to a prior 
antecedent event; in the simulation heuristic an antecedent is selected and changed 
in order to see what effect it may have on the outcome. There does not necessarily 
need to be a specific outcome in mind when running the simulation, but if this 
technique were used in an occupational safety setting making a change to an 
antecedent which increases the risk of an accident would be rejected. The 
simulation heuristic can be used in making predictions or assessing the probability 
of a specified event so is akin to the cognitive process used in making a risk 
assessment that is required of an employer under health and safety law, 
Management of Health and Safety Regulations 1999 (HMSO, 1999). 
These two approaches utilising counterfactuals are complementary in terms of the 
way that a safety professional may think.  Selecting an antecedent and running a 
forward simulation (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986) can help assess the potential of that 
antecedent to cause or prevent a subsequent accident. When an accident does occur 
the unwanted outcome (loss or injury) provides the necessary negative affect to 
stimulate the use of a counterfactual approach in searching the antecedent events, 
with a view to selecting one which if altered would bring about a different outcome. 
 Hindsight bias and unrealistic control 
Hindsight bias refers to a person’s judgement that an outcome was more 
predictable, even inevitable, after learning about an outcome – in retrospect people 
‘knew it all along’. (Fischoff, 1975; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; Nestler & Von 
Collani, 2008). 
Hindsight bias may be dysfunctional in that it can lead a person to wrongly 
believing that the outcome of mutating an antecedent was more foreseeable than it 
was and therefore more controllable than it was, leading to the selection of 
inappropriate antecedents to change with unrealistic conclusions being made about 
the role of oneself or others in preventing the unwanted outcome. Clearly this can 
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have implications in connection with accident investigation and the application of 
the law. Health and safety law can only apply to risks that are reasonably 
foreseeable and hindsight bias can distort judgements of how foreseeable the 
outcome really was. 
The implied causal link between the antecedent and the outcome becomes more 
important when it is considered in terms of why the alternative antecedent was not 
brought into play to bring about the alternative outcome. The identification of that 
antecedent and its causal link to the unwanted outcome leads observers to make the 
assumption that, given the original antecedent, the outcome was inevitable, thus 
strengthening the hindsight bias effect of making the outcome all the more certain 
given the preceding antecedents. This can be an issue when considering the 
relationship between failing to comply with a legal requirement and subsequent 
blame or liability for an unwanted outcome. The ability to bring about a better 
outcome through changing an antecedent in a way that meets a legal requirement 
can highlight a non-existent causal link and bring the legal duty holder in to a 
position of liability. 
Roese and Olsen (1994) suggested that hindsight bias is logically compatible and 
complementary to counterfactual thinking. They discussed hindsight bias as a belief 
that once an outcome is known the causal structure is then understandable. This 
does not mean that the outcome was predetermined but that it was inevitable under 
the extant antecedent conditions. The more predictable the outcome was under 
those conditions, the more likely it is that some mutation of those conditions would 
have led to a different outcome. For example, the more certain a person is that 
outcome A was predictable under condition X, the more positive that person will be 
that a change in condition X would lead to a different outcome. 
The fact is that the hindsight assessment and the inference about a counterfactual 
outcome are both likely to be incorrect. The outcome was not as predicable from the 
antecedent conditions as people think, nor was the alternative outcome based on the 
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mutation of the antecedent conditions as likely as people think (Sherman & 
McConnell, 1996). 
Hindsight bias carries particular risks for Safety Professionals because it can 
erroneously strengthen their belief that the mutated antecedent was either the cause 
of the accident or was a missed opportunity to have prevented it, and important 
decisions hang on that belief, such as the determination of legal responsibility, 
blame and punishment. Nestler and Collani (2008) found that the activation of a 
counterfactual mind-set strengthened the certainty of the hindsight effect in an 
unrelated task. By inducing individuals to engage in counterfactual considerations 
in which the alteration of the causal antecedent X undid the outcome Y should 
strengthen the certainty that X can be attributed to Y and that mind-set then 
influences their judgement about the certainty of outcome in another realm. Their 
study poses the question whether Safety Professionals might, through their role and 
experience and working within a legal framework, be more likely to adopt a 
counterfactual mind-set and be prone to the effects of hindsight bias in 
strengthening the link between the mutated counterfactual antecedent and the 
certainly of its causal power to justify enforcement decisions. Interestingly the 
defendant in a health and safety prosecution would be seeking to achieve the 
opposite effect and weaken the association between the antecedent and outcome and 
thus minimise hindsight bias. 
Robbennolt and Sorbus (1997) proposed an integration of counterfactual thinking 
and hindsight bias and tested this against a legal background involving police 
powers to stop and search for drugs based on drug courier profiles. These profiles 
are described as “formal or informal collections of characteristics, used by DEA, a 
police dept or police officer believes to indicate that the person is carrying illegal 
drugs”. It struck me that their description of a drugs courier profile was similar to a 
safety professional’s causal schema described by Woodcock (1996), as both provide 
a shorthand way of identifying situations requiring their professional intervention.    
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In their integration model Robbennolt and Sorbus (1997) tested a view that opposed 
the traditional link between counterfactual thanking and hindsight bias, namely that 
engaging in counterfactual thinking (induced by an abnormal and truly surprising 
outcome) would result in a reduction of hindsight bias. More specifically they 
suggested that when an outcome was normal or as expected, the presentation of the 
outcome information would produce the typical hindsight bias, however, when the 
outcome was abnormal or surprising and elicited counterfactual thinking, the 
hindsight effect would be reduced. They tested this in a study asking respondents to 
award compensation and punitive damages following a stop and search by a police 
officer. In the USA no warrant is required for such a stop although the officer must 
have ‘probable cause to act’, but if the officer does not have probable cause then the 
search may be unconstitutional and there is a civil remedy under United States 
legislation (42 U.S.C. §1983). In such a civil action the actual outcome of the 
search for drugs is immaterial and jurors are asked to ‘put this out of their minds’. 
There is a parallel to this in UK health and safety law where UK safety 
professionals could find themselves in much the same position as USA police 
officers. Both will have taken law enforcement action following their assessment of 
a situation based on a drugs currier profile or a causal schema. It seems likely that 
both safety professionals and the police would believe their actions to be correct 
based on the outcome which was predicted by the drug courier profile or causal 
schema, and in both countries their actions are judged by juries. In the USA the 
successful finding of drugs is irrelevant under a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, 
whereas in the UK the fact that an accident occurred has been judged to be a strong 
indicator that the risks were not adequately controlled and that is the offence in law 
and not the accident, which is the manifestation of that failure (R v Tangerine 
Confectionery Ltd and Veolia ES (UK) Ltd,  2011). 
The work of Robbennolt and Sorbus (1997) suggests that the relationship between 
counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias in a legal context can vary based on the 
roles that people adopt and the framing of the specific legal requirements. The role 
of Safety Professionals has a strong legal basis and this is a another reason why they 
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may demonstrate a different approach to counterfactual factual thinking following a 
slip or trip accident from either Managers or Accident Subjects. 
The framing effects of legislation 
Dunning and Madey (1995) suggested that the way the counterfactual question is 
put or phrased can influence the subsequent counterfactual mutation through a 
variety of ways including purpose, salience and availability. 
According to Norm Theory inaction is the norm in general social settings, however 
this may not be the case with health and safety legislation as many statutory duties 
create the expectation of an action in order to comply with them (HMSO, 1974). 
The purpose of health and safety legislation is to prevent injury and ill health and 
like many statutes the requirements can be expressed as either a requirement to do 
something (action) or a prohibition on doing something (inaction). For example, the 
duty under section 2 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (HMSO, 1974) 
to “ensure so far as reasonably practicable the health, safety and welfare of staff” is 
written as requiring positive action to meet its requirements (an action), but it could 
have been written as a prohibition on exposing staff to risks to their health and 
safety (inaction). As in the case of section 2 where the requirements of health and 
safety legislation require compliance with duties or the achievement of certain 
standards, an expectation is raised of positive action towards meeting those 
standards and these actions become the expected norm against which actual 
circumstances are judged counterfactually.  
In the context of that norm an accident implies that something had not been done to 
prevent it from occurring and is interpreted as a failure to comply and thus becomes 
an inaction. Under these circumstances counterfactual thinking may focus on 
changing inactions which are considered to be exceptional. 
When considering legal requirements that prohibit things, it is now easier to see that 
most of these relate to the prohibition of an action of some sort. A breach of such a 
prohibition requires the commission of an action, and counterfactuals are likely to 
be based on removing or undoing that action.  
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Counterfactual thinking – juries, rape, blame, punishment and 
compensation 
The legal system asks jurors to use counterfactual reasoning to make decisions 
about causation and compensation in both criminal and civil cases.  
To be considered a cause, the event in question must fulfil two requirements. It 
must be a ‘but for’ cause of the outcome (also called ‘cause in fact’, ‘factual cause’ 
or ‘sine qua non’), and it must be a legal cause (also called a proximate cause) of 
the outcome. The legal cause limits the otherwise unlimited ‘but for’ causes for 
which people could otherwise be held liable (Spellman & Kincannon, 2001). 
Roese (1997) distinguished between factors that activate counterfactual reasoning 
and those that influence the content of the counterfactual generated. As jurors are 
already in a context in which they are asked to do such reasoning, it is the content 
that is most relevant. In general, previous studies suggest that: 
1. exceptional or unusual events are more often mutated than normal or usual ones,  
2. events which are the focus of the story will be mutated more often than those that 
are not,  
3. controllable events will be mutated more than uncontrollable ones, 
4. immoral events or actions will be mutated more often than moral ones. 
The role and effect of counterfactual thinking by jurors has been researched in 
relation to rape, blame, compensation and punishment. Each of these will be briefly 
considered. 
Rape 
Turley et al. (1995) reported that a rape victim was found to be more responsible 
when her own actions before the rape were unusual. 
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Blame 
We know that focusing attention on an individual’s actions is likely to increase their 
availability for counterfactual mutation and the amount of responsibility attributed 
to the actor (Catellani & Milesi, 2001; Gavanski & Wells, 1989; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1982), such that Branscombe et al. (1996) found that blame assignment to 
the victim in a hypothetical rape case was greater when the participants undid the 
outcome by changing her actions rather than those of the offender and that the 
reverse effect was also noted in that greater blame was attached to the offender if 
his actions were mutated. 
Lehane (1998) reported differences in the attribution of causal responsibility for slip 
and trip accidents for two groups of respondents, Accident Subjects and their 
Managers. Accident Subjects placed causal responsibility for slip accidents with 
other people in 53% of the cases and accepted responsibility for their own accident 
in 12% of cases, but this was markedly different for trip accidents where 56% of 
Accident Subjects considered they were responsible for their own accident with 
other people being responsible for 12%. On the other hand, Managers were more 
likely to place causal responsibility with the accident subject for both slips and 
trips, but there were differences here too with Managers attributing responsibility to 
the accident subject for a slip accident in 37% of cases but 64% in the case of a trip 
accident. Whilst these results were not predicated on a counterfactual explanation, 
the existence of such diverse results may indicate significantly different approaches 
to the cognitive processes associated with accidents and this study seeks to explore 
further one possible aspect of those differences. 
Punishment 
Research has also shown that factors such as normality, direction of counterfactual 
and perspective can influence the severity of punishment. Turley et al. (1995) 
reported longer custodial sentences for an offender when mock jurors concentrated 
on unusual behaviours of the victim, and shorter ones when concentrating on 
unusual behaviours of the offender. 
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Wiener et al. (1994) found that determinations of negligence were related to mock 
jurors’ ability to mutate the negligent act, which in turn were related to perceptions 
of the abnormality of the defendant’s behaviour. Antecedent abnormality may 
influence mock jurors’ awards of compensation such that higher levels of 
compensation are awarded after a negative event following unusual (exceptional) 
circumstances (Macrae, 1992; Macrae & Milne, 1992; Miller & McFarland, 1986). 
Some studies have demonstrated that when counterfactual alternatives to the 
negative outcome are readily available participants feel greater sympathy towards 
the victim, envisage more severe punishment for the perpetrator, and judge the case 
as more serious that when such alternatives are not so readily available (Macrae, 
1992).  
Compensation 
Miller and McFarland (1986) reported that plaintiff compensation was influenced 
by counterfactual thinking. Where the negative event arose out of an unusual set of 
circumstances greater amounts of compensation were awarded than when the same 
negative event arose out of more normal circumstances. Bothwell and Duhon 
(1994) reported that the abnormality of the event did not necessarily result in 
greater compensation where the victim’s irresponsibility is emphasised and that 
lower compensation was awarded to plaintiffs if mock jurors took the perspective of 
the plaintiff rather than the defendant when imagining how the event could have 
been avoided. 
Accident Investigation 
As an experienced health and safety inspector the concept of counterfactual 
thinking was immediately familiar when I read about it. I recognised it as 
something that I and other inspectors used intuitively when we thought about 
accidents. This study did not seek to examine the detailed physical causes of slip 
and trip accidents or the ways in which they are investigated, but it may be helpful 
to outline briefly both the legal framework that exists relating to the working 
environment and the subsequent investigation of slips and trips that may occur.   
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The incidence of slip and trip accidents has remained largely untouched despite 
targeted campaigns by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), local authorities and 
employers. Over 30,000 slip or trip related accidents were reported to the HSE or 
local authorities in the UK in 2011/12. These are the accidents with the most serious 
outcomes requiring formal reporting under the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and 
Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995 (HMSO, 1995) but there will be many 
thousands more which are either not reported or are not so serious but which still, 
nevertheless, cause accident subjects pain and suffering as well as loss of working 
time to employers. Heinrich (1931) developed the safety pyramid based on a study 
of industrial accidents and employee injuries and proposed that for every 300 non-
injury accidents, there are 30 minor injuries and one major injury, leading to the 
possibility that there could be up to 900,000 other occupational slips and trips 
causing less serious injuries. Of the 30,000 reported occupational slip and trip 
accidents probably about 70% are investigated by managers (Lehane, 1998). 
Slip and trip accidents are low tech accidents in that they do not involve any 
complex processes, control systems or machinery, just people moving from one 
place to another, something which we do every day and have done since learning to 
walk. Because slips and trips arise out of such a basic human activity this may 
impact on how we perceive them and respond to them, and this idea was proposed 
by Lehane and Stubbs (2006) who suggested that people’s responses to slips and 
trips might be different from other types of accidents because of our universal 
exposure to them. 
The vast majority of research on slips and trips has focused on footwear, floors and 
contamination, but very little attention has been paid to their psychology. They are 
generally investigated in a simple way by managers who usually speak to the 
accident subject and visit the scene of the accident (Lehane, 1998) and this may be 
appropriate given the simple nature of slips and trips. There is a vast array of 
accident-related research, investigation techniques and models which Anderson, 
Johansson, Linden, Svanstrom and Svanstrom (1978) classified into three broad 
approaches: behavioural, epidemiological and systems. Of these three the 
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behavioural approach is most relevant, however a full review of this area of 
research is beyond the scope of this study but a few comments may help set the 
scene. Greenwood and Woods (1919) were one of the first researchers to consider 
the role of human factors in work-related accidents and identified that “the bulk of 
accidents occur to a limited number of individuals who had a special susceptibility 
to accidents and suggested that the explanation was to be found in the personality of 
the individuals”. In 1926 Farmer and Chambers coined the term ‘accident 
proneness’ which led to a search to isolate those factors which made the individual 
accident prone. However research failed to identify a typical accident prone person 
although Reason (1974) noted that people seemed to be accident prone for periods 
of time rather than continually throughout their lives and termed these ‘accident 
repeaters’, describing them as “Members of a club which is continuously changing 
its membership”. The elusive search for accident proneness was still being pursued 
in the 1980s when Boyle (1980) attempted to overcome some methodological 
problems found in previous studies and identified some support for the idea that 
individuals were differentiated with respect to their accident rates but saw no 
immediate opportunity to apply this in an industrial setting, whilst Mayer, Jones and 
Laughery (1987) failed to find evidence of accident proneness among Shell Oil staff 
in Texas.  
Other behavioural research has considered personality characteristics which 
measured the impact of personality types on accidents, principally introversion and 
extroversion (Eysenck, 1947, 1962, 1965, 1970), locus of control (Foreman, Ellis, 
& Beavan, 1983; Jones, 1984; Jones & Forman, 1984), impulsiveness (Denning, 
1983; Hilakivi et al., 1989), and risk taking and sensation seeking (Meadows, 1994; 
Zuckerman, 1979). As slips and trip arise out of people’s ability to move from one 
place to another their psychomotor skills may be a factor in their occurrence, but 
research on reaction time, times tests and co-ordination have not been generally 
illuminating. Further details on individual differences in accident liability was 
published by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE, 1998). 
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According to HSE research on accident investigation (HSE, 2001a) “the majority of 
companies do not effectively discriminate, or indeed understand the distinction 
between immediate and underlying causes”. The report also confirmed the 
relatively unsophisticated approach taken when investigating work-related accidents 
which focused on the collection of descriptive data representing the events 
surrounding the incident using witness statements, photographs and reconstructions, 
with causal analysis limited to immediate causes. The HSE report described two 
main types of accident investigation, the first being the traditional accident 
investigation approach, focusing on the individual or behavioural contribution to the 
incident and largely ignoring other potential contributory factors. The second type 
being the system-based approach, which sought to embrace the full range of 
contributing factors. The system-based approach includes a number of important 
concepts including the recognition of multiple causation, performance influencing 
factors, immediate and underlying causes and the modification of system factors as 
being a major preventative strategy. Some safety critical industries such as nuclear 
power and off-shore oil drilling have been instrumental in the  development of 
complex incident investigation procedures, collectively referred to as Root Cause 
Analysis, and a summary of the main ones was published by HSE in 2001 (HSE, 
2001b).    
In general, people are thought to counterfactually change what is made explicit to 
them, however Woodcock (1996) described the development of causal schema by 
Canadian safety officers in response to accident types. Through experience safety 
officers developed a cognitive framework for an accident which is evoked based 
largely on its general description and classification, thus a representation of a 
typical slip or trip accident would be brought to mind through hearing about an 
accident or reading an accident report. If safety practitioners do adopt causal 
schema it would include a set of expectations (norms) for an accident type against 
which the specific accident will be judged counterfactually. The possibility that a 
safety officer brings to mind a typical (normative) representation of an accident 
type simply by its categorisation raises the question whether the level of 
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information about an accident, whether presented to them or obtained through a 
simple investigation concerning a specific accident, has any influence on the way 
that counterfactual thinking is used to bring about a different outcome.  
In the course of an investigation the level of knowledge and understanding of the 
temporal sequence of events, people’s behaviours and the extant conditions 
increases as its various aspects are explored. If investigators approach an 
investigation without preconceptions then the opportunities for learning are 
increased, but if a causal schema is evoked at the initial stage then the subsequent 
investigation may be constrained and biased, not by what is known but by what is 
inferred or assumed through the causal schema. This idea is explored in this study 
by manipulating the level of information given to respondents and assessing its 
impact on the structure of the respondents’ thoughts generated in response to the 
research scenario.  
Differences in the selection of causal strategies between Safety Professionals, 
Managers and Accident Subjects have also been reported by Lehane (2004), with 
Safety Professionals focusing on abnormal conditions whilst Managers and 
Accident Subjects were most likely to attribute the cause to an action or inaction. 
Inevitably some of the counterfactual thinking research has been based on accident 
type scenarios, for example those developed by Wells and Gavanski (1989) which 
included Karen’s wine allergy and Eugene and Tina drowning after the bridge 
collapsed, and Kahneman and Miller’s (1986) car accident involving Mr. Jones. 
However there has been no specific counterfactual research in the area of 
occupational accidents and more specifically those involving slips or trips.  This 
research sought to address this neglected area. The motivation for engaging in 
counterfactual thinking influences the subsequent counterfactual thought process 
and the specific counterfactual thought which is finally expressed. 
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Consideration of Future Consequences Scale  
Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger, and Edwards (1994) developed the Consideration of 
Future Consequences (CFC) Scale which measures respondent’s propensity to 
consider the future when making decisions affecting the present.  
Given the suggestion by Ross and Nisbett (1991) that there is a strong social and 
situational influence on counterfactual thinking a variation of the CFC Scale was 
completed by respondents in the three job groups to evaluate any differences and 
examine the relationship between the counterfactual mutations used by the groups. 
The development of the scale for this study is discussed in the Methodology 
section. 
Comment on Scenario Designs and their Ecological Validity  
I have referred to the lack of ecological validity in scenario-based counterfactual 
research and to expand on that point I will critically evaluate three of the most often 
referred to and varied scenarios.  
In their first scenario Wells and Gavasnski (1989) presented details of Karen’s 
death following her consumption of wine in a meal of moules marinière brought by 
her boss after her promotion. Karen suffered from a rare inherited disease which 
meant she was allergic to alcohol, but her boss was unaware of this and selected 
meals from the menu, in one version he considered two choices both containing 
wine and in the other version he considered two choices but only one contained 
wine. Having read a version of the scenario respondents were asked to mutate 
events and list important causes of her death. As a real life scenario it lacks 
credibility, because it is inconceivable that Karen would not have mentioned such a 
significant life threatening condition to her boss before he took her out for a meal. 
In the second test they presented a scenario in which wheelchair users Eugene and 
Tina die in an accident driving their own vehicle when a bridge collapses after a 
storm. They were only driving their own vehicle because a taxi driver refused to 
take both of them as the taxi did not have room for their wheelchairs. The scenario 
is presented in two versions in which Eugene and Tina die but the taxi driver 
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survives, in one version he crosses the bridge safely before it collapses and in the 
other he crashes off the damaged bridge but gets out of his car before it is 
submerged. Respondents read the scenario before making judgements about cause 
and responsibility.  
I suggest that the scenario introduces biases through its context and emotional 
content. First of all the language describing Eugene and Tina is emotionally charged 
referring to them as partially paralysed and using wheelchairs, young and  recently 
married, and giving details of how they met and fell in love. Against this we are 
told nothing about the taxi driver other than it was a man. We know nothing about 
his background, how he came to be a taxi driver, we don’t know his age, whether he 
is single, married or divorced, whether he has children, as far as the respondents 
were concerned he is anonymous.  
Thinking about the context of the scenario I also found there to be a lack of realism. 
We are not given any details of the type of cab, whether any attempt was made by 
the driver to fit Eugene and Tina in the taxi. It seems improbable that Eugene would 
have booked a cab and not mentioned that he and Tina were disabled and used 
wheelchairs requiring a particular type of vehicle, as he would not want to risk a 
wasted journey by the cab company sending an unsuitable vehicle. No mention was 
made about whether Eugene had used this cab company before, and if so how many 
times. 
The cab driver’s refusal to take them was not causally linked to the collapse of the 
bridge, his action was not the cause of the bridge collapsing, the cause was the 
storm. Mandel and Lehman (1996) would have described his actions as being a 
missed opportunity to have prevented Eugene’s and Tina’s deaths. His actions were 
the focus of the narrative and as Kahneman and Miller (1986) point out a person’s 
actions are more highly available for counterfactual mutation. The taxi driver was 
the last person in a temporal chain of events and in such chains the latter events are 
more highly mutable, focusing on the actions of the taxi driver highlights how this 
can lead to potentially dysfunctional counterfactuals. His refusal to pick them up 
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represented an exception to a social norm, and his action may also have been 
considered as being selfish which can increase the counterfactual availability of his 
actions (Segura & McCloy, 2003), but he was not the cause of their death. 
Similar criticisms can be made about Kahneman and Tversky’s (1982) scenario, 
also used by Kahneman and Miller (1986), in which Mr. Jones dies in a road traffic 
accident on his way home from work. In one version he leaves work early and in 
the other he takes a different route home, but in both versions he is involved in an 
accident with a truck driven by Tom, a teenager under the influence of drugs.  In the 
1982 paper respondents were asked to complete counterfactual sentences from the 
perspective of Mr. Jones’ family and friends, and later different respondents were 
asked to complete the counterfactual sentences from the perspective of Tom’s 
family.  
I believe that an emotional bias was introduced to the scenario as quite a lot of 
detail was provided about Mr. Jones (47-year-old father of three, successful banking 
executive, with a sick wife for whom he was doing errands). In contrast, all that is 
said about Tom, the other driver, is that he is a teenager and was under the influence 
of drugs. The scenario exhibits an imbalance between the two actors, one is 
represented as being mature, upright, responsible, experienced and law abiding, 
whilst the other is young, reckless, inexperienced and law breaking. Whilst it is 
interesting that this imbalance did not affect the respondents’ counterfactual focus, 
respondents instructed to adopt Mr. Jones’ family’s position mutated antecedents 
which Mr. Jones had control over, and those instructed to adopt Tom’s family’s 
position focused on antecedents which were pertinent to Tom’s situation, very 
much as predicted by the focus rule.  
It would have been interesting to have seen how other people viewing the outcome 
from different  positions or the police might have responded. In these circumstances 
it seems likely that Tom’s actions would have been the focus of counterfactual 
speculation particularly as he was responsible for a deliberate criminal action, that 
of driving under the influence of drugs, which is most likely an unacceptable social 
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norm. In particular I would expect the police to focus on Tom’s actions because of 
their illegality and their role to investigate illegal acts. I also suggest that Mr. Jones’ 
decision to leave work early or take a different route home are unlikely to be 
identified by the police and they are in no way causally connected to the accident, 
in much the same way that the taxi driver in the Eugene and Tina scenario was not 
causally responsible for the bridge that collapsed. In both cases the behaviours 
represent missed opportunities to have avoided the accident. 
Linking Literature to My Research Proposals  
Counterfactual thoughts link the past with the present and allow us to speculate 
about the future, influence how we feel, and shape our intentions and behaviour.  
Many aspects of counterfactual thinking have been explored through philosophy 
and social psychology and we have an increasing understanding of how 
counterfactual thinking functions through many and varied studies, some of which 
have been referred to in this review. 
People respond to an event, even a simple scenario-based one, in an individual and 
personal way. The strength of that response is influenced by the emotional 
relationship and relevance between the event and the individual.  An event which 
has actually been experienced must be more emotionally relevant to a respondent 
than a hypothetical one presented in a scenario. The structure of the scenario often 
prescribes the motivation for undertaking counterfactual thinking, effectively 
constraining it to a single standpoint. For example, in Kahneman and Tversky’s 
(1982) scenario the respondents are asked to mutate the outcome of Mr. Jones’ car 
accident from the point of view of a bereaved relative, but there are other people 
who might have thought about his accident and brought about a different outcome 
from quite different perspectives by choosing other antecedents. How differently 
might Mr. Jones’ accident be viewed by the driver of the other car, work colleagues, 
witnesses, police officers who attended the accident or members of the public 
reading about it in the local newspaper? 
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As counterfactual thoughts are evoked by negative events or failing to attain  
desired outcomes or goals, researchers have used studies involving accidents of one 
type or another and these include Kahneman and Tversky (1982) whose Mr. Jones 
car accident has been much repeated and adapted by subsequent researchers 
including Mandel and Lehman (1996).  Davis et al. (1995, 1996) considered sudden 
infant death and spinal column injuries, Brickman et al. (1975) and Eck and Kite 
(1997) both used road traffic accidents, Wells and Gavanski’s (1989) scenario 
featured Eugene’s and Tina’s car crashing off a collapsed bridge, and Macrae 
(1992) used a scaffolding collapse as the basis for a scenario. 
In the main these unwanted outcomes, negative events and failures to attain desired 
goals have been presented through prepared scenarios given to undergraduate 
students. However a few have involved real life respondents, for example Landman 
and Manis (1992) used 1,145 adult women who had contacted the University of 
Michigan’s Centre for Continuing Education for Women (as sample 2) and 80 
adults as a matched control group (sample 3) in a study of counterfactual thoughts 
about people’s personal decisions; Mandel and Dhami (2005) worked with 90 adult 
male prisoners in a study looking at the effect of counterfactual thinking on blame, 
guilt and shame; Davis et al. (1995, 1996) undertook studies of counterfactual 
thinking in people who had been admitted to hospital following spinal injury and 
parents whose children had died suddenly and unexpectedly; and Gilovich and 
Medvec (1994) took random samples of adults from the New York and Chicago 
telephone directories and residents from nursing homes in their study of regret. 
Scenario-based research offers certain advantages because they allow the researcher 
to contrive a specific set of circumstances that allows them to manage and 
manipulate the information presented to the respondents so that it meets the 
counterfactual research aims, ensuring the researcher retains experimental control 
so that each respondent receives and responds to exactly the same information. 
However scenario-based research also has limitations - realistically scenarios can 
only present a limited amount of detail so they tend to lack the rich texture that real 
life experiences give, there can be no real personal involvement and they can 
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unintentionally introduce bias, for example refer to my criticism of the Eugene and 
Tina scenario used by Wells and Gavanski (1989) or the Mr. Jones scenario used by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1982) and Kahneman and Miller (1986) and subsequently 
adapted by other researchers.  
There are some situations where the scenario approach is more closely 
representative of the way information is presented to people to respond.  A good 
illustration of this would be a jury at a trial. Jurors are presented with a scenario, 
which is given to them in the form of the evidence they hear and they all respond to 
this in their role as a juror and this approach to counterfactual research was used by 
Miller and McFarland (1986) and Catellani and Milesi (2005) among others. 
Clearly one of the disadvantages of using respondents’ own experiences is that 
there is lack of experimental control over the nature of the incident and 
circumstances under which it happened. This approach, which might be considered 
to be the ultimate in ecological validity, has to be balanced against the use of a 
scenario where the information can be controlled so all the respondents react to the 
same situation, but where there is a lower level of ecological validity. 
One of the other limiting factors found in most previous counterfactual research is 
that it is undertaken by academic researchers typically using undergraduates as 
respondents, either responding as themselves or by being asked to role play a 
character from a scenario. This may not be a serious limiting factor for many areas 
of research in social psychology, but there are times where it is more important that 
real populations are used, particularly when the respondent’s social role in a 
particular setting has a strong influence and this is the case for counterfactual 
thinking following occupational accidents. For example, research by Davis et al.     
(1995) has shown significant variations between counterfactuals generated by real 
populations and those generated by role-playing students, whilst Woodcock (1996) 
said "It is hardly original to question the validity of using undergraduate students 
instead of ‘real people’. If the research is applied to naïve attribution, there may be 
no harm in this practice. However, where the research is supposed to reflect 
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practitioner’s real world judgements, it becomes a role-playing exercise. Role 
playing only reveals the role player's beliefs about the role-incumbents” and Byrne 
and McEleney (2000) commented on the limitations of research scenarios saying    
“judgements about the emotional experience of a fictional character in a scenario 
are very different from genuinely experienced emotions in a similar real life 
situation”.  
Various authors, including Roese and Olsen (1995) and Catellani and Milesi (2005), 
suggested that the motivation for undertaking counterfactual thinking is very 
important and proposed a social context model of counterfactual constraints in 
which the social context of the event itself and the social context in which the event 
is interpreted influence counterfactual mutability.  
Much of the research undertaken into counterfactual thinking has focused on how 
an individual thinks from a personal perspective, for example how they could have 
got a better grade in their last exam. In another research approach role-playing 
respondents are asked to assume the identify of a scenario character and ‘stand in 
their shoes’ and respond as though viewing the outcome through the eyes of this 
other person. This was the approach used by Kahneman and Tversky (1982) when 
they asked respondents to complete a counterfactual thought sentence from the 
perspective of Mr. Jones’ family. Under these research conditions one wonders if 
all the respondent does is project their own personal responses on to the scenario 
character in an ‘If that was me I would...’ type response. As has already been 
referred to, counterfactual thinking can be undertaken from an individual 
perspective focusing on how the thinker could bring about a different outcome for 
themselves, but also from a public perspective where people consider how an 
outcome could have been different for someone else and this situation arises 
whenever we think about an unwanted outcome following an accident. There are 
many people who are called upon to think this way as part of their professional or 
civic duties and these include: witnesses, other workers, managers, company safety 
officers, company directors, health and safety inspectors, insurance assessors, 
members of a jury, and members of the public hearing or reading about an accident. 
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Occupational accidents represent an outcome where it is suggested that real 
populations should be studied because of the influence of the social situation, and 
multiple perspectives that are brought to bear on such outcomes. It may be possible 
for undergraduate students to respond as accident subjects as many would have had 
some first-hand experience of being injured, possibly at work, however students are 
much less able to respond as managers because they are unlikely to have experience 
of managing people or have knowledge of a manager’s role and responsibilities for 
the health and safety of their staff.  Similarly students cannot replicate the 
experiences and knowledge of safety professionals. With the aim of presenting the 
most ecologically representative research, respondents from each of the three real 
life populations were used in the current study so they could bring to bear their real 
life experiences of similar situations.  
In many of the earlier studies involving counterfactual thinking the unwanted 
outcome was simply a means of establishing a suitable situation in the minds of the 
respondents from which to test the researcher’s hypothesis about counterfactual 
thinking. In no previous counterfactual thinking research has the specific nature of 
the outcome or unwanted event and its antecedents been of equal importance to the 
counterfactual response. This study takes a fundamentally new approach and for the 
first time sets out to examine the counterfactual response (along with the prevention 
and causal response) from different social perspectives to a specific type of real life 
outcome which has significant implications in the field of occupational safety, and 
in doing so seeks to develop a new approach to understanding the social psychology 
of slips and trips in an area which has been dominated to date by an ergonomic 
approach commonly based on slip resistance and tribology. A flavour of these 
approaches can be found in the proceedings of the Slips, Trips and Falls 
Symposium held in Nottingham, UK reported in Contemporary Ergonomics (2008).  
It was hoped that this approach would integrate the advantages of scenarios 
(experimental control and manipulation of variables) with the greater ecological 
validity provided by respondents approaching the scenario from their real 
experiences of being a Safety Professional, Manager or Accident Subject.  
Page | 70  
 
Recognising the benefits and limitations of scenario-based research this study used 
a scenario which was specifically developed based on a typical accident reported to 
local authorities involving a slip or trip by a supermarket employee (Mary). As with 
all scenarios this one cannot convey all the details that would be available to 
someone involved with a real accident, but nevertheless it is presented as a typical 
accident report in that it is brief, factual and focused on the actions of the accident 
subject (Mary).  
Given the importance of the social situation on the generation and content of 
counterfactual thinking, this study gains in ecological validity over previous 
research by recruiting respondents from three groups of people who had a real life 
involvement with slip and trip accidents and were able to bring that experience to 
bear on the scenario as they would in their day to day work, such that this is the first 
study to specifically explore the effect of different social roles on the same 
outcome. In this study three different groups, Safety Professionals, Managers and 
Accident Subjects, were asked to consider how Mary’s slip or trip accident could 
have been different, how it could have been prevented or what its cause was. In 
doing so this study returned to some of the earliest research into the social 
psychology of counterfactual thinking when the basic structure of counterfactual 
thought was identified and sought to compare and contrast the effect of the 
respondents’ different social roles on the structure of counterfactual, prevention and 
causal thinking of a single event. 
Summary of literature review and proposals for research  
Reviewing relevant literature covering the fields of counterfactual thinking, causal 
thinking and accidents highlighted a number of areas where further research is 
needed, the main one being that counterfactual thinking has not been rigorously 
tested under real life conditions where the circumstances, the outcome and possible 
alternative outcomes are at least as important a part of the research as the 
counterfactual dimensions being tested. There are some exceptions to this where the 
outcome itself was as significant as the thought processes that followed it and these 
were the studies by Davis et al. (1995, 1996), where they worked with respondents 
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who had suffered a serious spinal injury or had lost a child through Sudden Infant 
Death Syndrome, and the body of work on rape or other real life trauma such as the 
2004 tsunami (Teigen & Jenson, 2011) or failed silicone breast implants (Parker et 
al., 2002), but none of these have considered the outcome of an occupational 
accident as the situation which has prompted counterfactual thought.  
Occupational accidents occur in a specific social setting with its own rules and 
expectations and where those involved have different roles, be that of employer 
manager, supervisor, staff or the person who had an accident. The importance of  
the social situation on framing and constraining counterfactual thoughts  has been 
referred to in previous research, but few studies have properly considered how this 
impacts on the specific structure of counterfactual thoughts of people with different 
social roles, perspectives and motivations who are actually involved with a specific 
outcome under particular real life circumstances. 
Counterfactual thinking has been historically associated with causal thinking and in 
more recent years with missed opportunities to prevent the outcome. Clearly 
counterfactual thinking can be a route to both, but in the context of an occupational 
accident is counterfactual thinking more closely associated with one more than the 
other?  
With few exceptions, counterfactual thinking research has used university students 
as respondents. Whilst this may be acceptable for studies of a general nature they 
are not suitable in studies of specific real life situations where the respondents must 
have first-hand personal involvement and appropriate knowledge skills or 
responsibility to offer a realistic response.  
This study set out to address these gaps and inadequacies by establishing a realistic 
research scenario concerning a typical occupational slip and trip accident and 
recruiting respondents from three populations (Safety Professionals, Managers and 
Accident Subjects) who had real life direct and personal involvement in 
occupational accidents.  
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In the limited research to date on the psychology of occupational slip and trip 
accidents differences in the perceptions of causal responsibility between Managers 
and Accident Subjects (Lehane and Stubbs, 2001) and the causal strategies adopted 
by Safety Professionals, Managers and Accident Subjects have been identified 
(Lehane, 2004). This study sought to extend this area of research by recording and 
then comparing the structure of the counterfactual, prevention and causal thoughts 
of three groups of people directly involved in occupational slip and trip accidents 
and allowing and encouraging their social role to naturally influence their 
responses.  
Safety Professionals were expected to demonstrate through the structure of their 
counterfactual, prevention and causal sentences a greater influence of the legal 
framework which sets the rules for health and safety in the workplace. Accident 
Subjects were presumed to have little or no specific knowledge or appreciation of 
the legal requirements, and that the structure of their counterfactual, prevention and 
causal sentences would therefore be different to those of Safety Professionals. The 
responses of Managers was harder to predict - they have responsibilities to protect 
their staff and to ensure that organisational rules and procedures are followed, but 
probably don’t have the same awareness of the legal requirements as Safety 
Professionals although should have more than Accident Subjects - so it was 
expected that the structure of their completed counterfactual, prevention and causal 
sentences would lie somewhere between those of Safety Professionals and Accident 
Subjects. 
After reading a slip or trip scenario respondents were prompted to complete three 
sentences. The first was a counterfactual sentence and respondents completed an ‘if 
only...’ sentence, ‘If only... things could have been different’. Respondents were 
then asked to show how Mary’s accident might have been prevented by completing 
the sentence ‘Mary’s accident could have been prevented...’ and finally respondents 
were asked about what they thought was the cause of Mary’s accident by 
completing the sentence ‘The cause of Mary’s accident was...’. These sentences 
were compared against fourteen structural dimensions, seven of which had been 
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identified from previous counterfactual research and seven new ones identified as 
part of this study. 
A single outcome can be judged from many perspectives and most previous 
counterfactual research has focused on a single perspective from role-playing 
respondents, with a limited number of studies in which respondents were randomly 
allocated to one of two perspectives. For example, in Macrae and Milne (1992) 
respondents were asked to respond as though they were the person who had food 
poisoning or the food business. In real life situations people’s roles and 
responsibilities influence their motivation for engaging in various type of cognitive 
processes and this can constrain the scope of that thinking. After an occupational 
accident such constraints might include blame, responsibility and punishment due 
to criminal law considerations (Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, HMSO, 
1974), civil law compensation and insurance claims and, in addition, possible 
organisational sanctions for breaches of rules and procedures.  
This study focused mainly on the possible role of criminal law and its effects on the 
structure of the counterfactual prevention and causal thoughts generated by Safety 
Professionals compared to those of Managers and Accident Subjects. These 
differences were expected to be revealed through their counterfactual, prevention 
and causal thoughts. Based on previous research and an understanding of the legal 
requirements associated with occupational accidents including slips and trips, some 
general predictions can be made for the ways that the respondents might structure 
their counterfactual and causal sentences. Whilst there is no comparable literature 
on how people think about preventing an outcome, an attempt has been made to 
suggest the most likely structural dimensions. Table 1 sets out the predicted 
structure of Safety Professionals’ counterfactual, prevention and causal thoughts, 
with those of Managers in Table 2 and Accident Subjects in Table 3. The tables 
indicate that the expected structural differences between the three respondent 
groups will be focused on six structural dimensions, those being the temporal 
location of the selected antecedent (timescale), whether the antecedent was static or 
dynamic, general or specific to the scenario, known to the respondent or inferred, 
Page | 74  
 
was personal or situational, and its domain, which related to the antecedent being 
associated with  a procedure / process, a behaviour, an attitude or a physical item. 
The purpose of the current research was: 
1. To identify how the seven previously identified structural dimensions of 
counterfactual thoughts were used in the specific setting of a slip or trip accident. 
2. To establish how the seven new structural dimensions of the counterfactual 
thoughts were used in the specific setting of a slip and trip accident.  
3. To identify how the 13 sentence dimensions were used in the prevention and 
causal sentences in the specific setting of a slip and trip accident.  
4. To examine the effect of accident type (slip or trip) on the structure of 
counterfactual, prevention and causal sentence sentences.       
5. To examine the effect of job type (Safety Professionals, Managers and 
Accident Subjects) on the structure of counterfactual, prevention and causal 
sentences. 
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Table 1. Predicted responses for Safety Professionals                                                                                                            
Structure of counterfactual, prevention and causal sentences  
Structural element  Counterfactual 
thinking 
Prevention  
thinking 
Causal thinking 
Direction Better outcome N/A N/A 
Action or inaction  Inaction Action Inaction 
Addition or 
subtraction  
 
Addition Addition Subtraction 
Exceptionality  Exceptional 
antecedent 
Normal antecedent Exceptional 
antecedent 
Timescale* Distal to the 
accident (before the 
day of the accident) 
Proximal to the 
event (the day of 
the accident) 
Proximal to the 
event (the day of 
the accident) 
Did scenario actor 
have control   
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Dynamic or static 
antecedent * 
 
Static Static Static 
Case specific / 
general 
 antecedent * 
 
General Specific General 
Known or inferred 
antecedent* 
 
Inferred Inferred Inferred 
Personal / 
situational 
antecedent* 
 
Situational Situational Situational 
Spontaneous 
identification of 
scenario actor  
  
No prediction No prediction No prediction 
To whom did the 
sentence relate  
 
No prediction No prediction No prediction 
Specific subject of 
the sentence 
 
No prediction No prediction No prediction 
Domain  
(procedure, 
behaviour or a 
physical item)* 
Procedure Procedure Procedure 
*Dimensions predicted to be influenced by the respondent’s job group 
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Table 2. Predicted responses for Managers                                                               
Structure of counterfactual, prevention and causal sentences 
Structural element Counterfactual 
thinking 
Prevention  
thinking 
Causal thinking 
Direction Better 
outcome 
N/A N/A 
Action or inaction  Inaction Action Inaction 
Addition or 
subtraction  
 
Addition Addition Subtraction 
Exceptionality  Exceptional 
antecedent 
Normal 
antecedent 
Exceptional 
antecedent 
Timescale* Proximal to 
the accident. 
On the day of 
the accident 
Proximal to the 
accident. On the 
day of the 
accident 
Proximal to the 
accident. On the 
day of the accident 
Did scenario actor 
have control?   
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Dynamic or static 
antecedent * 
 
Active Active Active 
Case specific / general 
antecedent * 
 
Case Specific Case Specific Case Specific 
Known or inferred 
antecedent* 
 
Known Known Known 
Personal / situational 
antecedent* 
 
Personal Personal Personal 
Spontaneous 
identification of 
scenario actor   
 
No prediction No prediction No prediction 
To whom did the 
sentence relate? 
 
No prediction No prediction No prediction 
Specific subject of the 
sentence 
 
No prediction No prediction No prediction 
Domain (procedure, 
behaviour or a 
physical item)* 
Behaviour Behaviour Behaviour 
*Dimensions predicted to be influenced by the respondent’s job group 
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Table 3. Predicted responses for Accident Subjects                                                   
Structure of counterfactual, prevention and causal sentences 
Structural element  Counterfactual 
thinking 
Prevention  
thinking 
Causal thinking 
Direction Better outcome N/A N/A 
Action or inaction  Inaction Action Inaction 
Addition or 
subtraction  
 
Addition Addition Subtraction 
Exceptionality  Exceptional 
antecedent 
Normal 
antecedent 
Exceptional 
antecedent 
Timescale* Proximal to the 
accident. On the 
day of the accident 
Proximal to the 
accident. On the 
day of the 
accident 
Proximal to the 
accident. On the 
day of the 
accident 
Did scenario actor 
have control?   
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Dynamic or static 
antecedent * 
 
Active Active Active 
Case specific / 
general  
antecedent * 
 
Case Specific Case Specific Case Specific 
Known or inferred 
antecedent* 
 
Known Known Known 
Personal / 
situational 
antecedent* 
 
Personal Personal Personal 
Spontaneous 
identification of 
scenario actor   
 
No prediction No prediction No prediction 
To whom did the 
sentence relate? 
 
Mary Mary Other person 
Specific subject of 
the sentence 
 
No prediction No prediction No prediction 
Domain                  
(procedure, 
behaviour or a 
physical item)* 
Physical Behaviour Behaviour 
*Dimensions predicted to be influenced by the respondent’s job group 
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Methodology 
Participant Characteristics  
Six hundred and twelve (612) respondents were recruited from three real life groups 
between February 2002 and December 2003 and comprised 350 Safety 
Professionals, 129 Managers and 133 people who had been injured in an accident 
(Accident Subjects). All respondents received a postal invitation to participate 
along with the research scenario, questionnaire and a pre-paid reply envelope. 
Those respondents who completed the questionnaire did so voluntarily. 
 
Sampling Procedure  
Recruitment of respondents 
The 350 Safety Professionals consisted of 193 local government health and safety 
inspectors and 157 commercial safety officers.  Letters were written to 381 local 
government environmental health departments in England and Wales seeking 
agreement to their health and safety inspectors completing the research 
questionnaires. One hundred and two authorities agreed and 592 questionnaires 
were posted to them. One hundred and ninety three completed questionnaires were 
returned giving a response rate of 32.6%. Commercial safety officers were invited 
to participate by posting 569 questionnaires to branches of the Institute of 
Occupational Safety and Health (IOSH) and colleges offering the Diploma in 
Occupational Safety (NEBOSH). One hundred and fifty seven responded giving a 
response rate of 27.6%. Of the 350 Safety Professionals, 211 (60%) were male, 128 
(37%) were female and 11 (3%) did not indicate their gender.  
 
Managers were recruited using freely available local business directories from 
London Boroughs. Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) were identified and sent 
a letter inviting them to participate in the study and to pass the research scenario 
and questionnaire on to a manager to complete. In total 2,427 questionnaires were 
posted and 129 completed questionnaires were returned, giving a response rate of 
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5.3%.  67 (52%) Managers were males, 53 (41%) were females and 9 (7%) did not 
indicate their gender. 
An ‘Accident Subject’ was defined as anyone who had been accidentally injured in 
any way. However accidents involving fatalities, people in care institutions or 
children less than 16 years were excluded. A number of different methods were 
used to identify potential Accident Subjects including:  a) statutory occupational 
accident reports, b) local General Practitioners surgeries, c) local newspapers, d) the 
local hospital Accident and Emergency department and e) advertising in local 
libraries.  
The vast majority of Accident Subjects were identified through the statutory 
occupational accident reporting system known as RIDDOR -  Reporting of Injuries, 
Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995 (HMSO, 1995). These 
regulations require certain occupational accidents to be reported to the HSE, the 
national health and safety authority in the UK, or to the local environmental health 
department, depending on the nature of the work activity involved. I had access to 
both local and national RIDDOR accident reports because I was a local government 
safety inspector.  
All accident reports received by my employing borough (London Borough of 
Bromley) were considered for inclusion in the research, subject to the exclusion 
criteria set out above. In addition the national RIDDOR database was searched on a 
monthly basis for reported slip or trip accidents. Those identified as meeting the 
selection criteria were invited to participate and an invitation letter including the 
research scenario, questionnaire and pre-paid reply envelope were posted to them. 
A total of 688 questionnaires (228 locally reported and 460 nationally reported) 
were sent to people who had been involved in a reportable occupational accident. 
133 Accident Subject questionnaires were returned giving a response rate of 19.3%.  
78 (59%) Accident Subjects were female and 50 (38%) were males whilst 5 (3%) 
did not indicate their gender.  
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The identification and recruitment of Accident Subjects through local General 
Practitioners surgeries, the local hospital Accident and Emergency department and  
a request in a local newspaper were all implemented but were non-productive and 
abandoned in favour of using the RIDDOR accident database. 
 
Sample Size and Power 
A-priori sample size calculations were undertaken using G* Power 3 software 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) to identify samples of sufficient size to 
differentiate medium-sized effects (0.3). The number of degrees of freedom (df) for 
the coding of the various different sentence dimensions was predicted to range from 
2 to 20, and G* Power indicated that the minimum sample size required was 108 
for options with 2 degrees of freedom and 233 for those options with up to 20 
degrees of freedom.  
Measures  
Materials  
No previous research had considered the use of counterfactual thinking in the 
context of a slip or trip accident, so appropriate stimulus material needed to be 
developed. A scenario was created inspired by Kahneman and Tversky’s (1982) 
paper, in which Mr. Jones was involved in a fatal road traffic accident.  In their 
study respondents were given one of two versions, in one version Mr. Jones left 
work early to do an errand for his wife and in the other version he took a more 
scenic route home. In both cases Mr. Jones was killed in an accident when a young 
man under the influence of drugs ran a red light and collided with him. Kahneman 
and Tversky informed their respondents that Mr. Jones’ family and friends often 
thought and said ‘if only...’ in the days following his accident and asked 
respondents to write one or more likely completions to the ‘if only...’sentence.  
 
Two scenarios were developed for the current research, one for slips and one for 
trips. Each scenario mirrored the other as to the setting, antecedent events and the 
actions of the characters, the only difference being that in the slip version the 
Page | 81  
 
accident involved a slip on a spillage of milk and in the trip version the accident 
involved a trip over a box. The scenario described a typical scene in ABC 
Supermarket at about mid-morning when the checkout operators were taking their 
rest break. Mary (the subject of the scenario) was going for her break when she 
slipped on a spillage of milk or tripped over a box. In keeping with many previous 
scenario-based research studies the one developed for this study contained details 
of an exceptional event, in this case Mary had agreed to work an extra day on a 
Thursday to cover for her friend who was on holiday. 
For each version of the scenario (slip or trip) details were manipulated including the 
level of background detail provided to the respondents (minimum detail and 
maximum detail versions). In addition the outcome of the accident was controlled, 
in the minor injury version respondents were informed that Mary strained her wrist 
and was off work for one day, whilst in the major injury version Mary broke her 
arm and was off work for three weeks.    
 
The scenario opened with a brief background to Mary, the subject of the scenario: 
“Mary is a lady of about 55 years of age who has worked for ABC Supermarkets as 
a part-time checkout operator for about eight years. She usually works Monday, 
Tuesday and Wednesday but had come in on this particular Thursday to cover for a 
friend who was on holiday.” 
Respondents were then requested to answer the questions that followed, doing so as 
‘a [Safety Professional], [Manager] or as [someone who has recently had an 
accident], responding in the same way as you would in your own workplace, and 
using your own knowledge or experience of slipping / tripping accidents to add to 
the information given about the accident’.  
Respondents were then presented with a brief accident report to the Store Manager 
about Mary’s accident from Bill the Shop Floor Supervisor. The type of accident 
(slip / trip) and the outcome severity (minor / major injury) was manipulated in the 
report according to the questionnaire version required. Figure 1 accident report  
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Figure 1. Accident report provided in the written scenario 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Manipulation of background information  
In the minimum information version the scenario ended with Bill’s report to the 
Store Manager (as in Figure 1).  In the maximum information version (Figure 2) 
respondents were given further written details in the scenario booklet and were 
informed that the Store Manager had interviewed Bill the Shop Floor Supervisor 
and had also spoken to Jane one of the other checkout operators who witnessed the 
accident. The information was provided in a context which was appropriate for both 
the accident type (slip / trip), outcome severity (sprained wrist / broken arm) and 
the respondent’s job group (Safety Professional, Manager or Accident Subject). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABC SUPERMARKET 
MESSAGE TO  STORE MANAGER 
FROM                 BILL  SHOP FLOOR SUPERVISOR 
DATE    THURSDAY 10 AUGUST   TIME  11.30 HRS 
SUBJECT - ACCIDENT TO MARY 
At about 10.30am Mary went for her rest break and slipped over on some spilt milk 
(tripped over a box) and hurt her arm. An ambulance was called to take her to 
hospital.  She has broken her right arm, which has been plastered. She will be off 
work for at least 3 weeks [strained her wrist and will be off work for a day]. 
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Figure 2. 
Example of additional information provided in the maximum information and 
major injury scenario - Slip version 
 Mary does not usually work on Thursdays but was covering for a friend who was 
on holiday. 
 Mary closed her checkout at the usual time for her mid-morning break and waited 
for a friend on the checkout next to hers to serve her last customer and they both 
went to their break together as usual. 
 They were walking together past the checkout when Mary slipped over on some 
spilt milk and fell awkwardly on her right arm. 
 The First Aider attended and an ambulance was called to take Mary to hospital. 
 At hospital she was found to have a broken right arm. She will be off work for at 
least three weeks with her arm in plaster.    
 A customer  had seen the milk and reported it to Bill the Supervisor. 
 Bill confirmed that the spillage had been reported by a customer and the Cleaner 
had been asked to clear it up five minutes before the accident but had not got round 
to dealing with it. 
 No warning signs had been put out. 
 It is not known how long the milk had been on the floor before it was reported by 
the customer. 
 Spillages around the checkouts are very common. 
 According to the Accident Book four other people had been injured in slipping 
accidents in the past six months. 
 
 
The scenario-based exceptional event was repeated and reinforced in the Maximum 
detail version as the fact that Mary was covering for her friend and did not usually 
work on Thursday was given twice, once in the general introduction and again in 
the additional information. More respondents selected the scenario exceptional 
event (Mary working on Thursday) under the minimum detail condition (22) than 
under the maximum detail condition (9) and this difference was significant (χ2 (1) = 
5.45 p = 0.20). Notwithstanding this, Mary’s decision to work on Thursday was not 
selected significantly frequently by any of three respondent groups. See Tables 15, 
16 and 17 for details of frequency of the selection of the scenario exceptional event 
for the counterfactual, prevention and causal sentences. 
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Manipulation of injury severity 
The severity of the slip or trip injury was manipulated by having two levels of 
injury. In the major injury version Mary suffered a broken arm and a three week 
absence from work, whereas in the minor injury version she suffered a strained 
wrist and a day’s absence from work. More extreme outcomes (death and no injury) 
were considered but they did not allow respondents the possibility of both upward 
and downward counterfactual alternatives as both were anchored at the extremes. It 
was important to maintain the ecological validity of the scenarios as the vast 
majority of reported slip and trip accidents actually result in strains or fractures.     
Referring to Figure 3, if outcome severity is considered on a linear scale with 0 
being no accident and 10 being a fatality, it is suggested that the minor injury 
suffered by Mary would be at about point 2 on the scale and the major injury 
(broken arm) would be around point 8 on the scale. 
 
 
 
 
Figure. 3 Design of the scenario allowing for better and worse outcomes.  
Scenario design allowing for a better or worse outcome 
Norm = No 
Accident 
Minor 
Injury  
Major 
Injury 
Fatality  
0.       1.          2.         3.          4.          5.           6.          7.          8.         9.          10.  
Increasing severity of injury / Exceptionality 
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Piloting of the scenarios 
The research scenario and questionnaire were piloted with 10 local businesses and 
10 Safety Professionals. As a result of the responses obtained the questionnaires 
were amended by improved formatting and layout, some questions were omitted 
and others refined. Piloting of the questionnaire indicated that the scenario actor 
was not often identified spontaneously in the completed sentences so a further 
question was added which asked the respondent to indicate from a list of scenario  
actors which of them their sentence referred to. The person identified in this 
question was later used to judge the degree of control they had over the specific 
subject referred to in the completed sentence. 
After reading the scenario, respondents were asked to complete a questionnaire 
which included writing three sentences focusing on how the outcome of Mary’s 
accident could have been different (counterfactual thoughts), how Mary’s accident 
could have been prevented and what the cause of the accident was, and to complete 
a number of other questions and scales.  
In order to enhance ecological validity respondents were asked to complete the 
questionnaire as they would respond to such an accident as a Safety Professional, a 
Manager or, in the case of an Accident Subject, to imagine themselves as being 
Mary.  
The counterfactual sentence was prompted by the following statement – ‘After 
Mary’s accident you found yourself thinking ‘If only…’. How would you continue 
this thought?’ Respondents were requested to complete the counterfactual sentence 
– ‘If only… things could have been different’. Respondents were then asked if they 
believed that Mary's accident could have been prevented. 95.8% of respondents 
considered the accident could have been prevented and they were then asked to 
complete the prevention sentence – ‘Mary’s accident could have been 
prevented…’.  Finally all respondents were asked to say what the cause of Mary’s 
accident was by completing the causal sentence – ‘The cause of Mary's accident 
was...’.  Respondents who received the longer questionnaire version were then 
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asked to complete a modified Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC) Scale 
based on Strathman et al. (1994).  
The CFC Scale was developed to measure the consideration of future consequences 
in a broad way. This research focused on a specific aspect of respondents’ 
consideration of future consequences, namely that of future safety, and the 
questions making up the scale were modified to reflect that aspect.  The tone and 
structure of the questions was maintained to ensure the integrity of the scale. 
Strathman et al.’s (1994) original questions and the modified versions are shown in 
Table 4. The questions relating to the modified CFC Scale were coded and scored 
according to Strathman et al. (1994).  
The modified 12 item CFC Scale gave a Cronbach’s Alpha result of .651 but this 
was increased to .735 if item 8 was removed. Subsequent analysis of respondents’ 
CFC scores was based on an 11 item scale.   
 
Coding of responses  
As part of the questionnaire respondents were asked read a slip or trip scenario and 
then to complete sentences describing how the outcome might have been different 
(counterfactual), how the slip or trip might have been prevented and finally to 
describe the cause of the slip or trip. The individual responses were collated into a 
single Word document along with the Accident Subject’s counterfactual thoughts 
relating to their own accident. I examined the sentences and identified the relevant 
aspects of their structure relevant to the research and these were coded in to SPSS 
statistical software. The coding scheme used for the respondents’ sentences is 
contained in Appendix 1, and the respondents’ completed sentences are contained  
in Appendix 5 . 
Each completed counterfactual sentence was coded against 14 structural 
dimensions, whilst the prevention and causal sentences were coded against 13 
structural dimensions. The structural dimension of direction was only applicable to 
the counterfactual sentence. All the coding options for the structural dimensions 
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produced categorical data, for example a sentence may relate to either an action or 
inaction. (Table 5 sets out the structural dimensions that this research considered). 
 
Content analysis  
After reading the stimulus scenario, respondents completed three sentences to 
record their counterfactual, prevention and causal thoughts and these sentences 
were subject to conceptual content analysis in which the coders examined the 
wording to identify the presence of specific words, their meaning and the concepts 
contained within the sentence (Krippendorff, 1980; Weber, 1990).  
Using a content analysis approach I examined each respondent’s counterfactual, 
prevention and causal sentences against each of the structural descriptions set out in 
Table 5. Each respondent’s completed sentence was copied from the hand written 
questionnaire and typed in to a Word document containing a table in which the 
respondent’s number, job group and questionnaire version were recorded along 
with the text of their three sentences. For each sentence the scenario actor identified 
by the respondent as being associated with a particular sentence was also noted. An 
example of a single respondent’s completed sentences is given in Figure 4. The full  
responses are provided in Appendix 5.  
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Table 4.  
Original and modified Consideration of Future Consequences Scale questions 
Original questions Modified version used for consideration 
of safety in the future 
1. I consider how things might be in the future, 
and try to influence those things with my day to 
day behavior. 
I think about safety in the future and try 
to influence things by my day to day 
behaviour. 
2. Often I engage in a particular behavior in order 
to achieve outcomes that may not result for many 
years. 
I think about safety in the future and do 
things now to achieve safety in the years 
ahead. 
3. I only act to satisfy immediate concerns, 
figuring the future will take care of itself. 
Thinking about safety I only do things to 
deal with the immediate situation, not 
worrying about the future. 
4. My behavior is only influenced by the 
immediate (i.e. a matter of days or weeks) 
outcomes of my actions. 
What I do about safety is only influenced 
by how things work out in the short term. 
5. My convenience is a big factor in the decisions 
I make or the actions I take. 
My convenience is a big factor in how I 
make decisions or take actions about 
safety. 
6. I am willing to sacrifice my immediate 
happiness or well-being in order to achieve future 
outcomes. 
I am willing to put in extra time, effort 
and money now to ensure that the job is 
safe in the future. 
7. I think it is important to take warnings about 
negative outcomes seriously even if the negative 
outcome will not occur for many years. 
I think it is important to take warnings 
about safety seriously, even if it is 
unlikely that an accident will happen for 
many years. 
8. I think it is more important to perform a 
behavior with important distant consequences 
than a behavior with less-important immediate 
consequences. 
I think it is more important to do 
something about serious accidents in the 
future than minor accidents now. 
9. I generally ignore warnings about possible 
future problems because I think the problems will 
be resolved before they reach crisis level. 
I generally ignore warnings about 
possible risks in the future, because they 
generally get sorted out before that 
happens. 
 
10. I think that sacrificing now is usually 
unnecessary since future outcomes can be dealt 
with at a later time. 
I think it is unnecessary to change things 
now to prevent a possible future accident 
as problems can be dealt with nearer the 
time. 
11. I only act to satisfy immediate concerns, 
figuring that I will take care of future problems 
that may occur at a later date. 
I only act when there is an immediate 
risk, I prefer to take care of future 
problems that may occur at a later date. 
12. Since my day to day work has specific 
outcomes, it is more important to me than 
behavior that has distant outcomes. 
I believe that safety today is more 
important than safety at some time in the 
future. 
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Figure 4.                                                                                                                             
Example of a respondent’s completed counterfactual prevention and causal sentences  
Counterfactual sentence If only Bill the Shop Floor Supervisor had taken 
immediate action when the spill was first reported things 
could have been different.  
Prevention sentence Mary’s accident could have been prevented if Bill had 
taken immediate action… closed the checkout, placed a 
cone near the spill and stood by the spill until the Cleaner 
arrived. 
Causal sentence The cause of Mary’s accident was the failure to have a 
procedure in place to deal with spillages.    
 
Each sentence was examined by asking a series of questions about its contents to 
determine the relevant structural dimensions and entering the appropriate coding in 
to IBM SPSS Statistics 20 for analysis. The complete set of coding instructions is 
given in Appendix 1. All the structural dimensions that were identified and coded 
related to different categories of the various dimensions being tested, therefore this 
study relied on the use of appropriate non-parametric statistical tests.  
Data cleaning and coding checks 
The data set was checked for general coding errors and corrected by reference to 
the original responses contained in the questionnaire where necessary.  
 
Specific cross-referencing was undertaken to check the respondents’ group ( Safety 
Professional, Manager or Accident Subject) against the questionnaire version. The 
main purpose of this was to ensure that the data relating to Managers was not 
influenced by Safety Professionals who were also managers. Where there was any 
indication that the respondent was or had an element of being a Safety Professional 
they were recorded as such. For example, if a questionnaire indicated that the 
respondent was a Manager but the questionnaire was one sent to a Safety 
Professional it was coded as being a Safety Professional. When Safety Professional 
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questionnaires were sent to local authorities or colleges it is quite possible that a 
Safety Professional in a management position completed one. They might describe 
themselves as being a Manager but they are professional safety officers who are 
managing a team. It would have introduced a bias if these responses were coded 
alongside other Managers who had no specialist safety experience.  
 
In 59 cases there was some uncertainty as to the appropriate coding for the 
respondent’s group. Forty three questionnaires designed for Safety Professionals 
were returned by respondents who classified themselves as either Managers or 
Supervisors (40) or Accident Subjects (3). For each of these questionnaires the 
respondent group coding was cross-checked against the details provided regarding 
their employment sector and number of people they managed to ensure they were 
coded appropriately. Sixteen questionnaires designed for Managers were completed 
by respondents who indicated they were not Managers (15 Safety Professionals and 
1 Accident Subject). It is likely that when a Manager’s questionnaire was sent to a 
business who had a manager / supervisor with specific health and safety 
responsibility that it was directed internally to them as being the most suitable 
person to complete it. All such questionnaires were coded as Safety Professionals 
and the single questionnaire from an Accident Subject was coded as such. 
Managers do have accidents and the occupation of Accident Subjects was not 
requested in their questionnaire. There were no coding anomalies from the Accident 
Subjects’ questionnaires, all the respondents indicated they were from that group.  
 
In total the respondent’s group could not be satisfactorily determined in a total of 
19 cases and these were excluded from analysis.   
 
Inter-rater reliability 
A 10% sample of randomly selected responses were coded by a work colleague 
who had been trained to identify the different structural dimensions from the 
completed sentences but who was blind to the research aims. Differences in coding 
were discussed and agreed. An inter-rater reliability analysis using the Kappa 
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statistic (Landis & Koch, 1977) was performed to determine consistency between 
the two raters. Details of the inter-rater reliability for the structural dimensions of 
each of the three sentences is given in full in Tables 86  and 87 in Appendix 2. The 
mean Kappa score for all parameters was .753 p = < . 001 with a range from 0.634 
p = < .001 to 0.903 p = < .001.  
 
Research design  
Eight versions of the scenario were produced in a 2 (slip / trip) x 2 (minimum / 
maximum detail) x 2 (minor injury / major injury) study, the versions of the 
scenario are summarized in Table 6. The questionnaires for each population were 
colour coded for ease of identification - green for Safety Professionals, yellow for 
Managers and pink for Accident Subjects. Examples of the scenario versions and 
full and short questionnaires can be found in Appendix 4.  
 
Long and short questionnaire versions 
When the questionnaire was used for actual data collection the response rate from 
the Manager and Accident Subject populations was lower than anticipated. One 
possible reason for this was the length of the questionnaire, so a shortened and 
simplified questionnaire was produced for these two groups. Table 91 in Appendix 
4 sets out the questions used in the full version completed by Safety Professionals 
and the shorter version completed by Managers and Accident Subjects. 
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Table 5.  Structural dimensions of the counterfactual, prevention and causal 
sentences 
Number   Counterfactual 
sentence 
Prevention 
sentence 
Causal 
sentence 
1.  Direction (better 
or worse outcome) 
 
Yes Not 
applicable 
Not  
applicable 
2.  Action or inaction  
 
Yes Yes Yes 
3.  Addition or 
subtraction 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
4.  Exceptional or 
routine antecedent 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
5.  Antecedent 
timescale 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
6.  Locus of control Yes Yes Yes 
7.  Dynamic or 
passive  
antecedent 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
8.  Case specific or 
general  
 
Yes Yes Yes 
9.  Known or inferred 
antecedents  
 
Yes Yes Yes 
10.  Personal or 
situational 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
11.  Spontaneous 
identification of 
the scenario actor 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
12.  To whom did the 
sentence refer? 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
13.  The specific 
subject of the 
sentence 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
14.  The ‘domain’ of 
the specific 
subject  
Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 6. 
Summary of questionnaire versions 
Accident subject Manager Safety Professional 
Accident 
type  
Outcome 
severity  
Background 
information  
Accident 
type  
Outcome 
severity  
Background 
information  
Accident 
type  
Outcome 
severity  
Background 
information  
Slip Minor 
injury 
Minimum 
information 
Slip Minor 
injury 
Minimum 
information 
Slip Minor 
injury 
Minimum 
information 
Slip Minor 
injury 
Maximum 
information 
Slip Minor 
injury 
Maximum 
information 
Slip Minor 
injury 
Maximum 
information 
Slip Serious 
injury  
Minimum 
information 
Slip Serious 
injury  
Minimum 
information 
Slip Serious 
injury  
Minimum 
information 
Slip Serious 
injury  
Maximum 
information 
Slip Serious 
injury  
Maximum 
information 
Slip Serious 
injury  
Maximum 
information 
         
Trip Minor 
injury 
Minimum 
information 
Trip Minor 
injury 
Minimum 
information 
Trip Minor 
injury 
Minimum 
information 
Trip Minor 
injury 
Maximum 
information 
Trip Minor 
injury 
Maximum 
information 
Trip Minor 
injury 
Maximum 
information 
Trip Serious 
injury  
Minimum 
information 
Trip Serious 
injury  
Minimum 
information 
Trip Serious 
injury  
Minimum 
information 
Trip Serious 
injury  
Maximum 
information 
Trip Serious 
injury  
Maximum 
information 
Trip Serious 
injury  
Maximum 
information 
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Results  
 
Previous research identified a number of different structural dimensions to the way 
that respondents record their counterfactual thoughts following an unwanted 
outcome. The unwanted outcome has usually been presented in the form of a 
vignette or scenario and respondents are asked to record their counterfactual 
thoughts by completing an ‘if only...’ type sentence. Counterfactual thoughts bring 
about an imagined alternative outcome by changing an antecedent prior to the 
unwanted outcome.  
Seven of the most relevant dimensions were selected for inclusion in this research 
and they were: 
1. The direction of the alternative outcome. Did the change bring about a better 
or worse outcome? 
2. Was an action or inaction changed to bring about the alternative outcome? 
3. Was the change brought about by adding a new antecedent or subtracting 
(deleting) an existing antecedent?    
4. Was the antecedent changed unusual or exceptional or was it a routine or 
normal event? 
5. Where in the sequence of antecedents leading up to the unwanted outcome 
was the one selected for change? Was it close to the outcome (proximal) or 
was it more distant (distal)? 
6. Was the event being changed under the control of the scenario actor?  
7. Was the antecedent dynamic or static?  
 
Seven new dimensions were identified when analysing the counterfactual sentences 
generated in response to this research and they were: 
8. Did the counterfactual thought relate to a specific aspect of the scenario or 
was it more general? 
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9. Was the antecedent selected for change something that had been specifically 
given in the scenario details (known) or was it something that had been 
inferred from the situation?  
10. Did the counterfactual sentence refer to an antecedent which was personal to 
the scenario actor or was it related to the situation that the scenario actor 
found himself or herself in? 
11. Was the scenario actor spontaneously identified in the counterfactual 
sentence? 
12. To whom did the counterfactual sentence refer? A list of scenario actors was 
presented to respondents who were asked to select one that their 
counterfactual thoughts referred to.  
13. What was the specific subject of the counterfactual sentence? 
14. Did the specific subject of the counterfactual sentence relate to something 
physical, behavioural, was it an attitude or was it something that related to a 
system of work or a procedure? These are referred to as ‘domains’ in this 
study.  
 
After reporting the results for these 14 structural dimensions I will report on the 
macro-analysis of the sentences, looking at whether the prevention or the causal 
sentences were most like the counterfactual sentences, and I will also report the 
score for the amended Consideration of Future Consequences Scale (Strathman et 
al., 1994) for the three respondent groups.  
After reading about Mary, a checkout operator in a supermarket, who was involved 
in a slip or trip accident, respondents were asked to complete a questionnaire which 
included three different sentences. The first sentence was designed to record their 
counterfactual thoughts, i.e. how the outcome to Mary’s accident could have been 
different, the second sentence asked them how Mary’s accident could have been 
prevented and the third sentence asked respondents to identify the cause of Mary’s 
accident. 
In addition to applying the 14 point structural analysis to the counterfactual 
sentences this study extended the analysis to two new areas, namely the prevention 
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and causal sentences. Each sentence was examined to identify each of the structural 
dimensions listed above. Fourteen structural dimensions were identified in respect 
of each counterfactual sentence, however the element relating to direction (a better 
or worse alternative outcome) did not apply to either the prevention or causal 
sentences so they were analysed against 13 different structural dimensions.  
For each dimension the results will be presented for the counterfactual, prevention 
and causal sentences and for each of these the responses by Safety Professionals, 
Managers and Accident Subjects will be shown for slips and trips separately. The 
results will be presented in the same order as the structural sentence dimensions (1 
to 14) have been referred to above. For each dimension the specific subjects of the 
respondent’s sentences will be mentioned and commented on. 
Before presenting the detailed results for the structural analysis of the sentences I 
will make some general comments about the process of coding and analysis and 
present some broad results relating to the three population groups and the 
questionnaires. 
General Results  
Preliminary analysis indicated that the necessary conditions for Chi Square ( χ2) 
tests were not met when the sentences were tested against the three variables used 
in the study (job group, accident type and the level of detail). For this reason the 
analysis presented in this section focuses only on the two main variables ‘job 
group’ and ‘accident type’. The only exception being when the completed sentence 
was tested for a known or inferred antecedent where the influence of the level of 
detail provided was significant and a four-way interaction was tested for.  
Sample sizes were sufficiently robust to distinguish medium-sized effects in 31 of 
the 40 sentence dimensions being examined (14 for each counterfactual sentence 
and 13 for the prevention and causal sentences). The sample sizes for the remaining 
9 sentence dimensions were sufficient to identify large effects. The actual sample 
size achieved and the post hoc power calculations are reported for the structural 
element of each sentence in Tables 88, 89 and 90 in Appendix 2, in summary it can 
be reported here that the power ranged from 0.44 (for the scenario actor in the 
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prevention sentence) to 0.99 (for the timescale in the counterfactual sentence). The 
average power calculations were 0.87 for the counterfactual sentences, 0.78 for the 
prevention sentences and 0.84 for the causal sentences. 
A 10% sample of the responses was coded by an independent coder and the mean 
inter-rater reliability for all 14 structural dimensions was Kappa .753 p = < .001, 
with a range from 0.634 p = < .001 to 0.903 p = < .001. The full results are in 
Appendix 2, Tables 86 and 87. 
The results reported in this study are based on a total of 612 responses from 350 
Safety Professionals, 129 Managers and 133 Accident Subjects. 
Population results  
Respondents’ age and gender are given in Table 7. The average age of male Safety 
Professionals was 40.9 years with females being younger at 34.4 years. The age 
range for both male and female safety officers was almost identical, 23-59 for 
males and 21-59 for females. The average age of the male Managers was 47.1 years 
and female Managers was 40.5 years. Male Managers showed a wider age range 
(22-73 years) than female Managers (22-60 years). 58.7% of Managers who 
completed a questionnaire were responsible for up to 10 staff, 25.5% of Managers 
had responsibility for 10-50 staff and 14.5% had over 50 staff. The average age for 
both male and female Accident Subjects was 46.1 years with almost identical age 
ranges, 19-78 for males and 17-78 for females. 
The questionnaires presented the research scenario in different versions based on 
the type of accident (slip or trip), the level of detail provided to respondents 
(minimum or maximum) and the seriousness of the outcome (minor or major 
injury). The number of questionnaire versions completed by each of the respondent 
groups is presented in Table 8. 
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Table 7.  Age and gender of respondents by job group   
 Safety 
Professionals 
Managers Accident     
Subjects 
 Males Females Males Females Males Females 
Age group       
Under 20 0 0 0 0 1 3 
20-29 yrs 33 45 5 8 5 8 
30-39 yrs 52 49 15 18 9 14 
40-49 yrs 84 27 14 17 13 21 
50-59 yrs 42 7 28 8 14 15 
60-69 yrs 0 0 4 2 5 12 
70-79 yrs 0 0 1 0 3 5 
       
Total  = 
587 
211 128 67 53 50 78 
       
Mean age  40.9 34.4 47.1 40.5 46.5 46.5 
Range  36 38 51 38 59 61 
Min and 
max age 
23 -59 21 - 59 22 – 73 22 - 60 19 - 78 17 - 78 
Standard 
deviation 
9.6 8.3 11.2 10.1 13.9 14.9 
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Table 8. Responses by job group and accident type to the scenario versions 
 Safety 
Professionals 
Managers Accident  
Subjects 
Slips    
Minimum detail 
& minor injury  
35 9 19 
Minimum detail 
& major injury 
45 14 15 
Maximum detail 
& minor injury 
46 11 17 
Maximum detail 
& major injury 
44 27 18 
Total 170 61 69 
    
Trips    
Minimum detail 
& minor injury  
47 18 16 
Minimum detail 
& major injury 
47 13 13 
Maximum detail 
& minor injury 
45 21 19 
Maximum detail 
& major injury 
41 16 16 
Total 180 68 64 
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The specific results for the structural analysis of the respondents’ sentences 
In the sections that follow the results from the completed counterfactual, prevention 
and causal sentences for the three job groups are presented. In the first section the 
structural composition of the sentences is presented for the seven dimensions which 
have been identified in earlier counterfactual research, these being direction, which 
is outcome based and then six antecedent based dimensions including:  action or 
inaction, addition or subtraction, normality, temporal order, locus of control and 
dynamic or static. In the second section the results for seven new outcome-based 
antecedent dimensions developed in this study will be presented. These are: specific 
or general, known or inferred, personal or situational, spontaneous identification of 
the scenario actor, which scenario actor was linked to the sentence, what was the 
specific subject of the sentence, and which of four domains (physical / 
environmental, behavioural, procedural or process and attitude) did the specific 
subject of the sentence relate to.  
The structural dimension identified for counterfactual research was also applied to 
the prevention and causal sentences and are also reported here.  
Part 1 – results for previously identified structural dimensions 
 
   The direction of the alternative outcome in the counterfactual sentence 
The analysis of the structural dimension describing the direction of the alternative 
outcome only applied to the counterfactual sentences as the prevention and causal 
sentences do not have directional alternatives. In the current study 100% of 
respondents in each of the three job groups completed the counterfactual sentence 
in a way which brought about a better alternative outcome to that presented in the 
scenario, and this was the same for both slip and trip accidents.  
Action or inaction 
The sentences were analysed to identify whether the alternative (counterfactual) 
outcome, the means to prevent Mary’s accident and the cause of Mary’s accident, 
were referred to as being an action or a failure to act (inaction).  
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Action or inaction in the counterfactual sentence 
For the counterfactual sentence a strong inaction effect was identified for all three 
job groups for both slips and trips (Table 9). 
When completing the counterfactual sentence for slip accidents Safety 
Professionals, Managers and Accident Subjects changed an antecedent which was 
considered to represent a failure to act (inaction). All three job groups selected an 
inaction significantly more than they selected an action (Safety Professionals slips 
98.3%  χ2  (1) = 158.366, p < .001, Managers slips 93.5%  χ2  (1) = 43.61, p < .001 
and Accident Subjects slips 82.4%  χ2 (1) = 25.94, p < .001). 
For Safety Professionals the inactions most commonly referred to in their 
counterfactual sentences after Mary’s slip accident were the inadequate warnings 
(24.3%), failure to clear up the spillage (22.2%) and inadequate system of work 
(20.8%). Managers also referred to two of these three antecedents with the lack of 
warnings being the subject of 34.7% of Managers’ counterfactual sentences along 
with the failure to clear up the spillage (20.4%). Accident Subjects also commonly 
referred to the lack of warnings (25.5%), but more interestingly 21.6% thought that 
had Mary paid more attention she might not have slipped over on the spilt milk. 
 Safety Professionals and Managers also brought about an alternative outcome to 
Mary’s trip accident by changing inactions significantly more frequently than 
actions (Safety Professionals trips 85.2%  χ2 (1) = 83.72,  p < .001 and Managers 
trips 88.2% χ2  (1) = 39.76, p < .001). However whilst Accident Subjects also 
changed slightly more inactions (60%) than actions (40%) the difference in this 
case failed to reach statistical significance (χ2 (1) = 2.97, p = .085). 
Quite different specific antecedents were used by Safety Professionals and 
Managers in their counterfactual sentences following Mary’s trip accident. Both 
groups focused on the presence of the trip hazard (32.7% of Safety Professionals 
and 28.6% of Managers), but with 26.5% of Managers also referring to someone’s 
inaction. Accident Subjects’ counterfactual sentences reflected both actions and 
inactions, which of itself was a different approach from either Safety Professionals 
or Managers who focused on inactions, but Accident Subjects focused their 
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counterfactual sentences on Mary herself. Mary’s decision to work was referred to 
by 56.5% of Accident Subjects whose counterfactual sentences reflected an action, 
and to Mary’s lack of attention (37.9%) when their sentences focused on inactions.      
Table 9.                                                                                                      
Proportion of respondents changing an action or inaction in their 
counterfactual sentence  
 N  Action 
% 
Inaction 
% 
Slips    
Safety 
Professional  
174 1.7 98.3 
Manager  62 6.5 93.5 
Accident Subject  68 17.6 82.4 
 304   
Trips    
Safety 
Professional  
 
169 14.8 85.2 
Manager  68 11.8 88.2 
Accident Subject  65 40 60 
 302   
 
Action or inaction in the prevention sentence  
Safety Professionals, Managers and Accident Subjects showed a strong action 
effect when completing the sentence about how Mary’s accident could have been 
prevented. All three groups showed a significant tendency to complete the sentence 
by referring to something that ‘if done’ would have prevented Mary’s slip and trip 
accident.  
The use of an action to prevent Mary’s accident was in contrast to the use of an 
inaction to bring about a counterfactual outcome. All three job groups showed a 
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strong preference for preventing Mary’s accident by using an action rather than an 
inaction and the results are shown in Table 10.  
Safety Professionals were consistent in the specific antecedent they used when 
completing their prevention sentences, referring to improved systems of work 
following both Mary’s slip (48.9%) and her trip (24.6%). Managers’ responses 
differed according to the type of accident, with 33.3% believing that Mary’s slip 
could have been prevented by better warnings, however they did not refer to 
warnings following Mary’s trip accident but instead considered that improved 
systems of work (19.6%), improved housekeeping (17.9%) and the removal of the 
hazard (16.1%) would have prevented the accident. Similarly Accident Subjects’ 
prevention sentences also referred to different antecedents for slips and trips. When 
they were completing their slip prevention sentences they were most likely to refer 
to improving the Cleaner’s response time (18.7%) or to improved warnings 
(16.7%), whereas following Mary’s trip accident they spread the subject of their 
prevention sentences over a wider range of antecedents including removing the 
hazard (19.5%), improving standards of housekeeping (17.1%) and improved 
systems of work, a quicker response by the Cleaner and someone’s actions, all at 
12.2%.  
 
Action or inaction in the causal sentence  
The completion of the causal sentence (Table 11) closely reflected the pattern of 
responses for the counterfactual sentences (Table 9).  
The cause of Mary’s slip accident was attributed to inactions by Safety 
Professionals, Managers and Accident Subjects. (Safety Professionals 85.7%  χ2 (1) 
= 75.0  p < .001, Managers 89.4%  χ2 (1) = 29.13  p < .001, and Accident Subjects 
90.4%  χ2  (1) = 33.92  p < .001). Failure to implement an adequate safe system of 
work accounted for 52.6% of the causal antecedents referred to by Safety 
Professionals, with 29.4% of Managers attributing the cause to the Cleaner’s slow 
response time and 26.5% to inadequate systems of work. The cause as far as 
Accident Subjects were concerned was the failure to clean up the spillage (32.6%). 
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Table 10.                                                                                                 
Proportion of respondents changing an action or inaction in their 
prevention sentence   
 N Action 
% 
Inaction 
% 
Slips     
Safety 
Professional  
161 99.4 0.6 
Manager  59 98.3 1.7 
Accident 
Subject 
70 100 0 
 290   
Trips    
Safety 
Professional  
 
164 96.3 3.7 
Manager  65 93.8 6.2 
Accident 
Subject  
62 82.3 17.7 
 291   
 
As with the counterfactual trip sentence, Accident Subjects did not show a 
significant preference between actions (60%) and inactions (40%) when identifying 
the cause of Mary’s trip (χ2 (1) = 2.0,  p = .157). This was is in contrast to the 
responses of both Safety Professionals and Managers who recorded the cause of 
Mary’s trip as being from an inaction (Safety Professionals 73.4%   χ2 (1) = 27.13,  
p < .001 and Managers 76.6%  χ2 (1) = 13.31,  p < .001).  
Failure to implement adequate safe systems of work was the most common 
antecedent selected by Safety Professionals (34.1%) and Managers (21.8%). 
Accident Subjects also referred to inadequate systems of work (22.2%), along with 
Mary’s lack of attention (22.2%) as being inactive causes and to the presence of the 
hazard (75%) as being an active cause of the trip accident.  
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Table 11.                                                                                             
Proportion of respondents changing an action or inaction in 
their causal sentence  
 N Action 
% 
Inaction 
% 
Slips    
Safety 
Professional  
147 14.3 85.7 
Manager  47 10.6 89.4 
Accident Subject 52 9.6 90.4 
 246   
Trips    
Safety 
Professional  
 
124 26.6 73.4 
Manager  47 23.4 76.6 
Accident Subject  50 60.0 40.0 
 221   
 
Addition or Subtraction 
The counterfactual sentence could be completed by either adding or subtracting an 
antecedent. The concept of addition and subtraction was extended to the prevention 
and causal sentences, where an addition might also be described as something that 
was more than expected with something which was less than expected being coded 
as a subtraction.  
Addition or subtraction in the counterfactual sentence 
A strong addition effect was found with 83% of respondents completing their 
counterfactual sentence by adding in a new antecedent to bring about their 
alternative outcome (Safety Professionals 88%, Managers 89% and Accident 
Subjects 70.4%). The effect was constant for slips χ2 (2) = 23.62 p < .001 and trips 
χ2 (2) = 14.03  p = .001 and the results are presented in Table 12. 
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Respondents from all three job groups completed the slip scenario counterfactual 
sentence by adding in a new antecedent event significantly more than they removed 
one (Safety Professionals 98.3%  χ2 (1) = 162.21,  p < .001, Managers 93.5%  χ2  
(1) = 47.03,  p < .001 and Accident Subjects 81.2%  χ2 (1) = 26.79,  p < .001).  
Improved warnings were the most common antecedent selected for change by 
respondents from all three job groups (24.3% of Safety Professionals, 34.7% of 
Managers and 25.5% of Accident Subjects). 
Safety Professionals and Managers also showed a strong tendency to add in a new 
antecedent when completing the counterfactual sentence for Mary’s trip accident 
(Safety Professionals – trip 78.1%  χ2 (1) = 58.96,  p < .001 and Managers – trip  
85.9%  χ2 (1) = 36.63, p < .001). However Accident Subjects showed no preference 
for adding (59.7%) or subtracting (40.3%) an antecedent (χ2 (1) = 2.52, p = .112).  
Safety Professionals (29.9%) and Managers (28.6%) both added an antecedent 
relating to the hazard in their trip counterfactual sentences, most commonly 
referring to a missing behaviour which would have removed the hazard. Accident 
Subjects’ responses were quite different as they were as likely to have used an 
additive counterfactual as a subtractive counterfactual but whichever they used they 
were focused on Mary, with 37.9% suggesting Mary should have paid greater 
attention to where she was walking (additive counterfactual) or 54.2% saying she 
should not have agreed to cover for her friend’s holiday (subtractive 
counterfactual). 
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Table 12.                                                                                                       
Proportion of respondents adding or subtracting an antecedent in 
their counterfactual sentence 
 N Addition  
% 
Subtraction 
% 
Slips    
Safety 
Professional  
171 98.3 1.7 
Manager  58 93.5 6.5 
Accident Subject  56 81.2 18.8 
 285   
Trips    
Safety 
Professional  
 
146 78.1 21.9 
Manager  61 85.9 14.1 
Accident Subject  40 59.7 40.3 
 247   
 
Addition or subtraction in the prevention sentence  
A strong addition effect was identified for the completion of the sentences 
preventing Mary’s slip and trip accident and the results are presented in Table 13.  
Overall 92% of respondents completed the prevention sentence by adding or 
increasing something to prevent Mary’s accident (99% for slips and 85% for trips).  
The use of an addition in the prevention sentence was significantly higher than the 
use of a subtraction and Table 13 shows that trend for Safety Professionals (slips: 
98.8%  χ2 (1) = 154.09, p < .001 and trips: 91.3%  χ2 (1) = 117.23, p < .001),  
Managers (slips: 98.3% χ2 (1) = 56.07,  p < .001 and trips: 92.4% χ2 (1) = 47.51, p 
< .001) and for Accident Subjects (slips was 100% and trips was 72.3% χ2 (1) = 
12.94, p < .001).  
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 The antecedents most commonly referred to in the respondents’ sentences to 
prevent Mary’s slip accident were improved systems of work by 48.5% of Safety 
Professionals, improved warnings by 32.5% of Managers and clearing up the 
spillage was used by 23.3% of Accident Subjects. Safety Professionals also referred 
to improved systems of work when seeking to prevent Mary’s trip accident 
(26.3%), but Managers and Accident Subjects were likely to use one of a number of 
possible preventative strategies, and for Managers these included improved systems 
of work (19.6%), housekeeping (17.9%) and the removal of the hazard (16.1%). 
Accident Subjects tended to select antecedents that related to the removal of the 
hazard (16.2%), improved housekeeping (13.5%), and improved response time 
(13.5%). 
Table 13.                                                                                              
Proportion of respondents who prevented the accident by adding or 
subtracting an antecedent 
 N Addition  
% 
Subtraction 
% 
Slips     
Safety 
Professional  
160 98.8 1.2 
Manager  59 98.3 1.7 
Accident Subject 71 100 0 
 293   
Trips    
Safety 
Professional  
 
172 91.3 8.7 
Manager  66 92.4 7.6 
Accident Subject  47 72.3 27.7 
 303   
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Addition or subtraction in the causal sentence  
A significant majority of all respondents completed the causal sentence for both slip 
and trip accidents in a way which indicted the cause of Mary’s accident was 
attributed to something which was subtractive or ‘less than expected’ (Table 14). 
There was no divergence between any of the job groups when completing the 
causal sentence following a slip accident, all referred to the cause as being 
subtractive in nature - 84.5% of Safety Professionals (χ2 (1) = 80.09, p < .001), 81% 
of Managers (χ2 (1) = 22.34,  p < .001) and 77.8% of Accident Subjects (χ2 (1) = 
19.44 p < .001.   
Safety Professionals (78.1% ,  χ2 (1) = 57.97,  p < .001) and Managers (79.7%,   χ2 
(1) = 22.56,  p < .001)  also completed the trip scenario sentence by referring to 
something which was less than expected. There was no significant difference in the 
proportion of Accident Subjects who referred to the cause of Mary’s accident as 
being something which was more than expected (43.3%) or less than expected 
(56.7%,  χ2  (1) = 1.06,  p = .302). 
A wide range of antecedents were identified as being the cause of Mary’s accident 
with no common approach being adopted by respondents or for different types of 
accidents. Safety Professionals selected inadequate systems of work as being the 
cause of Mary’s slip (52.8%), whilst preferring to refer to poor standards of 
housekeeping (29.5%) or the presence of the box (hazard) for Mary’s trip. 
Managers considered the slow response time by the Cleaner (30.6%) and 
inadequate systems of work to be the causes of Mary’s slip accident, and 
inadequate systems of work (25.6%) as being the cause of her trip accident. As 
Accident Subjects considered antecedents which were both additive and subtractive 
to be causal they referred to the presence of the box (hazard) as being additive i.e. 
more than expected, and subtractive (less than expected) antecedents including 
inadequate systems of work (14.3%), the failure to remove the box, (14.3%) and a 
lack of care as being causal (14.3%). 
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Table 14.                                                                                                                
Proportion of respondents identifying the cause of the accident as 
being an addition or subtraction 
Sentence element  N Addition 
% 
Subtraction 
 % 
Slips    
Safety Professional  168 15.5 84.5 
Manager  58 19.0 81 
Accident Subject 63 22.2 77.8 
 289   
Trips    
Safety Professional  183 21.9 78.1 
Manager  64 20.3 79.7 
Accident Subject  60 43.3 56.7 
 307   
 
Normal or exceptional events   
Norm Theory suggested that counterfactual thoughts focused on changing an 
unusual or exceptional antecedent to bring about the desired alternative outcome. 
The majority of previous research has confirmed this effect but a noteworthy 
exception was reported by Davis et al. (1995). 
In the current study a new categorisation of exceptional antecedent event types was 
developed and applied to the respondents’ sentences. In addition to the exceptional 
event described in the scenario (Mary’s decision to work on a Thursday to cover for 
her friend), three other classes of exceptional event were found to have been used 
by respondents. In this study normal events were not selected for counterfactual 
change by any of the respondents. The four new classes of exceptional event used 
in this study were as follows: 
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Scenario-based exceptions – first order exception  
Scenario-based exceptions arise when respondents select and mutate the exceptional 
event designed in to the scenario. In this study the sentence would have made 
reference to Mary’s decision to work on Thursday.   
Exception to an existing rule – second order exception  
Exceptions to an existing rule arise when the counterfactual sentence indicated that 
the outcome would have been different had some expected behaviour, standard or 
rule been followed. For example ‘If only I had been careful I might not have 
slipped’. In the prevention sentence the accident would not have occurred if 
existing rules and procedures were adhered to, and in the causal sentence an 
exception to an existing rule would have been indicated if the cause arose from a 
failure to follow an existing rule or procedure.  
New rule exception – third order exception  
A new rule exception arose when the counterfactual sentence created a new 
behaviour, standard or rule to bring about the alternative outcome. For example a 
counterfactual outcome would be achieved if only cleaning equipment had been 
provided in each aisle of the store, when this has not previously been the case. 
Similarly a new rule would be indicated in the prevention sentence where a 
completely new preventative approach is suggested. A causal sentence indicating 
that a previously unknown or novel cause had been identified would suggest a new 
set of rules applied to it. 
Improving an existing rule to increase the likelihood of the desired outcome 
– fourth order exception. 
This type of exception arose when the counterfactual sentence modified an existing 
behaviour, standard or rule in such a way that the desired outcome was more certain 
to be achieved than by simply applying the expected but unmodified behaviour, 
standard or rule (second order exception). If for example the Cleaner had a five 
minute response time to attend a spillage after it was reported, reducing this to two 
minutes would improve the prospect of preventing accidents. If an accident could 
have been prevented by improving an existing rule or procedure then that would be 
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an example of this type of exception. In a causal setting the failure to do something 
to a better or higher standard would be an exception of this type.  
 
The use of normal or exceptional events in the counterfactual sentence 
In the context of Mary’s slip or trip accident the counterfactual sentence was most 
commonly completed by changing an antecedent in a way which increased the 
probability of the desired outcome being realised over and above the unaltered 
antecedent (fourth order exception). See Table 15. 
Respondents who were given the slip scenario most commonly completed the 
counterfactual sentence in a way which made a change to an antecedent designed to 
improve the likelihood of their desired outcome being realised. This option was 
selected significantly more frequently than any of the other options with 63.2% of 
Safety Professionals (χ2 (3) = 153.03, p < .001), 67.2% of Managers (χ2 (3) = 62.73, 
p < .001) and 65.7% of Accident Subjects responding in this way (χ2 (3) =  32.09,  p 
< .001). In the main respondents thought that improved warnings about the spilt 
milk would have been improved the probability of a better outcome being achieved 
(Safety Professionals 31.3%, Managers 38.2% and Accident Subjects 32.5%). 
A different outcome to Mary’s trip accident was also proposed by 65.8% of Safety 
Professionals (χ2 (3) = 177.98  p < .001) and 57.7% of Managers (χ2 (3) = 47.50 p < 
.001) by completing the counterfactual sentence in a way which sought to increase 
the probability of bringing about the desired alternative outcome. However no 
significant difference (χ2 (1) = .020  p = .886) was found between Accident 
Subjects’ choices of rectifying a breach of an existing rule or norm (38.5% second 
order exception) or by changing the antecedent to be more sure that the desired 
outcome could be achieved (36.9%, fourth order exception). 
The specific antecedents that respondents selected were influenced by the type of 
accident. A different outcome to Mary’s slip accident was believed to be most 
likely if warnings were improved (Safety Professionals 31.3%, Managers 38.2% 
and Accident Subjects 32.5%), whereas it was the removal of the hazard for Safety 
Professionals (52.1%) and Managers (51.4%) for Mary’s trip accident. Accident 
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Subjects selected Mary’s lack of attention (45%) when they brought about a 
different outcome based on an expectation to an expected norm. Clearly Accident 
Subjects expected Mary to have exercised care and attributed the trip to her failure 
to do so, however when Accident Subjects thought about improving the likelihood 
of the better outcome they also focused on the removal of the box (44.4%) in the 
same ways as Safety Professionals and Managers did. 
Table 15.  
The proportion of respondents selecting types of exceptional event in their 
counterfactual sentence  
 N Scenario 
exception 
% 
Existing 
rule 
exception 
% 
New 
rule 
% 
Improve 
likelihood 
of 
outcome 
% 
Slips      
Safety  
Professional 
  
174 1.1 12.1 23.6 63.2 
Manager  
 
61 1.6 21.3 9.8 67.2 
Accident  
Subject  
37 13.4 20.9 0 65.7 
 302     
Trips      
Safety  
Professional 
  
187 1.1 17.6 15.5 65.8 
Manager  
 
71 1.4 21.1 19.7 57.7 
Accident  
Subject  
65 20 38.5 4.6 36.9 
 323     
 
The use of normal or exceptional events in the prevention sentence 
Managers and Accident Subjects used a single strategy to prevent both Mary’s slip 
and her trip accident, which involved taking steps to improve the identification and 
management of hazards leading to a reduced risk of an accident (fourth order 
exception). It was noticeable that when seeking to prevent an accident Managers 
and Accident Subjects did not rely on existing rules but sought to improve on them 
to be more certain of avoiding accidents (Table 16). 
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For Mary’s slip accident this approach was adopted by 60% of Managers (χ2 (2) = 
20.80 p < .001) and 78.3% of Accident Subjects (χ2  (2) = 65.30 p < .001) and for 
her trip accident by 58% of Managers (χ2 (2) = 23.74 p < .001) and 62.5%  of 
Accident Subjects (χ2 (2) = 27.87 p < .001). 
 
Managers primarily sought to prevent Mary’s slip accident by improved warnings 
(32.1%), whilst Accident Subjects prevention sentences generally referred to 
improved warnings (19.1%) and a quicker response by the Cleaner (19.1%). 
Different prevention antecedents were used for Marys’ trip accident with 32.4% of 
Managers mentioning improved housekeeping whilst 30.6% of Accident Subjects 
removed the box from the scenario.  
Safety Professionals were found to identify two types of exceptional event to 
change when seeking to prevent Mary’s slip accident but one when preventing her 
trip accident. Following a slip accident 48.5% of Safety Professionals established a 
new rule (third order exception), which was mainly based on the system of work 
(42.9%), with 41.9% seeking an improvement to an existing rule (fourth order 
exception) which typically involved better warning signs (33.3%). A single 
approach was adopted for Mary’s trip accident with 56.6% of Safety Professionals 
electing to improve an existing rule to prevent it (fourth order exception,  χ2 (1) 
8.10 p = .004). The specific antecedent in this instance related to improved 
standards of housekeeping with 30.4% of Safety Professionals adopting this 
approach (Table 16). 
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Table 16.  
Proportion of respondents selecting types of exceptional events in their 
prevention sentence 
 N Scenario 
exception 
% 
Existing 
rule 
exception 
% 
New 
rule 
% 
Improve 
likelihood 
of 
outcome 
% 
Slips       
Safety 
Professional  
167 0 9.6 48.5 41.9 
Manager  60 0 13.3 26.7 60 
Accident 
Subject 
69 0 18.8 2.9 78.3 
 296     
Trips      
Safety 
Professional 
  
182 0 7.1 36.3 56.6 
Manager  
 
69 0 10.1 31.9 58.0 
Accident 
Subject  
64 0 28.1 9.4 62.5 
 315     
 
The use of normal or exceptional events in the causal sentence 
Safety Professionals differentiated between slips and trips when completing their 
causal sentences identifying two types of cause for slips and one for trips (Table 
17). The causes of slips were either an exception to an existing rule (second order 
exception 38.6%) or failing to do something more effective to reduce the risk 
(fourth order exception 39.2%). There was no difference in the proportion of Safety 
Professionals who chose either of these type of cause (χ2 (1) = 7.686 p = .006). On 
the other hand the cause of Mary’s trip accident was seen by Safety Professionals as 
having its origin in failing to do something more effective to reduce the risk (fourth 
order exception 50.3% ,  χ2 (1) =  3.834  p = .05). The presence of the hazard 
(spillage of milk) was the specific antecedent most often referred to by Safety 
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Professionals (45.1%) in their causal sentences as being an exception to an existing 
rule, and to inadequate safety systems of work (53.5%) when the causal exception 
was one where it related to failing to do more. 
Managers used two main approaches (Table 17) when completing the causal 
sentence for Mary’s accident. They identified exceptions to existing rules (second 
order exceptions) and failures to take steps to improve the management of the 
situation (fourth order exceptions), in other words failing to prevent the accident by 
doing something more effective to reduce the risk, but they used these options in 
different ways depending on the type of accident. The cause of Mary’s slip accident 
was predominately identified as arising from an exception to an existing rule 
(52.5%), that is to say something that was expected to be done wasn’t or something 
unexpected was done, and this was identified significantly more often than the 
other causes in Table 17 (χ2 (2) = 18.03 p < .001). This most often referred to the 
presence of the spillage (40%). 
Mary’s trip accident was attributed to two types of exceptional event, namely an 
exception to an existing rule (second order exception 44.6%) and failing to prevent 
the accident by doing something more effective to reduce the risk (fourth order 
exception 44.6%). There was no significant difference in the rate that Managers 
identified  these causes (χ2 (2) = 12.98, p = .002). Managers clearly expected Mary 
to have been paying attention as her lack of attention was identified by 40% of 
Managers as being an exception to an existing rule (second order exception). Not 
having a quick enough response by the Cleaner was the antecedent used by 29.4% 
of Managers when expressing the cause as failing to have done more to stop the 
accident (fourth order exception).  
Accident Subjects used a single approach when identifying the cause of Mary’s 
accident, that being an exception to an existing rule (second order exception). 
61.7% of Accident Subjects completed the causal sentence in this way for Mary’s 
slip accident and 62.3% for her trip accident. In both cases this related to the 
presence of the hazard and was selected significantly more than the second choice 
causal antecedent in Table 17 (slips χ2 (1) = 5.786  p = .016, and trips χ2 (1) = 6.33 p 
= .012).  
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Table 17.  
Proportion of respondents selecting types of exceptional events in their 
causal sentence 
 N Scenario 
exception 
% 
Existing 
rule 
exception 
% 
New 
rule 
% 
Improve 
likelihood 
of 
outcome 
% 
Slips      
Safety 
Professional  
166 0 38.6 22.3 39.2 
Manager  59 0 52.5 8.5 39.0 
Accident 
Subject 
60 0 61.7 6.7 31.7 
 285     
Trips      
Safety 
Professional  
 
187 0 36.9 12.8 50.3 
Manager  67 0 44.6 10.8 44.6 
Accident 
Subject  
61 0 62.3 6.6 31.1 
 315     
 
Temporal position of the antecedent 
The temporal position of the antecedent leading up to Mary’s accident was 
identified from the respondents’ sentences and coded against 11 stages. Full details 
of all the stages used in this study is given in Table 82 in Appendix 1, but a brief 
summary of the 11 antecedent stages is given here in Table 18 for ease of reference.  
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Table 18.                                                                                                       
Summary of antecedent events leading to Mary’s accident 
Before 
Stage A  
Mary agrees to cover for her friend.  
Stage A Mary goes for her usual mid-morning rest break. 
Stage B Mary waited for her friend on the next checkout and they both 
walked along the front of the checkouts towards the staff room.   
Stage C Milk had been spilt on the floor / A box had been left on the floor. 
Stage D  The spillage / box had been reported five minutes ago. The 
Cleaner had been requested to clear up but had not got round to it.  
Stage E Mary did not see the milk / box on the floor. 
Stage F Mary stepped on the milk /  box. 
Stage G Mary slipped on the milk / tripped on the box. 
Stage H Mary lost her balance and fell over. 
Stage I Mary fell awkwardly, hurting her right arm. 
Stage J  Mary was taken to hospital - (her wrist was strained and she will 
be off work for one day),  [her arm was x-rayed and found to be 
broken. She will be off work for three weeks]. 
 
Temporal position of the antecedent in the counterfactual sentence 
Not all 11 stages in the accident sequence were identified by respondents and some 
were only used very infrequently. To ensure that the χ2 test assumptions were met 
some stages were excluded from the analysis. Data analysed for slip accidents 
accounted for 96.7% of all responses with Stage A - Mary going for her break 
(0.3%) - and Stage E - Mary not seeing the hazard  (3%) - being excluded.  The trip 
accident data used in the analysis accounted for 91.8% of all the responses with 
Stage B - Mary waiting for her friend (1.5%) - and Stage D - the point where the 
hazard had been reported but before the Cleaner dealt with it (6.7%) - being 
excluded.   
The counterfactual sentences were found to relate to two main antecedent stages, 
those that occurred before the day of the accident (Before Stage A), and those at the 
point where the hazard had been reported but before the Cleaner dealt with it (Stage 
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D) and this pattern of responses was consistent across all three job groups (Table 
19).  
The tendency of respondents to focus on two main antecedent stages raised a 
question whether this might have been influenced by the experimental manipulation 
of the level of detail (minimum and maximum detail). It is possible that 
respondents with less information about Mary’s accident might have focused their 
attention on Mary’s decision to cover for her friend and change things that 
happened earlier in the sequence of events (Before Stage A), whist the additional 
information contained in the maximum detail versions of the scenarios might have 
allowed a greater opportunity to select an antecedent later in the sequence, for 
example at Stage D - the point where the hazard had been reported but before the 
Cleaner dealt with it.  Further tests indicated that the level of detail had no effect on 
the respondents’ choice of antecedent stage. When selecting a stage in the sequence 
of events leading up to Mary’s slip accident respondents from all three job groups 
were most likely to focus their counterfactual attention at events happening at Stage 
D - the point where the hazard had been reported but before the Cleaner dealt with 
it. Respondents referred to antecedents at Stage D significantly more than they 
referred to antecedents that occurred before the day of the accident -  56.2% of 
Safety Professionals (χ2 (1) = 7.803 p = .005), 69.5%  of Managers (χ2 (1) = 13.255 
p < .001) and 65.5% of  Accident Subjects (χ2 (1) = 10.796 p = .001).  
Following Mary’s slip accident respondents from all three job groups referred most 
commonly to inadequate warnings specifically (32.3% of Safety Professionals, 
42.5% of Managers and 31.4% of Accident Subjects). 
The counterfactual sentences for Mary’s trip accident revealed a different picture. 
There was no difference in the frequency with which Managers or Accident 
Subjects selected events that happened before the day of the accident (Before Stage 
A) or at Stage D - the point where the hazard had been reported but before the 
Cleaner dealt with it (Managers χ2 (1) = 1.42 p = .233, Accident Subjects χ2 (1) =  
1.78 p = .182) - but Safety Professionals showed  a clear preference  (χ2 (1) =  4.56 
p = .033) to select an antecedent that occurred before the day of the accident 
(Before Stage A) which most frequently related to inadequate systems of work.  
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Managers’ and Accident Subjects’ counterfactual sentences at Stage D (the point 
where the hazard had been reported but before the Cleaner dealt with it) related to 
the presence of the hazard with 50% of Managers and 36.4% of Accident Subjects 
doing so. However different antecedents were selected by Managers and Accident 
Subjects when their counterfactual sentences related to the time before the day of 
the accident (Before Stage A), with 38% of Managers mutating an action or an 
inaction of someone, whilst 81.3% of Accident Subjects mutated Mary’s decision 
to cover for her friend. 
 Temporal position of the antecedent in the prevention sentence 
When asked how Mary’s accident could have been prevented respondents focused 
on three stages, before the day of the accident (Before Stage A) , the hazard on the 
floor (Stage C)  and the point where the hazard had been reported but before the 
Cleaner dealt with it (Stage D). These stages accounted for 96.7% of responses for 
slips and 94.5% for trips  
Table 20 presents the prevention sentence results for the three stages. For Mary’s 
trip accident the most common stage selected, irrespective of job group, was Before 
Stage A (before the day of the accident). This was selected by 81.5% of Safety 
Professionals, 71% of Managers and 40.4% of Accident Subjects. For Safety 
Professionals and Managers this choice was made significantly more frequently 
than their respective second choices – Stage D for Safety Professionals (the point 
where the hazard had been reported but before the Cleaner dealt with it,  χ2 (1) =  
101.54 p < .001) and at Stage C for Managers (the hazard on the floor,  χ2 (1) = 
27.58 p < .001). Accident Subjects also selected an antecedent occurring before the 
day of the accident (Before Stage A) most commonly, but this stage was no more 
frequently used than either Stage C (the hazard on the floor) or Stage D - the point 
where the hazard had been reported but before the Cleaner dealt with it. (χ2 (2) 1.68 
p = .431). 
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Table 19. 
Proportion of respondents selecting antecedent stages in 
their counterfactual sentences 
  N  Before 
Stage 
A % 
Stage C 
% 
Stage D 
% 
Slips     
Safety 
Professional  
171 35.7 8.2 56.2 
Manager  59 23.7 6.8 69.5 
Accident 
Subject 
55 23.6 10.9 65.5 
 285    
Trips     
Safety 
Professional  
 
183 44.3 25.1 30.6 
Manager  68 48.5 16.2 35.3 
     
Accident 
Subject  
49 44.9 26.5 28.6 
 300    
 
Where the sentences referred to antecedents temporally located before the day of 
the accident (Before Stage A), all three job groups focused on the same two specific 
subjects, which were improved standards of housekeeping and improved systems of 
work, but the rate of selection differed slightly (Safety Professionals: housekeeping 
30.5%, improved systems of work 28.9%; Managers: housekeeping 20.9%, 
improved systems of work 25.6%; and Accident Subjects: housekeeping 28.6%, 
improved systems of work 23.8%). Accident Subjects also identified prevention 
opportunities at Stage C (the hazard on the floor) where 70.6% of sentences 
referred to the hazard and its removal and Stage D (where the hazard had been 
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reported but before the Cleaner dealt with it) where the prevention sentences were 
most likely to reflect the inadequate response time by the Cleaner (35.7%). 
 A different pattern emerged for the selection of antecedent stages for the 
prevention of Mary’s slip accident. Safety Professionals selected events that 
happened before the day of the accident (Before Stage A) significantly more 
frequently than those at Stage D (χ2 (1) = 24.96  p < .001). These sentences were 
likely to refer to improvements in the implementation of safe systems of work 
(65.9%).   
 
There was no significant difference in the proportion of Managers who selected an 
antecedent before the day of the accident (Before Stage A) or an antecedent at 
Stage D - the point where the hazard had been reported but before the Cleaner dealt 
with it, both these stages were selected by 46.4% of Managers. Their prevention 
sentences focused on improvements to the systems of work when temporally 
located before the day of the accident and on improved warnings when located at 
Stage D. 
 
For Accident Subjects there was only one real point in the antecedent chain where 
Mary’s slip accident could be prevented, and that was at Stage D - the point where 
the hazard had been reported but before the Cleaner dealt with it. 73.5% of 
Accident Subjects chose this point to prevent the accident and this was significantly 
more than either Stage C (the hazard was on the floor ) or Before Stage A (before 
the day of the accident) - χ2  (2) = 49.44 p < .001.   26.1% of Accident Subjects 
mentioned that Mary’s accident could have been prevented had the hazard (spillage 
or box) been cleaned up.  
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Table 20.                                                                                        
Proportion of respondents selecting antecedent stages in their 
prevention sentences 
  N Before 
Stage A 
% 
Stage C 
% 
Stage D 
% 
 
Slips      
Safety 
Professional  
167 64.7 7.8 27.5 
Manager  56 46.4 7.1 46.4 
Accident 
Subject 
68 13.2 13.2 73.5 
 291    
Trips     
Safety 
Professional  
184 81.5 8.2 10.3 
Manager  69 71 15.9 13 
Accident 
Subject  
57 40.4 33.3 26.3 
 310    
 
Temporal position of the antecedent in the causal sentence 
Respondents’ causal sentences focused on three stages for Mary’s slip accident but 
on four stages for Mary’s trip accident.  A very small number of respondents 
focused on other stages but these were discarded to ensure that the χ2 test 
assumptions were met. For Mary’s slip the results presented in Table 21 
represented 92.3% of all responses (the discarded data covered Stage B 0.3%, Stage 
E 3.9%, Stage F 0.3%, Stage G 2.6% Stage H 0.3% and Stage I 0.3% ). For Mary’s 
trip accident the results presented in Table 21 are for 98.8% of all responses 
(discarded data was for Stage B 0.6%, Stage G 0.3% and Stage J 0.3%). 
Safety Professionals were consistent in locating the cause of Mary’s accident at a 
point that occurred before the day on which it happened (Before Stage A) for both 
slips and trips (60.1% for slips  χ2  (2) = 54.46 p < .001 and 66.5% for trips χ2  (3) = 
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187.36 p < .001). Nearly seventy per cent (69.6%) of Safety Professionals referred 
to inadequate systems of work as causing Mary’s slip accident, whilst only 33.3% 
referred to inadequate systems of work as being a cause of Mary’s trip accident, 
along with inadequate housekeeping (34.3%). 
Managers were more likely to have referred to the cause of Mary’s slip accident as 
being at one of two stages. Over fifty per cent (52.5%) of Managers completed their 
slip scenario sentence focusing on events at Stage D (the point where the hazard 
had been reported but before the Cleaner dealt with it), whilst 33.9% of Managers 
focused on a events that occurred before the day of the accident (Before Stage A). 
There was no statistical difference in the proportion of Managers who selected 
these two stages (χ2  (1) = 2.378 p = .123). In contrast 55.7% of Managers 
completed the causal sentence for Mary’s trip by referring to events that occurred 
before the day of the accident (Before Stage A). This was significantly more than 
the 27.1%  who selected Stage C (χ2  (1) = 6.90 p = .009). When Managers’ causal 
sentences were temporally located before the day of the accident (Before Stage A) 
they were most likely to relate to inadequate systems of work for both slips (58.3%) 
and trips (33.3%). However when Managers located the cause of Mary’s slip at 
Stage D (the point where the hazard had been reported but before the Cleaner dealt 
with it) the sentence most commonly made reference to the inadequate response 
time by the Cleaner (38.5%) or to the presence of the milk on the floor (34.6%). 
When Accident Subjects completed the causal sentences for Mary’s slip accident 
two stages were used equally frequently, 40% used Stage C (hazard on the floor) 
and 41.5% used Stage D - the point where the hazard had been reported but before 
the Cleaner dealt with it (χ2 (1) = .019,  p = .891) but for the trip accident it was 
Stage C, where the hazard was on the floor, that was used by 51.6% of Accident 
Subject and this was a significantly greater proportion than the 26.6% who selected 
events occurring before the day of the accident (Before Stage A) (χ2 (1) = 5.12  p = 
.024). When Accident Subjects selected a causal antecedent at Stage C (the hazard 
was on the floor) their sentences most commonly referred to the hazard itself for 
both slips (70.8%) and trips (74.2%). Stage D (the point where the hazard had been 
reported but before the Cleaner dealt with it) was only used by Accident Subjects in 
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connection with Mary’s slip accident and in 40% of cases their causal sentences 
referred to the failure to clear up the spillage. 
Table 21.                                                                                                  
Proportion of respondents selecting antecedent stages in their causal 
sentences 
 N  Before 
Stage A 
% 
Stage C 
% 
Stage D  
% 
 
Stage E 
 % 
 
Slips      
Safety 
Professional  
158 60.1 13.9 25.9 N/A 
Manager  59 33.9 13.6 52.5 N/A 
Accident 
Subject 
65 18.5 40.0 41.5 N/A 
 282     
Trips      
Safety 
Professional 
  
191 66.5 20.9 8.9 3.7 
Manager  70 55.7 27.1 8.6 8.6 
Accident 
Subject  
64 26.6 51.6 9.4 12.5 
 325     
 
Control over the selected antecedent 
Previous counterfactual literature has explored the role of control, with many 
studies showing that people make changes to events over which they had personal 
control. This study extended the idea that in real life situations, such as are 
experienced in the working environment and particularly where there has been an 
accident or other unwanted outcome, different degrees of control are reflected in 
the structure of people’s counterfactual thoughts.  
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In the current study control is expressed from two different perspectives, the first 
being a personal perspective adopted by Accident Subjects, and the second being a 
public perspective that was adopted by both Managers and Safety Professionals.  
These different roles were expected to highlight different control strategies. Three 
coding options were developed to analyse the structure of the sentences - direct 
control, indirect control and uncontrollable. Direct control related to sentences 
where the focal actor had personal control over the antecedent which was changed. 
For example Mary had direct control over her decision to cover for her friend’s 
holiday leave. The other coding used for control was indirect control and was used 
to identify changes where the focal actor had influence over an antecedent but 
could not have made changes to it directly or personally. For example the Store 
Manager would have had responsibility for, and therefore indirect control over, the 
development and implementation of safe systems of work. In the context of this 
study indirect control is analogous to having a legal responsibility. The law often 
places duties on people to achieve a stated objective or standard but that is only 
achieved through the actions of others in the organisation. The third coding option 
related to uncontrollable antecedents where the focal actor had no possibility of 
exercising control either directly or indirectly. 
The degree of control exercised by the scenario actor in the counterfactual 
sentence 
Table 22 sets out the responses from the three job groups. In general the 
counterfactual sentences followed pervious research as they involved making 
changes to antecedents which were controllable by the focal actor (both directly or 
indirectly) more than they focused on completely uncontrollable antecedents.  
When completing the counterfactual sentence for Mary’s slip accident 46.1% of 
Safety Professionals changed an antecedent over which the focal actor had direct 
control, whilst 40.7% made a change to an antecedent over which the focal actor 
had indirect control. There was no significant difference in the proportion of Safety 
Professionals using either of these options (χ2 (1) = .559 p = .455). The specific 
antecedent that was selected by Safety Professionals was related to the type of 
control. For example, inadequate response times were more often associated with 
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direct control (57%) than indirect control (29%), whereas as antecedent relating to 
inadequate systems of work was more usually associated with indirect control 
(65%) than direct control (21%).  
For some unknown reason when Safety Professionals were thinking about 
counterfactual control and Mary’s trip accident they were as likely to attribute 
counterfactual control equally to directly controllable, indirectly controllable and 
uncontrollable antecedents (χ2 (2) = 2.06 p = .356). On further examination of these 
results it was found that Safety Professionals were most likely to judge the presence 
of the hazard to be uncontrollable when the focal actor was the company safety 
officer. Whilst this is a realistic view it is nevertheless unexpected. Safety 
Professionals had the freedom to select the counterfactual antecedent and then 
attribute it to a number of possible scenario actors, so it is difficult to explain why 
they should link a perfectly sensible antecedent to a person who had no control over 
it. When Safety Practitioners selected a directly controllable antecedent it was most 
likely to relate to inadequate warnings and be under the control of the Store 
Supervisor, whilst indirectly controllable antecedents were most likely to be 
attributed to the Employer and relate to systems of work, both of which appear to 
be in keeping with Safety Professionals’ expectations based on the law and good 
practice.  
Managers made changes to controllable events (direct or indirect) more than they 
changed uncontrollable ones, but there were differences between slips and trips. 
Fifty nine per cent of Managers who completed the counterfactual sentence 
following a slip accident made a change to an event over which the focal actor had 
direct control and this was significantly more than the 26.2% who selected an event 
over which the focal actor had indirect control (χ2(1) = 7.70 p = .006). Managers 
typically attributed direct control to the Store Supervisor over specific antecedents 
such as the inadequate response time and inadequate warnings.  
However when Managers undid the outcome of Mary’s trip accident they were 
equally likely to select events over which the focal actor had direct control (47.1%) 
or indirect control (35.7%) (χ2 (1) = 1.10  p = .294). The selection of  two types of 
control was consistent with the specific antecedent being changed to bring about the 
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alternative outcome. For example, Managers selecting an antecedent relating to the 
presence of the hazard believed the Store Supervisor had direct control, however 
when Managers referred to standards of housekeeping this was usually associated 
with either the Store Manager or the Supervisor, who had indirect control over the 
matter. 
Accident Subjects chose to change antecedents over which their focal scenario 
actor had direct control following both Mary’s slip accident (52.3%) and trip 
accident (84.1%). Direct control was selected significantly more frequently than 
indirect control for both types of accident (slips χ2 (1) = 6.48  p = .011 and trips χ2 
(1) = 41.67 p < .001). Accident Subjects most commonly changed Mary’s decision 
to work on that day and that was something Mary had direct control over. 
The degree of control exercised by the scenario actor in the prevention 
sentence 
Table 23 presents the results for the type of control exercised by the scenario actor 
in the respondents’ prevention sentences.  
Safety Professionals selected antecedents which were under indirect control most 
frequently for both Mary’s slip and trip accidents. Fifty eight per cent (58.8%)  
attributed indirect control to the scenario actor following Mary’s slip accident and  
this was significantly higher than the proportion (31.3%) who attributed direct 
control ( χ2 (1) = 13.44 p < .001), similarly 63.6% of Safety Practitioners attributed 
indirect control to the scenario actor following Mary’s trip accident and this was 
significantly greater than the 26.1% who thought the scenario actor had direct 
control over the means to prevent the accident ( χ2 (1) = 27.57 p < .001). Safety 
Professionals most commonly completed the slip accident prevention sentence by 
referring to indirectly controllable antecedents such as improving safe systems of 
work (55.3%) being attributed to the Employer as the scenario actor. For trip 
accidents they focused strongly on improving systems of work (26%), but also on 
improved standards of housekeeping (25%) both of which relate to the Employer 
and Store Manager as the focal actors. The focus of Safety Professionals on 
prevention through indirect control by the Employer and Store Manager of safe 
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systems of work and housekeeping is predictable given their role under the Health 
& Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (HMSO, 1974).  
Table 22.                                                                                               
Type of control attributed to the scenario actor by respondents 
in their counterfactual sentence 
 N Direct 
control 
% 
Indirect 
control 
% 
No 
control 
% 
Counterfactual 
sentence for 
slips 
    
Safety 
Professional  
167 46.1 40.7 13.2 
Manager  61 59.0 26.2 14.8 
Accident 
Subject  
65 52.3 24.6 23.1 
 293    
Counterfactual 
sentence for 
trips 
    
Safety 
Professional  
 
183 36.6 35.0 28.4 
Manager  70 47.1 35.7 17.1 
Accident 
Subject  
65 84.1 7.7 7.7 
 318    
 
Managers’ prevention strategies were equally likely to be under the direct control of 
the scenario focal actor as they were to be under indirect control, and this was the 
same for both Mary’s slip accident as it was for her trip accident. For slips 
Managers attributed direct control in 48.2% of cases and indirect control for 42.9% 
of cases (χ2 (1) = .176 p = .674). The position was much the same for Mary’s trip 
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accident with 34.4% of Managers attributing  direct control to the scenario actor 
and 51.6% selecting indirect control (χ2 (1) =  2.20 p = .138).  
Following Mary’s slip accident Managers believed the Cleaner (41%) had direct 
control over the response time (35.3%), and where there was indirect control 
(40.0%) felt that improved warnings were under the Store Manager’s (50%) 
indirect control.  
Managers seeking to prevent Mary’s trip accident considered that improvements to 
the working procedures (30%) were directly controllable by the Store Supervisor 
(45%). Where Managers referred to improved housekeeping (25.8%) that was 
under the indirect control of the Store Manager (32.3%).  
Accident Subjects also selected direct and indirect controllable antecedents to 
prevent Mary’s slip accident (direct control 52.2%, indirect control 32.8%,  χ2 (1) = 
2.0 p = .157).  
Accident Subjects’ slip prevention sentences were most likely to refer to the 
Cleaner as having direct control over cleaning up the milk more quickly (20.0%), 
whilst the need for better warnings (25.0%) was associated with the indirect control 
of the Store Supervisor.  
Accident Subjects were most likely to prevent Mary’s trip accident by selecting 
antecedents over which the scenario actor had direct control (60.9% direct control,  
25.0% using indirect control χ2 (1) = 9.62  p = .002). The Store Supervisor was 
selected by 25.9% of Accident Subjects as having direct control over the presence 
of the box.  
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Table 23.                                                                                             
Type of control attributed to the scenario actor by respondents 
in their prevention sentence 
 N Direct 
control 
% 
Indirect 
control 
% 
No 
control 
% 
Slips      
Safety 
Professional  
160 31.3 58.8 10 
Manager  56 48.2 42.9 8.9 
Accident 
Subject 
67 52.2 32.8 14.9 
 283    
Trips     
Safety 
Professional  
 
176 26.1 63.6 10.2 
Manager  64 34.4 51.6 14.1 
Accident 
Subject  
64 60.9 25.0 14.1 
 304    
 
The degree of control exercised by the scenario actor in the causal sentence 
Table 24 presents the results for the type of control exercised by the scenario actor 
over the specific causal antecedent. According to Safety Professionals the cause of 
Mary’s slip accident was subject to indirect control by the scenario actor. Just over 
half of Safety Professionals (57.2%) completed the causal sentence in this way, as 
compared to 24.7% who responded with direct control over the causal antecedent 
(χ2 (1) = 21.44  p < .001). Safety Professionals most frequently referred to the 
presence of the hazard (spilt milk) as being the cause (30.0%) and Mary as the 
scenario actor having indirect control (30.0%). A more balanced approach was 
taken by Safety Professionals when identifying the cause of Mary’s trip accident, 
with 49.7% referring to an antecedent subject to indirect control and 36.5% direct 
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control (χ2 (1) 3.70 p = .055). Safety Professionals directed their attention towards 
the presence of the hazard (box) (31.5%) and another worker as having direct 
control, and to standards of housekeeping (32.5%) and systems of work (32.5%) as 
being subject to indirect control by the Store Supervisor and the employer.   
Managers’ responses indicated both direct and indirect control over the causes of 
Mary’s slip and trip accident. Following Mary’s slip accident there was no 
significant difference in the proportion of Managers referring to indirect control 
over causal antecedents (49.2%) and those referring to direct control (35.6%)  (χ2 
(1) = 1.28  p = .258). Similar proportions were observed for trips, with 45.5% of 
Managers referring to direct control and 36.4% to indirect control (χ2 (1) = .667 p = 
.414).  
Typically direct control by the Cleaner or Supervisor was associated with the 
presence of the hazard for slip accidents (40%), whilst for the slip accident, indirect 
control by the Supervisor was seen by 34.8% of Managers to relate to response 
times .  
Managers considered Mary’s trip accident was due to a lack of attention which was 
under direct control (28%), or to systems of work (28.6%) or housekeeping (28.6%) 
which were under the indirect control of the Store Manager.  
Accident Subjects responding to Mary’s slip accident completed the causal 
sentence by referring to an antecedent which was equally likely to be under direct 
control (41.9%) as it was to be under indirect control (30.6%  χ2 (1) =1.09  p = 
.297). The antecedents most often referred to by Accident Subjects as being under 
direct control were the failure to clear up the milk (33.%) and the Cleaner’s slow 
response (28.6%). Where the antecedents were under indirect control they most 
commonly related to the presence of the hazard (28%) and the failure to clear up 
the milk (28%) with the Store Supervisor. 
Over half (56.9%) of Accident Subjects inferred that the scenario actor had direct 
control over the causal antecedent for Mary’s trip accident, with only 20% 
associating the scenario actor as having indirect control over the causal antecedent  
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(χ2 (1) = 11.52 p < .001) and were most likely to refer to the presence of the hazard 
(box) 41.4% and another worker. 
Table 24.                                                                                           
Type of control attributed to the scenario actor by respondents 
in their causal sentence 
 N Direct 
control 
% 
Indirect 
control 
% 
No control 
% 
Slips     
Safety 
Professional  
166 24.7 57.2 18.1 
Manager  59 35.6 49.2 15.3 
Accident 
Subject 
62 41.9 30.6 27.4 
 287    
Trips     
Safety 
Professional  
 
181 36.5 49.7 13.8 
Manager  66 45.5 36.4 18.2 
Accident 
Subject  
65 56.9 20 23.1 
 312    
 
Dynamic or Static Antecedents  
Previous research identified that dynamic antecedents, i.e. those that were in motion 
or varying, were more usually selected to be changed to bring about an alternative 
outcome than those that were static (passive, unchanged or still). In this study an 
antecedent which was observable was coded as being dynamic, whereas something 
which was not observable was coded as being static, so for example any reference 
to the milk, box or warning signs were coded as being dynamic, whereas the 
existence or otherwise of a documented safe system of work was coded as being 
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static because it was not observable or could not be established or verified without 
further enquiries. 
The use of dynamic or static antecedents in the counterfactual sentence 
The use of a dynamic or static antecedent when completing the counterfactual 
sentence was influenced by both the respondents’ job group and the type of 
accident, as shown in Table 25.  
For slip accidents a strong dynamic effect was identified for all three job groups 
(59.8% for Safety Professionals χ2 (1) = 6.644  p = .010, 73% for Managers χ2 (1) = 
13.35 p < .001 and 75.4% for Accident Subjects χ2 (1) = 17.75  p < .001). Dynamic 
antecedents included the lack of adequate warnings and the failure to clear up the 
spilt milk. Inadequate warnings were referred to by 30.8% of Safety Practitioners, 
37% of Managers and 25% of Accident Subjects, whilst the failure to clear up the 
spilt milk was referred to by 29.8% of Safety Practitioners, 21.7% of Managers and 
19.2% of Accident Subjects. 
Safety Professionals (64.9%,  χ2 (1) = 16.68 p < .001) continued to select dynamic 
antecedents when they completed their counterfactual sentences after Mary’s trip 
accident mainly referring to the presence of the hazard. 
In contrast there was no significant difference in the use of dynamic and static 
antecedent by Managers or Accident Subjects after Mary’s trip accident (Managers: 
54.9% dynamic and 45.1% static, χ2 (1) = 690  p = .406; Accident Subjects: 55.2% 
dynamic and 44.8% static, χ2 (1) = 731  p = .392). Their counterfactual sentences 
were most likely to refer to the presence of the hazard (box) as being dynamic 
(59.0% Managers and 43.2%  Accident Subjects), with the most likely static 
antecedents being an action or inaction by another person for 28.1% of Managers, 
with Mary’s lack of attention being used by 36.7% of Accident Subjects.  
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Table 25.                                                                                                 
Proportion of respondents selecting a dynamic or static antecedent 
in their counterfactual sentence 
 N  Dynamic 
% 
Static 
% 
Slips    
Safety 
Professional  
174 59.8 40.2 
Manager  63 73.0 27.0 
Accident Subject  69 75.4 24.6 
 306   
Trips    
Safety 
Professional 
  
188 64.9 35.1 
Manager  71 54.9 45.1 
Accident Subject  67 55.2 44.8 
 326   
 
The use of dynamic or static antecedents in the prevention sentence 
Each job group adopted a different approach to the use of static and dynamic 
antecedents when seeking to prevent Mary’s accident.  
After Marys slip accident Safety Professionals used more static antecedents 
(dynamic 40.2% & static 59.8%, χ2 (1) = 6.44 p = .01) whilst Accident Subjects 
used more dynamic antecedents’ (dynamic 74.6% & Static 25.4%  χ2  (1) = 17.25 p 
< .001). Managers showed no preference for either dynamic or static antecedents 
(dynamic 45.1% & static 54.1% χ2 (1) =  .410 p = .522 ). The results are presented 
in Table 26. 
Safety Professionals’ static antecedents focused on improving systems of work 
(67.5%). Accident Subjects used dynamic antecedents when completing their 
prevention sentences and referred to better clearing up of spills (20%), a quicker 
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response time (15.7%) and better warning (14.3%). Managers referred to improved 
warnings as being both dynamic (44%) and static antecedents (31.7%).  
Following Mary’s trip accident an identical pattern of responses was used, with 
Safety Professionals preferring static antecedents (59.8% χ2  (1) = 4.98  p = .027), 
Accident Subjects using more dynamic antecedents (62.1%  χ2 (1) = 3.88, p = .049) 
and Managers using both dynamic and static antecedents equally (51.4% dynamic, 
48.6% static, χ2 (1) = .057  p = .811) .  
Safety Professionals referred to improved work practices (system of work 36.9%) 
and improved training (28.6%) as being static antecedents. Managers referred to the 
presence of the hazard (38.9%) as being a dynamic antecedent and improved work 
practices (system of work 33.3%) and to improved training (25.9%) as being static. 
The presence of the hazard (box) was the dynamic antecedent referred to by 44.7% 
Accident Subjects whilst inadequate training was the most commonly used static 
antecedent (25%). 
The use of dynamic or static antecedents in the causal sentence 
Respondents showed a general tendency to complete the causal sentence following 
Mary’s slip or trip accident using both dynamic or static antecedents equally often,  
however the exception was Safety Professionals who identified the cause of Mary’s 
slip accident as arising from a static antecedent (59.4% ) more often than a dynamic 
one (χ2 (1) = 6.22 p = .013).  
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Table 26.                                                                                               
Proportion of  respondents selecting an dynamic or static 
antecedent in their prevention sentence 
 N Dynamic 
% 
Static 
% 
Slips     
Safety 
Professional  
169 40.2 59.8 
Manager  61 45.9 54.1 
Accident Subject 71 74.6 25.4 
 301   
Trips    
Safety 
Professional  
 
184 41.8 58.2 
Manager  70 51.4 48.6 
Accident Subject  66 62.1 37.9 
 320   
 
Managers and Accident Subjects completed the causal sentence for Mary’s trip 
using both dynamic and static antecedents equally (Managers – trip 43.7% dynamic 
56.3% static χ2 (1) = 1.14 p = .285 and Accident Subjects – trip 57.6% dynamic 
42.4% static χ2 (1) = 1.51 p = .218). The results are presented in Table 27.  
The presence of the hazard was referred to as being a dynamic cause of both 
Mary’s slip and trip accident. It was used by 50% of Managers and 46.3% of 
Accident Subjects in connection with her slip and by 40.8% of Safety 
Professionals, 36.7% of Managers and 65.8% of Accident Subjects in connection 
with her trip.  
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Safety Professionals and Managers referred to inadequate systems of work as being 
static causes of both Mary’s slip and trip accident (Safety Professionals 65% slip 
and 41.8% trip, Managers 35.5% slip and 37.9% trip). Static causes used by 
Accident Subjects tended to focus on a lack of staff ownership for health and safety 
(poor safety culture) 25% for Mary’s slip accident and to Mary’s lack of attention 
(22.2%) and the action or inaction of another person (22.5%) for her trip accident. 
 
Table 27.                                                                                                     
Proportion of  respondents selecting a dynamic or static 
antecedent in their causal sentence 
 N Active 
(dynamic) 
% 
Passive 
(static) 
% 
Slips    
Safety 
Professional  
175 40.6 59.4 
Manager  64 54.7 45.3 
Accident Subject 70 60.0 40.0 
 309   
Trips    
Safety 
Professional  
 
191 51.8 48.2 
Manager  71 43.7 56.3 
Accident Subject  66 57.6 42.4 
 328   
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Part 2 – results for the newly identified structural dimensions 
 
The results presented here are for the seven new dimensions of the counterfactual, 
prevention and causal sentences that were developed for this research.  
They were:  
1. Did the counterfactual thought relate to a specific aspect of the scenario or 
was it more general? 
2. Was the antecedent selected for change something that had been specifically 
given in the scenario details or was it something that had been inferred from 
the situation? 
3. Did the counterfactual sentence refer to an antecedent which was personal to 
the scenario actor or was it related to the situation that the scenario actor 
found himself or herself in? 
4. Was the scenario actor spontaneously identified in the counterfactual 
sentence? 
5. To whom did the counterfactual sentence refer? A list of scenario actors was 
presented to respondents who were asked to select one that their 
counterfactual thoughts referred to.  
6. What was the specific subject of the counterfactual sentence? 
7. Did the specific subject of the counterfactual sentence relate to something 
physical, behavioural, was it an attitude or was it something that related to a 
system of work or a procedure? 
 
Did the sentence relate to a specific or general aspect of the scenario?  
 
Was the counterfactual sentence specific or general to the scenario? 
The means to bring about a different outcome to Mary’s accident could be 
expressed in a way which was specific to the particular circumstances set out in the 
scenario or it could be expressed in a more general and non-specific way. Table 28 
sets out the results for this element of counterfactual thinking and shows a strong 
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case specific effect across all respondents and for both types of accident. Case 
specific antecedents were used significantly more than general ones for both slips 
and trips (Slips - Safety Professionals 66.1%  χ2 (1) = 18.02,  p < .001, Managers 
85.4%  χ2 (1) = 32.14,  p < .001 and Accident Subjects 94.2%  χ2 (1) = 53.93,  p < 
.001 and for trips - Safety Professionals 70.2%  χ2 (1) = 30.72,  p < .001 Managers 
66.2%  χ2 (1) = 7.45, p = .006 and Accident Subjects 95.5%  χ2 (1) =  55.53,  p < 
.001). 
Having identified that all respondents preferred to use case specific antecedents 
further analysis identified some interesting consistencies in the nature of the 
specific subjects of the counterfactual sentences. For slip accidents the most 
frequently antecedent related to inadequate warnings (Safety Practitioners 31.1%, 
Managers 37.8% and Accident Subjects 21.3%). Whereas respondents in all three 
groups selected the presence of the hazard most commonly when undoing Mary’s 
trip accident (Safety Practitioners 54.3%, Managers 51.1% and Accident Subjects 
30.8%).  
Table 28.  
Proportion of respondents selecting a case specific or general 
antecedent in their counterfactual sentence   
 N Case specific 
% 
General % 
Slips    
Safety 
Professional  
 
174 66.1 33.9 
Manager  
 
63 85.7 14.3 
Accident Subject  69 94.2 5.8 
 306   
Trips    
Safety 
Professional  
 
188 70.2 29.8 
Manager  
 
71 66.2 33.8 
Accident Subject  67 95.5 4.5 
 326   
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Was the prevention sentence specific or general to the scenario? 
No consistent pattern of responses were identified for the use of case specific or 
general antecedents for the prevention of Mary’s accident, with the exception of 
Accident Subjects who used case specific antecedents for both types of accident 
(84.5% for slips χ2 (1) = 33.82,  p < .001 and 71.2% for trips χ2 (1) = 11.88,  p = 
.001). Safety Professionals were equally likely (χ2 (1) = 2.61, p = .106) to use a case 
specific antecedent (43.8%) as a general one (56.2%) when completing the 
prevention sentence for Mary’s slip accident, but not for her trip where they were 
more likely to use a general antecedent (72%, χ2 (1) = 36.15, p < .001). Managers 
showed the reverse pattern, preferring to use a specific antecedent for Mary’s slip 
accident (62.9% χ2 (1) =  4.13, p = .042) but both a general antecedent (52.9%) and 
a specific antecedent (47.1%) for Mary’s trip accident (χ2 (1) = .229, p = .633). 
Table 29 presents the responses for the use of general and specific antecedents in 
the prevention sentences. 
Safety Professionals used both case specific and general antecedents when 
completing their prevention sentences following Mary’s slip accident, most 
commonly referring to improved systems of work both specifically (41.3%) and 
generally (54.3%). The specific antecedent referred to most commonly in relation 
to Mary’s trip accident was the need for improved standards of housekeeping 
(26.1%) and to improved systems of work in a more general way (37.23%).  
Managers used specific antecedents more than general ones when considering 
Mary’s slip accident and these related in the main to improved warnings (33.3%). 
Specific and general antecedents were used equally by Managers preventing Mary’s 
trip accident. The specific antecedent was most likely to refer to the presence of the 
hazard (25.6%) and the general antecedent to improved staff training (26.3%). 
Accident Subjects used specific antecedents significantly more often than general 
antecedents, referring to cleaning up the spillage following a slip (20%) and to 
removing the tripping hazard following a trip (34%).  
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Table 29.  
Proportion of respondents selecting a case specific or general 
antecedent in their prevention sentence  
 N Case specific 
% 
General 
% 
Slips     
Safety 
Professional  
 
169 43.8 56.2 
Manager  
 
62 62.9 37.1 
Accident Subject 71 84.5 15.5 
 302   
Trips    
Safety  
Professional  
 
186 28.0 72.0 
Manager  
 
70 52.9 47.1 
Accident Subject  66 71.2 28.8 
 322   
 
Was the causal sentence specific or general to the scenario? 
Table 30 shows that Accident Subjects were consistent when they completed the 
causal sentences using case specific antecedents for both slips (75.7%   χ2 (1) = 
18.51,  p < .001) and trips (70.6%, χ2 (1) = 11.53,  p = .001). Managers were also 
consistent in selecting case specific and general antecedents equally frequently for 
both slips and trips (slips - case specific 53.1% , general 46.9% , χ2 (1) = .250,  p = 
.617 ; trips - case specific 47.9%, general 52.1%,  χ2 (1) = .127,  p = .722). Safety 
Professionals were found to use specific (45.4%) and general (54.6%) antecedents 
equally frequently (χ2 (1) = 1.47, p = .255) when completing the causal sentence for 
Mary’s slip accident, but to concentrate on general antecedents (65.3%, χ2 (1) = 
18.03,  p < .001) for Mary’s trip accident.  
There was little variation in the selection of the specific antecedents by Safety 
Professionals or Managers with both groups selecting the hazard (spillage of milk 
or the box on the floor) as being the specific cause of the accident (Safety 
Professionals - slips 47.7%, trips 54.7%; Managers - slips 45.4%, trips 33.3%). 
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Both groups also referred to inadequate system or procedures when referring to the 
cause more generally (Safety Professionals - slips 64.7%, trips 32.4%; Managers - 
slips 36.8%, trips 31.0%). Accident Subjects also followed this pattern of responses 
referring to the specific cause as being the presence of the hazard (slips 38.8% and 
trips 60.5%) and the inadequate systems of work as being the general cause of 
Mary’s slip accident (33.3%). However Accident Subjects referred to three causal 
antecedents for Mary’s trip accident, those being the inadequate systems of work 
(23.1%), someone being careless or reckless (23.1%) and some action or inaction 
by a someone (23.1%).  
 
Table 30.  
Proportion of respondents selecting a case specific or general 
antecedent in the causal sentence   
Sentence element  N Case 
specific % 
General 
% 
Slips    
Safety 
Professional  
 
174 45.4 54.6 
Manager  
 
64 53.1 46.9 
Accident Subject 70 75.7 24.3 
 308   
Trips    
Safety 
Professional  
 
193 34.7 65.3 
Manager  
 
71 47.9 52.1 
Accident Subject  68 70.6 29.4 
 332   
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Did the sentence refer to an antecedent which was known to the 
respondent from the scenario or to an inferred antecedent ? 
 Scenarios cannot give a contextually rich picture of all the circumstances in which 
an accident occurred. In this study respondents were asked to react to the accident 
in the same way that they would in their own workplace and to bring to bear their 
own personal experiences of slips and trips when completing the counterfactual, 
prevention and causal sentences, in addition two levels of detail were presented to 
respondents (minimum or maximum detail versions). These factors suggested that it 
would be interesting to examine the completed sentences to see if people were 
restricting themselves to the facts given in the scenario, or were bringing other 
sources of information in to play when completing the sentences. The specific 
antecedents referred to in the counterfactual, prevention and causal sentences were 
identified and coded as being either ‘known’ if they were specifically mentioned in 
the scenario or ‘inferred’ from their knowledge or experience. 
Was the subject of the counterfactual sentence known or inferred? 
The results for the completion of the counterfactual sentence are presented in 
Tables 31 (slips) and 32 (trips) showing how the type of accident and the level of 
detail influenced the way in which the three different job groups responded. What is 
most noticeable is that for slips the level of detail correlated directly with the use of 
a known or inferred antecedent, with each of the job groups showing the same 
response to the manipulation of the level of detail. Where respondents were only 
given the minimal level of detail they consistently preferred to complete the 
counterfactual sentence following a slip accident using an antecedent that they 
inferred to have existed. This pattern of responses was statistically significant (χ2 
(1) = 9.78, p = .002 or higher). This is in strong contrast to the responses where 
maximum detail was provided which led respondents to use a ‘known’ antecedent 
most commonly (χ2 (1) = 6.72, p = .01 or higher). This pattern of responses was not 
repeated for trip accidents where there was a greater tendency for respondents to 
use known and inferred antecedents regardless of the level of detail, the only 
exception being Safety Professionals when they were mutating Mary’s trip accident 
based on minimum details and this led to them using inferred antecedents 
significantly more commonly (χ2 (1) = 4.167, p = .041).   
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A further analysis of the completed counterfactual sentences was undertaken to try 
to establish if the specific antecedent was also influenced by the level of detail 
provided to the respondents. When respondents were given the minimum detail 
scenario were they just mentally filling in the gaps that the maximum detail 
scenario version provided, so that the manipulation of the level of detail had no 
effect on the specific antecedent being selected, or did the level of detail influence 
the choice of antecedents? 
The inferred antecedents that were most commonly changed were more varied than 
those that were known, for example Safety Professionals selected from three 
antecedents (failing to clear up 27.3%, inadequate systems of work 25%, and 
hazard reporting 22.7%), Managers also selected from three antecedents 
(inadequate systems of work 19%, inadequate warnings 19%, and failing to clear up 
the spillage 19%), but Accident Subjects were most likely to complete their 
counterfactual sentence about the failure to clear up (26%). 
Was the subject of the prevention sentence known or inferred? 
Safety Professionals and Managers adopted the same approach as in their 
counterfactual sentence to the completion of the prevention sentence when 
presented with the minimum detail scenario, but a different approach in the 
maximum detail version of the scenarios (Tables 33 slips and 34 trips). Under 
minimum detail conditions both groups completed the prevention sentence for slips 
and trips by referring to an inferred antecedent (Safety Professionals - slips 93.5%,  
χ2 (1) = 58.3,  p < .001; trips 88.5%,  χ2 (1) =57.04,  p < .001. Managers - slips 
95.8%, χ2 (1) = 20.17,  p < .001; trips 80.6%,  χ2 (1) = 11.64, p = .001).  
However when Managers were given the maximum detail scenario they then 
shifted their prevention focus and used both known and inferred antecedents 
equally (slips - known 48.6% and inferred 51.4%, χ2 (1) = .027,  p = .869; trips - 
known 41.0% and inferred 59.0%,  χ2  (1) = 1.25,  p = .262) but Safety 
Professionals still maintained a significant focus on inferred antecedents (slips - 
inferred 71.7%, known 28.3%,  χ2 (1) = 17.39,  p < .001; trips - inferred 77.8%,  
known 22.2%,  χ2 (1) = 27.78,  p < .001).  
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Accident Subjects showed a different pattern of responses depending on the type of 
accident. For slips they preferred to use an inferred antecedent when given the 
minimum level of detail (inferred 91.2%, known 8.8%,  χ2 (1) = 23.06, p < .001) 
and a known antecedent when they were given the maximum detail scenarios 
(known 70.3%, inferred 29.7%,  χ2 (1) = 6.08,  p = .014).When Accident Subjects 
were considering how to prevent Mary’s trip accident they still preferred to use an 
inferred antecedent when they were given minimum details (inferred 93.1%, known 
6.9%,  χ2 (1) = 5.88,  p = .015) but when the scenario contained maximum details 
they were equally likely to use a known or inferred antecedent (known 56.4%, 
inferred 43.6%,  χ2 (1) = .641 p = .423).  
Further analysis was undertaken to explore the specific subject of the prevention 
sentences and to see if this was influenced by the level of detail and whether the 
antecedent was known or inferred. 
Safety Professionals presented with either minimum or maximum detail in their 
scenarios responded to slip and trip scenarios by selecting an inferred antecedent. 
For slips the inferred antecedent related to improved systems of work for both 
levels of detail (minimum detail 51.7%, and 62.3% for maximum detail). When 
Safety Professionals considered how to prevent Mary’s trip accident and were 
given minimum details they referred to improved housekeeping (29.9%), but when 
they were given maximum details they referred to systems of work in their 
prevention sentence (29.9%). 
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Table 31.                                                                                                         
Proportion of respondents using known or inferred antecedents in 
their counterfactual sentences (Slips) 
 N Known 
antecedent 
% 
Inferred 
antecedent 
% 
Slips    
Safety 
Professional (all) 
173 46.2 53.8 
Safety 
Professional  
(minimum detail) 
80 26.3 73.8 
Safety 
Professional  
(maximum detail) 
93 63.4 36.6 
    
Manager  63 58.7 41.3 
Manager  
(minimum detail) 
23 17.4 82.6 
Manger 
(maximum detail  
40 82.5 17.5 
    
Accident Subject  66 56.1 43.9 
Accident Subject  
(minimum detail) 
32 27.3 72.7 
Accident Subject  
(maximum detail) 
34 77.1 22.9 
 132   
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Table 32.                                                                                                   
Proportion of respondents using known or inferred antecedents in their 
counterfactual sentences (Trips) 
 N Known 
antecedent 
% 
Inferred antecedent 
% 
Trips    
Safety Professional  186 49.5 50.5 
Safety Professional 
(minimum detail) 
96 39.6 60.4 
Safety Professional 
(maximum detail) 
90 60.0 40.0 
    
Manager  71 39.4 60.6 
Manager   
(minimum detail) 
31 35.5 64.5 
Manger    
(maximum detail  
40 42.5 57.5 
    
Accident Subject  66 56.1 43.9 
Accident Subject 
(minimum detail) 
29 51.7 48.3 
Accident Subject 
(maximum detail) 
37 59.5 40.5 
 132   
 
Managers presented with minimum details prevented both slip and trip accidents by 
selecting an inferred antecedent. For slips that was to improve the response time 
(23.1%), but after a trip accident they were most likely to refer to improved systems 
of work (22.7%) or improved training (22.7%). However when Managers were 
given maximum details there was no difference in their use of known or inferred 
antecedents for either slips or trips. The known antecedents were improved 
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warnings (60%) for slip accidents and the removal of the hazard (35.3%) for trip 
accidents. The inferred antecedents related to improved systems of work (25%) 
following a slip accident and for trip accidents systems of work were referred to by 
21% of Managers along with improved housekeeping (21%). 
The type of accident and the level of information influenced the selection of known 
and inferred antecedents for Accident Subjects. For slip accidents minimum details 
led to the use of inferred antecedents relating to improved clearing up of the 
spillage (33.3.%), whilst maximum details led Accident Subjects to use a known 
antecedent most commonly relating to improved response times (28%). The 
prevention of Mary’s trip accident was also influenced by the level of detail. 
Minimum detail again being associated with an inferred antecedent, this time 
relating to the presence of the hazard (35%), but under maximum detail conditions 
Accident Subjects used known and inferred antecedents. The known antecedent 
was the presence of the hazard (35.3%), whilst the inferred antecedent was most 
likely to refer to improved housekeeping (25%). 
Was the subject of the causal sentence known or inferred? 
The cause of Mary’s trip accident was commonly inferred by all three job groups 
under both minimum and maximum levels of detail in the scenarios. (See Tables 35 
slips and 36 trips).  
Safety Professionals inferred the cause of Mary’s slip accident under both 
minimum and maximum levels of detail (Maximum detail 65.2%,  χ2 (1) = 8.52,  p 
= .004 and Minimum detail 79.5%,  χ2 (1) = 28.93, p = < .001). Managers were 
most likely to infer the cause of Mary’s slip accident when they were given 
minimum levels of detail (79.2%, χ2 (1) =  8.16, p = .004) but used both known and 
inferred antecedents when given maximum details (Table 35). On the other hand 
Accident Subjects showed a clear difference based on the level of detail provided. 
Under minimum levels of detail Accident Subjects were most likely to infer the 
cause of Mary’s slip accident (84.8%,  χ2 (1) = 16.03, p < .001) whereas when they 
were given the maximum detail scenario they were then most likely to describe the 
cause as being something that was known to them (69.3%, χ2 (1) = 5.44,  p = .020). 
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Table 33.                                                                                                                        
Proportion of respondents using known or inferred antecedents in their 
prevention sentences (Slips) 
 N   
 
Known 
antecedent 
% 
Inferred 
antecedent 
% 
Slips    
Safety Professional 
(all) 
169 18.3 81.7 
Safety Professional 
(minimum detail) 
77 6.5 93.5 
Safety Professional 
(maximum detail) 
92 28.3 71.7 
    
Manager (all) 61 31.1 68.9 
Manager   
(minimum detail) 
24 4.2 95.8 
Manager    
(maximum Detail  
37 48.6 51.4 
    
Accident Subject 
(all) 
71 40.8 59.2 
Accident Subject 
(minimum detail) 
34 8.8 91.2 
Accident Subject 
(maximum detail) 
37 70.3 29.7 
 142   
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Table 34.                                                                                                                   
Proportion of respondents using known or inferred antecedents in 
their prevention sentences (Trips) 
 N  Known 
antecedent 
% 
Inferred 
antecedent 
% 
Trips    
Safety Professional (all) 
 
186 16.7 83.3 
Safety Professional 
(minimum detail) 
96 11.5 88.5 
Safety Professional 
(maximum detail) 
90 22.2 77.8 
    
Manager (all) 70 31.4 68.6 
Manager         
(minimum detail) 
31 19.4 80.6 
Manager         
(maximum detail  
39 41.0 59.0 
    
Accident Subject (all) 68 35.3 64.7 
Accident Subject 
(minimum detail) 
29 6.9 93.1 
Accident Subject 
(maximum detail) 
39 56.4 43.6 
 136   
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With only three exceptions respondents selected an inferred antecedent when 
completing their causal sentences for both slips and trips (Tables 35 slips and 36 
trips). Considering slip accidents first, Safety Professionals’ sentences referred to 
inadequate systems of work or procedures when given minimum levels of detail 
(53.1%) and maximum levels of detail (65.1%). Under minimum detail conditions 
Managers’ slip accident causal sentences most commonly inferred the presence of 
the hazard (27.3%), but both known and inferred antecedents were used when 
Managers were presented with maximum detail scenarios. The sentences containing 
known antecedents most often referred to the slow response time, whereas inferred 
antecedents were most likely to refer to inadequate systems of work.  
Accident Subjects’ causal sentences flowing a slip accident displayed a clear 
relationship between the use of inferred antecedents when presented with minimum 
details and the use of known antecedents when given maximum details. Their 
inferred antecedents related to the failure to clear up the spillage (27.3%), whilst 
their known antecedents related to the presence of the hazard (50%). 
With the exception of Accident Subjects, who were presented with maximum detail 
scenarios, the cause of Mary’s trip accident was attributed to inferred antecedents 
(Safety Professionals - minimum detail 82.8%,  χ2 (1) = 42.68, p = < .001,  
maximum detail 66.7%,  χ2 (1) = 10.33, p = .001; Managers - minimum detail 
77.4%, χ2 (1) =  9.32, p = .002, maximum detail 72.5%,  χ2 (1) = 8.10, p = .004; 
Accident Subjects - minimum detail 79.3%,  χ2 (1) = 9.97, p = .002), maximum 
detail known 47.4%, inferred 52.6%,  χ2 (1) = 105, p = .746). 
When given a trip scenario containing minimum details, 31.4% of Safety 
Professionals inferred poor housekeeping caused the accident, 23.8% of Managers 
inferred the cause to be inadequate systems of work, whilst 38.1% of Accident 
Subjects inferred the presence of the hazard caused  the accident. However when 
respondents were given a maximum detail scenario, 32.7% of Safety Professionals 
continued to infer that poor housekeeping was the cause and 30% of Managers 
continued to inferred the cause arose  from inadequate systems of work . Accident 
Subjects used both known and inferred antecedents, attributing the inferred cause of 
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the trip accident to poor housekeeping (25%) and the presence of the hazard as the 
known cause (70.6%). 
 
Table 35.                                                                                                                    
Proportion of respondents using known or inferred antecedents in their 
causal sentences (Slips) 
 N  Known 
antecedent 
% 
Inferred 
antecedent 
% 
Slips    
Safety  
Professional (all) 
 
175 28.0 72.0 
Safety 
Professional  
(minimum detail) 
 
83 20.5 79.5 
Safety 
Professional  
(maximum detail) 
92 34.8 65.2 
    
Manager  
 
64 39.1 60.9 
Manager  
(minimum detail) 
 
24 20.8 79.2 
Manager 
(maximum detail  
40 50.0 50.0 
    
Accident Subject  
 
69 43.5 56.5 
Accident Subject 
(minimum detail) 
 
33 15.2 84.8 
Accident Subject 
(maximum detail) 
36 69.4 30.6 
 138   
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Table 36.                                                                                                                  
Proportion of respondents using known or inferred antecedents in their 
causal sentences (Trips) 
 N  Known 
antecedent 
% 
Inferred 
antecedent 
% 
Trips    
Safety Professional 
(all) 
 
192 25 75 
Safety  
Professional  
(minimum detail) 
 
99 17.2 82.8 
Safety  
Professional  
(maximum detail) 
93 33.3 66.7 
    
Manager (all) 
 
71 25.4 74.6 
Manager  
(minimum detail) 
 
31 22.6 77.4 
Manager 
(maximum detail) 
40 27.5 72.5 
    
Accident Subject 
(all)   
 
67 35.8 64.2 
Accident Subject 
(minimum detail) 
 
29 20.7 79.3 
Accident Subject  
(maximum detail) 
38 47.4 52.6 
 134   
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Did the sentence refer to a personal or situational antecedent? 
In this study Safety Professionals and Managers viewed Mary’s accident from a 
pubic or third party perspective, looking in from the outside, and with different 
roles and from different emotional / psychological distances than Accident 
Subjects, who were asked to view the accident from the perspective of Mary who 
was the injured person and would have been thinking about her accident from a 
personal (first person) perspective. These different positions could have influenced 
the ways in which the respondent groups approached the completion of the 
sentences, one of which is through the use of an antecedent which reflected a 
personal characteristic of the scenario actor identified as being the subject of the 
sentence, or through a situational antecedent based on the circumstances that the 
scenario actor was in at that time. 
Did the counterfactual sentence relate to a personal or situational 
antecedent? 
Safety Professionals showed a significant tendency to complete the counterfactual 
sentence after both Mary’s slip and trip accident by referring to a situational 
antecedent (slip 92.7% , χ2 (1) = 67.97,  p < .001 and trip 75.5% , χ2 (1) = 38.26,  p 
< .001). Managers were found to use personal antecedents as often as they used  
situational ones (slip personal 43.1% and slip situational 56.9%,  χ2 (1) = .961,  p = 
.327,  trip personal 37.3% and trip situational 62.7%,  χ2 (1) = 3.31, p = .069). See 
Table 37.  
For Accident Subjects the type of accident influenced the choice of a personal or 
situational antecedent. Following Mary’s slip accident they were as likely to use a 
personal antecedent as they were a situational one (slip personal 47.6% and slip 
situational 52.4%. χ2 (1) = 143,  p = .705), but personal antecedents when they were 
undoing Mary’s trip accident (68.8%,  χ2 (1) = 9.00, p = .003).  
The specific antecedents that respondents used were found to be influenced by both 
the type of accident and the respondent’s job group. Safety professionals used 
situational antecedents for both slips and trips but different specific ones; systems 
of work were most often used for slips (30.7%) and the presence of the hazard for 
trips (48.5%). Managers used both personal antecedents (response time 27.8%) and 
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situational antecedents (inadequate warnings 39.1%) for slips, but just situational 
ones (the presence of the hazard 42.6%) for trips. On the other hand Accident 
Subjects used both personal antecedents (Mary’s lack of attention 46.2%) and 
situational antecedents (inadequate warnings 33.3%) for slips, but only personal 
antecedents relating to Mary’s lack of attention (40%) for trips.    
Table 37.                                                                                        
Proportion of respondents referring to personal or situational 
antecedents in their counterfactual sentences 
 N Personal 
antecedent 
% 
Situational 
antecedent 
% 
Slips    
Safety 
Professional  
130 13.8 92.7 
Manager  51 43.1 56.9 
Accident Subject  63 47.6 52.4 
 244   
Trips    
Safety 
Professional  
 
147 24.5 75.5 
Manager  51 37.3 62.7 
Accident Subject  64 68.8 31.3 
 262   
 
 Did the prevention sentence relate to a personal or situational antecedent? 
The type of accident had no effect on the way respondents sought to prevent Mary’s 
accident (Table 38).  
Safety Professionals and Managers considered Mary’s accident could have been 
prevented though changing the situation rather than a personal characteristic (Safety 
Professionals - slip 89.7%,  χ2 (1) = 92.16, p < .001 and trip 92.3%,  χ2 (1) = 120.02,  
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p < .001; Managers - slip 75.0%  χ2 (1) = 13.00,  p < .001 and trip 78.7%, χ2 (1) =  
20.82,  p < .001). Accident Subjects completed the prevention sentences for both 
Mary’s slip and trip accident with reference to a personal antecedent as often as 
they did to a situational one (slip accident - personal antecedent 42.6%, situational 
antecedent 57.4%, χ2 (1) = 1.47,  p = .220, trip accident - personal antecedent 
41.5%, situational antecedent 58.5%, χ2 (1) =  1.86, p = .172). 
The specific antecedents used in the prevention sentences were not consistent for  
job group or accident type. Safety Professionals referred to systems of work 
(55.5%) as the situational antecedent following Mary’s slip and to housekeeping 
(29%) as the situational antecedent following Mary’s trip accident. Managers also 
used situational antecedents for both Mary’s slip and trip referring to improved 
warnings to prevent the slip accident (39.3%) and improved housekeeping (23.9%) 
to prevent her trip accident.  
Accident Subjects used both personal and situational antecedents to prevent slips as 
well as trips. The personal antecedent used to prevent Mary’s slip accident was to 
improve the Cleaner’s response time (22.7%) whilst the situational antecedent was 
to improve the warnings of the hazard (20%). Different antecedents were used to 
prevent Mary’s trip accident; the personal antecedent related to someone actions or 
inactions (26.7%) whilst the situational antecedent referred to was the removal of 
the hazard (40.5%). 
Did the causal sentence relate to a personal or situational antecedent? 
The type of accident had no effect on the responses of either Safety Professionals or 
Accident Subjects when they completed the causal sentence, but there was a 
difference for Managers, see Table 39.  
Over 80% of Safety Professionals (82.1% for slips, χ2 (1) =  62.31,  p < .001 and 
80.2% for trips χ2 (1) =  61.08,  p < .001) considered the cause of Mary’s accident 
to be situational in origin. Accident Subjects were equally likely to have identified 
the cause as having a personal origin and a situational one for both slips and trips 
(38.5% slips personal and 61.5% slips situational, χ2 (1) = 3.46,  p = .063;  57.6% 
trips personal and 42.4% trips situational, χ2 (1) =  1.51,  p = .218). 
Page | 158  
 
Table 38.                                                                                                                 
Proportion of respondents referring to personal or situational 
antecedents in their prevention sentences 
 N Personal 
antecedent 
% 
Situational 
antecedent 
% 
Slips     
Safety 
Professional  
146 10.3 89.7 
Manager  52 25.0 75.0 
Accident Subject 68 42.6 57.4 
 266   
Trips    
Safety 
Professional  
 
168 7.7 92.3 
Manager  61 21.3 78.7 
Accident Subject  65 41.5 58.5 
 294   
 
Managers’ selection of the cause was influenced by the type of accident. When 
considering Mary’s slip accident Managers were as likely to have identified the 
cause as having a personal origin (37.7%) as a situational one (62.3  χ2  (1) = 3.69  p 
= .055), however the cause of Mary’s trip accident was more likely to have a 
situational antecedent (65.1%) than a personal one (34.9%  χ2  (1) = 5.73  p = .017). 
The specific antecedents associated with the personal and situational dimension 
were identified. Safety Professionals were most likely to complete their causal 
sentences for Mary’s slip accident with situational antecedents referring to 
improved systems of work (53.2%) whilst it was improved housekeeping (28.6%) 
for trips. Managers identified one main situational cause of Mary’s trip accident, 
the trip hazard itself - the box (29.7%) - but found two major causes for her slip 
accident, with the situational cause being the slip hazard - spilt milk (42.4%) - and 
Page | 159  
 
the personal cause being the slow response to the reported spillage (35.7%). 
Accident Subjects identified both situational and personal antecedents in their 
completed sentences for both slips and trips. The personal causes of Mary’s slip 
were identified as a lack of staff ownership of safety (31.6%), whilst the personal 
causes of her trip were a lack of care on her part (29.6%). The situational causes 
were the presence of the hazard, the milk, in the case of Mary’s slip (44.7%) or the 
box where Mary tripped (70.4%). 
Table 39.                                                                                          
Proportion of respondents referring to personal or situational 
antecedents in their causal sentences 
 N Personal 
antecedent 
% 
Situational 
antecedent 
% 
Slips    
Safety 
Professional  
151 17.9 82.1 
Manager  61 37.7 62.3 
Accident Subject 65 38.5 61.5 
 277   
Trips    
Safety 
Professional  
 
167 19.8 80.2 
Manager  63 34.9 65.1 
Accident Subject  66 57.6 42.4 
 296   
 
Was a scenario actor spontaneously identified in the sentences? 
When coding the completed counterfactual, prevention and causal sentences it was 
noted that some respondents made a clear and specific reference to a person (the 
scenario actor) in the sentence and that this person was in some way able to 
influence the outcome or was responsible for it. For example a counterfactual 
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sentence might have been completed in a way in which the person was named e.g. 
‘If only Mary had looked where she was going’, or it may have referred to a person 
by a reference to their job e.g. ‘If only the Cleaner had cleared up the spillage 
sooner’. The other way that a sentence could have been completed is by making no 
reference to anyone at all such as ‘If only housekeeping had been better’. 
Was the scenario actor spontaneously identified in the counterfactual 
sentence? 
Respondents showed no significant tendency to make spontaneous references to a 
particular scenario actor (Table 40), except for Accident Subjects’ counterfactual 
sentences following Mary’s trip accident where 62.8% spontaneously identified a 
scenario actor (χ2 (1) = 5.628, p = .018).  
Following Mary’s slip accident there was no significant difference in proportion of 
respondents from any of the job groups who spontaneously identified a scenario 
actor from those that did not (Safety Professionals χ2 (1) = .089, p = .766, Managers 
χ2 (1) = 1.25, p = .264  and Accident Subjects χ2 (1) = .012,  p = .914).  A similar 
pattern of responses was also found from Safety Professionals and Managers 
following Mary’s trip accident (Safety Professionals χ2 (1) = .621,  p = .431 and 
Managers  χ2 (1) = .123,  p = .725). 
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Table 40.                                                                                                            
Proportion of respondents who spontaneously identified the scenario 
actor in their counterfactual sentence 
 N Actor 
identified  
No actor 
identified 
Slips    
Safety 
Professional  
180 48.9 51.1 
Manager  65 56.9 43.1 
Accident Subject 85 49.4 50.6 
 330   
Trips    
Safety 
Professional  
 
195 47.2 52.8 
Manager  73 52.1 47.9 
Accident Subject  80 62.8 37.2 
 348   
 
 
Was the scenario actor spontaneously identified in the prevention sentence? 
Safety Professionals and Managers did not identify a scenario actor following either 
a slip or trip accident (Table 41). 
When completing their prevention sentences following Mary’s slip accident 80.5% 
of Safety Professionals (χ2  (1) = 62.77,  p < .001)  and 69.4% of Managers (χ2  (1) 
= 9.29,  p < .001) made no spontaneous identification of a scenario actor, however 
Accident Subjects were as likely to refer to a scenario actors as not. For slip 
accidents 46.5%  of Accident Subjects referred to a scenario actor, with 53.5% not 
doing so (χ2 (1) = .352, p = .553).  
An identical pattern of responses was found for the completion of the prevention 
sentence following Mary’s trip accident, with 80.6% of Safety Professionals (χ2 (1) 
= 69.87, p < .001) and 75.7% of Managers (χ2 (1) = 18.51,  p < .001) not making a 
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specific reference to a scenario actor in their prevention sentence. Again there was 
no difference in the proportion of Accident Subjects who identified a scenario actor 
and those who did not, 47.1%, specified an actor in their prevention sentence whilst 
52.9% did not (χ2 (1) = .235,  p = .628). 
Table 41                                                                                                       
Proportion of respondents who spontaneously identified the scenario 
actor in their prevention sentence 
 N Actor 
identified  
No actor 
identified 
Causal sentence 
for slips 
   
Safety 
Professional  
169 19.5 80.5 
Manager  62 30.6 69.4 
Accident Subject 71 46.5 53.5 
 302   
Causal sentence 
for trips 
   
Safety 
Professional  
 
186 19.4 80.6 
Manager  70 24.3 75.7 
Accident Subject  68 47.1 52.9 
 324   
 
Was the scenario actor spontaneously identified in the causal sentence? 
Table 42 indicates that after Mary’s slip accident none of the respondent job groups 
showed a tendency to identify a scenario actor in their causal sentences - no actor 
identified by 79.1% of Safety Professionals (χ2 (1) =  59.94,  p < .001), 76.6% for 
Managers  (χ2 (1) =  18.06,  p < .001) and 74.3% for Accident Subjects (χ2 (1) =  
16.51,  p < .001). 
Safety Professionals and Managers showed the same response for the completion of 
the causal sentence following Mary’s trip (no actor identified by 77.7% of Safety 
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Professionals χ2 (1) =  59.32,  p < .001, and 83.1% of Managers χ2 (1) =  31.11,  p < 
.001), however Accident Subjects were as likely to refer to an actor as not in their 
causal sentences where 46.4% referred to an actor and 53.6% did not (χ2 (1) = .362.  
p = .547). 
Table 42.                                                                                                       
Proportion of respondents who spontaneously identified the scenario 
actor in their causal sentence 
 N Actor 
identified  
No actor identified 
Slips    
Safety Professional  177 20.9 79.1 
Manager  64 23.4 76.6 
Accident Subject 70 25.7 74.3 
 311   
Trips    
Safety Professional  193 22.3 77.7 
Manager  71 16.9 83.1 
Accident Subject  69 46.4 53.6 
 333   
 
Which scenario actor was referred to? 
The pilot study identified that about half of all completed sentences made no 
specific reference to a scenario actor, so the questionnaire was amended to include 
a further question to elicit from the respondents which scenario character (actor) the 
sentence best related to. They were given a list of actors from which to choose.  
The purpose was to identify any particular trends in the association of scenario 
actors to the type of accident (slip or trip) or by respondents’ group (Safety 
Professionals, Managers or Accident Subjects). Respondents were able to select 
from a list of nine possible scenario actors, however some actors were rarely or 
never selected and these were excluded in the analysis to ensure that the Chi Square 
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test assumptions were met. For the analysis of the counterfactual sentences for slips 
79.8% of possible responses were included and 87.7% for trips. The prevention 
sentences included 95.6% of cases for Mary’s slip accident and 97.8% for her trip. 
For the causal sentences the responses covered 83.4% for Mary’s slip and 83.6% 
for her trip.  
Which scenario actor was most often referred to in the counterfactual 
sentence? 
The Supervisor was selected by Safety Professionals and Managers most frequently 
when completing the counterfactual sentences following both Mary’s slip and trip 
accident. The modal responses shown in Table 43 indicate that the Supervisor was 
selected by 42.1% of Safety Professionals after Mary’s slip accident (χ2 (4) = 75.15,  
p < .001) and 34.3% after her trip accident (χ2 (4) = 38.07,  p < .001), with broadly 
similar responses by Managers who selected the Supervisor in 41.9% of responses 
after a slip (χ2 (4) = 32.94, p < .001) and 40.3% after a trip ( χ2 (4) =  27.35,  p < 
.001). Whilst Accident Subjects’ modal response to the slip accident was also to   
select the Supervisor (39.3%,  χ2 (4) = 28.10,  p < .001), they made a clearly 
different selection following Mary’s trip accident where they were most likely to 
select her own role to change (53.7%, χ2 (4) = 41.74,  p < .001).   
 
The modal choice of  scenario actor most often referred to in the counterfactual 
sentences was in each case selected significantly more often than their second 
choice of actor - Safety Professionals selected the Supervisor more than the 
Employer (slips  χ2  (1)  = 9.19,  p = .002 and trips χ2  (1) = 2.0,  p = .157 ), 
Managers also selected the Supervisor over Store Manager (slips χ2  (1) = 45.96,  p 
< .001, and trips χ2  (1) = 4.33,  p = .037), and following a trip Accident Subjects 
selected Mary more often than they did the Store Supervisor (χ2  (1) = 32.98,  p < 
.001), but after a slip accident there was no significant difference between the rate 
that the Supervisor or Mary were selected (χ2  (1) = .40,  p = .527).  
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Table 43.                                                                                                                                       
Proportion of scenario actors referred to by respondents in their counterfactual sentence 
  N  Mary 
% 
Supervisor 
 % 
Manager 
% 
Employer 
% 
Cleaner 
% 
Other 
worker 
% 
Slips        
Safety 
Professional  
133 4.5 42.1 18.0 31.6 3.8 N/A 
Manager  53 9.4 49.1 24.5 7.5 9.4 N/A 
Accident 
Subject  
56 32.1 39.3 5.4 3.6 19.6 N/A 
 242       
Trips        
Safety 
Professional  
 
169 8.9 34.3 23.1 23.7 N/A 10.1 
Manager  
 
62 11.3 40.3 30.6 4.8 N/A 12.9 
Accident 
Subject  
54 53.7 18.5 9.3 3.7 N/A 14.8 
 285       
 
Which scenario actor was most often referred to in the prevention sentence? 
Based on the modal responses each respondent group showed a consistent approach 
to the completion of the prevention sentence across accident type, but Safety 
Professionals selected different scenario actors from Managers and Accident 
Subjects (Table 44). 
Safety Professionals selected the Employer as having the opportunity to have 
prevented Mary’s slip (36.9%,  χ2  (6) = 103.25,  p < .001) and her trip accident 
(30.9%,  χ2  (6) = 117.34,  p < .001). Managers and Accident Subjects selected the 
Supervisor for both types of accident (Managers – slips: 31.7%,  χ2  (6) = 25.86,  p 
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< .001 and trips: 34.4%,  χ2 (6) = 32.47,  p < .001 and Accident Subjects – slips: 
47.7%, χ2  (6) = 67.57,  p < .001 and trips: 24.2%, χ2 (6)  = 13.33,  p = .038).  
The frequency with which first and second choice of scenario actor were referred to 
was explored using chi square test to determine if there was a significant difference 
between them.  
For the prevention of Mary’s slip accident there was no significant difference 
between Managers’ first and second choice of scenario actors and they were equally 
likely to have referred to the Supervisor or the Store Manager ( χ2 (1) = .471,  p = 
.493), but for both Safety Professionals and Accident Subjects one scenario actor 
was selected above all the others. Safety Professionals selected the role of the 
Employer more frequently than the Supervisor ( χ2 (1) = 6.26,  p = .012), whilst 
Accident Subjects selected the Supervisor more frequently than the Cleaner (χ2 (1) 
= 7.36,  p = .007). 
For Mary’s trip accident there was no significant difference in the frequency which 
any of the job groups selected their first and second choice scenario actors, so that 
for each job group two actors could be said to have be selected equally often. For 
Safety Professionals these were the Employer 30.9% and the Store Manager 29.8% 
(χ2 (1) = .037,  p = .847), for Managers it was the Supervisor 34.4% and the 
Manager 20.3%  (χ2  (1) = 2.314, p = .128), and for Accident Subjects it was the 
Supervisor 24.2% and Mary herself 22.7%  (χ2 (1) = .032, p = .857).   
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 Which scenario actor was most often referred to in the causal sentence? 
Table 45 presents the scenario actors associated with respondents’ causal sentences. 
Only Safety Professionals were consistent in their selection of the Employer as 
being the subject of their causal sentence for both slips (53.2% ,  χ2 (4) = 118.01,  p 
< .001 ) and trips (37.1%,  χ2 (4) = 40.18,  p < .001). Both Managers and Accident 
Subjects selected different scenario actors for slips and trips.  46.9% of Managers 
referred to the Supervisor (χ2 (4) = 29.29,  p < .001) when they completed their 
causal sentence following Mary’s slip accident and to the Store Manager (36.5% χ2 
(4) = 10.88, p = .028) when they were writing about Mary’s trip accident. Accident 
Subjects were also found to have referred to the Supervisor most frequently 
following Mary’s slip accident (54.2%, χ2 (4) = 37.83,  p < .001) but referred to 
another worker most frequently in their trip sentence (31.3%,  χ2 (4) = 5.33, p = 
.255). 
Table 44.                                                                                                                       
Proportion of scenario actors referred to by respondents in their prevention  sentence 
 N  Accident 
Subject 
 % 
Supervisor 
% 
Manager 
% 
SO* 
% 
Employer 
% 
Other 
Worker 
% 
Cleaner 
% 
Slips          
Safety 
Professional  
157 1.9 21.7 17.8 11.
5 
36.9 8.9 1.3 
Manager  60 10.0 31.7 25.0 5.0 8.3 6.7 13.3 
Accident 
Subject 
65 6.2 47.7 6.2 6.2 3.1 10.8 20.0 
 282        
Trips         
Safety 
Professional 
  
178 2.8 19.7 29.8 9.0 30.9 7.3 0.6 
Manager  64 4.7 34.4 20.3 17.
2 
10.9 10.9 1.6 
Accident 
Subject  
66 22.7 24.2 7.6 13.
6 
6.1 12.1 13.6 
 308        
         
*SO = Safety Officer 
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As with the counterfactual and prevention sentences, further analysis of the results 
was undertaken to compare the frequency of responses between respondents’ first 
and second choice of scenario actor. This analysis revealed differences between 
slips and trips and between respondent groups.   
For slip accidents each job group selected one scenario actor over all the others. 
Safety Professionals selected the Employer significantly more than the Supervisor 
(χ2 (1) = 26.51, p < .001). Managers and Accident Subjects both selected the Store 
Supervisor significantly more often than other scenario actors. Managers selected 
the Store Supervisor more than the Store Manager (χ2 (1) = 3.45,  p = .063). Whilst 
Accident Subjects selected the Supervisor over both the store Safety Officer and 
another worker ( χ2  (1) = 9.53, p = .002). 
The causal sentences following Mary’s trip accident indicated that Safety 
Professionals selected the Employer significantly more frequently than the Store 
Supervisor (χ2 (1) = 7.36, p = .007). Managers and Accident Subjects were found to 
select their first and second choice of scenario actors equally frequently following 
Mary’s trip accident. Managers selected the Store Manager and other workers (χ2  
(1) = 1.58, p = .209) whilst Accident Subjects selected other workers  and the Store 
Supervisor equally frequently (χ2  (1) = 1.00, p = .317). 
What was the specific antecedent referred to in the sentence?  
This study considered how Safety Professionals, Managers and Accident Subjects 
thought about slip and trip accidents specifically and asked them to record their 
thoughts by completing a counterfactual, prevention and causal sentence, and 
because there was an explicit focus on slips and trips there was a particular interest 
in examining the specific antecedents that were selected for each type of sentence  
to see if their selection was influenced by the type of accident or the respondents’ 
social role (job group).  
Seventeen different categories of antecedent were identified from the respondents’ 
completed sentences and used to code their responses. One of the categories used 
was ‘other’ but it contained a diverse range of responses each of which was used by 
a very small number of respondents and this was excluded in the final analysis. 
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Table 45.                                                                                                                            
Proportion of scenario actors referred to by respondents in their causal sentence 
  N Supervisor 
% 
Manager 
% 
Safety 
Officer 
% 
Employer 
% 
Other 
worker  
% 
Slips       
Safety 
Professional  
154 18.2 16.9 8.4 53.2 3.2 
Manager  49 46.9 24.5 6.1 18.4 4.1 
Accident Subject 48 54.2 8.3 16.7 4.2 16.7 
 251      
Trips       
Safety 
Professional  
 
170 21.2 20.0 8.2 37.1 13.5 
Manager  52 13.5 36.5 15.4 11.5 23.1 
Accident Subject  48 20.8 18.8 18.8 10.4 31.3 
 270      
 
Some categories were used more frequently than others and those with the least 
number of responses were excluded systematically from the χ2  tests (smallest 
response rate first) until the test assumptions for the minimum cell count were met. 
The antecedent categories that remained are presented in Table 46 for the 
counterfactual sentence, Table 47 for the prevention sentence and Table 48 for the 
causal sentence. 
   What was the specific subject of the counterfactual sentence? 
Table 46 presents the results for the counterfactual sentence. Six categories of 
antecedent event were used in the completion of the sentence for Mary’s slip 
accident and these represented 82.7% of all responses. The counterfactual sentence 
for Mary’s trip accident was also completed using six categories and this accounted 
for 86.2% of all responses. Of the six categories used for each type of accident only 
three were common to both slips and trips, and these were systems of work, lack of 
attention by Mary and Mary’s decision to work. The remaining categories were 
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only used to any significant degree in respect of either Mary’s slip accident (lack of 
warnings, response time and falling to clean up) or trip accident (the presence of the 
hazard, poor housekeeping and a personal action / inaction). 
Safety Professionals responding to Mary’s slip accident most often referred to 
inadequate warnings (28.9%) when completing a counterfactual sentence, but their 
second choice was failing to clean up (26.4%) and very close (at 24.8%) was 
systems of work. There was no significant difference in the frequency with which 
Safety Professionals used these three antecedents (χ2 (2) = .392,  p = .822).  
Managers completing their counterfactual sentence following Mary’s slip accident 
were most likely to refer to inadequate warnings (39.5%). Their second choice of 
antecedent event was the failure to clean up (23.3%) and the inadequate response 
time (20.9%), and there was no significant difference in the frequency with which 
Managers used these three antecedents (χ2 (2) = 3.167,  p = .205). 
Accident Subjects’ responses focused on five antecedent events as shown in Table 
46 (inadequate warning 25.5%, slow response time 13.7%, Mary’s lack of attention 
23.5%, Mary’s decision to work 17.6%, and failing to clean up 19.6%) and again 
there was no significant difference in the frequency of their use (χ2  (4) = 2.23,  p = 
.693). 
Safety Professionals and Managers responded in a different way to Mary’s trip 
accident, choosing to bring about a different outcome through the use of one main 
antecedent, that being the presence of the tripping hazard which was referred to by 
51.6% of Safety Professionals and 43.4% of Managers. Accident Subjects 
continued to select three main antecedent events when completing their trip 
counterfactual sentences, namely the presence of the hazard (34.8%), a lack of 
attention by Mary (30.4%) and Mary’s decision to work (28.3%) (χ2  (2) =  .326,  p 
= .850). 
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What was the specific subject of the prevention sentence? 
The results presented in Table 47 for the specific subject of the prevention sentence 
account for 75.6% of the possible results from respondents who received a slip 
scenario and 75.5% for those respondents who received a trip scenario.  
The means by which Mary’s accident could have been prevented differed 
depending on the type of accident and the respondent’s job group. When preventing 
Mary’s slip accident 60.2% of Safety Professionals focused the specific subject of 
their sentences on improving systems of work and working procedures (χ2  (3) = 
75.78, p < .001), whereas both the other groups were found to focus their 
prevention sentences on a wider range of antecedent events. Managers and 
Accident Subjects were most likely to refer to one of three antecedents to prevent 
Mary’s slip accident - improved warnings, improved response time by the Cleaner 
or better cleaning (Managers χ2  (2) = 2.214, p = .331; Accident Subjects χ2  (2)  = 
.743, p = .690).  
The prevention of Mary’s trip accident presented a different pattern of responses 
with 50% of Accident Subjects tending to focus on a single antecedent, the 
presence of the hazard (χ2 (1) = 3.0, p = .083) whilst both Safety Professionals and 
Managers associated prevention with one of three antecedents, which were the 
removal of the hazard, improved system of work and better housekeeping (Safety 
Professionals χ2 (2) = 2.96, p = .227 and Managers χ2 (2) = .500, p = .779).        
 
What was the specific subject of the causal sentence? 
The results presented in Table 48 for the cause of Mary’s accident represent 77.6% 
of responses for respondents who were given a slip scenario and 64.6% of those 
given a trip scenario.  
The failure to implement a safe system of work was the most common subject of  
Safety Professionals’ causal sentences (53.3%) following Mary’s slip accident and 
was used significantly more often than their second choice of cause which was the 
presence of the hazard (32.4%,  χ2 (1) = 5.378,  p = .02). Managers were most likely 
to attribute the cause of Mary’s slip accident to one of three antecedents (χ2 (1) =  
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1.167,  p = .558), those being the presence of the hazard (40.5%), the inadequate 
response time (29.7%) and inadequate systems of work / procedures (27.0%). 
According to Accident Subjects the causes for Mary’s accident were as likely to 
relate to the presence of the hazard (44.4%) or the failure to clear up the spillage ( 
33.3%,  χ2 (1) = .714,  p = .398). 
Safety Professionals drew their causal antecedents from a wider range of options 
after Mary’s trip accident. As with Mary’s slip accident Safety Professionals 
referred to the failure to implement a safety system of work (31.6%), but also to the 
presence of the hazard (36.8%) and to poor standards of housekeeping (31.6%). 
None of these causes was found to be used significantly more often than the other 
(χ2 (1) = .615,  (2) p = .735). Managers completed the trip accident causal sentence 
in a similar way to the slip accident referring to three antecedent events in 
preference to the others, these being the presence of the hazard 36.7%, inadequate 
systems of work 36.7% and poor housekeeping 26.7% (χ2  (2) = .60,  p = .741). In 
the case of Mary’s trip, 76.5% of Accident Subjects focused on the presence of the 
hazard (χ2  (2) = .28.47,  p < .001).  
 
What was the ‘domain’ of the specific subject (antecedent) of the 
sentence? 
Analysis of the completed sentences revealed that the specific antecedents could be 
grouped in to one of four ‘domains’. These domains are described as being 
physical, behavioural, attitudinal or procedural. The content of each completed 
sentence was coded against these four domains. To ensure that the Chi Square (χ2) 
test assumptions (minimum expected cell count) were met, the very few results 
coded as being attitudinal were excluded in each section that follows. 
Which ‘domain’ did the counterfactual antecedent belong to?   
The results for the counterfactual sentences are presented in Table 49 and represent 
98% of all responses for slips and 95.7% for trips. 
For Mary’s slip accident a strong behavioural effect was identified, with each of the 
respondent groups’ counterfactual sentences referring to someone’s behaviour 
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significantly more frequently than they referred to either of the other two domains 
(Safety Professionals χ2  (2) = 49.70, p < .001, Managers χ2  (2) = 28.75,  p < .001, 
Accident Subjects χ2  (2) = 51.21,  p < .001).  
The same behavioural effect was also found in the counterfactual sentences of all 
three respondent groups for Mary’s trip accident (Safety Professionals χ2  (2) = 
28.23,  p < .001, Managers χ2  (2) = 19.44,  p < .001, Accident Subjects χ2  (2) = 
75.41, p < .001). 
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Table 46.  
Specific subject of the counterfactual sentence 
 N Presence 
of the 
hazard 
% 
Inadequate 
systems of 
work 
% 
Inadequate 
warnings 
% 
Poor 
housekeeping 
% 
Slow 
response 
time 
% 
Lack of 
attention 
by Mary 
% 
Mary’s 
decision 
to work 
% 
Personal 
action / 
inaction 
% 
Failing 
to 
clean 
up 
% 
Slips           
Safety 
Professional 
 
121  24.8 28.9  16.5 1.7 1.7  26.4 
Manager 
 
43  9.3 39.5  20.9 4.7 2.3  23.3 
Accident 
Subject 
51  0.0 25.5  13.7 23.5 17.6  19.6 
 215          
Trips           
Safety 
Professional 
 
126 51.6 15.9  15.1  5.6 4.0 7.9  
Manager 
 
53 43.4 11.3  13.2  5.7 1.9 24.5  
Accident 
Subject 
46 34.8 0.0  2.2  30.4 28.3 4.3  
 225          
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Table 47. 
Specific subject of the prevention sentence 
 N Presence  
of the  
hazard 
% 
Inadequate 
systems of 
work 
% 
Inadequate 
training 
% 
Inadequate 
warnings 
% 
Poor 
housekeeping 
% 
Inadequate 
response 
time 
% 
Failing to 
clean up 
% 
         
Safety 
Professional 
  
108  60.2  21.3  11.1 7.4 
Manager  
 
33  15.2  39.4  24.2 21.2 
Accident 
Subject  
42  16.7  23.8  26.2 33.3 
 183        
Trips         
Safety 
Professional  
 
103 20.8 30.0 18.5  30.8   
Manager  
 
29 32.6 25.6 16.3  25.6   
Accident 
Subject  
18 50 13.9 11.1  25.0   
 150        
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Table 48. 
Specific subject of the causal sentence 
 N = Presence  
of the 
 hazard 
% 
Inadequate 
systems  
of work 
% 
Poor 
housekeeping 
% 
Inadequate  
response time 
% 
Failing to clean 
up 
% 
Slips       
Safety 
Professional  
 
105 32.4 53.3 N/A 6.7 7.6 
Manager 
  
37 40.5 27.0 N/A 29.7 2.7 
Accident Subject  45 44.4 11.1 N/A 11.1 33.3 
 187      
Trips       
Safety 
Professional  
 
117 36.8 31.6 31.6 N/A N/A 
Manager  
 
30 36.7 36.7 26.7 N/A N/A 
Accident Subject  34 76.5 11.8 11.8 N/A N/A 
 181      
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Table 49.                                                                                                                              
Proportion of respondents’ chosen antecedents by domain for the  
counterfactual sentence 
 N  Physical 
item 
% 
Behaviour 
% 
Procedure or process 
/ system of work 
% 
Slips     
Safety 
Professional  
170 11.8 55.9 32.4 
Manager  61 19.7 65.6 14.8 
Accident 
Subject  
69 23.2 72.5 4.3 
 300    
Trips     
Safety 
Professional  
180 21.1 51.7 27.2 
Manager  68 14.7 57.4 27.9 
Accident 
Subject  
64 10.9 84.4 4.7 
 312    
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Which ‘domain’ did the prevention antecedent belong to?   
97% of all the slip scenario responses are accounted for in Table 50 and 94.7% for 
the trip scenario. 
Different domains were used in the prevention sentences to those used in the 
counterfactual sentences and no overall effect was identified. The domain that was 
selected was influenced by the respondent’s job group rather than the type of 
accident. 
Safety Professionals considered that improving or implementing safe systems of 
work and procedures was the best way to have prevented Mary’s accident 
irrespective of whether that was a slip or a trip (60.2% for slips χ2 (2) = 58.78,  p < 
.001 and 69.5% for trips χ2 (2) = 109.89, p < .001). Managers’ prevention sentences 
focused equally on two domains for both Mary’s slip and for her trip accident. A 
behaviour was referred to by 48.3% of Managers when preventing Mary’s slip 
accident and 44.1% when she had tripped; with 35% referring to safe systems of 
work as preventing her slip and 47.1% thought that improved safe systems of work 
would have prevented her trip accident (slips χ2 (1) = 1.28, p = .258,  trips χ2 (1) = 
.065, p = .799). 
Accident Subjects were most likely to complete their prevention sentence by 
referring to a single domain, that of someone’s behaviour for both Mary’s slip 
accident (74.6% χ2 (2) = 54.62, p < .001) and her trip accident (55.6%  χ2 (2) = 
14.09,  p = .001). 
Which ‘domain’ did the causal antecedent refer to?   
The results for the completion of the causal sentences are presented in Table 51 and 
account for 92.1% of responses for slips and 87.3% for trips. Safety Professionals 
identified inadequate systems of work in their causal sentences following both 
Mary’s slip accident (49.7%) and following her trip accident (55.1%) and these 
were significantly more likely to be referred to than antecedents in the behavioural 
domain which was their second choice ( slip χ2 (1) = 5.48, p = .019, and  trip χ2 (1) 
= 16.94, p < .001) . 
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The cause identified by Managers through their completed sentences was 
influenced by the type of accident. When it was Mary’s slip accident their sentences 
referred to someone’s behaviour most frequently (50.9%, χ2 (2) =7.89, p = .019) but 
when they were considering the cause of Mary’s trip accident there were no 
significant differences in the frequency that Managers used three domains, a 
physical item 23.0%, someone’s behaviour 37.7% or inadequate systems of work 
39.3% (χ2  (2) = 2.98, p = .225). 
 
Table 50.                                                                                                                                
Proportion of respondents’ chosen antecedents by domain for the  
prevention sentence 
 N Physical 
item 
% 
Behaviour 
% 
Procedure or 
process / system 
of work 
% 
Slips      
Safety 
Professional  
161 11.8 28.0 60.2 
Manager  60 16.7 48.3 35.0 
Accident 
Subject 
71 11.3 74.6 14.1 
 292    
Trips     
Safety 
Professional  
174 6.9 23.6 69.5 
Manager  68 8.8 44.1 47.1 
Accident 
Subject  
63 20.6 55.6 23.8 
 305    
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Accident Subjects also referred to the same domain for both slips and trips. In this 
case they completed their causal sentences with reference to someone’s behaviour 
most frequently (slips 58.1% χ2 (2) = 20.54, p = < .001 and trips 57.1% χ2 (2) = 
16.00, p = < .001). Accident Subjects’ second choice of causal domain referred to a  
physical item, but they referred to these significantly less often than they did to 
someone’s behaviour (slips χ2  (1) = 5.25,  p = .002, trips χ2 (1) = 5.33, p = .021).  
 
Table 51.                                                                                                                
Proportion of respondents’ chosen antecedents by domain for the causal 
sentence 
 N Physical 
item 
% 
Behaviour 
% 
Procedure or process / 
system of work 
% 
Slips     
Safety 
Professional  
161 17.4 32.9 49.7 
Manager  55 21.8 50.9 27.3 
Accident 
Subject 
62 30.6 58.1 6.9 
 278    
Trips     
Safety 
Professional  
 
167 18.6 26.3 55.1 
Manager  61 23.0 37.7 39.3 
Accident 
Subject  
56 28.6 57.1 14.3 
 284    
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Comparing the counterfactual sentences with the prevention and causal 
sentences 
There has been some debate as to whether counterfactuals identify a causal 
relationship between the mutated antecedent and the outcome or identify a missed 
opportunity to prevent the unwanted outcome. This was explored in this study by 
simply comparing each respondent’s prevention and causal sentences to their 
counterfactual sentence and making a judgement as to which were more alike. 
I will illustrate this approach by way of an example using a Safety Professional’s 
three completed sentences following Mary’s slip accident (Figure 4). 
Figure  4.                                                                                                                             
Example of comparing a respondent’s counterfactual sentence to their prevention and 
causal sentences 
Counterfactual sentence If only Bill the Shop Floor Supervisor had taken immediate 
action when the spill was first reported things could have 
been different. 
Prevention sentence Mary’s accident could have been prevented if Bill had taken 
immediate action… closed the checkout, placed a cone near 
the spill and stood by the spill until the Cleaner arrived. 
 
Causal sentence The cause of Mary’s accident was the failure to have a 
procedure in place to deal with spillages.    
 
Using these three sentences as examples the prevention sentence is more like the 
counterfactual sentence than the causal sentence. 
 
Based on this approach the counterfactual and prevention sentences were found to 
be most closely associated. In total 532 respondents’ sentences were assessed to see 
whether the prevention or causal sentences were more alike the counterfactual 
sentence. In 316 of cases (59.3%) the counterfactual and prevention sentences were 
judged to be more alike, whereas 216 respondents’ (40.0%) causal and 
counterfactual sentences were judged to be alike. Further analysis by job group and 
accident type (Table 52) supported the general interpretation that the prevention 
and counterfactual sentences were much more alike than were the counterfactual 
and causal sentences. Whilst the counterfactual and prevention sentences are 
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generally more alike, when this relationship is considered by accident type and job 
group it is clear that this is so only in a little over half the cases. Again trip 
accidents did not follow the general trend in that less than half of the comparison 
cases was the counterfactual sentence more like the prevention sentence. 
 
Table 52.                                                                                                              
Proportion of respondents whose counterfactual sentences were 
comparable to the prevention sentences or the causal sentences 
 Yes alike  
% 
No not alike 
 % 
Counterfactual and prevention 
sentences  
  
Slip 58.2 41.8 
Trip 45.5 54.5 
Safety Professional 53.0 47.0 
Manager 55.1 44.9 
Accident Subject  52.2 47.8 
   
Counterfactual and causal  
sentences 
34.3 65.7 
Slip 35.7 64.3 
Trip 33.0 67.0 
Safety Professional 33.8 66.2 
Manager 37.9 62.1 
Accident Subject  32.3 67.7 
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How did the respondents’ job group or the type of accident affect the 
Consideration of Future Consequences score? 
 
The respondents’ scores for the modified Consideration of Future Consequences 
(CFC) Scale were calculated in accordance with the method developed by Stratham 
et al. (1994). The mean scores are shown in Table 53. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accident Subjects’ CFC scores were the highest (mean score 23.34) and this score 
was tested against the mean scores for Safety Professionals and Managers and was 
found to be significantly higher in both cases (Safety Professionals t (126) = - 6.83  
p < .001,  Managers  t (123) = - 2.97 p = .004). The type of accident had no effect 
on the mean CFC score. 
 
 
Table 53.                                                                             
Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC) scores 
Grouping Mean CFC score 
  
Safety Practitioners  20.41 
Managers  21.60 
Accident Subjects 23.34 
  
Slips  21.50 
Trips 20.94 
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DISCUSSION 
 
The results will be discussed in several sections. After summarising the research 
aims and objectives and the key findings, I will briefly compare the results obtained 
with those that I predicted for six of the sentence structural dimensions and make 
comments on the other eight. This will be followed by a more detailed 
consideration of each of the structural dimensions in which I will expand and 
develop the meaning of the results, compare them to previous relevant research and 
comment on their theoretical and practical relevance to counterfactual thinking and 
accident prevention.  
 
Research Aims  
This study explored the counterfactual, prevention and causal thoughts of three 
respondent groups (Safety Professionals, Managers and Accident Subjects) 
following an occupational slip or trip accident to Mary, a supermarket checkout 
operator. The accident was presented to the respondents in the form of a scenario 
and their counterfactual, prevention and causal thoughts were captured through the 
completion of appropriate stimulus sentence stems, for example the counterfactual 
thought was recorded by asking the respondent to complete an ‘if only...’ sentence. 
Previous research identified a number of different structural dimensions to 
counterfactual thought, and this study has applied seven of the most relevant ones 
and seven new ones to an occupational slip or trip accident.  Thirteen of these 14 
dimensions have also been extended for the first time to two closely allied areas 
associated with occupational accidents, namely how respondents thought the 
accident could have been prevented and what the cause of the accident was. One 
dimension, that of the direction of the alternative outcome, was only relevant to the 
counterfactual sentence. 
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Safety Professionals were considered likely to have had greater experience in the 
investigation of slip and trip accidents and they should have been be more aware of 
the appropriate legal requirements than Managers or Accident Subjects, therefore I 
anticipated that Safety Professionals’ counterfactual, prevention and causal 
thoughts would differ from those of Managers or Accident Subjects, being based 
more closely on the application of legal duties and responsibilities. 
Key findings  
Summary of the key results for the counterfactual sentences  
 Respondents’ job group was a key factor in determining the type of 
antecedent associated with counterfactual, prevention and causal thoughts.   
 The type of accident appeared to have a bigger influence on the 
counterfactual completion than did the level of detail or the severity of 
injury.  
 The ‘specific subject’ of the counterfactual sentence was influenced by both 
the Respondents’ job group and the type of accident.  
 Based on the modal responses Accident Subjects focused on Mary’s lack of 
attention whereas both Safety Professionals and Managers referred to the 
presence of the hazard.  Slip accidents focused on a lack of warnings, while 
trips accidents were more likely to refer to the presence of the hazard.  
 The counterfactual sentences changed people’s behaviours more than they 
changed physical aspects of the environment / situation or procedures / 
processes. 
 All respondents completed the counterfactual sentence to bring about a better 
outcome, described as an upward counterfactual. 
 Different outcomes were most likely to be attained by improving the 
likelihood that the desired outcome being achieved (fourth order exception).     
  Inactions were changed by the addition of a new antecedent by all 
respondents irrespective of job group or accident type. 
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 The level of detail provided to respondents was directly related to the 
selection of an antecedent which was ‘known’ to or ‘inferred’ to have been 
by the respondent. Minimum detail led to the use of an ‘inferred’ antecedent 
whilst maximum detail led to the selection of a ‘known’ antecedent.    
 Items which were either directly observable or changing were used most 
commonly by all respondents. 
 Matters ‘specific’ to the accident were changed more than ‘general’ matters.  
 The type of accident influenced the temporal location of the antecedent 
selected to be changed. Antecedents relating to the day of the accident 
(proximal) were selected for Mary’s slip accident whereas antecedents 
relating to events prior to the day of the accident (distal) were selected for 
Mary’s trip. 
 Safety Professionals and Managers focused their counterfactual sentence on 
‘situational’ antecedents whereas Accident Subjects focused on ‘personal’ 
antecedents.  
 Accident Subjects were more likely than Safety Professionals or Managers to 
spontaneously identify the actor from the scenario in their counterfactual 
sentence. 
 Antecedents over which the scenario actor had some degree of control were 
used in the counterfactual sentence more frequently than uncontrollable 
ones. 
Comparing the predicted and actual results obtained for the existing 
structural dimensions 
Safety Professionals, Managers and Accident Subjects were expected to show 
differences in the way that they completed the counterfactual, prevention and causal 
sentences and this was based on their different roles and involvement with the 
scenario accident. These differences were expected to be focused on six of the 14 
structural dimensions as set out in Tables 1,2 and 3.  
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These six antecedents were (1) the temporal location of the selected antecedent 
(timescale), (2) whether the antecedent was static or dynamic, (3) whether it was 
general or specific to the scenario, (4) whether it was known to exist by the 
respondent or was inferred to have existed, (5) whether it was personal or 
situational and was (6) either a procedure, a behaviour or a physical item (domain). 
Full comparisons of the predicted responses against those actually obtained from 
the respondents are set out in Tables 54 to 59 with a brief comment. Predictions 
were not made in respect of all 14 structural dimensions, only those six where it 
was anticipated that there would be a difference between the respondents’ job 
groups or the type of sentence (counterfactual, prevention or causal). 
In summary, as predicted the structural dimensions of the sentences were 
influenced not only by the respondents’ job group but also by the type of accident, 
however there was little previous research to suggest how this might manifest itself.  
The initial predictions in Tables 1, 2 and 3 were based on the respondents’ job 
groups and did predict differences based on the type of accident so were expected 
to apply to both slips and trips. As can be seen from Tables 54 to 59 the influence 
of the accident type is partially strong for certain structural dimensions, such as 
temporal location and the use of known or inferred antecedents, but the effect is not 
constant across respondents’ job group or the type of sentence, which makes it 
more complex to interpret the overall effects.   
Safety Professionals - Predicted and actual results  
The predicted responses for Safety Professionals were based on the expected 
influence of the legal framework on their thinking which would tend to focus their 
counterfactual thoughts on safe systems of work and procedures, which in turn 
would lead them to make changes to antecedents which were temporally distal to 
the accident, be more general and static in nature, be based on the situation, and the 
antecedent would be inferred to have existed rather than be known from the 
scenario details provided as part of the study.  
These counterfactual predictions were only supported in Tables 54 to 59 for both 
slips and trips in respect of being based on situational antecedents. The predicted 
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results were present for either slips or trips (but not both) for the temporal location 
of the antecedent and whether it was known or inferred, whereas the predicted 
structural element was not found at all for three dimensions, those being (1) the use 
of a general (2) static antecedent based on (3) procedures.  
The structure of Safety Professionals’ preventive thinking was found to fully match 
that predicted in Tables 54 to 59 in respect of its focus on systems of work / 
procedures and using situational antecedents. The predicted structural element was 
present for either slips or trips (but not both) for the use of static, general and 
known antecedents. The prediction that Safety Professionals would select 
preventative antecedents proximal to the accident (related to the day the accident 
occurred) was not supported by the results. 
The predicted results for Safety Professionals causal sentences was found for both 
slips and trips in respect of the temporal location being distal to the accident,  
situational and related to systems of work. Whilst the predicted structural element 
was present for slip or trips (but not both) for the antecedents being static, general 
and inferred.  
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Table 54. Safety Professionals                                                                                      
Predicted and actual results for the temporal location of the 
antecedent (timescale) 
Sentence type Predicted 
results 
Actual results 
for slip 
accident 
Actual results 
for trip 
accident 
    
Counterfactual 
sentence 
Distal to the 
accident.   
Before the day 
of the accident 
Proximal       
Stage D 
hazard on the 
floor, Cleaner 
notified but 
not removed  
Distal  
Before Stage 
A - before the 
day of the 
accident 
Prevention 
sentence 
Proximal to the 
accident. On 
the day of the 
accident 
Distal  
Before Stage 
A - before the 
day of the 
accident 
Distal  
Before Stage 
A - before the 
day of the 
accident 
Causal 
Sentence 
Distal to the 
accident. 
Before the day 
of the accident 
Distal   
Before Stage 
A - before the 
day of the 
accident 
Distal   
Before Stage 
A - before the 
day of the 
accident 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 55. Safety Professionals                                                        
Predicted and actual results for the use of dynamic or static antecedents 
Sentence type Predicted 
Results 
Actual results 
for slip 
accident 
Actual results 
for trip accident 
    
Counterfactual 
sentence 
Static Dynamic Dynamic 
Prevention 
sentence 
Static Both 
dynamic and 
static 
Both dynamic 
and static 
Causal  
sentence 
Static Static Both dynamic 
and static 
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Table 57. Safety Professionals                                                                  
Predicted and actual results for the use known or inferred antecedents 
Sentence type Predicted 
results 
Level of 
detail 
provided 
Actual 
results for 
slip 
accident 
Actual 
results for 
trip accident 
     
Counterfactual 
sentence 
 
Inferred Minimum Inferred Inferred 
Inferred Maximum Known Known 
Prevention 
sentence 
 
Inferred Minimum Inferred Inferred 
Inferred Maximum Inferred Inferred 
Causal 
sentence 
Inferred Minimum Inferred Inferred 
Inferred  Maximum Inferred Inferred 
 
Table 56.  Safety Professionals                                                        
Predicted and actual results for the use of case specific or general 
antecedents 
Sentence type Predicted 
results 
Actual results 
for slip 
accident 
Actual results for 
trip accident 
    
Counterfactual 
sentence 
General Specific Specific 
Prevention 
sentence 
Specific Both specific 
& general 
General 
Causal  
sentence 
General Both specific 
& general 
General 
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Table 59. Safety Professionals                                                    
Predicted and actual results for the domain of the specific subject of 
the sentence 
Sentence type Predicted 
results 
Actual results 
for slip 
accident 
Actual results 
for trip 
accident 
    
Counterfactual 
sentence 
System of 
work / 
procedure 
Behaviour Behaviour 
Prevention 
sentence 
System of 
work / 
procedure 
System of 
work / 
procedure 
System of 
work / 
procedure 
Causal  
sentence 
System of 
work / 
procedure 
System of 
work / 
procedure 
System of 
work / 
procedure 
 
 
Table 58.  Safety Professionals                                                                   
Predicted and actual results for the use of personal  / situational 
antecedents  
Sentence type Predicted 
results 
Actual results 
for slip 
accidents 
Actual results 
for trip 
accidents 
    
Counterfactual 
sentence 
Situational Situational Situational 
Prevention 
sentence 
Situational Situational Situational 
Causal     
sentence 
Situational Situational Situational 
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Managers - Predicted and actual results 
Managers’ responses were predicted based on them having some knowledge of the 
legal requirement for occupational accidents, not as much as Safety Professionals 
but more so than Accident Subjects. The predicted and actual results for Managers 
are presented in Tables 60 to 65. 
In their counterfactual sentences the predicted structures were found for both slips 
and trips in selecting antecedents which were specific to the accident and related to 
the behavioural domain, whilst the predicted structural element was present for one 
or other of the accident types for the use of antecedents which were proximal to the 
time of the accident, were dynamic and personal. The results did not support the 
predicted structural dimensions for the use of known antecedents under minimal 
levels of detail but did for maximum detail scenarios. 
None of the predictions relating to the structure of Managers’ preventative thinking 
were supported fully by the results. There was some degree of support (either for 
slips or trips) for five of the six predicted dimensions, those being the use of 
proximal, dynamic, known, case specific and behavioural antecedents. 
There was no support for the prediction that Managers would use personal 
antecedents as they were most likely to use situational ones when preventing 
Mary’s accident. 
Similarly the predicted structure of Managers’ causal sentences were not found in 
their results for both slips and trips. Personal antecedents were predicted to be used 
but situational ones dominated. For the other structural dimensions the predicted 
dimension was used for one or other of the accident types, or was used along with 
other options. The level of detail provided to Managers influenced the use of known 
or inferred antecedents, such that when minimal detail was provided inferred 
antecedents were selected most commonly. 
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Table 60.  Managers                                                                                                             
Predicted and actual results for the temporal location of the antecedent 
(timescale) 
Sentence type Predicted results Actual results 
for slip accident 
Actual results 
for trip 
accident 
    
Counterfactual 
sentence 
Proximal to the 
accident. (On 
the day of the 
accident) 
Proximal  Stage 
D hazard on the 
floor, Cleaner 
notified but not 
removed 
Both 
Proximal 
and distal 
Prevention 
sentence 
Proximal to the 
accident. (On 
the day of the 
accident) 
Both Proximal 
and distal 
Distal 
 Before Stage 
A - before the 
day of the 
accident 
Causal 
sentence 
Proximal to the 
accident. (On 
the day of the 
accident) 
Proximal  Stage 
D hazard on the 
floor, Cleaner 
notified but not 
removed 
Distal  
 Before Stage 
A - before the 
day of the 
accident  
 
Table 61. Managers                                                                           
Predicted and actual results for the use of dynamic or static antecedents 
Sentence type Predicted 
results 
Actual results 
for slip 
accident 
Actual results 
for trip 
accident 
    
Counterfactual 
sentence 
Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic and 
static 
Prevention 
sentence 
Dynamic Dynamic and 
static 
Dynamic and 
static 
Causal sentence Dynamic Dynamic and 
static 
Dynamic and 
static 
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Table 62.  Managers                                                                                                      
Predicted and actual results for the use of case specific / general 
antecedents  
Sentence type Predicted 
results 
Actual results 
for slip 
accident 
Actual results 
for trip 
accident 
    
Counterfactual 
sentence 
Specific Specific Specific 
Prevention 
sentence 
Specific Specific Both specific 
and general 
Causal sentence Specific Both  specific 
and general 
Both specific 
and general 
 
Table 63. Managers                                                                                                   
Predicted and actual results for the use of known or inferred antecedents 
Sentence type Predicted 
results 
Level of 
detail 
Actual 
results for 
slip 
accident 
Actual 
results for 
trip 
accident 
     
Counterfactual 
sentence 
Known Minimum Inferred Inferred 
Known Maximum Known Known 
Prevention 
sentence 
Known Minimum Inferred Inferred 
Known Maximum Both 
inferred & 
known 
Both 
inferred & 
known 
Causal sentence Known Minimum Inferred Inferred 
Known Maximum Both 
inferred & 
known 
Inferred 
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Table 64. Managers                                                                                                           
Predicted and actual results for the use of personal or situational antecedents  
Sentence type Predicted results Actual results for 
slip accident 
Actual results 
for trip 
accident 
    
Counterfactual 
sentence 
Personal Both personal & 
situational 
Both personal 
& situational 
Prevention 
sentence 
Personal Situational Situational 
Causal sentence Personal Situational Situational 
 
 
Table 65.  Managers                                                                                                      
Predicted and actual results for the domain of the specific subject of the 
sentence 
Sentence type Predicted results Actual results 
for slip accident 
Actual results for 
trip accident 
    
Counterfactual 
sentence 
Behaviour Behaviour Behaviour 
Prevention 
sentence 
Behaviour Behaviour & 
system of work 
Behaviour & 
system of work 
Causal 
sentence 
Behaviour Behaviour Behaviour, 
system of work & 
physical item 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page | 196  
 
Accident Subjects - Predicted and actual results 
Accident Subjects’ responses were predicted on the basis that they were least likely 
to be influenced by legal considerations and would respond in ways that might 
reflect the more typical counterfactual approaches identified in earlier literature. 
Accident Subjects’ predicted and actual results are presented in Tables 66 to 71. 
In their counterfactual sentences Accident Subjects’ results supported the predicted 
structural approach across both types of accident in selecting specific and 
behavioural antecedents. The predicted counterfactual structure was used for one or 
other of the accident types in respect of using proximal, dynamic and personal 
antecedents. Accident Subjects demonstrated an interesting response to the 
manipulation of the level of detail provided in the scenario. They selected an 
inferred antecedent for slip accidents under both minimum and maximum levels of 
detail.  
The results of Accident Subjects’ prevention sentences were as predicted in respect 
of three of the structural dimensions, those being the use of antecedents which were 
dynamic, specific and behavioural. For the other three structural dimensions the 
predicted results were found for one type of accident or at least included in one or 
both of the accident types. The minimum level of detail resulted in inferred 
antecedents being used for both slips and trips but this was not the predicted result. 
Accident Subjects’ causal results matched the predictions for three structural 
dimensions, those being the use of proximal, specific and behavioural antecedents. 
Again the remaining three dimensions (dynamic, known and personal) were used in 
connection with one or both types of accident but usually in combination with other 
options. As with their prevention sentences inferred antecedents were preferred 
under minimal detail conditions. 
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Table 66.  Accident Subjects                                                                                                                   
Predicted and actual results for the temporal location of the antecedent 
(timescale) 
Sentence type Predicted results Actual results for 
slip accident 
Actual results 
for trip 
accident 
    
Counterfactual 
sentence 
Proximal to the 
accident. On the 
day of the 
accident 
Proximal.  Stage 
D hazard on the 
floor, Cleaner 
notified but not 
removed 
Distal              
Before Stage 
A - before the 
day of the 
accident 
Prevention 
sentence 
Proximal to the 
accident. On the 
day of the 
accident 
Proximal.  Stage 
D hazard on the 
floor, Cleaner 
notified but not 
removed 
Both Distal & 
Proximal. 
Before the 
day of the 
accident at 
Stage C & D 
Causal sentence Proximal to the 
accident. On the 
day of the 
accident 
Proximal. Stage 
C hazard on 
floor, D hazard 
on the floor, 
Cleaner notified 
but not removed 
Proximal          
Stage C 
hazard on 
floor 
 
Table 67. Accident Subjects                                                                                                      
Predicted and actual results for the use of dynamic / static antecedents 
Sentence type Predicted 
results 
Actual results 
for slip 
accident 
Actual results for 
trip accident 
    
Counterfactual 
sentence 
Dynamic Dynamic Both dynamic & 
static 
Prevention 
sentence 
Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic 
Causal sentence Dynamic Both 
dynamic & 
static 
Both dynamic & 
static 
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Table 68. Accident Subjects                                                                                                 
Predicted and actual results for the use of case specific / general 
antecedents 
Sentence type Predicted 
results 
Actual results 
for slip 
accident 
Actual results 
for trip 
accident 
    
Counterfactual 
sentence 
Specific Specific Specific 
Prevention 
sentence 
Specific Specific Specific 
Causal sentence Specific Specific Specific 
 
 
Table 69. Accident Subjects                                                                                                       
Predicted and actual results for the use of known or inferred antecedents 
Sentence type Predicted 
results 
Level of 
detail 
Actual 
results for 
slip 
accidents 
Actual 
results for 
trip 
accidents 
     
Counterfactual 
sentence 
Known Minimum Inferred Both known 
& inferred 
Known Maximum Inferred Both known 
& inferred 
Prevention 
sentence 
Known Minimum Inferred Inferred 
Known Maximum Known Both known 
& inferred 
Causal 
sentence 
Known Minimum Inferred Inferred 
Known  Maximum Known Both known 
& inferred 
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Table 70. Accident Subjects                                                                                                      
Predicted and actual results for the use of personal / situational 
antecedents 
Sentence type Predicted 
results 
Actual results 
for slip 
accidents 
Actual results 
for trip 
accidents 
    
Counterfactual 
sentence 
Personal Both personal 
& situational 
Personal 
Prevention 
sentence 
Personal Both personal 
& situational 
Both personal 
& situational 
Causal sentence Personal Both personal 
& situational 
Both personal 
& situational 
 
 
Table 71. Accident Subjects                                                                
Predicted and actual results for the domain of the specific subject of the 
sentence 
Sentence type Predicted 
results 
Actual results 
for slip 
accidents 
Actual results 
for trip 
accidents 
    
Counterfactual 
sentence 
Behaviour Behaviour Behaviour 
Prevention 
sentence 
Behaviour Behaviour Behaviour 
Causal sentence Behaviour Behaviour Behaviour 
 
General comments on the results of the other structural dimensions of the 
sentences  
The results for the remaining structural dimensions referred to in Tables 1, 2 and 3 
(predicted responses for Safety Professionals, Managers and Accident Subjects) and 
not covered in the preceding section will be briefly reviewed. 
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Counterfactual direction   
As predicted all respondents completed their counterfactual sentences in an upward 
direction, irrespective of the respondents’ job group, the type of accident, the 
severity of the injury or the level of detail provided.  
Addition or subtraction  
It was predicted that each of the respondent job groups would add antecedents to 
the event sequence for their counterfactual and prevention sentences and subtract 
antecedents for their causal sentence, and the results in Tables 12, 13 and 14 
support this. The only subtle difference was found in Accident Subjects’ responses 
to the counterfactual and causal trip sentences where the modal responses were as 
predicted but their use was not statistically significant. 
Exceptionality  
The use of exceptional or normal antecedents was predicted to be constant across 
the respondents’ job groups but to vary according to the type of sentence being 
considered, with counterfactual and causal thinking utilising exceptional 
antecedents and more normal antecedents being used in connection with 
preventative thinking. 
Norm Theory has been refined in this study by developing a classification for the 
type of exceptional event that the respondents changed in their counterfactual 
thoughts. Exceptional events are selected for counterfactual mutation over routine 
or normal events so the antecedent selected by respondents in this study must be 
considered to be unusual or exceptional in some way. The exceptional event 
designed in to the scenario (Mary’s decision to work) was not the one selected most 
commonly (Tables 15 and 46), but some other antecedent in the sequence of events 
that led to her slip or trip accident. It is those other antecedents that have been 
analysed to identify different categories of exceptional events. These are presented 
as a refinement of Norm Theory and a classification scheme for exceptional events 
has been developed. This is discussed more fully when I review the results of the 
normality of the sentences later in the discussion section. 
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In light of the above definition of what is normal or exceptional the predicted 
results for the counterfactual and causal sentences were both supported to some 
degree by the actual results, but not exactly as anticipated. Mary’s decision to work 
and cover for her friend who was on holiday, which was the exceptional event 
designed into the scenario, was not selected routinely as expected and predicted by 
previous research. Other aspects of the situation were changed in keeping with the 
extended definition of exceptional events developed for this study. With regard to 
the prediction that the prevention sentences would be associated with normal or 
routine antecedents, the result did not support his. It would seem that respondents 
sought to prevent Mary’s accident by improving an existing situation.  
Spontaneous identification of the scenario actor and to whom the sentence 
referred 
When the research scenario was piloted the initial results indicated that about 50% 
of respondents made a spontaneous reference to a scenario actor in their sentences. 
From a functional perspective it was anticipated that a greater number of 
respondents would have been specific about who was in a position to have brought 
about a different outcome, prevent the accident or be identified with the cause. Of 
the three respondent groups this was perhaps most likely by Safety Professionals, 
whose role as enforcement officers can involve attribution of responsibility from a 
legal perspective. The results in Tables 40, 41 and 42 show that respondents did not 
make a spontaneous reference to a scenario actor. 
No predictions were made as to which of the scenario actors would be selected but 
the results indicate some interesting patterns. Safety Professionals referred to the 
Supervisor most commonly in their counterfactual sentences but to the Employer in 
their prevention and causal sentences. Managers referred to the Supervisor most 
commonly in all three types of sentence, whilst Accident Subjects referred to Mary 
in their counterfactual sentences, the Supervisor and Mary when completing their 
prevention sentence, and to other workers as being causally connected to the 
accident. 
 
Page | 202  
 
The specific subject of the sentence  
No predictions were made as to what the specific subject of the sentences might 
relate to. 
The results in Tables 46, 47 and 48 indicate that Safety Professionals’ prevention 
and causal sentences related mainly to systems of work and procedures whereas 
their counterfactual sentences tended to refer to inadequate warnings, failing to 
clear up, and the presence of the hazard. Managers showed an overall tendency to 
refer to either a lack of warnings or the presence of the hazard in their sentences. 
Accident Subjects’ responses tended to refer to broadly similar antecedents as 
Safety Professionals and Managers for their prevention and causal sentences, but it 
was in their counterfactual sentences that Accident Subjects selected different 
antecedents referring to Mary’s lack of attention or her decision to work on that day 
covering for her friend. 
Discussion on the results of the structural dimensions of the sentences  
I will now discuss in more detail the results for the 14 structural dimensions and 
will expand and develop the meaning of the results, comparing these with previous 
relevant research and comment on their theoretical and practical relevance to 
counterfactual thinking and accident prevention. I will start by making some 
general comments applicable to this study and then make some specific comments 
on each of the structural dimensions in turn. 
General comments  
There has been some debate in the counterfactual literature as to whether 
counterfactual thoughts identify a causal relationship between the antecedent and 
the outcome or whether they represent a missed opportunity to have prevented the 
outcome. Both are possible but the actual use may be context dependent. In this 
study the context was one of an occupational accident in which people naturally 
seek to understand the cause and prevent similar accidents in the future. On that 
basis counterfactual thoughts might be used equally to identify a cause and prevent 
future occurrences, but the role that people play might also influence the way that 
they use counterfactual thoughts and this would be reflected in their structure. 
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Three real life roles associated with an occupational accident were tested in this 
study, Safety Professionals, Managers and Accident Subjects. 
Figure 4 illustrates the method used for a simple analysis of the subject of 
respondents’ sentences. In that example the counterfactual and prevention sentences 
were more comparable than were the counterfactual and causal sentences. After an 
accident it would seem that the respondents think about its causes in a different way 
to how it could have been prevented or how it could have been different. When it is 
expressed in that way the similarity in the purpose of counterfactual thoughts and 
prevention thoughts is more apparent. Although bringing about a different outcome 
has two possible directions, only an upward direction was used in this study and 
bringing about a better outcome equates to preventing an accident. Preventing 
something from happening has as its aim the complete suppression of all risks of 
the unwanted outcome from occurring, and this was found in the counterfactual 
sentences which sought to completely undo the outcome of Mary’s accident 
irrespective of its seriousness (degree of injury). 
Counterfactual and prevention thinking are more alike in their overall purpose. 
After looking back at the antecedent sequence and selecting a suitable one, they 
both utilise a forward looking simulation heuristic to evaluate the power of that 
antecedent to bring about a different outcome or prevent the outcome. It is in this 
way that I suggest they differ from causal thinking. Whilst this also involves a 
backward look at the antecedent sequence its purpose remains backward looking 
and is limited to the identification of the most suitable causal antecedent. Whilst 
there must be some forward looking element to ensure there is a cause effect link 
between the antecedent and the outcome, I suggest that is more of a feedback loop 
that a forward looking simulation. It is as though identifying a cause is half of the 
process necessary to make a counterfactual or prevention thought. These concepts 
are illustrated in Figures 5, 6, 7 and 8. 
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Accident 
 Antecedent 
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Antecedent
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Antecedent 
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Counterfactual thinking identifies and changes an antecedent   
Upward outcome 
or 
Changed 
Antecedent
1 
Antecedent 
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Antecedent
3 
Real world outcome  
Counterfactual outcome  
Downward 
outcome 
Figure 5. Schematic representation of counterfactual thinking 
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No accident 
Accident 
Antecedent 
1 
Antecedent
2 
Antecedent
3 
Counterfactual thinking identifies and changes an antecedent   
Changed 
Antecedent
1 
Antecedent 
2 
Antecedent
3 
 Prevention via backward causal inference  
Prevention predicted by simulating outcome based on changed antecedent   
Figure 6. Schematic representation of outcome based preventative thinking  
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No accident 
Accident 
Antecedent 
1 
 
Antecedent
2 
Antecedent
3 
Stage 1 Risk assessment approach to prevention using forward causal inference 
Start 
point 
Causal potential of Antecedent 1 tested using forward causal inference  
Changed 
Antecedent 
1 
Antecedent
2 
Antecedent
3 
Stage 2 Risk assessment approach to Prevention using forward causal inference 
Start 
point 
Causal potential of changed Antecedent 1 tested using forward causal inference  
Figure 7. Schematic representation of antecedent based preventative thinking  
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A possible causal antecedent is identified  
Real world outcome  
Causal potential test stage  
Causal potential of the 
antecedent is assessed.  
Accident 
If it explains 
the outcome 
it is 
classified as 
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Figure 8. Schematic representation of causal thinking 
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Specific comments on the existing structural dimensions  
Counterfactual direction 
The directional dimension of the sentence was only relevant to the counterfactual 
sentences as they are the only ones in which an alternative outcome could vary by 
being better or worse than the original outcome. The prevention sentence starts with 
an assumption that a better outcome will be achieved, whereas the causal sentence 
does not address the future outcome at all but simply looks back as the antecedents 
and seeks to identify the cause. The remaining 13 structural dimensions were 
applicable to all three types of sentence. 
Counterfactual ‘if only…’ thoughts are said to offer the potential for two alternative 
outcomes, either changing things for the better or worse outcome. Better outcomes 
are referred to as having an upward direction, whereas counterfactual thoughts 
bringing about a worse outcome are referred to as having a downward direction. It 
was with that in mind that the study was designed to ensure that a better or worse 
outcome could be made for both the minor or serious injury versions of the scenario 
(see Figure 3), theoretically a counterfactual sentence could leave the outcome 
unchanged and these types thoughts are often illustrated as using the phrase ‘Even 
if...’  but this type of thought was not included in this study.  
Counterfactual thoughts tend to restore unusual or unexpected events to their 
default or normal status. Unwanted outcomes such as being injured in a slip or trip 
accident should be changed in such a way that the outcome (accident) is either 
avoided or the effect (injury) is minimised. Although slips and trips are commonly 
reported to the HSE and local authorities, and are the most frequent cause of major 
injuries such as fractures (HSE, 2013a), they are very rare occurrences in relation to 
the number of working people and the number of steps taken in an occupational 
setting. The rarity of the event and the unwanted injury are sufficient to invoke 
people’s counterfactual thought processes and in this study all (100%) respondents 
from all three job groups (Safety Professionals, Managers and Accident Subjects) 
completed the counterfactual ‘If only...’ sentence to bring about a better outcome 
(an upward counterfactual). This suggests that the respondents’ default norm was 
one in which the accident was avoided completely. Not a single respondent 
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completed their counterfactual sentence in a way where the accident still happened 
but where Mary’s injury was reduced in severity or she was uninjured, although 
that approach was open to respondents and would still have been an upward 
counterfactual. Every respondent’s counterfactual sentence sought to bring about a 
better outcome and this is not unexpected given the particular setting of this study. 
People naturally seek to avoid accidental injury, whether by virtue of their specific 
roles and responsibilities (Safety Professionals and Managers) or simply because of 
an innate desire to survive which drives our basic responses to keep away from 
environments and situations where we could be physically or emotionally harmed.  
There was no social imperative inherent in this study which would have naturally 
led respondents to bring about a worse outcome, and they were not asked to 
commiserate, reassure, or sympathise with Mary, so a strong response to bring 
about a better outcome was expected.  
If injury severity is represented on a 10-point scale (Figure 3), both a minor injury 
at position 2 and a major injury at position 8 have scope to be changed for a better 
or worse outcome.   
 
Better outcomes as reported in this study require the injury severity to be reduced 
(moved to the left) on the scale from the original starting point. A two- point 
reduction reverts a minor injury to the desired norm of no injury (0 on the scale), 
Figure. 3 Design of the scenario allowing for better and worse outcomes.  
Scenario design allowing for a better or worse outcome 
Norm = No 
Accident 
Minor 
Injury  
Major 
Injury 
Fatality  
0.       1.          2.         3.          4.          5.           6.          7.          8.         9.          10.  
Increasing severity of injury / Exceptionality 
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whereas a major injury at point 8 requires a greater movement on the scale (minus 
eight steps) to revert this to the normal situation. 
If a counterfactual mutation produced a linear response, that is an equal reduction in 
injury severity from any given starting point, a two-point reduction in severity 
would reduce a severe injury at point 8 to one at point 6 but would change a minor 
injury to a position where the accident would have been avoided altogether for the 
same amount of counterfactual effort. However this is not what these results 
indicate. The same counterfactual change is applied to bring about the expected 
norm no matter how far along the injury scale they start from. The minor injury was 
changed by minus two steps, but the major injury was changed by minus eight steps 
to bring about the non-injury norm using the same counterfactual approach. 
The counterfactual response may be described as being asymmetrical and it 
highlights that under the approach adopted by respondents in this study the norm 
(no injury) is fixed in their minds and the counterfactual change re-established the 
norm irrespective of the severity of the original outcome. Of course respondents in 
this study were simply ‘undoing’ the accident as presented to them in the scenario 
and were not making comparisons with a more or less severe outcome, but 
nevertheless all respondents approached their counterfactual thoughts with the aim 
of completely undoing the accident. This differs from the approach suggested in the 
often-used example of a student who gets bad exam grades after drinking the night 
before (Roese & Olson, 1995). In that situation the counterfactual alternative is also 
a better outcome with improved grades, but it does not imply that the student would 
get the best possible outcome (Grade A pass), merely a better grade or perhaps 
returning to their normal or expected grade. In an accident scenario the best 
possible outcome is the expected norm. 
This study has established that the norm brought to mind following an occupational 
slip or trip is the complete avoidance of the accident. Although both minor and 
major injury outcomes could be mutated to bring about a better (upward) or worse 
(downward) outcome, only one direction was used by all respondents and that was 
an upward change preventing Mary’s accident from occurring. From a functional 
basis, avoiding accidents and injury completely is more beneficial than accepting 
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that an accident may occur but seeking to minimise its severity, although this 
approach does have a place in certain areas of risk management (for example 
wearing of seat belts and the provision of air bags in cars) it is not one adopted by 
the respondents in this study. The outcome of an accident can be unpredictable, so 
it makes sense from a functional perspective to ensure that the route to the 
counterfactual outcome is sufficiently robust to account for the wide range of 
possible real world outcomes and still achieve the desired norm. In this sense 
counterfactuals employed after a slip or trip, and probably other accident situations, 
are more of an ‘all or nothing’ approach. 
It should come as no surprise that Safety Professionals who are highly familiar with 
the detail of health and safety legislation should use this as a framework for their 
counterfactual thoughts, but it was less expected from Managers. Certainly there 
would be little expectation that general employees (Accident Subjects) would be 
aware of legal requirements, yet there no was variation in the responses of any of 
the job groups to employ upward counterfactuals to bring about a better outcome 
for Mary. In this study respondents in the Manager and Accident Subject groups 
were not specifically asked about their knowledge of health and safety law so it 
cannot be ruled out that they had some knowledge. However, I suggest that this is a 
less likely explanation than that people have a generally held belief and 
expectation, based on widely experienced personal and social norms, that accidents 
are unwanted and to be avoided. This makes perfect sense from a functional 
psychological perspective. 
On this basis the results presented by the respondents for the counterfactual 
direction element of the sentence are as predicted in Tables 1, 2 and 3, and I suggest 
consistent with general expectations learnt from personal experience of work and 
life in general. In addition, the specific setting of the scenario where an injury has 
been sustained and the active prompting of respondents for a counterfactual 
outcome would make a better outcome more available. If the setting of the scenario 
were to be altered to one in which Mary narrowly missed being seriously injured 
the framing effect would be shifted and respondents might be more inclined 
towards making a comparison to a worse outcome. Similarly had the respondents 
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been asked to console Mary after her accident downward counterfactuals might 
well have been recorded. The respondents’ roles and the specific setting of this 
research scenario led to the universal adoption of counterfactuals highlighting a 
better outcome, but it is easy to appreciate how a slight change in the social 
situation where respondents’ roles were different could influence the motivation for 
counterfactual thinking which could lead to a reversal of the counterfactual 
direction presented here. 
Acton or inaction effects 
In their counterfactual thoughts Safety Professionals, Managers and Accident 
Subjects all reported a strong tendency towards the selection and mutation of an 
inaction to restore the status quo. These results are consistent with the findings of 
Davis et al. (1995) who also reported that counterfactual thinking focused on 
inaction, following real life events. However, these results do not follow the 
expected mutation of actions proposed by Norm Theory which suggests that actions 
are more likely to be perceived in everyday social settings as being more unusual 
(exceptional) and therefore more likely to be changed counterfactually.  
Roese and Olsen (1995) proposed that the social situation had an important effect in 
determining whether an action or an inaction was changed to bring about the 
desired outcome and the current study had an occupational setting in which 
statutory standards apply. The law is framed in such a way as to establish a duty on 
employers to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety and 
welfare of their staff  (HMSO, 1974) and this establishes an expectation that active 
steps are taken to comply with that duty and prevent accidents. Against this 
background an accident suggests there has been a failure to comply with the legal 
duty and implies that the necessary actions have not been taken, and this is 
translated in counterfactual thoughts to the mutation of inactions and that has been 
demonstrated in this study. The particular social setting of this study contains a 
strong implication that actions are expected and by default that inaction is 
unexpected and unacceptable. This expectation arises from two sources, the first 
source is the legal background which sets out duties on employers and staff to act in 
ways that comply, and the second source is the generally implied expectation that 
Page | 213  
 
success (avoiding accidents in this case) arises from planned actions (McGill, 
1989), which implies that failures (accidents) arise from not having taken the 
required actions (inactions). 
However, it does not follow that all accidents result from inaction even in the slip 
and trip category.  The exact nature of the circumstances is likely to exert a 
powerful influence on the action / inaction effect. As far as the mutation of actions 
is concerned in terms of occupational slips and trips, I suggested that they are only 
considered after all possible inactions have been excluded. Take for example a 
variation of the research scenario in which standard preventative measures had been 
taken, and Mary had ignored warning signs and the advice of a colleague and chose 
to walk through the milk. It seems very likely under those circumstances that a 
deliberate action would override any possible inaction and be selected for mutation. 
It is likely that inactions will normally be selected for counterfactual mutation for a 
wide range of occupational accidents, except where there is a deliberate action by 
an individual which is considered to be causal and overrides the inaction effect.  
This is in keeping with the general principles of identifying causes in law. Hart and 
Honore (1985) discussed tracing causes back through the antecedent chain to the 
‘sine qua non’ (but for event), but that search does not go past a deliberate human 
action. 
Both the counterfactual and causal sentences resulted in an inaction effect, so were 
more alike, whereas the prevention sentence showed a strong propensity for the use 
of actions to prevent Mary’s accident. 
It is not surprising that the prevention sentences were more action based (Table 10) 
given the setting of this particular research in an occupational setting, with its 
attendant legal standards and very often explicit expectations for active measures to 
be taken to prevent accidents and ill health. As I discussed in the literature review 
the framing effect of the law established a strong expectation for positive actions, 
and breaches of the law are very often expressed in summonses to court as failures 
to comply. Equally the language associated with prevention is so often action 
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based, so we speak of ‘taking steps to prevent’ or asking ‘what will be done to 
prevent this from happening again?’. 
In a general sense causes are not normally constrained linguistically or by legal 
framing effects as arising from either actions or inactions. However the specific 
setting can determine if one or other of these is more likely to be selected. For 
example, the Mr. Jones scenario involved at least four deliberate decisions and 
actions for the accident to happen as described. Mr. Jones decided to leave work 
early / go home via the coast road and he braked hard to stop at the junction, and 
the young man who jumped the red lights decided to drive while drunk and not to 
stop at the red light, all of which arise from actions. In much the same way the 
death of Eugene and Tina (Wells & Gavanski, 1989) might be attributed to actions 
which were the effect of the storm on the bridge or the decision by Eugene to drive 
Tina’s car, after the taxi driver refused to take them.   
This refusal presents an interesting question about the nature of actions and 
inactions in respect of decisions. If someone, having weighed up a situation, 
decides not to take an action is it an action or inaction? Is the decision itself 
considered to be an action and the inaction a consequence of that, or is taking no 
action following a reasoned decision classified as an inaction as it would be in other 
circumstances where there was no consideration and the inaction was from a lapse 
of memory or a fault arising from human error? (Rasmussen, 1982). It seems in this 
case that the taxi driver’s refusal would be an action because it was a conscious 
decision taken after an assessment of the situation. In both these studies the 
respondents are constrained by the structure of the scenario to consider the role of 
actions. 
 In the current study the scenario included specific inactions such as the lack of 
warning signs and the Cleaner’s slow response, as well as implied inactions such as 
the Supervisor not making sure the Cleaner had responded, or the failure to learn 
from the previous accidents. 
In both scenarios (Mr. Jones and Eugene and Tina) respondents were asked about 
alternative outcomes (counterfactual thinking) or responsibility for the outcome, but 
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were not asked directly what the cause was. Had they been, I would have expected 
respondents to have identified the cause of Mr. Jones’ accident as being the 
drunken driving by the young man who jumped the red light. In the Eugene and 
Tina scenario the cause might well have been identified as the taxi driver’s refusal 
to pick up his passengers. Whilst this is speculative, both would appear to violate 
expected behaviours. Drunk driving is explicitly prohibited by statute in the UK 
and there must be an implicit expectation for a taxi driver to pick up a passenger 
who booked a journey. In this way both actions and inactions can be 
counterfactually available and causally linked to the outcome, and a respondent’s 
particular role and the social setting along with the expectations or motivations that 
these bring can determine whether actions or inactions are selected when people 
think about how an accident might have been different or its cause. 
In the case of Mary’s accident respondents selected a failure to act as being the 
cause significantly more than an action was selected, and this is likely to be a 
combination of the specific scenario and the framing effects of the social setting 
and legislative requirements. We know from the maximum detail scenario that the 
inactions were more significant in that they were highlighted as exceptions to an 
expected procedure, which is typical of an accident report, for example no warning 
signs were put out, the Cleaner did not clear up the spillage and there was an 
implied failure to implement a safe system work, all of which are set against a 
background of the expected duties to prevent accidents established by the Health 
and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (HMSO, 1974). In such circumstances inactions 
would almost certainly be seen as being more causally potent than actions and this 
was borne out by the results presented in Table 11. The one notable exception being 
the 60% of Accident Subjects who found the cause of Mary’s trip accident to be 
from actions. 
 Addition or subtraction effects 
Previous counterfactual research identified that an alternative outcome can be 
achieved by either adding a new antecedent to the event sequence (this would be an 
additive counterfactual) or removing a pre-existing antecedent from the sequence of 
events leading to the unwanted outcome (a subtractive counterfactual). In this study 
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the idea that a counterfactual antecedent could be either added to or subtracted from 
the sequence of events leading up to an outcome was extended to how the outcome 
could have been prevented and what the cause was. Used in this way an addition in 
a prevention or causal sentence becomes something which was improved, better or 
more than expected, and a subtraction  becomes something which was less or worse 
than expected. Under this extended concept there is a logical relationship between 
the counterfactual, prevention, and causal use of additions and subtractions. 
Assuming an upward additive counterfactual is generated this should relate to an 
additive prevention sentence in which Mary’s accident is prevented by improving 
something, whilst the cause is most likely to be presented as being less than 
expected. Conversely, where an upward but subtractive counterfactual is generated, 
prevention of Mary’s accident should also be achieved by removing something. 
As a strong additive counterfactual effect has been shown in this study, a similarly 
strong additive effect would be expected in the way that respondents completed 
their prevention sentences and this in turn leads to an expectation that the cause will 
be expressed in terms of being subtractive or less than expected, and this is what the 
results have shown (see Tables 12, 13 and 14). 
No particular preference for the use of additional or subtractive counterfactuals has 
been expressed in previous research for different social situations, but there is 
inevitably a rational relationship between the mutation of actions or inactions and 
the use of additional or subtractive counterfactuals. The specific situation and the 
level of knowledge possessed by the respondent may also influence the use of 
additional or subtractive counterfactuals. In this study respondents showed a strong 
tendency towards using additional counterfactuals, with 84% of all respondents 
adopting this approach. 
As respondents showed a strong inaction effect (discussed in the previous section) 
the logical mutation on the addition / subtraction dimension is to add in the missing 
action to the event sequence (additive counterfactuals). This is the result shown in 
Table 12, with the exception of Accident Subjects responding to Mary’s trip 
accident who brought about a different outcome through the use of both additive 
and subtractive counterfactuals. 
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The use of additive counterfactuals was predicted in Tables 1, 2 and 3, because of 
the anticipated focus on inactions which arises from the legal duties to actively 
manage risk, and the assumption that when an accident occurs something has not 
been done properly. When people believe that something more could or should 
have been done additive counterfactual thoughts are inevitable and functionally 
adaptive to more creative ways to ensure the desired outcomes is achieved. The use 
of additive counterfactuals will also be discussed when considering the 
respondents’ selection of exceptional events and a proposal that these can be 
classified into different classes of exceptionality. 
Counterfactual thinking is not simply limited to adding or subtracting antecedents, 
as there must be occasions where both strategies are employed simultaneously in 
what becomes a substitution or a replacement of an antecedent. This can be 
illustrated with a simple four event sequence, A B C D leading to an unwanted 
outcome X, which can be written as A B C D → X. In an additive counterfactual 
the alternative outcome Y is achieved by adding a new antecedent E to the event 
sequence, giving A B C D E → Y, thus increasing the antecedent steps by one to 
give a five step sequence. Where a subtractive counterfactual approach is used the 
event sequence will be reduced to three stages, A B C → Y. The mutations of 
events in the real world would seem to suit a replacement approach in many 
situations. 
Whilst counterfactual thinking is often illustrated by ‘if only...’ thoughts which 
imply ‘If only I had...’ or ‘If only I hadn’t... then things might have been different’, 
there must be occasions where the two are joined by a ‘but’ or ‘and’ so the 
counterfactual thoughts become ‘If only I had / hadn’t ... but / and had... instead, 
things might have been different’. Roese and Olson (1995) refer to an example of 
counterfactual thinking which illustrates this. John is a student who goes out 
drinking the night before an exam and gets a poor grade, and is reported as thinking 
‘If only I hadn’t drunk so much I might have passed’. However normal preparation 
for an exam is likely to involve revising the evening before and having an early 
night to ensure you get sufficient sleep, so a more realistic counterfactual might 
involve substituting the unusual behaviour of going for a drink with the more 
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normal behaviour of revising and having an early night. The counterfactual now 
becomes ‘If only I hadn’t gone out drinking but / and I had revised and gone to bed 
early I might have received a better grade’. As this example shows, the order in 
which additions or subtractions are made is not important. 
To illustrate this I return to my simple four stage event, A B C D → X. I will 
substitute event D (drinking) with event R (revising), so the desired outcome Y (a 
better grade pass) can be achieved by subtracting D before adding R or vice versa. 
The sequence now looks like this: A B C (–D +R) → Y,  which is the same as 
adding R before subtracting D, i.e. A B C (+R –D), as the resultant sequence is A B 
C R → Y in both cases. Of course substitution of an antecedent can occur at any 
point in the antecedent chain and not just at the end as I have illustrated. Equally 
the substitution could be split over two separate temporal points and antecedents, 
and it is logically possible for an antecedent to be added at one point and subtracted 
at a different one. For example A B C D → X could be mutated by adding a new 
antecedent between A and B and subtracting C, so that the sequence becomes A, 
+E, B, –C, D → Y (or A E B D → Y). 
The use of inaction and additive counterfactuals in response to the slip and trip 
scenarios may indicate how people build up a retrospective perception (hindsight 
bias) that the accident could and therefore should have been prevented.  This is 
referred to as the counterfactual fallacy (Miller et al., 1990). The combination of 
inactions and additive counterfactuals gives anyone considering the event after it 
happened a wide range of choices and options to bring about the different outcome. 
The more choices available counterfactually, the more obvious it is that one of the 
many options would have prevented the accident and in the face of this weighty 
evidence blame and punishment can follow. 
The prevention sentences also showed a strong addition effect, indicating that to 
have prevented Mary’s accident something more was needed over and above that 
which existed, and this implies that the cause might be perceived as arising from 
something which was less than expected or subtractive in its nature, and there is a 
logical relationship between the two. If the cause was from something missing or 
lacking, then an obvious remedy is to replace that which was missing or provide 
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something which is better or improved. The results of the causal sentences bear this 
out with 76% of all respondents showing a strong preference for the use of a 
subtractive / less than sentence, with the exception of Accident Subjects and trip 
accidents where subtractive causes were not used significantly more than additive 
causes (Table 14). 
The counterfactual use of addition and subtraction was predicted in Tables 1, 2 and 
3 and the results provide evidence of a logical relationship in which the use of 
additive counterfactual thoughts is repeated in the prevention sentences but not in 
the causal sentences. For this structural dimension counterfactual thoughts were 
more like prevention thoughts (missed opportunities to have prevented), so when 
someone thinks counterfactually following a work-related accident the implied 
failure to control the hazard leads to an inevitable counterfactual mutation, bringing 
the hazard under control by doing something additional to remedy the inaction that 
led to the situation. Under these circumstances counterfactual thinking is more like 
preventative thinking than causal thinking. The ability to control the antecedent 
may also play an important role in determining the use of additional or subtractive 
counterfactuals. Where an antecedent can be controlled it is more likely to be 
changed, and additional counterfactual thinking allows for greater and more 
innovative control than subtractive counterfactual thinking which simply removes 
an existing antecedent and might be more appropriate for uncontrollable 
antecedents. 
Causes of Mary’s accident were generally described in terms of being less than 
expected (for example, inadequate warnings), and as causal thinking is only 
retrospective it identifies the cause but leaves it at that. If control is to be exercised 
over it there has to be a further stage of cognitive processing which makes changes 
to the cause and runs a forward looking simulation in order to assess the impact of 
the proposed change. It is the control that is exercised over the antecedent that 
makes counterfactual and prevention thinking more comparable under the structural 
dimension of addition / subtraction. 
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It is noteworthy that again the results for Accident Subjects’ counterfactual and 
causal trip sentences were different and did not show the same effect presented by 
the other respondents in Tables 12 and 14. 
Normality 
According to Norm Theory counterfactual ‘if only…’ thoughts seek to re-establish 
the expected, desired or normal state of affairs and, in doing so, an antecedent event 
is selected and changed and that event is considered to be unusual or exceptional in 
some way, however Gavanski and Wells (1989) suggested that the relationship 
between outcome and antecedent was based on a correspondence heuristic, in 
which exceptional outcomes had exceptional causes and normal outcomes had 
normal causes. 
In most counterfactual research the unusual or exceptional event is designed into 
the research scenario and this study was no exception, with Mary (the accident 
subject) agreeing to cover for her friend who was on holiday from work. Mary 
would not normally have been at work on the day the accident occurred and that 
was therefore exceptional or unusual. 
Typically in previous research, respondents have focused their counterfactual 
attention on the exceptional events provided in the scenario, however in this 
research the designed exceptional event (Mary working) was only selected to any 
significant degree by Accident Subjects (16.2%), but was rarely referred to by 
either Safety Professionals (1.1%) or Managers (1.5%) and failed to reach statistical 
significance compared to other antecedents that were selected and changed as being 
exceptional events.  
On the basis of Norm Theory counterfactuals are targeted towards an event 
considered by the respondent to be unexpected or exceptional, therefore it must 
follow that whatever events were selected and changed in this study were 
considered by those respondents to be exceptional. However not all previous 
research has supported the findings of Norm Theory. For example Davis et al. 
(1995) found that parents chose to change mundane everyday events when undoing 
the death of their child. 
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The results prompt a question as to why the scenario exceptional event (Mary’s 
decision to cover for her friend’s holiday leave) was so rarely selected? Was the 
scenario design deficient in some way that failed to make her decision salient and 
available, or was this a more realistic test of what the respondents classified as 
being exceptional events in this type of accident? Whatever the reason, respondents 
were given a free choice in the selection of the antecedent, but 95.6% of 
respondents rejected the scenario exceptional event of Mary working in favour of 
some other antecedent, the exact nature of which will be discussed further in this 
section when I discuss the specific subject of the counterfactual sentence. However 
in summary, the most commonly selected antecedents were: the presence of the 
hazard and poor housekeeping – selected by Safety Practitioners; the presence of 
the hazard and inadequate warnings – selected by Managers – and Mary’s lack of 
attention; Mary’s decision to work; and the presence of the hazard, selected by 
Accident Subjects. 
The antecedents that were selected as being exceptional were categorised into four 
types, based on how the alternative outcome was expressed in relation to the norm 
that was evoked by the actual outcome. Apart from the exceptional event designed 
in to the scenario, which I will refer to as being a first order exception, three other 
categories of exceptional event were identified and these were where the alternative 
outcome was secured by adhering to an established set of rules (norm) which had 
not been met (second order exception). The next category of exceptional event was 
remedied by establishing a new set of rules (new norm) which led to a different 
outcome (third order exception), and lastly a different outcome was achieved 
through modifying an existing set of rules in a way which improved the likelihood 
of the desired alternative outcome being achieved (fourth order exception). I 
suggest that this new approach to the nature of the exceptional event and its 
relationship to the counterfactual outcome represents a useful development to the 
concept of exceptionality first developed in Norm Theory. The approach proved to 
be applicable to the antecedents selected in this study, but it would benefit from 
being tested more rigorously in other settings to assess its wider value as a means of 
describing the route from the selected exceptional antecedent to the desired 
outcome. 
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The classes of exceptional events used in this study were:  
The scenario exception (first order exception). Where an event is presented to 
respondents as being exceptional in the context of the research scenario. In this 
study it was Mary’s decision to cover for her friend, and in Kahneman and Miller’s 
(1986) Mr. Jones study the exceptional events were presented as being Mr. Jones’ 
choice of route home or the time of day he left work. 
An exception to an existing rule (second order exception). This is an exception to 
an expected rule or norm. The respondent identifies the existence of an appropriate 
rule or norm which was not met in the circumstances of the actual outcome and the 
counterfactual is framed to that ensure the rule or norm is met in the alternative 
outcome. This differs from the norm as presented in previous research in that it is 
not expressly presented as being exceptional or unusual to respondents in the 
research scenario. 
New rule (third order exception). These are changes that establish a new norm, 
either replacing an existing one with a completely new norm or establishing one 
from first principles where there has not been one before. 
Changing an existing norm to improve the likelihood of the desired alternative 
outcome being achieved (fourth order exception). Counterfactuals in this category 
of exceptional events take an existing rule (norm) and change it in a way that 
increases its power to deliver the desired alternative outcome. I will refer to this 
type of exception as ‘improving an existing rule’. 
Normal events. For the sake of completeness the coding of responses also included 
a fifth order exception which was the mutation of a normal event. This option was 
so infrequently used it was excluded from subsequent analysis. 
The exceptional event designed into the study (scenario exception - Mary working) 
only accounted for 4.4% of all the counterfactual changes made by the respondents. 
Previous scenario-based research would have predicted that this class of 
exceptional event should have been selected much more often than it was in this 
study and there may be several reasons why this was the case. Mary’s decision to 
cover for her friend was too distant from the accident to be considered relevant 
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when undertaking counterfactual thinking. The details provided to respondents did 
not specify when Mary made the decision, but as holidays are usually planned in 
advance, it may have been assumed that this was weeks or even months earlier. 
Mary’s presence may have been considered almost incidental to the scenario and 
respondents may have thought if it was not Mary it could have been any other 
worker and proceeded on that basis, or respondents may have considered there was 
no causal link between Mary covering for her friend and the slip, although changing 
her decision to cover for her friend would have brought about a different outcome 
or prevented this specific accident. 
Having recognised the possible design limitations, the results obtained are now 
considered in more detail. 
Comment on scenario exceptions and existing rule exceptions 
There can be a fine distinction between scenario exceptions (first order exceptions) 
and existing rule exceptions (second order exceptions). 
Scenario exceptions (first order exceptions) are those specifically designed into the 
research scenario, manipulated by the researcher and drawn to the attention of the 
respondents, however they can also be examples of real life existing rule exceptions 
(second order exceptions). The main difference is that the respondents’ attention is 
drawn toward a scenario exception because it is included in the study scenario often 
as a manipulated element of the design, whereas existing rule exceptions are not 
presented obviously to the respondents who may infer their existence from norms 
developed from other experiences and source. 
In Kahneman and Miller’s (1986) scenario, Mr. Jones decision to go home early or 
take a different route both fall into the category of being an exceptional event. In 
the definitions of exceptions developed in this study, those events would be 
categorised as scenario exceptions (first order exceptions) because they arose out of 
a manipulated research scenario where the respondents’ attention was actively 
drawn toward them by the structure of the scenario and the way it was presented. In 
other words, the norm that the researcher wants the respondent to adopt is presented 
to them. In a real life situation Mr. Jones’ behaviour would be existing rule 
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exceptions (second order exceptions) because they represent an obvious departure 
from an established routine / norm. 
Exceptions to existing rules (second order exceptions) may be based on previous 
experiences of similar situations or from higher-level general norms. In the case of 
the Mr. Jones accident, a general norm might be that drunk drivers are more likely 
to be the cause of accidents than sober drivers. It seems that exceptions to existing 
rules can arise in two distinct ways. In the first way a fact must be made known to 
the respondent (counterfactual thinker) which highlights a departure from a norm. 
The main difference between this and a scenario norm is that the respondent is able 
to select the fact and the norm it breaks from among many such facts, and it is their 
choice which to select rather than being directed towards a norm suggested by the 
limited and selective information provided in a scenario. In real life situations the 
exceptional fact may be obtained either by asking questions, as would happen 
during an accident investigation, or by being told. Respondents in this position 
would be basing their counterfactual thoughts on ‘known’ information and this 
tendency has been examined in this study as part of the manipulation of the level of 
details provided to respondents as part of this study.  
The second way in which existing rule exceptions are identified is through an 
‘inferred’ route. The situation which stimulates the respondents’ counterfactual 
thinking has an inherent norm associated with it which is brought to mind through 
the classification of the situation with minimal specific details being necessary, 
typically a stereotype of an event or person will bring to mind certain norms 
without specific facts being available to the respondent. 
Comment on new rules 
Some outcomes evoke a desired norm, but to achieve it the respondent has to 
establish a whole new set of ‘rules’. These are described as new rule exceptions 
(third order exceptions) in which a new set of rules or circumstances designed to 
undo the unwanted outcome are established. Such a response may be based on 
previous experience of similar unwanted events or it may be developed specifically 
in response to a completely new experience.  
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A respondent would need to have some degree of general or domain-specific causal 
or prevention knowledge to generate a new rule exception. For example, few 
members of the public watching the Challenger space shuttle disaster in 1986 could 
generate a meaningful new rule exception because they did not possess the 
necessary technical knowledge upon which to draw conclusions about the possible 
cause or how to prevent it, and therefore could not establish a coherent and lucid 
counterfactual. On the other hand, a NASA technician with technical knowledge 
probably could generate a new rule exception because they would have the 
necessary technical understanding. 
This does not imply that the general population cannot make new rule exceptions, 
but in order to do so they may need to be provided with basic information through 
media reports or following technical / legal investigations, but once apprised of the 
relevant information anybody can draw the inferences necessary to make new rule 
exceptions. 
Adopting the new rule approach relies on the use of additional counterfactuals 
which have already been described by Roese and Olsen (1993b) as being more 
highly creative. When a new rule is being developed the thinker is relatively 
unbounded by existing constraints and this opens the door to highly innovative 
solutions and approaches. 
Comment on changing an existing norm to improve the likelihood of the 
desired alternative outcome being achieved – improving an existing rule 
(fourth order exception) 
This type of exception recognises that for a particular outcome certain behaviours 
or circumstances should pre-exist, but that they could be improved in the light of 
the recent event and in making those improvements (mutations) the certainty of 
achieving the desired alternative outcome is increased over just re-establishing pre-
existing norms or rules.  
In effect, the unwanted outcome prompts a review of the established and expected 
norm and seeks to improve it.  This appears to be a process very similar to that 
involved in undertaking a risk assessment, which is required of employers under the 
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Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (HMSO, 1999). This 
implies the use of forward inferential counterfactuals and involves identifying the 
potential for an unwanted outcome arising from a particular set of circumstances, 
and then assessing the adequacy of the existing controls (antecedent events) to 
determine whether or not they are satisfactory. One way of testing this is to run ‘if 
only…’ scenarios based on changing antecedent events and evaluating the likely 
outcomes.  When a counterfactual change to an existing norm increases the 
likelihood of the desired alternative outcome being achieved I have classified this 
as a separate type of exceptional event called ‘improving an existing rule’. 
Comment on new rules (third  order exceptions) and improving existing rules 
to improve the likelihood of the desired outcome (fourth order exceptions) 
Because some degree of general or specific knowledge is required to make these 
types of exceptions, it was thought that differences may exist between the 
respondents’ job groups in this study as to the type of counterfactuals being used. 
The specific nature of the accident may have a strong influence on the general level 
of understanding of its causes and opportunities for prevention.  In this study, slips 
and trips are a relatively non-technical type of accident involving walking which is 
a fundamental human activity. Everyone has experienced a slip or trip and their 
nature is intuitively understood. If you slip on a liquid or trip over an object, it is an 
obvious choice to mutate its presence, and few people can be unaware of the need 
to provide warnings about hazards. Against a background of well-established 
preventative rules (norms) and retrospectively obvious opportunities to improve 
systems of work, respondents used both second and fourth order exceptions most 
frequently in the counterfactual sentences. 
Accident Subjects were expected to have less understanding of the technical and 
legal aspects of occupational accidents and this would have resulted in them using 
the scenario-based exceptions most commonly, especially as these are actively 
drawn to the respondents’ attention. Whilst Accident Subjects were the group most 
likely to use this approach their use did not reach statistical significance and 
Accident Subjects most commonly made changes that led to the improved 
likelihood of achieving the desired outcome for slip accidents (65.7%) and for trip 
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accidents (36.9%), as well as identifying exceptions to existing rules for trips 
(38.5%) (Table 15). 
There is no obvious explanation why Accident Subjects selected a different 
approach for trips from that used following a slip accident, especially when Safety 
Professionals and Managers most commonly improved an existing rule (fourth 
order exception) for both slip and trip accidents. 
In this study no group showed a significant use of new rule (third order) exceptions  
for either slips or trips. This indicates that respondents had no need to create a new 
norm because they already had one against which to compare the accident outcome, 
and this is based on there being no accident which our everyday experience tells us 
is the case. 
The use of a counterfactual approach which involves making changes to an existing 
set of rules, with the aim of improving the prospect of achieving the desired 
outcome, is psychologically healthy and implies that people learn from their 
involvement with unwanted outcomes, including slips and trips. If people only 
sought to re-establish existing rules (norms) it might indicate a more limited and 
narrow approach to counterfactual thinking by unquestioningly adhering to a pre-
existing set of rules which may not be effective. By adopting a developmental 
approach to counterfactual thinking the opportunity for continual improvement in 
achieving the desired outcome exists by reviewing the existing rules and building 
on them. However there are two risks inherent in this approach. The first is that by 
continuingly adding to a set of rules they could become longer or more complex 
with the risk that people forget to implement all the steps, thus increasing the risk 
of creating an unwanted outcome based on an exception to an existing rule (second 
order exception). The other risk is that of making changes based on false 
understanding. Because a change to an antecedent was effective in another situation 
it may be ‘imported’ and applied to the current outcome without it being properly 
assessed, however this should not be a problem if the proposed new set of rules are 
properly evaluated by applying an appropriate forward simulation model. 
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The use of exceptions that improved the likelihood of achieving the desired 
outcome may also be linked to the theory of Regulatory Focus proposed by Roese 
et al. (1999) who suggested that there are prevention and promotion goals. 
Prevention goals are those that seek to maintain the status quo, whereas promotion 
goals are those that people aspire to achieve. Slips and trips are an uncommon 
occurrence and people’s personal experience and expectation is that they will not 
slip or trip and be injured and I suggest this is a prevention focused goal, albeit 
possibly an unconsciously held one. From a functional perspective, the continued 
wellbeing of an individual is more certain the longer the status quo can be 
maintained. As changing existing rules to improve the likelihood of achieving the 
desired outcome also improves the prospects of maintaining the status quo, it 
follows that they support the achievement of a prevention goal. 
The relationship between counterfactual exceptions and the addition or 
subtraction of antecedents  
Four categories of exceptional event have been identified from the respondents’ 
completed sentences and I will discuss a possible relationship between these and 
the use of additive, subtractive or replacement counterfactual strategies. 
The first order of exceptional events are described as the mutation of a scenario 
exceptional event and in this study that was Mary’s decision to cover for her friend, 
and this is most likely to be mutated by a simple subtractive counterfactual such as 
‘If only Mary had not agreed to cover for her friend things could have been 
different’. 
The second order of exceptional events arises where there are expected or 
established rules which become the default norm. When these rules are not 
complied with the exceptional event is described as being an exception to an 
existing rule. When respondents identify this type of exception the counterfactuals 
that follow are likely to be additive where the rule requires something to be done 
and involve the addition of an action to replace the omitted one, and where rules 
prohibit actions the counterfactual thinker is most likely to bring about a different 
outcome through the subtraction of the action that was done but which should not 
have been. 
Page | 229  
 
Additional counterfactuals are most likely to be generated where the respondent 
seeks to bring about the alternative outcome by establishing a new rule (third order 
exceptional event). This would be used in situations where no rules exist or an 
existing rule had been superseded for some reason. This is probably a relatively rare 
situation in comparison to those in which an existing rule is not met or where an 
existing rule is strengthened to be more certain that the desired outcome is 
achieved.  In this category I suggest that counterfactuals may involve the 
substitution of antecedent events as existing rules are changed and substituted with 
ones that improve the likelihood of the desired alternative outcome being realised. 
Exceptional events – a general comment 
The concept of different categories of exceptionality may go some way to explain 
the differences found between studies such as those of Kahneman and Miller (1986) 
(Mr. Jones) and Davis et al. (1995) (SIDS Study). Respondents undoing Mr. Jones’ 
motor vehicle accident focused on the exceptions highlighted in the research study 
(route home or time of departure), whereas Davis et al. (1995) found people undid 
mundane everyday events.  
Typically in traditional counterfactual research, respondents are given a scenario to 
read which contains details of the expected norm and a specific exception.  If this 
exception is selected for change it is categorised as a scenario exception, but 
because scenarios contain limited contextual details respondents are typically 
constrained by the limited details that are provided and have to choose from a 
restricted number of options. The scenario-based exceptions often also represent 
exceptions to existing rules, but I draw a distinction between the two types. In the 
main where scenarios are used, respondents’ counterfactuals are based on the 
specific details provided to them, whereas in studies based on respondents’ personal 
experiences these constraints do not arise and the respondent is free to choose from 
an almost unlimited range of counterfactuals. In those circumstances studies such as 
those reported by Davis et al. (1995) and Gavanski and Wells (1989) have shown 
that people tend to select normal or mundane events to mutate, which could be 
classified as being an exception to an existing rule or exceptions which if changed 
they believe might have brought about the desired outcome. 
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Scenario studies have been criticised by researchers including Davis et al. (1995), 
Woodcock (1996), and Byrne and McEleney (2000) for being limited in their 
ecological validity, as they cannot convey all the necessary relevant information to 
the respondent who is very often a role-playing student. Woodcock (1996) said that 
such role playing only highlights the role expectations held by the role player.  In 
the real life studies such as those undertaken by Davis et al. (1995) the respondents 
were parents who had a personal involvement and intimate knowledge of the 
circumstances, routines and behaviours prior to the sudden and unexpected death of 
their child. Faced with the death of a child Davis et al. (1995) found that parents 
selected a routine action or a normal behaviour which was missed out or done 
differently to change. For example, not checking on the child before going to bed or 
the other parent checking instead of the usual one would be categorised as  
exceptions to existing rules as they were changes to an established routine. 
Equally, respondents could invent a norm such as checking on their child before 
going to sleep and this would be a new rule exception. In the same way they could 
still use the same antecedent behaviour (checking on their child), but improve it by 
checking the child more frequently, and this is a change designed to increase the 
likelihood of the desired outcome.  
 Davis et al. (1995) commented that choosing to change mundane behaviours was 
unhelpful, because they could become viewed as causally linked to the death of the 
child, which they clearly were not. In the light of the more recent work by Mandel 
and Leman (1996) if counterfactuals are failed opportunities to prevent then the 
selection of more mundane and routine antecedents may be more understandable. 
The correspondence principle (Gavanski & Wells, 1989) suggests that serious 
outcomes arise from significant incidents, omissions or actions, but in the absence 
of one of these and faced with the huge psychological need to understand and feel 
in control the person seeking an answer may have no alternative but to use a slight 
variation to a mundane or routine action to bring about the alternative desired 
outcome. 
Truly exceptional events are rare and highly available for counterfactual mutation, 
but the reality is that unwanted outcomes happen in the course of everyday living. 
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If counterfactuals are ‘missed opportunities to prevent’ then the ability to identify 
exceptionality in the four ways described here becomes more helpful in identifying 
the route to the desired outcome. 
The use of exceptional events in the prevention and causal sentences 
Both counterfactual and prevention sentences address how the future could be 
altered by looking to the past to see what could have been changed, with the aim of 
securing a different counterfactual outcome and using this in the future to prevent 
the same outcome from being experienced again, whereas causal sentences start 
with the outcome and just look to the past to identify the cause. It is because of the 
future aspirations implicit in both the counterfactual and prevention sentences that 
the type of exceptional events they identify should be similar and this is confirmed 
by the results presented in Tables 15, 16 and 17. 
Table 15 presents the results for the use of exceptional events in the counterfactual 
sentences and clearly shows a strong preference for the use of exceptional 
antecedents being changed in a way which improved the likelihood of the desired 
outcome being achieved. This trend is not so obvious in Table 16 which presents 
the results for the type of exceptional events referred to in the prevention sentences, 
but on closer analysis changing antecedents in a way which improved the likelihood 
of the desired outcome was significantly higher than the use of new rule exceptions 
in all but one case, that being Safety Professionals and slip accidents. 
Superficially, the results in Table 17 for the type of exceptional events used in the 
causal sentences look similar to those for the prevention sentences, but there are 
two important and significant differences. Firstly, different types of exceptions 
were used. Whilst both the prevention and causal sentences referred to exceptions 
which improved the likelihood of achieving the desired outcome, the second most 
frequent type of exception referred to in the prevention sentences were of the new 
rule type, but it was exceptions to existing rules that were the focus in the causal 
sentences. However, the most important difference was that the proportion of 
respondents using exceptions to existing rules (second order exceptions) was higher 
in most cases than the proportion using fourth order exceptions which improved the 
likelihood of achieving the desired outcome. Not only was there a general trend 
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away from using exceptions which improved the likelihood of achieving the desired 
outcome, in half the cases their use was significantly less. These results support the 
proposal that the type of exceptional events referred to in the counterfactual and 
prevention sentences are more alike and different to those used in connection with 
the causal sentences. 
Timescale 
The nature of the relationship between antecedents leading up to an accident can 
influence the temporal position of the antecedent selected for change. Where the 
antecedents are causally related researchers such as Brickman et al. (1975) and 
Wells (1987) proposed that antecedents early in the chain were more likely to be 
changed than later ones. Where the antecedents are independent of each other 
Miller and Gunasegaram (1990) suggested that those later in the chain and closer to 
the accident are more likely to be selected for change. In this study events occurring 
before the day of Mary’s accident are described as being ‘distal’ and as being 
‘Before Stage A’ whist events that occurred on the itself are described as being 
‘proximal’ and cover stages referred to in Tables 18 and 82 as A to J.  
This study has revealed an interesting effect highlighting a difference in the 
temporal position of the selected antecedent for slips and trips. 
Slips were most commonly undone at Stage D (the spillage had been reported but 
not cleared up), whereas trips were mostly undone by changing something 
occurring before the day of the accident (Before Stage A).  
This is an unexpected result and one for which there is no obvious explanation 
given that the structure of both the slip and trip scenarios were identical.  The 
respondent’s job group had no influence on this effect as Safety Professionals, 
Managers and Accident Subjects all showed a preference to undo the accidents at 
those two stages. The counterfactual antecedent for trips focused on matters which 
were controllable before the day of the accident (Before Stage A in Table 18), 
whilst the focus for slips was at the point where the spilt milk had been reported but 
not cleared up (Stage D). This could possibly arise from two inter-related sources, 
namely physical aspects of the situation and systems of work. If respondents 
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believed that slips and trips have different physical origins which are best changed 
at different points in the temporal sequence, this would in turn influence the focus 
of the safe systems of work to avoid them, however it is difficult to see exactly how 
these might differ. Employers are required to proactively establish safe working 
procedures, which should lead to the selection of antecedents before the day of the 
accident.  It is not clear why this approach was adopted for trips but not slips. The 
results indicate the temporal location of the antecedent can be very variable, even in 
closely related type of events. The influence of the respondents’ social role on the 
temporal position of the selected antecedent is an area where further research might 
prove to be of interest. 
On the basis of previous research these results suggest that the slip accident was 
part of a chain of independent events because the antecedent selected most 
commonly was late in the sequence (Stage D, the spillage had been reported but not 
cleared up), whereas the trip accident was part of a causal sequence because the 
event changed was one that occurred much earlier in the sequence (before the day 
on which Mary had her accident - Before Stage A). 
In reality, the sequence of events leading up to an unwanted outcome is likely to 
contain both causal and independent events.  Previous research has typically been 
focused on short chains of up to four events, but this study presented a more 
realistic accident sequence containing 11 stages of mixed causal and independent 
events, and the suggested relationship between the various stages is set out in Table 
72.  
Given that the relationship between the antecedent events was the same for both 
types of accident it is unclear why different antecedent stages were selected for 
slips and trips. 
The predicted results in Table 1 suggested that Safety Professionals would select 
counterfactual antecedents occurring more ‘distal’ to the accident, that is occurring 
before the day of the accident itself (Before Stage A), on the assumption that they 
would be basing their thoughts on legal requirements such as safe systems of work, 
procedures and risk assessments, all of which should have been undertaken and 
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implemented before the accident. Likewise it was anticipated that Managers and 
certainly Accident Subjects would be less influenced by the legal requirements and 
would focus their counterfactual thoughts on the more directly observable and 
controllable events on the day, showing a greater tendency to select antecedents 
closer to the accident itself (proximal antecedents).   
Table 72. The temporal relationship between the antecedent events 
Antecedent 
stages 
Description of event Relationship to 
the previous 
event 
Before Stage 
A 
Mary agrees to cover for her 
friend 
 
Stage A Mary goes for her break Independent 
Stage B Mary waits for her friend and 
walks towards the rest room 
Causal 
Stage C Milk on the floor/box on the floor Independent 
Stage D Reported to Cleaner five minutes 
ago, Cleaner requested to attend, 
but not cleared up 
Causal 
Stage E Mary did not see the milk or box Independent 
Stage F Mary stepped on the milk/box Causal 
Stage G Mary slipped or tripped Causal 
Stage H Mary lost balance and fell Causal 
Stage I Mary is injured Causal 
Stage J Taken to hospital, off work Causal 
 
The distinction in the temporal location of counterfactual antecedents for slips and 
trips was not clearly replicated by all respondents in either the prevention or the 
causal sentences. The most obvious change was exhibited by Safety Professionals 
for slip accidents, who shifted their attention to a much earlier stage when seeking 
to prevent the accident. They selected an event occurring before the day of the 
accident (Before Stage A) for prevention, whereas they selected events at Stage D 
Page | 235  
 
(the spillage had been reported but not cleared up) when changing the outcome 
counterfactually.  
This change in the temporal position of the focal event can be explained by the 
influence of the legal framework in which they work. The Health and Safety at 
Work etc. Act 1974 (HMSO, 1974) seeks to prevent occupational accidents and ill 
health by requiring employers to have safe systems of work in place to prevent 
accidents, so naturally when one does happen Safety Professionals’ attention is at 
least initially drawn towards checking that this duty has been discharged. If it has 
then their attention may move up the temporal chain towards other pre-requisites 
such as training and supervision which again are antecedents that are most relevant 
and controllable before the day of the accident.  
It is interesting that Safety Professionals selected antecedents located before the day 
of the accident (Before Stage A) for trips irrespective of whether they were thinking 
counterfactually, preventatively or causally (Tables 19, 20 and 21) and for slips for 
prevention and the cause, so it is only when thinking counterfactually about slips 
that Safety Professionals focused on events other than those occurring before the 
day of the accident (Before Stage A). This is in contrast with both Managers and 
Accident Subjects who maintained their focus on events at Stage D (the spillage 
had been reported but not cleared up) consistently in their counterfactual, 
prevention and causal sentences for slip accidents. 
Control 
If counterfactuals have a functional use to the person making them, then it should 
follow that changes are made to events that they can personally control as opposed 
to events over which they have no control (Miller et al., 1990; Girotto et al., 1991) 
and this assumes that counterfactual thinking is being undertaken from a personal 
perspective. However there are many situations in which a public perspective is 
adopted due to the thinker’s social role and people make counterfactual changes to 
outcomes experienced by other people. This does not alter the underlying 
assumption that a person (scenario actor) associated by a counterfactual thinker 
with an antecedent would have control over it, but it may change the nature of that 
control from being direct to indirect. 
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 In this study the concept of control was extended to differentiate between direct 
control and indirect control, and this was rooted in the difference between personal 
and pubic perspective counterfactuals and the different ways that responsibilities 
under health and safety legislation can be discharged (HMSO, 1974). Therefore the 
scenario actor selected as being the subject of the counterfactual sentence could 
have had either direct or indirect control over the selected antecedent. A duty to 
comply with a legal requirement is usually placed on a person who holds a position 
of responsibility (the duty holder).That person is not necessarily in a position to 
discharge the duty personally, but they can delegate responsibility to another person 
(member of staff) placing the duty holder in a position of  indirect control. If that 
member of staff were subsequently selected as being the focal actor in the 
counterfactual sentence they would be in a position to exercise direct control. In 
this study  the Store Manager would have responsibility (be a legal duty holder) for 
having and implementing, a robust procedure to deal with spillages but is highly 
unlikely to clean it up himself so would exercise indirect control through delegation 
and employ a Cleaner to mop up the spilt milk. The Cleaner would be considered as 
having direct control over the prompt clearing up of the spillage. 
The counterfactual sentences revealed that controllable actions (both direct and 
indirect control) were used significantly more often than uncontrollable actions; 
however there were some interesting and unexpected results between job groups 
and the type of accident. Safety Professionals selected directly and indirectly 
controllable actions following Mary’s slip accident, but used controllable (direct 
and indirect) and uncontrollable actions when mutating her trip accident. Safety 
Professionals’ use of uncontrollable actions in relation to trips (28.4%) was 
markedly higher than for slips (13.2%). 
Managers were more likely to select directly controlled antecedents for slips 
(59.0%) but use direct and indirect control for trips (direct 47.1% and indirect 
35.7%).  
In contrast Accident Subjects showed a clear preference to complete the 
counterfactual sentence by changing antecedents over which the scenario actor had 
direct control (52.3% for slips and 84.1% for trips) and in doing so clearly followed 
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the pattern of earlier research in which direct control was found to be used most 
commonly.  
It appears that Safety Practitioners more than Managers and Accident Subjects 
recognise that different outcomes can be achieved both by an individual who can 
exercise direct control, but also by someone who has indirect control. 
Managers’ positions lie somewhere between Safety Practitioners and Accident 
Subjects, attributing direct control over antecedents for slips and equally attributing 
direct and indirect control to antecedents for trips. 
Perhaps control is not as simple an issue as has been previously suggested.  While 
controllable events were selected significantly more than uncontrollable ones, there 
are clear differences which are influenced by the respondents’ job group (social 
situation or knowledge) and the nature of the event (slips or trips) over the type of 
controllability of the antecedent selected for change. 
People’s social roles may influence whether they make self-referential (internal) 
counterfactuals or external counterfactuals (pertaining to someone else). It would 
be more functional for internal self-referential counterfactuals to focus on 
antecedents over which there was direct personal control, whereas when a 
counterfactual is focused externally there is the opportunity for control to be direct 
or indirect. 
The type of control over the selected antecedents in the prevention and causal 
sentences was similar to the counterfactual sentences, scenario actors having both 
direct and indirect control over the antecedent. The antecedent selected by Safety 
Professionals was most commonly under indirect control by the scenario actor 
58.8% in their prevention sentences and 57.2% in their causal sentences. This again 
reflects the difference between the duty placed on an employer or manager to 
comply with the law through indirect control when thinking counterfactually, and 
the direct control being attributed to the person who is undertaking a task or with 
immediate supervisory responsibility and control when thinking about the cause of 
the accident or how it could have been prevented. 
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Managers’ use of direct and indirect control was not significantly different for the 
prevention or causal sentences for either slips or trips. It was the same for Accident 
Subjects following Mary’s slip accident but not after her trip accident, where 
Accident Subjects showed a significant propensity to attribute direct control over 
the antecedents in their prevention and causal sentences as well as in their 
counterfactual sentences for both slips and trips.  
The greater use of direct control by Accident Subjects promoted a further stage of 
analysis to consider who they saw as the scenario actor having direct control for trip 
accidents. They most commonly referred to Mary in the counterfactual sentence 
(52.7%) and prevention sentence (33.3%), and another worker (41.7%) in the 
causal sentences. This makes intuitive sense and is in keeping with the general 
results presented in Tables 43, 44 and 45 (proportion of scenario actors referred to 
by respondents in their counterfactual, prevention and causal sentences). 
A clear preference for indirect control was expressed by Safety Professionals for 
preventing slips and trips , and for the cause of slips. Tables 44 and 45 refer to the 
Employer which again supports the idea that the social role of the respondent has an 
important influence on who is in their mind when they think about how Mary’s 
accident could have been prevented, or what the cause was, and that this links 
directly to the nature of the antecedent they associate with that person and the type 
of control they exercise over it.  
     Dynamic or static effects 
When the counterfactual sentences were coded for this structural element a 
reference to anything that was present at the scene or was directly observable or 
otherwise directly detectable was classified as being dynamic, whereas any 
reference to anything which was not present or directly observable, such as training, 
safe working procedures, risk assessments or reviews of previous accidents, would 
have been classified as static. 
A general trend shown by previous research has been for dynamic antecedents to be 
selected for counterfactual mutation because they are more easily observable and 
co-vary with outcomes. This was replicated in this study by Safety Professionals for 
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slips and trips and by Managers and Accident Subjects but for slips only. An 
interesting divergence was found for Managers and Accident Subjects completing 
the counterfactual sentence for trip accidents, where there was no significant 
difference between the selection of dynamic or static antecedents (Table 25).  
There is no obvious explanation for this. If any group were expected to have shown 
a preference to select a static antecedent it would have been Safety Professionals 
(Table 25), because of their greater legal knowledge and the requirements of the 
Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (HMSO, 1974) to establish safe systems 
of work. This could have prompted them to relate the accident to failures to 
establish or monitor safe systems of work and Safety Professionals would expect 
there to be documentary evidence to support the existence of safe systems of work. 
As these are not directly observable it was anticipated that they would select a static 
antecedent to mutate, however this does not seem to be the case as Safety 
Professionals clearly focused on directly observable (dynamic) events to change. 
An alternative explanation might be that on learning of an accident Safety 
Professionals brought to mind a model procedure, one that improves the prospect of 
the desired outcome being achieved. That model is mentally adopted as the 
expected norm and is actively visualised and then compared to a mental 
reconstruction of the accident sequence. Comparing the model procedure against 
the actual sequence of events highlights differences which become more tangible 
resulting in them being expressed as dynamic antecedents. 
Although Managers and Accident Subjects selected a dynamic antecedent for slips, 
there must be something about trip accidents which changed the way they 
approached bringing about a different outcome as they were equally likely to select 
a dynamic or static antecedent. This is an area which this study cannot explain and 
would be an interesting area for further study. 
Safety Professionals opted for static antecedents to prevent Mary’s slip and trip 
accident and typically these referred to systems and procedures, Accident Subjects 
referred to dynamic antecedents for both types of accident, and Managers showed 
no preference for dynamic or static antecedents. I suggest this is further evidence of 
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the influence that the respondents’ social roles have on the way that they approach 
thinking about the prevention of an accident. Static antecedents are those that were 
not  directly observable on the day of the accident and fit in with the results 
showing that Safety Professionals selected antecedents relating to an early temporal 
stage (Before Stage A – before the day of the accident) when completing their 
prevention sentences. 
Safety Professionals recorded the cause of Mary’s accident as being both dynamic 
and static depending on the type of accident. The cause of Mary’s slip accident was 
more likely to be static, whereas the cause of her trip accident was more likely to be 
dynamic. One wonders why this might be, when in both cases the spilt milk and the 
box were there for all to see before and immediately after the accident, in which 
case the cause should be dynamic for both. There again both could have their cause 
rooted in inadequate systems of work which would have given rise to static causes. 
What is it about a slip accident that prompts Safety Professionals to prefer a static 
cause, but prefer a dynamic cause for trip accidents? Some explanation may be 
gleaned from the specific type of antecedents that Safety Professionals used in their 
causal sentences. They attribute the cause of Mary’s slip accident to antecedents 
relating to inadequate systems of work (Table 48) and these are matters that should 
have been fully established before the accident. Inevitably these are classified as 
being static and arise very early in the temporal sequence of events. However 
Safety Professionals focused their causal sentences on different specific antecedents 
following Mary’s trip accident. They most commonly referred to the presence of 
the hazard as being the cause, which led to the classification of the antecedent as 
being dynamic and being at a different temporal location (Stage D, the box had 
been reported but not cleared up). 
Without discussing each specific antecedent and the relationship between its 
temporal position and dynamic or static nature, I have illustrated a consistency 
based on the type of accident and / or the respondent’s job group. For example, 
Safety Professionals are more likely to be influenced by legal requirements 
requiring safe systems of work being implemented before the accident, so their 
counterfactual, prevention and causal thoughts are more likely to be located earlier 
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in the temporal sequence and be static, whereas Accident Subjects who looked at 
Mary’s accident through much more contemporary eyes and focused on later 
antecedents concerned themselves with the presence of the hazard and more visible 
and dynamic antecedents. 
Specific comments on the new structural dimensions  
The following seven structural dimensions have not been considered in relation to 
counterfactual thinking before so it is not possible to compare the results with any 
previous research findings, but I have made some general comments about them.  
Case specific or general antecedents 
This dimension was suggested by the proposal that Safety Professionals’ 
counterfactual thoughts would be significantly influenced by the legal requirements 
of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (HMSO, 1974) which set out goals 
for employers to achieve but not the detail on how to meet them. If Safety 
Professionals chose to bring about a different outcome by changing an antecedent 
to comply with a general legal duty, they were more likely to express that in a 
general way by saying e.g. ‘If only the Employer had undertaken risk assessments 
the accident would not have happened’. A more technical change to the antecedent 
might have been ‘If only the floor had a higher coefficient of friction Mary would 
not have slipped’, and this would have represented a case specific antecedent.  
Safety Professionals were predicted in Table 1 to use general counterfactuals 
whereas Managers and Accident Subjects were predicted in Tables 2 and 3 to use 
more specific ones. The results in Tables 28, 29 and 30 supported the predicted use 
of specific counterfactuals by Managers and Accident Subjects, but not the use of 
general counterfactuals by Safety Professionals. 
The strong preference shown by all respondents’ groups for specific counterfactuals 
supports their functional use by providing a clearly identified antecedent to change 
and exactly how it should be changed, rather than leaving it unspecified and 
general.  
Whilst Safety Professionals and Managers used specific counterfactual thoughts, 
most frequently they made greater use of general counterfactuals (typically 30%) 
Page | 242  
 
than Accident Subjects (5%), suggesting that people are more inclined to use 
general counterfactuals when they adopt a public perspective to their counterfactual 
thoughts. 
Referring to the results in Table 28 one third of Safety Professionals used general 
counterfactuals, but this was significantly less than the two thirds who used case 
specific counterfactuals. The proportion of Managers using general counterfactuals 
was higher for trip accidents (33.8%) than slips (14.3%) but again they were used 
significantly less then case specific ones. Accident Subjects showed the greatest 
tendency to use a case specific counterfactual approach. 94.2% of Accident 
Subjects responding to Mary’s slip and 95.5% responding to Mary’s trip accident 
used case specific counterfactual thoughts. 
From a functional perspective specific counterfactuals are probably more useful to 
an individual who wishes to avoid repeating an unwanted outcome because they are 
more focused on the precise detail of the actual event, rather than taking a wider 
and more general perspective. They focus on how to avoid this specific outcome 
rather than how to avoid outcomes of a similar type to this one.  
I expected there to be a difference in the use of specific and general counterfactuals 
based on the three job groups. Safety Professionals’ knowledge and application of 
the law led me to predict they would use general counterfactuals more than case 
specific ones because the law is written in a general way so that it is applicable to 
all occupational settings.  In addition Woodcock (1996) reported on causal schema 
used by Canadian Safety Officers to provide a shorthand way of describing 
occupational accidents, developed through repeated experience of accidents they  
build up a general stereotypical description of a class of accident, and this is 
another reason why I had anticipated that Safety Professionals would be more 
inclined to use a general approach to counterfactual thinking after an accident. 
The results for Safety Professionals were not as expected and they showed a strong 
preference to use case specific counterfactual antecedents and this could be 
prompted by the framing effect of the counterfactual sentence they were asked to 
complete. Causal schema may provide a convenient shorthand way for Safety 
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Professionals to describe a class of accidents but this study asked how Mary’s 
accident could have been different, and the task of thinking about a specific 
accident counterfactually may utilise the general framework of a causal schema to 
ask specific questions about a specific accident which demands specific answers 
and therefore specific counterfactuals. 
The means by which Mary’s accident could have been prevented was influenced by 
both the type of accident and the respondents’ job group. Slip accidents were most 
likely to be prevented by a specific antecedent whilst trips were being prevented 
more generally, in addition the respondents’ job group influenced the choice of 
specific and general antecedents between accident types. The only exception was 
Accident Subjects who consistently selected case specific antecedents for both slips 
(84.5%) and trips (71.2%). Safety Professionals’ and Managers’ selection of 
antecedents varied, there was no difference in the use of case specific and general 
antecedents by Safety Professionals to prevent slip accidents or by Managers to 
prevent trip accidents. However, Managers prevented slip accidents by specific 
antecedents and Safety Professionals prevented trip accidents by using general 
antecedents. 
Generally respondents showed no preference for specific or general causes for 
Mary’s accident. Managers showed no distinction between specific or general 
causes for either slips or trips and neither did Safety Professionals for slips, 
however Safety Professionals showed a strong preference for general causes of trip 
accidents. Accident Subjects responded consistently to both Mary’s slip and trip by 
identifying a specific cause to her slip and trip accident. 
The results for the respondents’ use of specific and general antecedents following 
Mary’s slip and trip accident are summarised in Table 73 for the counterfactual, 
prevention and causal sentences. Specific antecedents were used significantly more 
in connection with the counterfactual sentence than either the prevention or causal 
sentences where their use was more even. Accident Subjects were the only 
respondent group to be consistent in the way that they responded using a specific 
antecedent to both slip and trip accidents in their counterfactual, prevention and 
causal sentences. 
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The results indicate that counterfactual thoughts are more closely associated with 
the precise detail of the event being undone and this is in keeping with their 
functional use in identifying a single mutable event which if changed had the power 
to bring about a different outcome. Identifying just one event allows the person 
seeking to bring about the different outcome greater clarity, and may increase the 
perception of control and certainty of success by specifying an unambiguous route 
to take. 
The prevention sentences show an overall distinction between slips and trips, with 
slips being prevented more commonly by using specific antecedents whilst trips 
were more often prevented by applying more general antecedents. Tables 73 and 29 
summarise the positions for the three job groups. 
It is worth noting that Safety Professionals and Managers used both specific and 
general antecedents when preventing Mary’s accident, but that Safety Professionals 
used more general antecedents than Managers, and Managers used more general 
antecedents than Accident Subjects (Table 29). This trend in the increasing use of 
general antecedents by Managers and Safety Professionals can be explained by the 
influence exerted on their prevention thinking by the legal framework established 
by the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 (HMSO, 1974). The more highly 
involved the respondent was with the accident the greater the likelihood that 
preventing it would be expressed in general terms. 
To be able to complete the prevention sentence respondents must have some 
understanding of the relationship between a particular antecedent and the unwanted 
outcome in order to be sure that changing it would  have had the desired effect. To 
arrive at the point where an individual can form ideas about how an outcome could 
be prevented it would seem likely that they engage in either counterfactual or 
causal thinking to identify an antecedent which if changed would have the effect of 
bringing about a different outcome, that of preventing the unwanted outcome. 
Counterfactual thoughts might be more suitable because they are considered by 
Mandel and Lehman (1996) to represent missed opportunities to prevent an 
unwanted outcome and identify a potential antecedent, which is then used in a 
forward running simulation heuristic to assess its impact on the outcome. If 
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changing the antecedent changes the outcome then it has the potential to be 
classified as having a preventative role. Having identified the specific preventative 
antecedent Accident Subjects used it in its raw state when completing their 
preventions sentences, as well as in their counterfactual and causal sentences 
referring to specific antecedents. To different degrees Safety Professionals and 
Managers undertake some refining of the specific antecedent and classify it as 
being part of a more general class of preventative measures and select these to 
complete their prevention sentences. 
Respondents were predicted to use case specific causes (Table 3) but this was only 
supported for Accident Subjects (Table 30), whereas the results for Safety 
Professionals and Managers were not as predicted. Respondents were asked to 
complete the causal sentence ‘The cause of Mary’s accident was...’  which might 
have led respondents to give a specific cause to a specific accident, making the use 
of a specific causal antecedent  predictable, which was the response for Accident 
Subjects.  
Accident Subjects’ tendency to see causes in specific terms may be more 
representative of the general population when compared to the more balanced use 
of specific and general causes by Safety Professionals and Managers, whose 
thinking is more likely to have been influenced by the general duties imposed by 
the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 (HMSO, 1974) and accident prevention 
initiatives and campaigns which address types of accident rather than a single 
specific accident. The results again show a graduation of responses, with Safety 
Professionals showing a greater use of general causes than Managers; however this 
was only statically significant for Safety Professionals and trip accidents. 
It is not clear from this study whether Managers and Safety Professionals start by 
identifying a particular cause for a particular accident which is then subsumed in to 
a general category of ‘causes for accidents of this type’ and reported in the 
completed causal sentence in a general way. Alternatively Managers and Safety 
Professionals might categorise an accident and identify a typical cause though its 
associated causal schema. When the details of the accident confirm the presence of 
the typical cause, it becomes associated with this particular accident and is 
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expressed as a specific cause when the causal sentence is completed. The results 
summarised in Table 73 would suggest that both approaches are likely to be used.  
Known or inferred antecedents 
The idea that respondents might select an inferred antecedent was prompted by the 
work of Woodcock (1996) who proposed that Safety Professionals used causal 
schema when investigating accidents. This approach suggested that, after clarifying 
an accident as being of a particular type, Safety Professionals adopt a stereotypical 
representation of it. This mental image of an accident provides sufficient 
information for a Safety Professional to make judgements concerning its origin, 
cause and how it might have been prevented in the absence of any specific details 
being made known to them. I have referred to such judgements as being ‘inferred’ 
as opposed to being drawn from ‘known’ information. 
In this study I proposed that causal schema are recruited early in an accident 
investigation based on minimal information. The results indicate a significant 
relationship between counterfactual antecedents that were known or inferred by the 
respondents and the level of detail provided. When respondents were given the 
minimum level of information they used inferred antecedents, but when they were 
given greater detail they used known antecedents. 
The results offer support to the idea that Safety Professionals have a mental model 
(norm) of a slip or trip accident. The mental model contains information built up 
through experience of the cause, how it could be prevented and how it could have 
been different, so that when they are asked to complete a counterfactual sentence 
about an accident for which they lack detailed information, they draw on this 
mental model for the missing details and select inferred antecedents.   
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Table 73. Summary of the use of specific and general antecedents by accident type and job group  
 Counterfactual Prevention Cause 
 All 
accidents 
Slip Trip All 
accidents 
Slip Trip All 
accidents 
Slip Trip 
          
Safety 
Professional 
Specific* Specific* Specific* General* Specific & 
General 
General* General* Specific 
& General 
General* 
          
Managers Specific* Specific* Specific* Specific 
& 
General 
Specific*** Specific 
& 
General 
Specific 
& 
General 
Specific 
& General 
Specific 
& 
General 
          
Accident 
Subjects 
Specific* Specific* Specific** Specific* Specific* Specific* Specific* Specific* Specific* 
          
All 
respondents 
 
Specific* Specific* Specific* Specific 
& 
General 
Specific* General* Specific 
& 
General 
Specific 
& General 
Specific 
& 
General 
Cells marked with * were all significant between χ2 (1) = 55.54 p < .001** and χ2 (1) = 55.54 p = .042.***  
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In this study sufficient relevant additional details were provided to fill in the 
missing but expected detail, so that under the maximum detail conditions more 
respondents were able to find something in the additional details that fitted their 
mental model, resulting in a higher percentage (slips 63.4% and trips 60%) being 
changed counterfactually by referring to a known antecedent. 
It would appear that a greater level of detail is needed by a Safety Professional to 
identify how a slip or trip can be prevented or what its cause was than to bring 
about a different outcome, because they used more inferred antecedents than known 
antecedents even when the maximum detail scenarios were used. 
The results also suggest that Managers and Accident Subjects have a mental model 
of a typical slip accident as their results closely matched those of Safety 
Professionals. However the picture for Managers and Accident Subjects with regard 
to trip accidents was less clear, relying to a greater extent on known antecedents for 
trips under minimal detail conditions. This tends to imply that they have a less well 
defined mental model so require the facts provided in the scenario even when these 
are minimal. 
Overall the prevention and causal sentences were completed using more inferred 
antecedents than known ones. This might indicate a limitation with the scenario 
design by not providing the information that they wanted to meet their mental 
model, or it indicates that they are focusing on different aspects of the antecedent 
sequence. If this is so, further research would help understand this effect and its 
implications for practical accident investigation. 
The counterfactual responses to the manipulation of the level of detail in the 
scenarios were influenced to a greater degree than those for either the prevention or 
causal sentences (Table 32). Slip accidents demonstrated this relationship most 
clearly where respondents presented with minimal information selected antecedents 
which they inferred must have been in the sequence of events leading up to Mary’s 
accident. In contrast, respondents who were given the maximum detail most often 
selected an antecedent which had been specifically referred to in the scenario. This 
Page | 249  
 
dichotomy of responses inevitably led me to explore whether different antecedents 
where selected were any different when respondents’ inferred their presence or 
when they were known. A lack of information could have led respondents to use 
more imaginative counterfactual thinking or draw on previous experiences and 
select an antecedent which is commonly associated with the outcome. 
If Safety Professionals recruit causal schema it could result in counterfactual 
attributions for slips and trips which were not necessarily based on the individual 
facts presented in the scenarios but based on the stereotypical slip or trip. It was 
anticipated if causal schema were used by Safety Practitioners or indeed by 
Managers or Accident Subjects, that these would be recruited on the basis of 
minimal information. The manipulation of the level of detail in the scenarios was 
included to test whether this made any significant difference to what was selected 
for mutation. 
For both slips and trips minimal detail resulted in the counterfactual mutation of an 
inferred antecedent, whilst maximum detail led to the mutation of a known 
antecedent and the pattern of response was found in all three job groups (Safety 
Practitioners, Managers and Accident Subjects), see Table 32. 
Six specific antecedents accounted for 64.5% of all the those referred to in the 
counterfactual sentences about Mary’s slip accident. They were: systems of work, 
warnings, response time by the Cleaner, lack of attention by Mary, Mary’s decision 
to cover for her friend, and clearing up. On closer examination the first five of these 
antecedents were found to have significant differences between their selection as 
being known or inferred. Systems of work and Mary’s lack of attention were 
inferred by respondents, whilst the other three antecedents were known to the 
respondents because they were specifically mentioned in the scenario. These were 
the lack of warnings, the response time by the Cleaner, and Mary’s decision to 
cover for her friend. The sixth counterfactual antecedent, clearing up the spillage or 
the box, was used both as being known or inferred. 
Managers used fewer inferred antecedents in their counterfactual thoughts than 
either Safety Professionals or Accident Subjects. 53.7% of Safety Professionals 
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who used an inferred antecedent related it to systems of work, whilst 47.36% of 
Accident Subjects inferred that Mary had not been paying attention to where she 
was going. 
It is interesting to note that the subject of Safety Practitioners’ counterfactual 
sentences altered from being general, referring to safe systems of work when they 
were using inferring antecedents, to more specific ones relating to lack of warnings 
(37.9%), the failure to clear up (28.8%), and the Cleaner’s response time (27.3%) as 
being known antecedents. Only 1.5% of Safety Professionals referred to systems of 
work when they had greater detail, which is a significant reduction from 53.7% 
when they were using inferential counterfactuals. 
In summary, the level of detail provided to respondents had a clear influence on 
their propensity to base their counterfactual thoughts following Mary’s slip 
accident, on known or inferred antecedents (Table 74). Minimum detail tended to 
lead to inferred antecedents, which were quite different to those known antecedents 
generated when respondents were in possession of a greater level of detail about the 
circumstances of the accident. The relationship between the level of detail and the 
use of known or inferred antecedents found in the counterfactual sentences for slips 
was not exactly replicated for the trip accident. The trip scenario with minimum 
detail led to the use of an inferred antecedent, but the maximum detail scenario led 
to the use of both known and inferred antecedents. 
Reviewing Tables 33 and 34 (proportion of respondents using known or inferred 
antecedents in their prevention sentences) and Tables 35 and 36 (proportion of 
respondents using known or inferred antecedents in the causal sentence), it is 
apparent that the majority of responses were inferred. Overall, Safety Professionals 
and Managers showed a greater tendency to use inferred antecedents than known 
antecedents when completing their prevention and causal sentences. Again it was 
the Accident Subject group that showed the most variable responses. For both the 
prevention of slips and the cause of slips the level of detail influenced the selection 
of known or inferred antecedents in the same way as it did for the counterfactual 
slip, with minimum detail leading to inferred antecedents and maximum detail 
leading to known antecedents being used. However, this pattern was not found for 
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Accidents Subjects’ prevention and causal sentences for the trip accident. In both 
instances Accident Subjects continued to use inferred antecedents when presented 
with minimum detail scenarios, but used both known and inferred antecedents with 
maximum detail scenarios. 
Counterfactual thinking about slip accidents was more sensitive to the level of 
detail provided to the respondents than was counterfactual thinking about trip 
accidents or to preventative thinking or causal thinking. The reason for this is 
unclear from this study and it may benefit from further research to establish why 
this may be so and what effect it has on the way that slip accidents are responded to 
in the workplace. 
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Table 74.  Summary of the use of known or inferred antecedents by accident type and job group 
 Counterfactual Prevention Cause 
 All 
accidents 
Slip Trip All 
accidents 
Slip Trip All 
accidents 
Slip Trip 
Safety Professional Known & 
Inferred 
Known & 
Inferred 
Known & 
Inferred 
Inferred*  Inferred* Inferred* Inferred* Inferred* Inferred* 
Safety Professional 
(minimum detail)  
Inferred * Inferred * Inferred * Inferred* Inferred* Inferred* Inferred* Inferred* Inferred* 
Safety Profession. 
(maximum detail) 
Known * Known* Known & 
Inferred 
Inferred * Inferred* Inferred* Inferred * Inferred * Inferred* 
Managers Known & 
Inferred 
Known & 
Inferred 
Known & 
Inferred 
Inferred* Inferred* Inferred* Inferred* Known & 
Inferred 
Inferred* 
Managers             
(minimum detail) 
Inferred* Inferred * Known & 
Inferred 
Inferred* Inferred* Inferred* Inferred* Inferred Inferred* 
Managers           
(maximum detail) 
Known * Known* Known & 
Inferred 
Known & 
Inferred 
Known & 
Inferred 
Known & 
Inferred 
Inferred*  Known & 
Inferred 
Inferred * 
Accident Subjects Known & 
Inferred 
Known & 
Inferred 
Known & 
Inferred 
Inferred* Known & 
Inferred 
Inferred* Inferred* Known & 
Inferred 
Inferred* 
Accident Subjects 
(minimum detail)  
Known & 
Inferred 
Inferred * Known & 
Inferred 
Inferred* Inferred Inferred Inferred* Inferred Inferred* 
Accident Subjects 
(maximum detail  
Known*  Known* Known & 
Inferred 
Known* Known* Known & 
Inferred 
Known & 
Inferred 
Known * Known & 
Inferred 
Cells marked with * were all significant between χ2 (1) =189.78 P < .00 and χ2 (1) = 46.72 p =  .044  
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Personal or situational antecedents 
This study sought to differentiate between situational counterfactual thoughts that 
related to the physical environment or situations which influenced a scenario 
actor’s behaviour and personal counterfactual thoughts which related to a scenario 
actor’s character, personality or other inherent traits.  
Safety Professionals and Managers showed a clear preference for selecting 
counterfactual antecedents which changed the situation over those that related to 
someone’s character or personality, but Accident Subjects used both types of 
counterfactual thought. The prevention and causal sentences showed a very similar  
pattern of responses to the counterfactual sentences, with the exception of  
Managers’ causal sentences which used personal and situational antecedents. 
Roese and Olsen (1993b) considered the generation of externally focused 
counterfactuals following failures to achieve a desired goal and internally focused 
counterfactuals following successes. In the context in which they discussed internal 
and external counterfactuals, they were being generated by the person who was the 
subject of the unwanted outcome and not, as in this study, by people who were 
personally and professionally involved to varying degrees.  
In this study the different roles that respondents held in relation to Mary’s accident 
were more complex, embracing a range of personal and professional involvement, 
and the scenarios were developed to allow for a more detailed exploration of the 
effect of these roles to be undertaken. Safety Professionals and Managers were 
expected to adopt a public perspective to their thinking and be more likely to use 
externally located situational antecedents, whilst Accident Subjects were more 
likely to adopt a personal perspective and use externally located (situational or 
personal) antecedents or internally (situational or personal) relevant antecedents. 
An illustration of these different respondent roles and the types of counterfactual 
thoughts that they might use is given in Figure 9. The four boxes represent 
decreasing personal involvement and increasing professional involvement as they 
get larger. The inner (left) box represents the highest personal involvement into 
which we place Mary as the accident subject. That box also represents the 
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immediate physical work environment. In that situation Mary could generate either 
an internal or an external counterfactual (Roese and Olsen, 1993b).  
As this study involved an accident and an injury it was reasonable to assume that 
Mary would regard that as a failure and generate an external counterfactual, which 
is represented by the black arrows AS1 and AS2. The possible, but probably 
unused, internal counterfactual is represented by the arrow AS3. There are many 
possible targets for external counterfactual thoughts but they can be described as 
belonging to two categories, the first being personal antecedents, where the event 
selected for change focuses on an aspect of a person’s nature, personality, character 
or behaviour. This particular type of external antecedent is represented by arrow 
AS1 in Figure 9. In this example Mary is selecting a personal aspect of the 
Cleaner’s behaviour, but this could have been anyone else who was sufficiently 
closely associated with the accident, for example Mary might have thought ‘If only 
the Cleaner had been more attentive and cleaned up the spillage quicker... things 
might have been different’. 
There are probably limits to the temporal, physical or emotional relationship with 
an outcome beyond which personal antecedents become less attractive or functional 
to the thinker. I suggest that a personal antecedent relating to a Safety Professional 
would not be a lucid counterfactual, probably because it is hard to imagine how 
changing their personal characteristics would bring about a different outcome.  
The second possible target of an external counterfactual relates to the situation or 
set of circumstances under which the unwanted outcome occurred, and this can also 
include behaviours influenced by the environment. This is illustrated by arrow AS2 
in Figure 9 and includes physical as well as procedural antecedents. An example of 
an external situational counterfactual might be ‘If only the warning signs had been 
displayed... things might have been different’. An antecedent is not fixed as being 
either a personal or a situational counterfactual, but is context dependent. As I have 
illustrated above the lack of warning signs could be an external situational 
counterfactual or, if it had been expressed slightly differently, as an external 
personal counterfactual (‘If only the Cleaner could have been bothered to put the 
warnings signs out things might have been different’). Similarly arrows M1 and 
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SP1 illustrate a possible personal focus for Managers’ and Safety Professionals’ 
counterfactual thoughts, whilst M2 and SP2 represent possible situational 
counterfactuals.  
It is noteworthy that Safety Professionals and Managers showed a strong tendency 
to select situational antecedents most commonly following both Mary’s slip and 
trip accident  in their counterfactual, prevention and causal sentences, whereas 
Accident Subjects were as likely to use both personal and situational antecedents, 
with two noticeable exceptions - Accident Subjects showed a significant tendency 
to use personal counterfactual antecedents after Mary’s trip accident and situational 
causal antecedents after her slip accident. 
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Cleaner  
Safety Professional 
The Employer 
Mary (Accident Subject) 
Store Supervisor Store Manager Other Staff  
Customers 
AS1 
AS2 
AS3 
SP1 
SP2 
M1 
M2 
Figure 9. Schematic representation of personal and situational counterfactual thinking 
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Was a specific actor spontaneously identified? 
 
All three respondent job groups were recruited from people who had relevant real life 
experience, however they were still to some extent role playing by having to apply that 
experience to the scenario setting of Mary’s accident. In this study respondents were 
asked to adopt two slightly different roles, with Safety Professionals and Managers 
adopting a more neutral, less personal, more public perspective (third party observers), 
whilst Accident Subjects were actually asked to respond as though they were Mary 
herself, so their stance was more personal and from a more first-hand perspective. 
Safety Professionals and Managers adopted a public perspective when undertaking 
their counterfactual thinking and it seemed likely that when they structured and 
expressed their thoughts they would make explicit the relationship between the 
antecedent selected for change and the person who they associated with it. The results 
in Table 40 showed that Safety Professionals and Managers did make some 
spontaneous reference to the scenario actor, but just as frequently did not. The pattern 
of responses in the prevention and causal sentences showed a significant difference for 
Safety Professionals and Managers with the majority not making any spontaneous 
reference to a scenario actor. 
Accident Subjects were expected to generate counterfactual thoughts from a more 
personal perspective and were less likely to refer to a scenario actor because they 
should be more self-referential. This was not supported by the results in that they 
referred to a scenario actor as often as not in their slip counterfactual sentences and 
went even further from this prediction in their counterfactual responses to Mary’s trip 
accident, with the majority making a spontaneous reference to a scenario actor. 
The majority of Safety Professionals and Managers made no reference to a scenario 
actor in their prevention and causal sentences; however, Accident Subjects were as 
likely as not to refer to a specific actor (Tables 41 and 42). 
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The accident scenarios used in this study were not ones in which Safety Professionals 
or Managers were expected to change anything that they had done personally or had 
any personal control over, whereas this was more likely from Accident Subjects, so it 
was interesting to note whether the counterfactual sentence spontaneously identified 
a scenario actor and who that person was. 
Across all respondents, counterfactual thoughts (Table 40) showed no significant 
difference in the proportion who spontaneously identified a scenario actor and those 
who did not with 52.4% identifying an actor and 47.6% not. Safety Professionals and 
Managers were equally likely to identify an actor as they were not for both slips and 
trips. Accident Subjects showed the same tendency in response to slip accidents, but 
they displayed a different approach towards trip accidents where they were 
significantly more likely to identify a specific person in their counterfactual sentence. 
In contrast, respondents were significantly less likely to identify a scenario actor in 
their prevention (72.8%) or causal sentences (75.6%), in Tables 41 and 42. However 
there were differences between the respondent groups. In the prevention sentence 
Accident Subjects were again noted as having a different approach from Safety 
Professionals and Managers, showing no statistical difference between those who did 
identify a scenario actor and those that did not, and this was the same for both slips 
and trips. In the causal sentences it was again Accident Subjects considering Mary’s 
trip accident who were equally likely to have spontaneously identified a scenario 
actor as not. 
A higher percentage of counterfactual thoughts were focused on a named individual 
than were causal or prevention thoughts. With a stronger personal focus, 
counterfactual thoughts are more likely to be associated with blame and 
responsibility. 
Of all the 1,906 sentences completed in this study (636 counterfactual, 626 
prevention and 644 causal), 1,246 (65.4%) did not make a direct and unprompted 
reference to a clearly identifiable scenario actor. This trend was identified during the 
pilot stage and an additional question was added to the questionnaire asking  
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each respondent after they had completed a sentence stating who, from a given list of 
scenario actors, their sentence related to. In the next section I will discuss the results 
from this question. 
To which scenario actor did the sentence refer? 
The person associated with a counterfactual, prevention or causal sentence can have 
important consequences as far as responsibility, blame or legal liability is concerned. 
It also assists in understanding how and more importantly who can exercise control 
over the selected antecedents and this is particularly relevant to social situations 
governed by strict rules. 
Table 75 reports the modal responses for the selection of the scenario actor in all 
three types of sentence. Whilst this simplifies the picture to some extent it  
nevertheless highlights an unexpected pattern to the selection of the scenario actors 
by Safety Practitioners in their sentences, with the counterfactual sentence referring 
to the Supervisor whilst both the prevention and causal sentences referred to the 
Employer. 
For Managers and Accident Subjects the results show a high degree of conformity 
with the respondents’ sentences most commonly referring to either the Supervisor or 
the Employer. There were two notable exceptions, the selection of the Store Manager 
by Managers in their causal sentence, and the reference to Mary by Accident 
Subjects in their counterfactual sentence. 
I do not consider Managers’ reference to the Store Manager to be particularly 
unexpected. Managers selected the Supervisor almost as often (22.9%) as the Store 
Manager (23.7%) in their causal sentences and Safety Professionals selected the 
Store Manager as their second choice of scenario actor (19.9%) in their prevention 
sentences. So the Store Manager was being selected with some degree of regularity 
by both Safety Professionals and Managers, but not, on closer examination of the 
results, by Accident Subjects. 
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Table 75.                                                                                                                            
Proportion of respondents selecting a scenario actor as their modal choice    
 All responses Safety 
Professionals 
Managers Accident 
Subjects 
Counterfactual 
sentence  
Supervisor 
(31.4) 
Supervisor 
(31.5%) 
Supervisor 
(37%) 
Mary 
(31.4%) 
Counterfactual 
sentence 
(Slips)  
Supervisor 
(34.3%) 
Supervisor  
32.6% 
Supervisor 
(41.3%) 
Supervisor 
(32.4%) 
Counterfactual 
sentence 
(Trips)  
Supervisor 
(28.6%) 
Supervisor  
30.5% 
Supervisor 
(35.7%) 
Mary (44.6%) 
     
Prevention 
sentence 
Supervisor  
(23.0%) 
Employer 
(32.7%) 
Supervisor 
(29.7%) 
Supervisor  
(38.4) 
Prevention 
sentence 
(Slips) 
Supervisor 
(28.5%) 
Employer 
(35.4%) 
Supervisor 
(30.6%) 
Supervisor 
(44.9%) 
Prevention 
sentence 
(Trips)  
Supervisor 
(23.2%)  
Employer 
(30.2%) 
Supervisor 
(32.8%) 
Supervisor 
(24.2%)  
     
Causal 
sentence 
Employer 
(24.4%) 
Employer 
(38.7%) 
Store 
Manager 
(23.7%)  
Supervisor 
(27.1%) 
Causal 
sentence 
(Slips) 
Employer 
(30.9%) 
Employer 
(47.7%) 
Supervisor 
(37.7%) 
Supervisor 
(38.8%) 
Causal 
sentence 
(Trips)  
Employer 
(22.9%) 
Employer 
(33.7%) 
Manager 
(27.1%) 
Other worker 
(22.7%) 
 
There is also a legally-based explanation why Safety Professionals and Managers 
might be more predisposed to selecting scenario actors who have a supervisory 
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responsibility or management role along with the employer, and this is based on the 
requirements of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 (HMSO, 1974) and 
regulations made under it, along with various codes of practice and guidance issued 
by the Health and Safety Executive, but in particular HSG65 Successful Health and 
Safety Management (HSE, 2013c). The Act sets out a general duty in Section 2 on an 
employer to ‘to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health, safety and 
welfare at work of all his employees’ and to ‘prepare…a written statement of his 
general policy with respect to the health and safety at work of his employees and the 
organisation and arrangements for the time being in force for carrying out that 
policy, and to bring the statement… to the notice of all of his employees’. In the 
employer’s health and safety policy statement, the management organisation and 
arrangements to implement the policy will set out the roles and responsibilities of 
managers and supervisors and HSG 65 provides guidance to managers on how the 
management of health and safety in an organisation needs to be planned and 
implemented in the same way as any other management function.  
The selection of Mary by 31.4% of Accident Subjects as being the counterfactual 
actor is more unexpected and is a distinct departure from the majority of the other 
responses in Table 75, and Mary is particularly associated with trip accidents 
(44.6%) over slip accidents (26.5%). It is perhaps particularly reassuring that 
Managers did not appear to have seen Mary as being important in bringing about a 
different outcome to her own accident. It would have been all too obvious and almost 
convenient for Managers to have focused their counterfactual thoughts on what Mary 
could have done differently and vice versa. Indeed this was the starting point for 
Lehane (1998) who examined the perceptions of causal responsibility for slips and 
trips and also found a greater divergence between Managers and Accident Subjects 
with regard to trip accidents than slip accidents. 
Looking at the responses for all respondents in Table 75, the counterfactual and 
prevention sentences both focused on the Supervisor as the scenario actor whilst the 
causal sentence focused on the employer, but each respondent group had a slightly 
different approach. For Safety Professionals the counterfactual sentence focused on 
the Supervisor whereas the prevention and causal sentences focused on the 
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Employer. The focus on the Employer can be explained by the framing effect of the 
legal duties placed on employers under the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 
(HMSO, 1974). This would imply that Safety Professionals saw a greater similarity 
in the role of the scenario actors between thinking about the cause of an accident and 
how it could have been prevented than how it could have been counterfactually 
different.  
Managers’ counterfactual sentences also focused on the Supervisor’s role indicating 
that these two groups adopted a similar approach to how Mary’s accident could have 
been different. Counterfactually the Supervisor was one of a number of people who 
could have acted in a different way and whose actions were sufficient to have led to a 
different outcome. It is interesting to note that 54.1% of Safety Professionals and 
46% of Managers who selected the Supervisor as the focal scenario actor considered 
him to have been in a position to have exerted direct control over the antecedent to 
be changed. It is perhaps surprising that the role of the Cleaner in bringing about a 
different outcome was not ranked more highly, after all the Cleaner’s role is directly 
associated with the removal of spillages and rubbish from the shop floor yet was not 
the scenario actor referred to most frequently by either Safety Professionals and 
Managers. 
In a later section I will propose that the relationship between the scenario actor and 
the specific subject of the sentence is one of either ‘responsibility’ or ‘control’, and it 
is that relationship which I propose drove Safety Practitioners to select the 
Supervisor as the scenario actor for their counterfactual sentence and the Employer 
for their prevention and causal sentence. 
Other results presented from this study suggest that Safety Professionals are more 
likely than Managers and Accident Subjects to think about slips and trips from within 
a legal framework. Health and Safety legislation sets out to identify hazards and 
control them with the aim of preventing occupational injury, and in doing so places 
specific duties on employers to comply with them. Against this background it is not 
unexpected that Safety Professionals focused their prevention thoughts on the role of 
the Employer, as they did in this study. When things go wrong and an accident 
occurs it highlights a failure to discharge these duties, and this must stimulate 
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thoughts about the cause of the accident, which according to the Safety 
Professionals’ responses in this study also focuses on the responsibility of the 
Employer. So why do Safety Professionals alter their focus to the Supervisor when 
they think about how a different outcome might happened? For Safety Professionals 
it seems that the frame of reference that counterfactual thinking operates within is in 
some way subtly different to that brought in to play by thinking about the cause of 
the outcome or how it could have been prevented. This is suggested by the 
differential focus on the Supervisor and the implied control relationship over the 
specific subject of the counterfactual sentence. 
Previous research initially considered the relationship between counterfactual and 
causal thinking and more latterly between counterfactual thinking and prevention. 
The cognitive processes involved are very similar and it is easy to slip into 
counterfactual thinking when trying to identify a cause or ways in which the accident 
could have been prevented, but from the results presented here for Safety 
Professionals it would seem that prevention and causal thinking are more closely 
related to each other than they are to counterfactual thinking. This may of course be 
an artefact of the particular role that safety practitioners have towards occupational 
accidents, and the influence of the legal framework on the context in which they 
operate cognitively, and it would be interesting to undertake further research on this 
aspect of counterfactual thinking by people with a role-specific relationship to an 
unwanted outcome. I was going to suggest that police officers investigating road 
traffic accidents might exhibit similar differences between counterfactual thinking 
and causal and prevention thinking, but there is probably an important difference in 
the legal framework applicable to road traffic accidents and occupational accidents.  I 
have already alluded to the fact that the Health & Safety at Work etc Act 1974 
(HMSO, 1974) places duties on employers who discharge them through the 
delegation of control to managers and supervisors. When a failure arises the 
employer is usually held to be culpable but this subtle difference is not apparent in 
road traffic accidents where the responsibility for compliance and control rests with 
the driver, so the effect identified in safety practitioners may only be found under 
certain and specific circumstances. 
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The results of this study indicate that Safety Professionals use counterfactual 
thinking to test the actions of an employer against their duties under Section 2 of the 
Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (HMSO, 1974). If an employer’s actions were 
found not to comply then Safety Professionals change an antecedent to bring about 
an alternative outcome in which the employer’s actions are legally compliant. If this 
is the case then the norm for a Safety Professional is compliance with the law but this 
raises the question as to whether compliance with the law would, in reality, have 
prevented Mary’s accident? Clearly the law sets out standards that are considered by 
the legislator to minimise the risk of people being injured, but I suggest that mere 
compliance does not of itself result in the avoidance of all accidents. However for 
Safety Professionals, whose norm is based on legal compliance undoing an outcome 
by returning a non-compliant situation to one which complies, it highlights and 
makes that non-compliance more exceptional and available. 
A counterfactual does not have to be objectively true, but it has to be subjectively 
convincing to the thinker so that they believe making the change would lead to the 
desired outcome. For a Safety Professional whose thoughts are framed by the law it 
is enough that the counterfactual change could bring about a different (better) 
outcome and that within that framework they believe it to be so, whereas the 
counterfactual brought to mind by an Accident Subject may be quite different but 
from their perspective they believe that the counterfactual change will achieve their 
goal to re-establish their norm and avoid accidents. Both may be objectively true or 
false but what is important is that from their respective positions, each framed by the 
social situation and roles they find themselves in and the attendant framing effects, 
they believe that their counterfactual is controllable and therefore achievable. 
The specific subject of the sentence 
The results presented in this study on the specific nature of the antecedents  referred 
to in the respondents’ sentences are limited to the scenarios used but should be 
relevant to slip and trip accidents in general, however they cannot be generalised 
across other types of occupational accident without further research and evaluation. 
The specific subject of the three types of sentence presented in Tables 46, 47 and 48 
help to understand and explain the pattern of responses revealed when considering 
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who the scenario focal actors were (Table 75). I suggest that the specific subject of 
the sentence points to a functional relationship with the scenario actor which is based 
on the actor either being responsible for something or having the opportunity to 
effect control by taking an action or not acting (responsibility or control), and may be 
illustrated in the responses of Safety Professionals. 
In their counterfactual sentences they associated the Supervisor with inadequate 
warning signs and I suggest this represents a control relationship, as a Supervisor 
could have ensured the signs were displayed, or even put them out himself! A 
different scenario actor and specific sentence subject were used by Safety 
Professionals for their prevention and causal sentences. In both cases they related to 
the Employer who was associated through the specific subject of the sentence to the 
establishment of safe systems of work, which I suggest represents a relationship 
based on responsibility. In this instance the responsibility is an explicit one 
established by Section 2 of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 (HMSO, 
1974). Not all responsibility-related antecedent relationships will be explicit; there 
will be situations where the responsibility will be implicit or will be a moral one. The 
two types of relationship (responsibility or control) are not mutually exclusive and it 
is quite easy to conceive of situations where being in a position to take action creates 
a moral responsibility to act. An example might be, if you were to witness a crime 
where you could have intervened and stopped it. Similar connections based on this 
responsibility or control relationship can be made for the other respondents and their 
sentences. I have set out in Tables 76, 77 and 78 the type of relationships I believe 
may have existed. 
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Table 76. Type of relationship between the scenario actor and the specific subject of the 
sentence for Safety Professionals 
Sentence  Scenario 
actor 
Specific subject of the 
sentence 
Relationship between 
actor and specific 
subject 
Counterfactual 
(Slips) 
Supervisor  Inadequate warnings  Control  
Counterfactual 
(Trips) 
Supervisor  The presence of the 
hazard  
Control  
    
Prevention (Slips) Employer Systems of work  Responsibility  
Prevention (Trips)  Employer Standards of 
housekeeping  
Responsibility 
    
Causal (Slips) Employer Systems of work  Responsibility  
Causal (Trips)  Employer The presence of the 
hazard  
Responsibility 
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Table 77. Type of relationship between the scenario actor and the specific subject of the 
sentence for Managers  
Sentence  Scenario 
actor 
Specific subject of the 
sentence 
Relationship between 
actor and specific 
subject 
Counterfactual 
(Slips) 
Supervisor  Inadequate warnings  Control 
Counterfactual 
(Trips) 
Supervisor The presence of the 
hazard  
Control 
    
Prevention (Slips) Supervisor  Inadequate warnings Control 
Prevention (Trips)  Supervisor The presence of the 
hazard  
Control 
    
Causal (Slips) Supervisor  The presence of the 
hazard  
Control 
Causal (Trips)  Store 
Manager 
The presence of the 
hazard  
Control 
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Table 78. Type of relationship between the scenario actor and the specific subject of the 
sentence for Accident Subjects 
Sentence  Scenario actor Specific subject of the 
sentence 
Relationship 
between actor and 
specific subject 
Counterfactual (Slips) Supervisor Inadequate warnings Control 
Counterfactual (Trips) Mary The presence of the 
hazard  
Control 
    
Prevention (Slips) Supervisor  Failing to clean up Control 
Prevention (Trips)  Supervisor The presence of the 
hazard  
Control 
    
Causal (Slips) Supervisor  The presence of the 
hazard  
Control 
Causal (Trips)  Other worker  The presence of the 
hazard  
Control 
 
Domains 
The specific subjects of the counterfactual sentences were initially grouped into one 
of four categories which I refer to as domains. These were based on a physical 
domain, a behavioural domain, a process or procedure, or an attitude. However 
attitude was excluded from subsequent analysis because it was so infrequently used. 
For both respondents’ job group and accident type the items selected for 
counterfactual change were most commonly located in the behavioural domain  
(mean percentages - Safety Professionals 53.7%, Managers 61.2% and Accident 
Subject 78.2%). Although the specific subject of the ‘if only…’ sentence may have 
related to the presence of the hazard or a lack or warnings, most commonly it was a 
behaviour that was changed in relation to the specific subject. Behaviours could be 
something that was done (an action) or something which had not been done 
(inaction). 
 Page | 269  
 
The pattern of responses changed for the prevention sentence where Safety 
Professionals’ sentences were located mostly in the process and procedure domain 
(mean 64.8%) whilst Accident Subjects were still mostly in the behaviour domain 
(mean 65.1%) and Managers were using both (mean behaviour domain 46.2%, mean 
procedure domain 41%). 
Safety Professionals’ causal sentences showed more mixed responses combining the 
behavioural domain (32.9%) of the counterfactual sentence with the procedural 
domain (49.7%) of the prevention sentence at least for slip accidents, but showed a 
continuing preference for causal antecedents for trip accidents in the procedure and 
process domain (55.1%). Managers showed a preference for behavioural antecedents 
(50.9%) in their causal sentences for slip accidents and a dual use of behaviours 
(37.7%) and processes (39.3%) for trip accidents. Accident Subjects continued to 
show a preference for behavioural antecedents in their causal sentences (58.1% for 
slips and 57.1% for trips). 
These results show that the counterfactual sentences mainly sought to make changes 
to behaviours. This is common to all three job groups and unaffected by the type of 
accident, although the behavioural focus is not so pronounced for the prevention and 
causal sentences, with the exception of Accident Subjects for whom a behavioural 
antecedent is most commonly used. Again the results reflect the influence exerted on 
Safety Professionals by their social role and the framing effect of the legal system 
that they work in. When they consider how Mary’s accidents could have been 
prevented they achieve this through antecedents located in the procedure / process 
domain, which reflect the legal requirements to have a safety policy, documented 
arrangements and procedures, and this emphasis on the procedure / process domain 
was also found in their causal sentences. 
Managers’ responses to the completion of the prevention and causal sentences tended 
to place them between the Safety Professionals and Accident Subjects, as they 
showed a more balanced use of antecedents using both the behavioural and 
procedure / process domains, except when thinking about the cause of Mary’s slip 
which was more firmly located in the behavioural domain. 
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Comparing the Counterfactual Sentences with the Prevention and Causal 
Sentences 
There has been some debate in the literature as to whether counterfactuals identify a 
causal relationship between the mutated antecedent and the outcome or identify a 
missed opportunity to prevent the unwanted outcome. In an attempt to explore this 
further, each respondent was also invited to complete a prevention and a causal 
sentence in addition to the counterfactual sentence. The responses to those sentences 
are detailed in Appendix 5. The prevention and causal sentences were coded across 
the same dimension as the counterfactual sentence, with the exception of ‘direction’ 
which only related to counterfactual thought. 
A high-level analysis of the sentences suggests that there is a greater degree of parity 
between the counterfactual sentence and the prevention sentences than between the 
counterfactual and causal sentences, and this has already been discussed where 
relevant in the preceding sections.   
The effect of the respondents’ job group and the type of accident on  the 
Consideration of Future Consequences score 
The Consideration of Future Consequences Scale (Strathman et al., 1994) was 
modified for this study and applied to the respondents to assess how much 
consideration they gave to safety in the future as opposed to now. Against 
expectation Accident Subjects’ mean scores were higher than those of both Safety 
Professionals and Managers. I had anticipated that the Safety Professionals scores 
would have been the highest given that they deal with safety on daily basis and are 
more closely associated with ensuring that ongoing safety standards are met than 
Accident Subjects. 
A possible explanation for these results is that Accident Subjects had recently been 
involved in a real work-related accident which had caused an injury serious enough 
to have kept them off work for at least three days. This experience was still fresh and 
being invited to respond to the research questionnaire strengthened their responses 
over those that might be expected of an employee who had not recently been 
involved in an occupational injury. Future research might usefully develop and refine 
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the use of the scale more widely in occupational settings to better understand how 
people think about their future safety and to find out if this varies in different 
occupational settings. 
Limitations of this research  
The study set out to examine how counterfactual thinking was used to bring about a 
different outcome to an occupational slip and trip accident using respondents who 
had recent and personal experience of such accidents, or who were professionally 
involved with safety or the management of workplaces. Whilst attempting to achieve 
a high degree of ecological validity there were inevitable limitations. These are 
briefly discussed in the following sections. 
The study attempted to examine a real life situation which includes many variables 
and these were included in the study scenario including three respondent groups, 
manipulating the type of accident, the severity of the injury and the level of detail 
that was provided to the respondents. In retrospect this was too ambitious and would 
have benefited from being focused on one type of accident and a single type of 
injury. The inclusion of three respondents’ groups and the two levels of detail proved 
to be the most relevant. 
Twenty four versions of the questionnaire were required to manipulate the various 
factors and this was unnecessarily complex and required a large sample to ensure 
adequate statistical power. Considerable time and effort was required to identify and 
recruit enough respondents. Access to Safety Professionals was easy and a very good 
response rate was obtained, but it proved difficult to recruit Managers and Accident 
Subjects and the data collection period was prolonged as a result. 
The scenario and its associated questionnaire attempted to capture a wide range of 
information from respondents and was correspondingly quite a substantial document 
which took about 20-30 minutes to complete. This was not a limiting factor for 
Safety Professionals but may have been a reason why the response rate from 
Managers and Accident Subjects was lower. A shortened version of the questionnaire 
was introduced part-way through the data collection phase to address this concern. 
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A key element of this research was the use of real life respondents to give a more 
authentic response than role-playing students. Scenarios and questionnaire were 
randomly addressed to businesses through publicly available business directories. 
This was an inefficient method of recruitment for Managers and was costly and time 
consuming. Future research might be easier if it could be undertaken with the support 
of a large partner organisation, but that would limit the responses to that 
organisation’s particular culture. Only a small percentage of employees have a 
reportable occupational accident from the total working population in England and 
Wales and recruiting from this population proved to be resource intensive and relied 
on access to the national accident database.  
Potential respondents were identified and invited to respond, but those that chose to 
complete the questionnaire were self-selecting and this had the potential to introduce 
a bias because it may have encouraged respondents who are interested in the subject 
to respond more than those who are more neutral or disinterested.  In this study it is 
likely that Managers who responded were more safety conscious than those who did 
not respond. Care was taken to exclude any Managers whose responses indicated any 
significant health and safety involvement and when there was any doubt they were 
coded as being from a Safety Practitioner. Questionnaires were posted out to 
potential Accident Subjects on a monthly basis in the hope that it would reach them 
when their accident was still fresh and they could respond with a high degree of 
realism, but that time scale might have been too soon for some individuals and too 
late for others. 
Theoretical and Practical Implications of this Study  
The study has highlighted a number of areas where the structural dimensions of the 
counterfactual sentence predicted to be the most common by earlier research have 
been influenced by either the respondents’ job group or the type of accident. I will 
comment on the main points and suggest why these are important and how further 
research might be directed towards a fuller understanding of the interrelationships 
between the various factors. 
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Counterfactual direction  
Whilst the respondents’ different social roles in this study exerted a more subtle 
influence on the structure of the counterfactual sentences, there was a common 
purpose shared by all respondents in seeking to bring about a better (upward) 
outcome following both slip and trip accident scenarios. This may have been a direct 
and inevitable consequence of the scenario in an occupational setting with its 
associated rules and responsibilities. The social setting presented through the 
scenario was based on an accident report and investigation and may have constrained 
the direction of counterfactual thinking so that the avoidance of the accident was 
most likely, although respondents had the opportunity to bring about a different but 
worse outcome however no respondent chose to change it in that direction.  
One avenue for future research would be to present respondents with other types of 
occupational accident, with different outcomes, and with different reasons for 
engaging in counterfactual thinking, in order to see which prompts a worse outcome 
(downward counterfactual). For example, a downward comparison might be made 
under circumstances where the risk of serious injury is higher but was avoided (a 
lucky outcome), or where the respondents’ role is to inform the accident subject’s 
family about the accident, depending again on the severity of the outcome. It is 
reasonable to suggest that as the legal process of accident investigation progresses 
and a prosecution is brought by an HSE or local authority inspector, their use of 
upward counterfactuals would be maintained because it highlights how easy it was to 
have prevented the accident and that justifies their role and subsequent blame and 
punishment. In this instance the relationship between counterfactual thinking and 
hindsight bias is important because an employer can only be responsible for risks that 
are reasonably foreseeable, and this is another important area to understand in the 
context of an occupational accident. 
Actions / inactions and addition / subtraction 
A predictably strong inaction effect was identified given the setting in which legal 
duties establish an expectation that action is required to meet those duties and avoid 
accidents. The implication of an accident is that the necessary actions were not taken 
(an inaction). Norm Theory suggests that in general social situations actions are more 
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exceptional than inactions, but this study has shown the reverse with inactions being 
mutated. In social situations governed by rules and legal standards inactions are the 
exception and are selected for change to return them to the expected norm. In such 
situations inactions are then likely to be associated with failure, bringing with that 
attributions of responsibility, blame and being punished. We know from previous 
research, for example Wells and Gavanski (1989), that where someone’s actions 
could have prevented an accident they are held to be more responsible for the 
outcome. However this study did not ask respondents to make these attributions, but 
it would be worthwhile extending the study to compare the attribution of 
responsibility, blame and degree of punishment as a result of thinking 
counterfactually, compared to thinking how the accident could have been prevented 
or how it was caused.  
The study identified a relationship between actions / inactions and addition / 
subtraction. Counterfactuals focusing on inactions were corrected by the addition of 
an action, and the subsequent prevention sentence was also likely to focus on the 
addition of an action. Respondents who identified the cause as arising from an 
inaction also found it to be subtractive in the sense that it was less than required.  
This pattern of responses is likely to be widespread in social situations which are 
subject to formal rules requiring certain actions (behaviours) to comply. In other 
social situations where the rules prohibit certain actions a different relationship 
would be expected, in which counterfactual thought would change actions, 
prevention would focus on inaction and cause would be attributed to an action.  
Further research in this area would assist in understanding the roles that 
counterfactual, prevention and causal thinking have on people’s actions and inactions 
under different regulatory regimes and how that leads to the identification of 
individuals and the attribution of responsibility, blame and punishment for unwanted 
outcomes when rules are broken. 
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Exceptionality  
A refinement of Norm Theory has been developed in this study.  Under Norm 
Theory unexpected outcomes are returned to their default and expected state, or 
norm, by changing an antecedent which is classified as being exceptional in some 
way. Three categories of exceptional event were developed which describe the 
relationship between the antecedent and the expected outcome. This was found to be 
achieved through the application of existing rules where these have not been 
correctly or adequately applied (second order exception), by altering existing rules to 
improve the probability of the desired outcome being achieved (fourth order 
exception) and, lastly and more rarely, by establishing completely new rules (third 
order exception). This new way of classifying exceptional antecedents was also 
applied to the prevention and causal sentences in this study. 
The classification scheme worked well in the specific context of this study but more 
work is needed to establish if it is applicable to other social situations and provides a 
useful additional utility to describing the nature of the antecedent and how it is 
changed. In this study the classification of exceptional antecedents based on this 
scheme appears to provide a better understanding of the route offered by a 
counterfactual mutation of an antecedent and how it leads to the desired outcome. It 
has the potential to help identify differences in the type of antecedents selected by 
different groups, and through this might facilitate a better understanding of how 
people’s post-accident cognitions operate and assist in delivering more targeted 
accident prevention strategies. 
Temporal location (timescale) 
Real accidents arise from long chains of antecedents combining causally and 
temporally related antecedents. This study successfully created and applied an 
accident scenario with 11 stages of mixed antecedents. Quite unexpectedly the type 
of accident had a significant influence on the temporal location of the antecedent 
selected to be changed whereas the respondents’ job group did not. The 
counterfactual antecedents most commonly selected following Mary’s trip accident 
were located very early in the temporal sequence (before the day of the accident) 
whilst the antecedent most commonly selected following Mary’s slip accident was 
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located at a much later stage, at the point where the hazard was on the floor and 
awaiting the Cleaner (Stage D). 
It is unclear what the reasons for this differentiation are and whilst I have speculated 
about possible causes they remain just that. This is potentially an important result 
because it is one of the few structural dimensions used in the study which shows 
clear blue water between the antecedents used in connection with slips and trips and 
is unaffected by respondents’ job group. Further research would be helpful to 
establish if this effect is repeated and not an artefact of this particular study. 
Control  
Under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (HMSO, 1974) employers are 
expected to exercise control over the working environment and working practices 
and procedures, making control over the antecedent both expected and legally 
required. This would be in keeping with previous research in which controllable 
antecedents were mutated in preference to uncontrollable ones. A differentiation in 
control was proposed and found in this study, in which some antecedents were under 
the direct control of the scenario actor whilst others were under indirect control. This 
difference was largely based on whether the respondent was viewing the outcome 
from a personal or public perspective. Safety Professionals showed a tendency to 
select antecedents that were under indirect control as opposed to Accident Subjects 
who selected a greater percentage of antecedents under direct control, and this 
differentiation was also likely to influence both the selection of the scenario actor 
and the specific subject of the counterfactual prevention and causal sentences. The 
nature of these relationships has been suggested in Tables 76, 77 and 78. The 
relevance and implications of direct and indirect control and how they are related to 
the person thinking counterfactually and to their selected actor is worthy of further 
research, particularly in social situations in which strong rules exist governing 
people’s behaviour. 
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     Dynamic or static antecedents 
This study has confirmed the results of previous research which suggested that 
dynamic antecedents were more highly available for counterfactual mutation. This is 
true even for Safety Professionals, whose selection of antecedent had been predicted 
to be more highly constrained towards static antecedents because of the overarching 
legal rules to meet goals through distinctly static requirements, such as having to 
have undertaken risk assessments, written safety policies and procedures, and have 
plans to monitor compliance, none of which are immediately obvious to an observer 
of an accident and can only be ascertained through questioning. A possible 
explanation why Safety Professionals still preferred dynamic antecedents has been 
offered, but this has not been tested and the influence of social rules on the use of 
dynamic and static antecedents would benefit from further research. 
The new structural dimensions of counterfactual thinking 
Seven new structural dimensions of counterfactual thought were proposed and 
applied in this study and their relevance to counterfactual thinking needs to be more 
fully explored and understood before their usefulness and importance can be 
assessed. 
Clearly some dimensions such as the specific subject of the counterfactual thought 
will be intimately linked to particular situations and outcomes, but could nevertheless 
inform research in very precise fields of enquiry such as accident investigation as 
used here. Others dimensions, for instance the use of known or inferred antecedents, 
could be much more widely applicable and the relevance of that to the psychology of 
hindsight bias, stereotyping and other similar heuristics, like the use of causal 
schema by Safety Professionals, might be informative. 
In this study a very strong association was found between the level of detail provided 
to respondents and their use of known or inferred counterfactual antecedents. 
Minimal details led to the greater use of inferred antecedents but reassuringly greater 
levels of detail led to more known antecedents being used. However this was not the 
case when respondents were asked what the cause of Mary’s accident was, which 
was in the main attributed to inferred antecedents. If this pattern were repeated in 
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other rule-based social settings there could be implications for the fairness of 
decisions made. 
 
Final comment  
Applying the seven existing and seven new structural dimensions to the 
counterfactual thoughts of three real life populations associated with an occupational 
accident has provided an insight into how people mentally undo an unwanted 
outcome and how their roles influence the ways in which they structure their 
thoughts. The ways in which respondents completed the counterfactual, prevention 
and causal sentences has been summarised in Tables 79, 80 and 81 to show how each 
of the 14 dimensions are influenced by the respondents’ job group and accident type, 
enabling for the first time the structure of counterfactual thoughts to be directly 
compared with the structure of thoughts directed at preventing the outcome and 
identifying its cause. Similarities and differences have been identified,  all of which 
are of interest to those involved with the study of how we think about life and the 
events that we face as well as those charged with keeping work safe and 
investigating things that inevitably go wrong leading us to think ‘If only…’. 
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Table 79. Modal responses for the counterfactual sentences  
Counterfactual 
dimension 
Safety 
Professional 
Slip 
Safety 
Professional 
Trip 
Manager Slip Manager Trip Accident 
Subject Slip 
Accident 
Subject Trip 
Counterfactual 
direction 
Upward 
(better 
outcome) 
Upward 
(better 
outcome) 
Upward 
(better 
outcome) 
Upward 
(better 
outcome) 
Upward 
(better 
outcome) 
Upward 
(better 
outcome) 
Action/inaction 
 
Inaction Inaction Inaction Inaction Inaction Inaction 
Addition or 
subtraction 
Addition Addition Addition Addition Addition Addition 
Normal 
/exceptional 
Improve 
existing 
norm 
Improve 
existing norm 
Improve 
existing 
norm 
Improve 
existing 
norm 
Improve 
existing norm 
Exception to 
an expected 
norm and 
improve 
existing norm 
Timescale Stage D Before Stage 
A 
Stage D Before 
Stage A 
Stage D Before Stage 
A 
Control 
 
Direct and 
indirect 
control 
Direct and 
indirect 
control 
Direct 
control 
Direct and 
indirect 
control 
Direct control Direct control 
Dynamic  or 
static  
Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic 
and static  
Dynamic  Dynamic and 
static  
Case specific or 
general 
Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific Specific 
Known or 
inferred 
antecedent under 
minimum detail 
conditions 
Inferred Inferred Inferred Inferred Inferred Known or 
inferred 
Known or 
inferred 
antecedent under 
maximum detail 
conditions 
Known Known Known Known or 
inferred 
Known Known or 
inferred 
Personal or 
situational 
Situational Situational Situational Situational Personal and 
situational 
Personal and 
situational 
Identify scenario 
actor 
Yes and no Yes and no Yes and no Yes and no Yes and no Yes 
Who Supervisor Supervisor Supervisor Supervisor Mary and 
Supervisor 
Mary and 
Supervisor 
Specific subject Hazard and 
warning 
Hazard and 
warning 
Hazard and 
warning 
Hazard and 
warning 
Mary’s lack 
of attention 
and decision 
to work 
Mary’s lack 
of attention 
and decision 
to work 
Domain Behaviour Behaviour Behaviour Behaviour Behaviour Behaviour 
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Table 80.  Modal  responses for the prevention sentences 
Prevention  dimension Safety 
Professional 
Slip 
Safety 
Professional 
Trip 
Manager 
Slip 
Manager 
Trip 
Accident 
Subject 
Slip 
Accident 
Subject 
Trip 
Direction of outcome N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Action/inaction Action Action Action Action Action Action 
Addition or subtraction Addition Addition Addition Addition Addition Addition 
Normal/exceptional 
 
New rule & 
improve 
existing rule 
improve 
existing rule 
improve 
existing 
rule 
improve 
existing 
rule 
improve 
existing 
rule 
improve 
existing 
rule 
Timescale Before Stage 
A 
Before Stage 
A 
Before 
Stage A & 
Stage C 
Before 
Stage A 
Stage D Before 
Stage A & 
Stage C & 
Stage D 
Control Direct control Direct control Direct & 
indirect 
control 
Direct & 
indirect 
control 
Direct & 
indirect 
sontrol 
Direct 
control 
Dynamic  or static  Dynamic & 
static  
Dynamic & 
static  
Dynamic & 
static  
Dynamic 
& static  
Dynamic  Dynamic 
& static  
Case specific or general Case specific 
& general  
General  General  Case 
specific & 
general 
Specific  Specific  
Known or inferred 
antecedent under 
minimum detail 
conditions 
Inferred  Inferred Inferred  Inferred  Inferred Inferred  
Known or inferred 
antecedent under 
maximum detail 
conditions 
Inferred Inferred Known & 
inferred 
Known & 
inferred 
Known Known & 
inferred 
Personal or situational Situational  Situational Situational Situational Personal & 
situational 
Personal 
& 
situational 
Identify scenario actor No No No No Yes & no Yes & no 
Who 
 
Employer Employer Manager Supervisor Supervisor  Supervisor  
Specific subject 
 
 
System of 
work  
Poor 
housekeeping 
Inadequate 
warnings 
The 
Hazard 
Failing to 
clear up 
The 
hazard 
Domain 
 
Procedure  Procedure Behaviour Procedure 
& 
behaviour 
Behaviour Behaviour 
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Table 81. Modal responses for the causal sentences 
Causal  dimension Safety 
Professional Slip 
Safety 
Professional 
Trip 
Manager Slip Manager      Trip Accident 
Subject 
Slip 
Accident 
Subject 
Trip 
Direction of outcome N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Action/inaction Inaction Inaction Inaction Inaction Inaction Action & 
inaction 
Addition or 
subtraction 
Subtraction 
(less than 
required)  
Subtraction 
(less than 
required)  
Subtraction 
(less than 
required)  
Subtraction 
(less than 
required)  
Subtraction 
(less than 
required)  
Addition 
(more than 
required)  & 
subtraction   
Normal/exceptional Improve 
existing rule  & 
existing rule 
exception  
Improve 
existing rule   
Improve 
existing rule  
& existing 
rule 
exception 
Improve 
existing rule  & 
existing rule 
exception 
Existing 
rule 
exception 
Existing 
rule 
exception 
Timescale Before Stage 
A 
Before Stage 
A 
Stage D Before Stage A Stage C & 
Stage D 
Stage C 
Control Indirect 
control 
Indirect 
control 
Direct & 
indirect 
control 
Direct & 
indirect control 
Direct & 
indirect 
control 
Direct 
control 
Dynamic  or static  Static  Dynamic & 
static  
Dynamic & 
static  
Dynamic & 
static  
Dynamic 
& static  
Dynamic 
& static  
Case specific or 
general 
Case specific  
& general  
General  Case specific  
& general 
Case specific  
& general 
Specific  Specific 
Known or inferred 
antecedent under 
minimum detail 
conditions 
Inferred  Inferred Inferred Inferred Inferred Inferred 
Known or inferred 
antecedent under 
maximum detail 
conditions 
Inferred Inferred Known & 
inferred 
Inferred Known Known & 
inferred 
Personal or Situational Situational  Situational Personal & 
situational 
Situational  Personal 
& 
situational 
Personal 
& 
situational 
Identify scenario actor No No No No No Yes & no 
Who Employer Employer Supervisor  Manager Superviso
r 
Supervisor / 
Manager & 
Safety 
Officer 
Specific subject 
 
 
Inadequate 
systems of 
work  
The 
hazard/inade
quate 
systems & 
poor 
housekeeping 
The hazard The 
hazard/inadequ
ate systems & 
poor 
housekeeping 
Hazard & 
failing to 
clear up 
The 
hazard 
Domain Procedures Procedures Behaviour  Behaviour & 
procedures  
Behaviour  Behaviour  
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Appendix 1  
Coding Scheme 
Coding Scheme 
When coding responses the coder adopted an ‘all seeing’ position as though viewing 
the scenario from above and following the actions and locations of all the characters as 
described in the scenario version. 
 
When coding the completed sentences the coder was asking the following questions. 
For the counterfactual sentence it was ‘What has been changed to bring about the 
alternative outcome?’, whilst for the prevention sentence the questions was ‘How was 
the accident prevented?’, and for the causal sentence the question was ‘What was the 
cause of the accident?’. 
 
The counterfactual sentence was coded for 14 different aspects to the way it was 
constructed (structural dimensions). There was no ‘directional’ element for the 
prevention and causal sentences so they were coded for 13 structural dimensions: the 
first seven structural dimensions described below have been identified by previous 
researchers, whilst the last seven have been identified during the current research. 
Counterfactual direction  
This describes whether the counterfactual outcome was better or worse than the actual 
outcome. The coding options were:  
Upward for a better outcome - Any mutation which would have the effect of 
preventing or minimising the consequences of the outcome of the accident. 
Counterfactual outcomes are better or less serious. 
Downward for a worse outcome - Any mutation which makes the actual outcome 
better or less serious than possible outcomes. Counterfactual outcomes are worse or 
more serious. 
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Example ‘If only I had been more careful I might not have slipped’ was coded as an 
upward mutation as it would have prevented the accident which is a better outcome.  
Counterfactual direction was only applicable to the counterfactual sentence as it can 
have two outcome options (bi-directional) whereas as both the prevention and the 
causal sentences are unidirectional.  
Action or inaction  
Did the sentence relate to something that was done – an action - or to something not 
done – inaction? The coding options were:  
Action – if the subject of the sentence or the antecedent referred to was an action taken 
by one of the characters. An action could be removed or undone. The coding was also 
applied to the prevention and causal sentences where the accident would have been 
prevented by an action being taken or where the cause was attributed to an action.  
Inaction – where the subject of the sentence or the antecedent referred to was an 
inaction or lack of action by one of the characters. The coding was also applied where 
the accident would have been prevented by something not being done or where the 
cause was attributed to the lack of an action being taken.  
Counterfactual sentence example -   
‘If only I had been more careful I might not have slipped’ was coded as a 
counterfactual mutation of inaction.  
Prevention sentence example - 
‘Mary’s accident might have been prevented if she had looked where she was going’ 
was coded as an action.  
Causal sentence example - 
‘The cause of Mary’s accident was her lack of attention’ was coded as an inaction.  
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Addition or subtraction  
The coding options were:  
Addition - did the counterfactual sentence change something by adding a new 
antecedent element or by subtracting an existing antecedent when bringing about the 
alternative outcome? 
When applied to the prevention and causal sentences the concept of addition was 
extended to include something that was ‘more than expected or more than optimal’ or 
‘better than’. 
Subtraction - correspondingly subtraction was used when an antecedent was removed 
from the existing sequence of events or when applied to the prevention and causal 
sentences was ‘less than expected or less than optimal’ or ‘worse than’. 
Counterfactual sentence example -  
‘If only I had been more careful I might not have slipped’ was coded as a 
counterfactual mutation of addition.  
Prevention sentence example - 
‘Mary’s accident might have been prevented if she had looked where she was going’ 
was coded as an addition. Mary would be paying more attention than before to prevent 
another accident. 
Causal sentence example - 
‘The cause of Mary’s accident was her lack of attention’ was coded as a subtraction 
(less than optimal), her level of attention was less than optimal.  
Normality    
Did the counterfactual sentence change something that was normal (a routine everyday 
antecedent) or something which was unusual, out of the ordinary or exceptional? Four 
types of exceptional event were identified and coded and the coding options were:  
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Scenario exception - this related to Mary’s decision to cover for her friend’s holiday 
leading to her working on Thursday which was not her usual day. 
Exception to an existing rule - where the sentence indicated that the outcome would 
have been different had some expected behaviour, standard or rule been followed. For 
example ‘If only I had been careful I might not have slipped’. 
New rule - where the sentence created a new behaviour, standard or rule to achieve the 
desired outcome, prevent it or cause it. For example ‘Cleaning equipment should be 
provided in each aisle of the store’ where this has not previously been the case.  
Improving an existing rule to increase the likelihood of achieving the desired 
outcome - this coding option was applied where the counterfactual sentence modified 
an existing behaviour, standard or rule is such a way that the desired outcome was 
more certain to be achieved than by simply applying the unmodified behaviour, 
standard or rule. For example suppose the Cleaner had a five minute response time to 
attend a spillage after it was reported and reduction to a three minute response time 
would improve the prospect of preventing accidents.  
Normal - the antecedent changed was a routine, usual or everyday unexceptional 
event.  
Timescale (temporal location)  
Where in time before the accident was the item changed? The accident sequence was 
split up into 11 stages – Before Stage A and Stages A to J (see Tables 18 and 82) and 
the location of the specific subject of the completed question was coded according to 
its position in the sequence. The response ‘If only the milk had been mopped up’ was 
coded as being at Stage D, whereas ‘If only Mary had not covered for her friend’ was 
coded as being ‘Before Stage A’.  
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Table 82. Accident sequence – timescale  
Coding options Slip event  Trip event  
   
Before A  Mary agrees to cover for her 
friend  
Mary agrees to cover for her 
friend 
Stage A Mary goes for her usual mid-
morning rest break 
Mary goes for her usual mid-
morning rest break 
Stage B Mary waits for her friend on 
the next checkout and they 
both walk along the front of 
the checkouts towards the 
staff room   
Mary waits for her friend on 
the next checkout and they 
both walk along the front of 
the checkouts towards the 
staff room   
Stage C Milk has been spilt on the 
floor 
A box has been left on the 
floor 
Stage D  The spillage has been 
reported 5 minutes ago. The 
Cleaner has been requested 
to clear up but has not got 
round to it  
The box has been reported 5 
minutes ago. The Cleaner 
has been requested to clear 
up but has not got round to it  
Stage E Mary does not see the milk 
on the floor 
Mary does not see the box 
on the floor 
Stage F Mary steps on the milk Mary's foot is caught in the 
box 
Stage G Mary slips on the milk Mary trips over the box 
Stage H Mary loses her balance and 
falls over 
Mary loses her balance and 
falls over 
Stage I Mary falls awkwardly 
hurting her right arm 
Mary falls awkwardly 
hurting her right arm 
Stage J  Mary is taken to hospital - 
her arm is x-rayed and found 
to be broken. She will be off 
work for 3 weeks 
Mary is taken to hospital - 
her arm is x-rayed and found 
to be broken. She will be off 
work for 3 weeks 
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Control 
Did the scenario actor have control over the item changed in the counterfactual 
sentence or referred to in the prevention or causal sentences?  
Following the completion of each counterfactual, prevention and causal sentence 
respondents were asked to select from a standard list the scenario actor to whom the 
sentence best related. The control that actor had over the subject of the sentence was 
then coded as:  
Direct control – where the actor could take the action personally.   
Indirect control – where the actor could secure the action but through the action of 
others. 
No control – where the actor had no control or responsibility towards the actions 
suggested in the sentence. 
Counterfactual sentence example -   
‘If only I had been more careful I might not have slipped’ was coded as direct control.  
Prevention sentence example - 
‘Mary’s accident might have been prevented if she had looked where she was going’ 
was coded as direct control.  
Causal sentence example - 
‘The cause of Mary’s accident was her lack of attention’ was coded as direct control.  
Active or passive  
Was an ‘active’ or ‘passive’ antecedent changed in the counterfactual sentence? Was 
the accident caused or prevented by something that was ‘active ‘or ‘passive’? For the 
purposes of coding the following definitions were used:  
Active 
Something that was changing over time and was directly observable or detectable by 
the senses, or was known to the respondent at the time based on the given information, 
for example ‘If only signs had been put out’ was coded a being ‘active’. 
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Passive  
This would refer to something unchanging or something not known at the time.  
For example no details were given in the scenario about the existence or otherwise of 
ABC Supermarkets’ working procedures to deal with spillages, so sentences relating 
to the adequacy of those procedures would have been coded as being ‘passive’ 
because further investigation would have been required before any judgment could be 
formed. 
 
Case specific  or general   
Was the alternative outcome achieved by changing an antecedent which was specific 
only to the research scenario accident, i.e. it was ‘case specific’, or was the change one 
that could be applied to a wider class of slip or trip accident, i.e. was it more ‘general’? 
Similarly did the prevention and causal sentences refer to matters which were specific 
to the scenario or did they refer to more general matters? 
The two coding options were: 
Case specific.  The subject of the sentence related to something which was only 
relevant to the specific accident referred to in the scenario.  
For example the counterfactual sentence ‘If only Mary had not agreed to work that 
Thursday’ was coded as being ‘case specific’. 
General . The general coding was used where the sentence referred to something 
which was applicable to a wider range of slip or trip accidents and was not 
confined to the scenario accident. 
 For example the counterfactual sentence ‘If only people followed procedures’ was 
coded as being ‘general’.  
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Known or inferred    
The use of two levels of detail in the study (minimum and maximum detail) gave rise 
to the possibility that the subject of the counterfactual, prevention or causal sentence 
was something that had been made explicit in the scenario or it was something that the 
respondent has added to the details already given based on personal experience. 
The coding of ‘known’ or ‘inferred’ was designed to differentiate these two 
possibilities.  
Two coding options were available: 
Known was used where the subject of the sentence was something that had been 
specifically included in the scenario details given to the respondent (with either 
minimum or maximum details). 
Inferred was used where the respondent completed the sentence with reference to 
something that was not made explicit in the scenario details (minimum or maximum). 
For example ’If only Mary had been more careful she might not have slipped’ was 
coded as inferred. Neither the minimum or maximum detail scenario made any 
reference to Mary not being careful or taking any less care than usual.  
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Minimum detail scenario version   
INVESTIGATING A SLIPPING ACCIDENT IN A SUPERMARKET 
In the section that follows you are asked to read about a slipping accident to Mary 
(a part-time checkout operator at ABC Supermarkets) who slipped over on a 
spillage of milk near to the checkouts as she was going to the staff room for her 
mid-morning break. 
 
When answering the questions that follow please do so as a safety professional, 
responding in the same way as you would in your own workplace.  
Use your own knowledge or experience of slipping accidents to add to the 
information given about the accident.  
 
Mary is a lady of about 55 years of age who has worked as a part-time checkout 
operator for about eight years. She usually works Monday, Tuesday and 
Wednesday but had come in on this particular Thursday to cover for a friend who 
was on holiday.  
 
As a safety professional you have received a report on an accident to Mary in 
ABC Supermarkets. 
 
 
 
ABC SUPERMARKET 
 
MESSAGE TO  SAFETY OFFICER 
FROM  BILL  SHOP FLOOR SUPERVISOR 
DATE    THURSDAY 10 AUGUST   TIME  11.30 HRS 
 
SUBJECT - ACCIDENT TO MARY 
At about 10.30am Mary went for her rest break and slipped over on some spilt 
milk and hurt her arm. An ambulance was called to take her to hospital.  She has 
broken her right arm, which has been plastered. She will be off work for at least 
three weeks. 
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Maximum detail scenario version   
Additional information provided in the maximum information scenario version  
 Mary does not usually work on Thursdays but was covering for a friend who was 
on holiday. 
 Mary closed her checkout at the usual time for her mid-morning break and waited 
for a friend on the checkout next to her to serve her last customer and they both 
went to their break together as usual. 
 They were walking together past the checkout when Mary slipped over on some 
spilt milk and fell awkwardly on her right arm. 
 The First Aider attended and an ambulance was called to take Mary to hospital. 
 At hospital she was found to have a broken right arm. She will be off work for at 
least three weeks with her arm in plaster.    
 A customer  had seen the milk and reported it to Bill the Supervisor. 
 Bill confirmed that the spillage had been reported by a customer and the Cleaner 
had been asked to clear it up five minutes before the accident but had not got 
round to dealing with it. 
 No warning signs had been put out. 
 It is not known how long the milk had been on the floor before it was reported by 
the customer. 
 Spillages around the checkouts are very common. 
 According to the Accident Book four other people had been injured in slipping 
accidents in the past six months. 
 
 
 
Personal or situational  
The subject of the completed sentence could relate to a characteristic of a person or the 
situation they were in. 
A personal characteristic might be carelessness, laziness or being reckless. Sentences 
relating to a situation might for example refer to the presence of the hazard or the lack 
of warning signs. 
The coding of sentences referring to behaviours was not so clear cut but generally the 
fact that a person did or did not do something was considered more as a fact of the 
situation rather than being an indication of something personal. 
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For example a sentence such as ‘Mary should have looked where she was going’ 
would have been coded as being ‘personal’, whereas ‘Warnings should have been 
given’ would have been coded as ‘situational’.  
 
Spontaneous identification of the scenario actor  
This element of the sentence identified whether the respondent spontaneously 
identified the person (scenario actor) to whom it related in the way it was structured.  
It has been noticed during the piloting of the research scenario and questionnaires that 
the scenario actor was identified or referred to by some respondents when completing 
the counterfactual, prevention and causal sentences. 
Two coding options were available: 
The scenario actor was spontaneously identified or  
The scenario actor was not spontaneously identified   
An example of where the counterfactual sentence did spontaneously identify the actor 
is ’If only Mary had been more careful she might not have slipped’, whereas a 
response such as ’If only the milk had been cleaned up’ was coded as not identifying 
the actor spontaneously.  
 
The specific subject of the sentence 
The specific subject of the counterfactual, prevention and causal sentences were 
identified and coded against a list of 17 options. These coding options were developed 
during the coding stage of the research as new categories were identified.  
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Coding options Example of an ‘If only...’ sentence 
completion 
The presence of the hazard  The milk had not been spilt 
Inadequate system of work  There has been a proper system in place to 
clean up the milk 
Inadequate training  Staff  had been trained to deal with 
spillages as well as the Cleaner 
Inadequate audits  Audits of spillages had been done  
Lack of staff ownership of safety  Staff cared more about safety  
Inadequate warnings Warning signs had been put out  
Poor safety culture  ABC supermarkets had a better safety 
culture 
Carelessness or recklessness  The person who left the box in the aisle 
had been more careful  
Poor housekeeping  The Manager had enforced better 
standards of housekeeping 
Inadequate response time   The leaner has got to the spillage quicker   
Lack of attention by Mary (Accident 
Subject) 
Mary had looked where she was going  
Failing to learn from other accidents The safety manager had looked at the 
accident book  
Mart’s decision to cover for her friends 
holiday  
Mary had not been at work that day  
An action or inaction by someone  Someone had picked up the box when 
they saw it 
Failing to clear up The box had been moved out of the way 
Inadequate hazard reporting procedures   Someone had told the Cleaner about the 
box when they saw it 
Other   
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Domains (physical, behavioural, procedural or attitude)  
The specific subjects of the sentences could be grouped into four broader categories 
which are called domains in this research. These were:  
The physical domain. Where the specific subject related to some physical aspect of 
the situation or environment e.g. the box on the floor, warning signs.   
The behavioural domain. Where the respondent referred to someone’s actions or 
inactions or behaviour, e.g. The person who left the box on the floor should have put it 
in the box store. 
The procedure or system of work domain. Would cover all sentences where the 
respondent made any reference to safe systems of work, legal responsibilities, training 
supervision or review of accident records etc., e.g. the Employer should have had 
better systems in palace to deal with the spillage. 
Attitude.  Would cover any sentence where the respondent made any reference to 
someone’s approach to the situation such as their being uninterested in safety, cavalier, 
reckless or careless. 
 To whom did the sentence refer (scenario actor)?  
During piloting of the questionnaires about 50% of  respondents made any 
spontaneous reference to an identifiable person when completing the sentences. A 
question was added after each sentence asking the respondent to select from a standard 
list of scenario actors to whom the sentence related. The coding options were: 
 Accident Subject   Supervisor  
 Store Manager  Safety Officer  
 Employer   Other Worker  
 Cleaner  Customer 
 None of the above      
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Table 83. Coding of a counterfactual sentence 
‘If only Bill had ensured the spill was cleaned up immediately... things could have 
been different’ 
Structural element of 
sentence 
Coding options Coding applied to the 
sentence 
Direction of outcome 1. Upward  
2. Downward 
Upward 
Action or inaction 
changed 
1. Action  
2. Inaction 
Inaction 
Addition to or 
subtraction from the 
antecedent sequence  
1. Addition  
2. Subtraction 
Addition 
Normality of the 
antecedent  
1. Scenario exception 
2. Exception to an existing rule 
3. New rule 
4. Improved existing rule   
Improved existing rule  
Increased likelihood 
of achieving desired 
outcome 
Temporal position of 
the antecedent 
(timescale)  
Before Stage A to Stage J (see Table 
82 for details) 
Stage E 
Scenario actors control 
over the selected 
antecedent   
1. Direct control 
2. Indirect control 
3. No control  
Direct control 
Dynamic or static 
antecedent  
1. Dynamic  
2. Static 
Dynamic 
Case specific or 
general antecedent 
1. Case specific  
2. General  
Case specific 
Known or Inferred 
antecedent  
1. Known  
2. Inferred  
Inferred 
Personal or situational 
antecedent  
1. Personal 
2. Situational 
Situational 
Was scenario actor 
identified in the 
sentence 
1. Yes 
2. No 
Yes 
What was the specific 
subject of the sentence 
1 The hazard, 2 Systems of work, 3 
Training, 4 Warnings,  
5 Housekeeping, 6 Inadequate 
response times, 7 Failing to clear up, 
8 Mary’s decision to work, 9 Lack 
of attention, 10 Personal action or 
inaction 
Personal inaction 
Domain of the specific 
subject  
1. Physical element or 
environment 
2. Work procedure  
3. Behaviour   
4. Attitude 
Behaviour 
Which scenario actor 1 Mary, 2 Supervisor, 3 Manager,  
4  Safety Officer, 5 Cleaner, 6 Other 
staff member  
Supervisor 
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Table 84. Coding of a prevention sentence 
Mary’s accident could have been prevented if a barrier had been placed around 
the spillage and the Cleaner or other member of staff had cleaned up the liquid. 
Structural element of 
sentence 
Coding options Coding applied to the 
sentence 
Direction of outcome 1. Upward  
2. Downward 
Not applicable 
Action or inaction 
changed 
1. Action  
2. Inaction 
Action 
Addition to or 
subtraction from the 
antecedent sequence  
1. Addition  
2. Subtraction 
Addition 
Normality of the 
antecedent  
1. Scenario exception 
2. Exception to an existing rule 
3. New rule 
4. Improved existing rule   
Improved existing 
rule  Increased 
likelihood of 
achieving desired 
outcome 
Temporal position of 
the antecedent 
(timescale)  
Before Stage A to Stage J (see Table 
82 for details)  
Stage D 
Scenario actors control 
over the selected 
antecedent   
1. Direct Control 
2. Indirect control 
3. No control  
Direct control 
Dynamic or static 
antecedent  
1. Dynamic  
2. Static 
Dynamic 
Case specific or 
general antecedent 
1. Case specific  
2. General  
Case specific 
Known or inferred 
antecedent  
1. Known  
2. Inferred  
Known 
Personal or situational 
antecedent  
1. Personal 
2. Situational 
Situational 
Was scenario actor 
identified in the 
sentence 
1. Yes 
2. No 
No 
What was the specific 
subject of the sentence 
1 The hazard, 2 Systems of work, 3 
Training, 4 Warnings,  
5 Housekeeping, 6 Inadequate 
response times, 7 Failing to clear up, 
8 Mary’s decision to work, 9 Lack 
of attention, 10 Personal action or 
inaction  
System of work 
Domain of the specific 
subject  
1. Physical element or 
environment 
2. Work procedure  
3. Behaviour   
4. Attitude 
Work procedure  
Which scenario actor 
(Selected from a list)  
1 Mary, 2 Supervisor, 3 Manager, 4 
Safety Officer, 5 Cleaner, 6 Other 
staff member  
Supervisor 
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Table 85. Coding of a causal  sentence 
The cause of Mary’s accident was the spilt milk which she did not see. 
Structural element of 
sentence 
Coding options Coding applied to the 
sentence 
Direction of outcome 1. Upward  
2. Downward 
Not applicable 
Action or inaction 
changed 
1. Action  
2. Inaction 
Action 
Addition to or 
subtraction from the 
antecedent sequence  
1. Addition  
2. Subtraction 
Addition 
Normality of the 
antecedent  
1. Scenario exception 
2. Exception to an existing rule 
3. New rule 
4. Improved existing rule   
Exception to an 
existing rule 
 
Temporal position of the 
antecedent (timescale)  
Before Stage A to Stage J (see Table 82 
for details) 
Stage C 
Scenario actors control 
over the selected 
antecedent   
1. Direct control 
2. Indirect control 
3. No control  
Direct control 
Dynamic or static 
antecedent  
1. Dynamic  
2. Static 
Dynamic 
Case specific or general 
antecedent 
1. Case specific  
2. General  
Case specific 
Known or inferred 
antecedent  
1. Known  
2. Inferred  
Known 
Personal or situational 
antecedent  
1. Personal 
2. Situational 
Situational 
Was scenario actor 
identified in the 
sentence 
1. Yes 
2. No 
No 
What was the specific 
subject of the sentence 
1 The hazard, 2 Systems of work, 3 
Training, 4 Warnings,  
5 Housekeeping, 6 Inadequate response 
times, 7 Failing to clear up, 8 Mary’s 
decision to work, 9 Lack of attention, 10 
Personal action or inaction 
Lack of attention 
Domain of the specific 
subject  
1. Physical element or 
environment 
2. Work procedure  
3. Behaviour   
Behaviour 
Which scenario actor 
(selected from a list)  
1 Mary, 2 Supervisor, 3 Manager, 4 
Safety Officer, 5 Cleaner, 6 Other staff 
member 
Mary 
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Appendix 2 
 Inter-rater reliability 
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Table 86. Inter-rater reliability 
Parameter Kappa P = < .001 
  
Counterfactual direction  Not calculated as it is constant 
Counterfactual action / inaction   Kappa  .729 
Counterfactual addition/ subtraction Kappa  .849 
Counterfactual active / passive Kappa .900 
Counterfactual control  Kappa .903 
Counterfactual normality Kappa .803 
Counterfactual timescale Kappa .856 
Counterfactual specific / general Kappa .684 
Counterfactual domain Kappa .785 
Counterfactual known / inferred Kappa .780 
Counterfactual actor identified  Kappa .702 
Counterfactual personal / situation Kappa .731 
Counterfactual sentence subject  Kappa .789 
Counterfactual scenario actor  Responses did not require coding 
  
Prevention direction  Not calculated as it is constant 
Prevention action / inaction  Kappa .685 
Prevention addition / subtraction Kappa .634 
Prevention active / passive Kappa .866 
Prevention control  Kappa .674 
Prevention normality Kappa .711 
Prevention timescale Kappa .736 
Prevention specific / general Kappa .700 
Prevention domain Kappa .678 
Prevention known / inferred Kappa .683 
Prevention actor identified  Kappa .685 
Prevention personal / situation Kappa .804 
Prevention sentence subject  Kappa .745 
Prevention scenario actor  Responses did not require coding 
  
Cause direction  Not calculated as it is constant 
Cause action / inaction Kappa .861 
Cause addition / subtraction Kappa .753 
Cause active / passive Kappa .830 
Cause control Kappa .681 
Cause normality Kappa .770 
Cause timescale Kappa .882 
Cause specific / general Kappa .727 
Cause domain Kappa .720 
Cause known / inferred Kappa .700 
Cause actor identified  Kappa .795 
Cause personal / situation Kappa .722 
Cause sentence subject  Kappa .758 
Cause scenario actor  Responses did not require coding 
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Table 87.                                                                                                
Mean inter-rater reliability results for each structural element   
Parameter Kappa  
Mean direction  Not calculated as it is constant 
Mean action / inaction   Kappa  .758 p = < .001 
Mean addition/ subtraction Kappa  .748 p = < .001 
Mean active / passive Kappa .865 p = < .001 
Mean control  Kappa .752 p = < .001 
Mean normality Kappa .761 p = < .001 
Mean timescale Kappa .773 p = < .001 
Mean specific / general Kappa .703 p = < .001 
Mean domain Kappa .727 p = < .001 
Mean known / inferred Kappa .721 p = < .001 
Mean actor identified  Kappa .717 p = < .001 
Mean personal / situation Kappa .752 p = < .001 
Mean sentence subject  Kappa .764 p = < .001 
Mean scenario actor   Responses did not require 
coding 
  
Mean Kappa for all scores  
 
.753 
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Table 88.                                                                                                                                        
Sample size calculations and post hoc power calculations for the counterfactual 
sentence 
 Sample size calculations 
based on desired power .80 
Post hoc power calculations 
 Effect 
size 0.3 
(medium) 
Min 
sample 
size 
required 
Df Actual 
sample 
size 
Critical 
chi sq 
Post hoc 
power 
Effect 
size 
found 
Direction 
 
0.3 108 2 612 5.99 0.99 0.3 
Normality 
 
0.3 160 7 111 14.07 0.98 0.5 
Addition or 
subtraction 
 
0.3 108 2 133 5.99 0.88 0.3 
Action or 
inaction 
 
0.3 108 2 130 5.99 0.87 0.3 
Static or 
dynamic 
 
0.3 108 2 134 5.99 0.88 0.3 
Control 
 
0.3 133 4 134 9.49 0.80 0.3 
Timescale 
 
0.3 181 10 132 18.31 0.99 0.5 
        
Specific 
subject 
 
0.3 233 20 135 31.41 0.97 0.5 
Domain 
 
0.3 152 6 134 12.60 0.74 0.3 
Spontaneous 
identificatio
n of actor 
 
0.3 108 2 135 5.99 0.89 0.3 
Personal or 
situational 
 
0.3 133 4 134 9.49 0.80 0.3 
Specific or 
general 
 
0.3 133 4 134 9.49 0.80 0.3 
Known or 
inferred 
 
0.3 108 2 134 5.99 0.88 0.3 
Scenario 
actor 
 
0.3 233 20 135 31.41 0.97 0.5 
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Table 89.                                                                                                                                         
Sample size calculations and post hoc power calculations for the prevention sentence 
 Sample size calculations 
based on desired power .80 
Post hoc power calculations 
 Effect 
size 0.3 
(medium) 
or 0.5 
(large) 
Min. 
sample 
size 
required 
Df Actual  
sample 
size 
Critical 
chi 
sq 
Post hoc 
power 
Effect 
size 
found 
Normality 
 
0.3 167 8 130 15.51 0.67 0.3 
Addition or 
subtraction 
 
0.3 108 2 126 5.99 0.86 0.3 
Action or 
inaction 
 
0.3 108 2 124 5.99 0.85 0.3 
Static or 
dynamic 
 
0.3 108 2 131 5.99 0.88 0.3 
Control 0.3 133 4 120 9.49 0.75 0.3 
Timescale 0.3 152 6 130 12.59 0.72 0.3 
        
Specific 
subject 
 
0.3 233 20 132 31.41 0.96 0.5 
Domain 
 
0.3 152 6 131 12.59 0.73 0.3 
Spontaneous 
identificatio
n of actor 
 
0.3 108 2 132 5.99 0.88 0.3 
Personal or 
situational 
 
0.3 133 4 130 9.49 0.79 0.3 
Specific or 
general 
 
0.3 133 4 132 9.49 0.79 0.3 
Known or 
inferred 
 
0.3 108 2 131 5.99 0.87 0.3 
Scenario 
actor 
 
0.3 215 16 40 26.30 0.44 0.5 
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Table 90.                                                                                                                                              
Sample size calculations and post hoc power calculations for the causal sentence 
 Sample size calculations based on 
desired power .80 
Post hoc power calculations 
 Effect size 
0.3 (medium) 
or 0.5 (large) 
Minimum 
sample 
size 
required 
Df Actual 
sample  
size 
Critical  
chi sq 
Post 
hoc 
power 
Effect  
size 
 found 
Normality  
 
0.3 167 8 127 15.51 0.99 0.5 
Addition or 
subtraction 
 
0.3 108 2 122 5.99 0.85 0.3 
Action or 
inaction  
 
0.3 108 2 94 5.99 0.74 0.3 
Static or 
dynamic 
 
0.3 108 2 135 5.99 0.88 0.3 
Control  
 
0.3 133 4 125 9.49 0.77 0.3 
Timescale 
 
0.3 152 6 133 12.59 0.73 0.3 
        
Specific 
Subject 
 
0.3 233 20 136 31.41 0.97 0.5 
Domain 
 
0.3 152 6 130 12.59 0.72 0.3 
Spontaneous 
identification 
of actor  
 
0.3 108 2 135 5.99 0.89 0.3 
Personal or 
situational 
 
0.3 152 6 136 12.59 0.74 0.3 
Specific or 
general  
 
0.3 133 4 135 9.48 0.80 0.3 
Known or 
inferred  
 
0.3 108 2 135 5.99 0.88 0.3 
Scenario actor  
 
0.3 215 16 131 26.29 0.97 0.5 
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Technical Report 
 
 
 
How safety practitioners, managers and accident subjects 
think about 
workplace slip and trip accidents - 
Implications for policy and practice. 
 
 
Paul Lehane JP. MSc. CFCIEH 
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1. Summary 
Slip and trip accidents caused 8416 major injury accidents in the UK in 2012-13.  
Investigations are usually undertaken by safety practitioners & managers and 
involve accident subjects. What they believe to be important is influenced by their 
individual perspectives and mental model of the accident. HSE’s guidance on slips 
and trips focuses on physical factors, but neglects peoples thought processes about 
them.    
This study examined how these three groups thought about slip and trip accidents. 
Three hundred and fifty safety practitioners, 129 managers and 133 accident 
subjects read a supermarket based scenario and recorded their thoughts about how a 
different outcome might have come about, how the accident might have been 
prevented and what its cause was.  
Four key results are reported here;- 
1. People’s thoughts were structured in such a way that behaviours were used 
to bring about different outcomes more than they were used to prevent the 
accident or as its cause.  
2. The level of detail provided in the scenario influenced how people thought 
about how a different outcome might have come about, rather then how they 
might have prevented it or identified its cause. Overall people thought about 
events that they ‘assumed’ to have happened, rather than what they ‘knew’ to 
have happened.  
3. Peoples’ thoughts about slips were more likely to focus on events that 
happened on the day of the accident, whereas they thought about earlier events 
for trips. 
4. Peoples thoughts about a different outcome and preventing the accident 
involved improving behaviours or procedures, whereas thinking about the 
cause focused on failures of behaviours or procedures. 
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As a result of this study the HSE is urged to recognise the importance of people’s 
thought processes, their role & the type of accident, and how these influence what 
they consider to be important.    
The importance of further commissioned research is highlighted to identify the 
extent to which people’s individual circumstances and context influences their 
mental models of accidents. This influential factor can then be incorporated into the 
design of prevention and investigation approaches to supplement existing 
knowledge. In the meantime, a suggested approach to investigation is proposed.  
 
2. Introduction 
The number of reported major injures from slips and trips has reduced by 23% over 
the last 7 years from 10963 (2007/08) to 8416 (2012/13), but they still account for 
56% of all major injuries (HSE 2013a) at an estimated annual cost to the UK 
economy of £197m (HSE 2013b).  
The Health & Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 requires employers to protect 
employees from harm. The Health & Safety Executive (HSE) is the lead body for 
enforcement and publishes guidance on managing occupational risks. In the case of 
slip and trip accidents this has focused on physical aspects such as surface 
roughness, slip resistance and footwear, but has not addressed how people think 
following a slip or trip accident.   
One way in which people might think about an accident is to consider how a 
different and better outcome might have occurred. This is known as counterfactual 
thinking and involves changing a pre-accident event and evaluating its effect on the 
outcome. This event is said to identify a cause of the accident (Roese 1994) or a 
missed opportunity to have prevented it (Mandel & Lehman 1996).   
This study explored the idea that peoples’ roles as safety professionals, managers or 
accident subjects, the type of accident and what they know about its circumstances 
influences how they think about how a different outcome might have been possible, 
how the accident might have been prevented and what caused it.  
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3. Overview of the current Study 
Most people are familiar with supermarkets so a scenario was developed in which a 
checkout operator slipped on spilt milk or tripped over a box. The sequence of 11 
events is shown in Table 1.   
Three hundred and fifty safety practitioners were recruited from local authority 
inspectors and company safety officers, 129 managers from small & medium sized 
businesses responded along with 133 workers who had been injured. 
Respondents were randomly allocated to two groups. In the ‘maximum detail’ 
group they were given information detailing the supermarket manager’s 
investigation, whilst the ‘minimum detail’ group were only told the accident was a 
slip or trip. 
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Table 1. The accident sequence 
Timescale Slip accident Trip accident 
Before the day of the 
accident 
  
Stage 1 Mary agreed to cover for her 
friend’s holiday  
Mary agreed to cover for her 
friend’s holiday  
   
On the day of the 
accident 
  
Stage 2 Mary goes for her usual mid-
morning rest break 
Mary goes for her usual 
mid-morning rest break 
Stage 3 Mary waited for a colleague on the 
next checkout and they both walked 
along the front of the checkouts 
towards the staff room 
Mary waited for a colleague 
on the next checkout and 
they both walked along the 
front of the checkouts 
towards the staff room 
 Stage 4 Milk had been spilt on the floor A box had been left on the 
floor 
Stage 5 The spillage had been reported 5 
minutes ago. The cleaner had been 
requested to clear up but had not got 
round to it  
The box had been reported 5 
minutes ago. The cleaner 
had been requested to clear 
up but had not got round to 
it  
Stage 6 Mary did not see the milk on the 
floor 
Mary did not see the box on 
the floor 
Stage 7 Mary stepped on the milk Mary 's foot caught the box 
Stage 8 Mary slipped on the milk Mary tripped over the box 
Stage 9 Mary lost her balance and fell over Mary lost her balance and 
fell over 
Stage 10 Mary fell awkwardly hurting her 
right arm. 
Mary fell awkwardly 
hurting her right arm. 
Stage 11 Mary taken to hospital- her arm was 
x-rayed  
Mary taken to hospital- her 
arm was x-rayed  
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Self-completion questionnaires were posted to respondents, who were asked to 
complete three sentences identifying;- 
1) How the accident could have had a different outcome 
(counterfactual thinking).  
2) How it could have been prevented. 
3) The cause of the accident. 
The subjects of the sentences were identified using content analysis and assessed 
against 13 criteria set out in appendix 1. 
4. Key findings  
Four key findings are presented here. 
4.1. Peoples’ roles and whether they were thinking about different outcomes, 
preventing the accident or its cause, influenced the use of behaviours or 
procedures. 
4.1.1. Safety practitioners, managers and accident subjects brought about a different 
(counterfactual) outcome to the accident by changing someone’s behaviour rather 
than a physical factor or a procedure. (Safety practitioners: slip 55.9%, trip 51.7%. 
Managers: slip 65.5%, trip 57.4%. Accident subjects: slip 72.5%, trip 84.4%). 
4.1.2. Safety practitioners’ thinking about slips and trips focused on procedures to 
prevent the accident and identify its cause. (Prevention: slip 60.2%, trip 69.5%. 
Cause: slip 49.7% and trips 55.1%). 
4.1.3. When thinking about slips and trips accident subjects focused on peoples 
behaviours to bring about a different outcome, prevent the accident or identify its 
cause. (Slips: different outcome 72.5%, prevention 74.6% and cause 58.1%. Trips - 
different outcome 84.4%, prevention 55.6% and cause 57.1%.) 
Table 2.1 in appendix 2 sets out the full results.  
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4.2. The level of detail in the scenario had a greater influence on how people 
thought about different outcomes,  than on how they thought about 
prevention or causes.   
 
Respondents’ thoughts relied heavily on events they ‘assumed’ to have occurred 
and not on ‘known’ facts from the scenario. This supports the idea that people use 
their own robust mental model when thinking about slip or trip accidents 
(Woodcock 1996). 
4.2.1. When given a ‘minimum detail’ slip scenario the majority of respondents 
thinking about a different outcome referred to an event they ‘assumed’ to have 
happened. (Safety practitioners 73.8%. managers 82.6% & accident subjects 
72.7%). In contrast when they were given a ‘maximum detail’ slip scenario 
respondents thought about a ‘known’ fact (safety practitioners 63.4%, managers’ 
82.5% & accident subjects 77.1%). 
Following a trip accident safety practitioners repeated this effect when thinking 
about a different outcome (minimum detail - assumed event 60.4%, maximum 
detail - known event 60.0%), but managers and accidents did not. Managers 
preferred to rely on ‘assumed’ events (minimum detail - 64.5% and maximum 
detail 57.5%), whilst accident subjects used ‘known’ events (minimum detail 
51.7%, maximum detail 59.5%).  
4.2.2. Safety practitioners prevention and causal thoughts used ‘assumed’ events 
regardless of the level of detail provided to them (Prevention minimum detail - 
slip 93.5%, trip 88.5%. Prevention maximum detail - slip 71.7% trip 77.8%. 
Cause minimum detail - slip 79.5%, trip 82.8%, cause maximum detail- slip 
65.2%, trip 66.7%) 
4.2.3. Managers’ preventative and causal thoughts also used ‘assumed’ events 
regardless of the level of detail provided to them (Prevention minimum slip 
95.8%, trip 80.6%. Prevention maximum detail slip 51.4%, trip 59.0%. Cause 
minimum detail slip 79.2% trip 77.4%. Cause maximum detail slip 50%, trip 
72.5%)  
Table 2.2 in appendix 2 sets out the full results. 
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4.3. The point in time of the event people thought about was influenced by 
their role, the type of accident and whether they were thinking about 
different outcomes, how the accident could have been prevented or its 
cause.   
4.3.1 The type of accident influenced the point in time for people’s thoughts 
about a different outcome. For a slip accident the most commonly selected 
event happened on the day of the accident, but for trips this was before the day 
of the accident. (Slip accident - on the day of the event:, safety practitioners 
56.2%, managers 69.5%, accident subjects 65.5%. Trip accident - events before 
the day: safety practitioners 44.3%, managers 48.5% and accident subjects 
44.9%).  
4.3.2 Managers’s and accident subjects’ thoughts about prevention and the 
cause of the slip accident used events that happened on the day of the accident. 
(Manager - prevent 46.4%, cause 52.5%. Accident subject - prevent 73.5%, 
cause 41.5%) 
4.3.3 Safety practitioners’ thinking about prevention and the cause of the trip 
accident used events that happened before the day of the accident. (Prevent 
81.5%, cause 66.5%) 
(Note: results represent respondent’s modal choice from 11 stages (1 before the 
day of the accident and 10 on the day of the accident, which is why some 
results do not exceed 50%). 
Table 2.3 in appendix 2 sets out the full results 
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4.4. Thinking about a different outcome and preventing the accident 
involved improving the way people behaved or the procedures they used.    
4.4.1 Respondents thinking about a different outcome and prevention changed 
an event in a way which improved it and making the desired outcome more 
likely than simply re-establishing the expected behaviour or procedure. In 
contrast the cause was thought about as a failure of existing behaviours or 
procedures.  
Table 2.4 in appendix 2 sets out the full results.  
5. Implications for HSE Policy and accident investigation practice  
The results of this study have implications for HSE in their role as policy advisor 
and the lead body for health & safety enforcement. 
HSE’s mission is to “prevent death, injury and ill health to those at work or those 
affected by work activities” (HSE 2014). They set the national health & safety 
agenda, identifying key hazards, priorities for research & development, and 
publishing guidance.  
HSE has successfully used academic and industrial research to develop and publish 
authoritative guidance on slips and trips. However these do not account for the 
effects of mental models and their impact on what people consider when thinking 
about slips or trips. If HSE guidance does not compliment what people think to be 
important there is a risk that the guidance will be ineffective and accidents remain  
investigated.  
Understanding people’s mental models offers a new approach to accident 
prevention and investigation which complements existing approaches. HSE is 
uniquely placed to champion this approach by commissioning research to establish 
the shape of people’s mental models for all categories of accident and how they 
influence the way that people think and what they think about. 
In the light of this wider research HSE should review their strategic approach to 
accident prevention and investigation and, where appropriate, develop a four track 
methodology based on 1) peoples mental models and 2) physical 3) environmental 
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& 4) procedural factors. This methodology should then be applied to the 
management of specific hazards and accident investigation through HSE’s advice, 
guidance and toolkits. HSE will need to actively promote this new approach to all 
stakeholders so it can be used effectively.     
In particular HSE and local authority inspectors will need to understand how 
people’s mental models influence how they think following an accident. They will 
need training to enable them to use the revised guidance, toolkits and accident 
investigation protocols because they will be applying them as part of their 
investigations of serious accidents. They can also demonstrate to other stakeholders 
how peoples’ mental models are influenced by their role, and what they know about 
the accident and how this influences their response to the accident.       
The challenge for HSE is to: 
 Recognise the potential contribution that understanding people’s mental 
models can have on preventing and investigating accidents. 
 Commission research to explore how people involved in the 
investigation of a range of accident types actually think about 
different outcomes, prevention and causes.  
 Map those mental models. 
 Develop a guidance and an accident investigation protocol 
incorporating the mental models perspective with existing 
knowledge of physical, environmental and procedural 
considerations. 
 Promote the use of the tools and train safety practitioners in their use. 
This study has shown that people’s roles, they way they think, the type of accident 
and what they know about it all affect what they think is important.  Relying on 
events that are assumed to have occurred could seriously hinder accident 
investigations by restricting them to a single perspective based on a person’s mental 
model. This is likely to lead to incorrect conclusions about the cause, responsibility, 
blame and liability and could lead to ineffective prevention strategies. 
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Holding different perspectives about an accident does not necessarily hinder 
effective investigation. If they are recognised and understood they can be used 
creatively to identify causes, design and implement preventative strategies. The 
challenge is to embrace peoples’ different mental models and use them positively, 
working in partnership, raising awareness and creating behavioural change to 
reduce accidents.  
Safety practitioners and managers lead accident investigations so it is essential that 
their approach is modified to embrace other people’s perspectives. Likewise 
accident subjects should be aware of manager’s and safety practitioner’s 
perspectives which will help them appreciate their judgements and decisions. 
To achieve this change in approach, safety practitioners and managers will require a 
bespoke accident investigation toolkit which embraces current practice considering 
physical, environmental and procedural elements and also account for people’s 
different mental models.  
Until people’s mental models are researched and can be integrated into an 
investigative protocol, accident investigators should be encouraged to actively 
identify those factors that are uniquely shaped by thinking about different 
outcomes, prevention and causes by asking all those involved to capture these 
thoughts by writing them down. These thoughts should be shared and areas of 
agreement and disagreement can be identified and discussed. This will enable the 
lead investigator to think about an accident from multiple perspectives not just their 
own mental model. 
A first draft of an accident investigation protocol based on this approach is 
proposed in appendix 3. It is designed to encourage a structured but open approach 
to establish how safety practitioners or managers and accident subjects think about 
slip & trip accidents and to freely share those thoughts, identify where they are the 
same and where they differ, then agree on a cause and how the accident could have 
been prevented. Finally it asks safety practitioner or managers what they will do to 
prevent similar accidents in the future.  
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The draft protocol needs piloting by a small group of safety practitioners to refine it 
before making it more widely available to the safety practitioner community, 
supported by training and instructions for use.      
 
6. Conclusions. 
Four factors have been shown to influence what people think to be important after a 
slip or trip accident: 
1) A person’s role 
2) The type of accident 
3) How they think about different outcomes, prevention and causes  
4) What they know about the circumstances 
These factors form the basis of people’s mental model of an accident. However the 
shape of these is currently unknown. 
HSE is urged to commission research to map these factors and peoples mental 
models to support the development of a psychological approach to accident 
investigation.  
Using a peoples mental models will strengthen the existing approaches used to 
investigate accidents and improve the effectiveness of preventative strategies 
supporting HSE’s mission to “prevent death, injury and ill health to those at work 
or those affected by work activities”. 
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Technical Report Appendix 1  
Criteria for assessing respondent’s sentences  
 Each sentence was examined by asking a series of questions.  
 
1. Did the sentence relate to an action or inaction? 
2. Was an event added to the sequence or removed from it? 
3. Did the sentence relate to an unusual / exceptional event or an routine event? 
4. Did the sentence relate to an event that happened on the day of the accident or 
before? 
5. Was the event under the control of the person referred to in the sentence? 
6. Did the event changed over time (dynamic) or was it unchanging (static)? 
7. Was the sentence specific to the accident or more general? 
8. Was the event ‘Known’ from the details given in scenario or was the event 
‘assumed’ to have happened because it was not given in the scenario?  
9. Was a person identified in the sentence? (Yes /No) 
10. Which person did the sentence relate to? (Selected from a list of people 
involved in the accident scenario) 
11. Was the event personal to a character in the scenario or their situation? 
12. What was the specific subject of sentence? 
13. Did the sentence refer to a physical factor, behaviour or a procedure?  
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Technical Report Appendix 2 Results  
Table 2.1 The dominant factor (behaviour or procedure) identified in 
peoples thoughts about different outcomes, prevention and causation. 
Percentages indicate how frequently each factor was identified by each 
group of respondents.  
 
 Different Outcome 
(Counterfactual 
thinking)  
Prevention 
thinking 
Causal 
thinking 
Slip accident    
Safety Practitioners Behaviour 
55.9% 
Procedure 
60.2% 
Procedure 
49.7% 
Managers Behaviour 
65.6% 
Behaviour 
48.3% 
Behaviour 
50.9% 
Accident 
Subjects 
Behaviour 
72.5% 
Behaviour 
74.6% 
Behaviour 
58.1% 
Trip accident    
Safety Practitioners Behaviour 
51.7% 
Procedure 
69.5% 
Procedure 
55.1% 
Managers Behaviour 
57.4% 
Behaviour 
44.1% 
& Procedure 
47.1% 
Behaviour 
37.7% 
& 
Procedure 
39.3% 
Accident 
Subjects 
Behaviour 
84.4% 
Behaviour 
55.6% 
Behaviour 
57.1% 
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Technical Report Appendix 2 Results 
Table 2.2 The use of ‘known’ or ‘assumed’ events by safety practitioners, managers and accident subjects for 
slips and trips when thinking about different outcomes, prevention and causation.  Percentages indicate how 
frequently each factor was identified by each group of respondents.  
 Different Outcome 
(Counterfactual 
thinking) 
Prevention           
thinking 
Causal                  thinking 
Safety Practitioners    
Slip accident    
Minimum detail Assumed event 73.8 % Assumed event 93.5 % Assumed event 79.5 % 
Maximum detail Known event 63.4 % Assumed event 71.7 % Assumed event 65.2 % 
Trip accident    
Minimum detail Assumed event 60.4 % Assumed event 88.5 % Assumed event 82.8 % 
Maximum detail Known event 60.0 % Assumed event 77.8 % Assumed event 66.7 % 
    
Managers     
Slip accident    
Minimum detail Assumed event 82.6 % Assumed event 95.8 % Assumed event 79.2 % 
Maximum detail Known event 82.5 % Assumed event 51.4 % Known event 50% 
Assumed event 50% 
Trip accident    
Minimum detail Assumed event 64.5 % Assumed event 80.6 % Assumed event 77.4 % 
Maximum detail Assumed event 57.5 % Assumed event 59.0 % Assumed event 72.5 % 
    
Accident Subject    
Slip accident    
Minimum detail Assumed event 72.7 % Assumed event 91.2 % Assumed event 84.8 % 
Maximum detail Known event 77.1 % Known event 70.3 % Known event 69.4 % 
Trip accident    
Minimum detail Known event 51.7 % Assumed event 93.1 % Assumed event 79.3 % 
Maximum detail Known event 59.5 % Known event 56.4 % Assumed event 52.6 % 
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Technical Report Appendix 2 Results 
 
 
 
Table 2.3 The temporal location of the event thought about by safety 
practitioners, mangers and accident subjects when thinking about 
different outcomes, prevention or causation following a slip or trip 
accident.  Percentages indicate how frequently each factor was 
identified by each group of respondents. 
  
 Different 
Outcome 
(Counterfactual 
thinking) 
Prevention 
thinking 
Causal thinking 
Slip accident    
Safety Practitioners On the day of the 
accident 
64.4% 
Before the day of 
the accident 
64.7% 
Before the day of 
the accident 
60.1% 
Managers On the day of the 
accident 
73.6% 
On the day of the 
accident 
53.5% 
On the day of the 
accident 
66.1% 
Accident Subjects On the day of the 
accident 
76.4% 
On the day of the 
accident 
86.7% 
On the day of the 
accident 
81.5% 
    
Trip accident    
Safety Practitioners Before the day of 
the accident 
44.3% 
Before the day of 
the accident 
81.5% 
Before the day of 
the accident 
66.5% 
Managers Before the day of 
the accident 
48.5% 
Before the day of 
the accident 
71.0% 
Before the day of 
the accident 
55.7% 
Accident 
Subjects 
Before the day of 
the accident 
44.9% 
On the day of the 
accident 
59.6% 
On the day of the 
accident 
73.5% 
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Technical Report Appendix 2 Results 
 
 
Table 2.4 How safety practitioners, managers and accident subjects thoughts 
brought about a different outcome, prevented the accident or identified its 
cause following a slip or trip. Percentages indicate how frequently each factor 
was identified by each group of respondents. 
 Different Outcome 
(Counterfactual 
thinking) 
Prevention thinking Causal thinking 
Slip accident    
Safety 
Practitioners 
Improve a behaviour 
or procedure                 
63.2% 
Create a new behaviour 
or procedure                       
48.5%. 
Improve a behaviour or 
procedure                        
41.9% 
Improve a 
behaviour or 
procedure               
39.2% 
Using an existing 
behaviour or 
procedure 38.6% 
Managers Improve a 
behaviour or 
procedure                
67.2% 
Improve a behaviour or 
procedure                        
60.0% 
Using an existing 
behaviour or 
procedure 52.5% 
Accident 
Subjects 
Improve a 
behaviour or 
procedure                 
65.7% 
Improve a behaviour or 
procedure                         
78.3% 
Using an existing 
behaviour or 
procedure 61.7% 
Trip accident   
Safety 
Practitioners 
Improve a 
behaviour or 
procedure                
65.8% 
Improve a behaviour or 
procedure                        
56.6% 
Improve a 
behaviour or 
procedure                 
50.3% 
Managers Improve a 
behaviour or 
procedure                 
57.7% 
Improving an existing 
rule/ procedure/ 
behaviour       58.0% 
Using an existing 
behaviour or 
procedure 44.6% 
Improve a 
behaviour or 
procedure                 
44.6% 
Accident 
Subjects 
Improve a 
behaviour or 
procedure               
38.5% 
Using an existing 
behaviour or 
procedure 36.9% 
Improve a behaviour or 
procedure                        
62.5% 
Using an existing 
behaviour or 
procedure 62.3% 
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Technical Report Appendix 3  
Draft investigation tool. 
This investigation tool is designed to be completed by a safety practitioner / 
manager with the person who had the slip or trip accident (accident subject).  
One copy should be completed by the safety practitioner / manager and a separate 
copy by the accident subject.  
Research has shown that how we think about an accident is influenced by, the type 
of accident, how much we know about it, our role in connection with it and the way 
that we think about it.  
This tool kit is designed to encourage a structured but open approach to find out 
how safety practitioner / managers and accident subjects think about slip & trip 
accidents and to freely share those thoughts, identify where they are the same and 
where they differ, then agree on a cause and how the accident could have been 
prevented.  
Finally it asks safety practitioner / managers what they will do to prevent similar 
accidents in the future.  
Please work though the questions in the order they are given.  
________________________________________________________________ 
Name of person completing this report _________________________________ 
Role in the organisation_____________________________________________ 
Date of accident___________________________________________________ 
Time of Accident___________________________________________________ 
Location _________________________________________________________ 
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 1. This accident was a Slip □ or Trip □ (Select one type)  
2 .In your own words please describe the accident (BOX 1 you will need to refer to 
this box again) 
 
 
 
  
 
3.Please compare your description of the accident with that of your safety 
practitioner / manager or the accident subject.  
Please note where your descriptions were the same.  
1  
2  
3  
4  
 
and where they were different  
1  
2  
3  
4  
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4. Now that you have shared your comments on the accident with your safety 
practitioner / manger or accident subject, please complete in your own words the 
following three sentences.  
4.1 The outcome of the accident could have been different if only .....?  
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 . The accident could have been prevented if ... 
 
 
 
 
4.3 The cause of the accident was...  
 
 
 
 
 
5. Now sharing the sentences you have just written with your safety practitioner / 
manager or the accident subject please complete the following questions for each 
of the three sentences.  
 
If only .... 
 
Then........ 
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5.1 Please answer the following questions for the ‘Different outcome’ sentence 
 safety practitioner 
/ Manager 
answers 
Accident Subjects 
answers 
Who did the sentence relate to? Please 
give their name or job  
  
Did it relate to behaviour, a procedure or 
something physical? (Chose one ) 
Behaviour / 
Procedure / 
physical 
Behaviour / 
Procedure / 
physical 
What was the subject of the sentence?   
Did the sentence refer to something that 
was dynamic or static?                                          
Dynamic = changing over time or could 
be seen                                                          
Static = unchanging or could not be seen  
Dynamic / Static Dynamic / Static 
Was the sentence specific to this accident 
or more general 
Specific / General Specific /General 
How did the sentence bring about a 
different outcome (Tick one from a, b or 
c) 
  
a. By reinforcing an expected or 
existing rule / procedure or 
behaviour 
a. a. 
b. By improving an existing rule / 
procedure or behaviour so that the 
desired outcome was more certain? 
c. By setting up a new behaviour or 
rule? 
b. b. 
c. c. 
If your ‘different outcome’ sentence 
referred to something that you 
specifically wrote in BOX 1 on page 2 
write ‘known’ in the column , if not write 
‘inferred’.  
Known /Inferred Known /Inferred 
Did your sentence refer to something on 
the day of the accident or to something 
earlier?  
On the day of the 
accident                                              
or                            
Something earlier 
On the day of the 
accident                                        
or                                            
Something earlier 
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5.2 Please answer the following questions for the ‘Prevention’ sentence 
 safety 
practitioner / 
Manager 
Accident 
Subject 
Who did the sentence relate to ?   
Did it relate to behaviour, a procedure or 
something physical? (Chose one ) 
Behaviour / 
Procedure / 
physical 
Behaviour / 
Procedure / 
physical 
What was the subject of the sentence?   
Did the sentence refer to something that was 
dynamic or static?                                          
Dynamic = changing over time or could be 
seen                                                               
Static = unchanging or could not be seen  
Dynamic / 
Static 
Dynamic / 
Static 
Was the sentence specific to this accident or 
more general 
Specific / 
general 
Specific / 
general 
How did the sentence prevent the accident 
(Tick one from a, b or c) 
  
a. Reinforcing an expected or existing 
behaviour / rule 
a. a. 
b. Improving an existing behaviour or 
rule so that it would be more certain 
that the accident would be prevented 
? 
c. Setting up a new behaviour or rule? 
b. b. 
c. c. 
If your ‘prevention’ sentence referred to 
something that you specifically wrote in 
BOX 1 write ‘known’ in the column to the 
right, if not write ‘inferred’. 
Known / 
Inferred 
Known / 
Inferred 
Did your sentence refer to the day of the 
accident or to something earlier? 
On the day of 
the accident                                              
or                            
Something 
earlier 
On the day of 
the accident                                
or                                         
Something 
earlier 
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5.3 Please answer the following questions for the ‘Causal’ sentence 
 safety 
practitioner / 
Manager 
Accident 
Subject 
Who did the sentence relate to ?   
Did it relate to behaviour, a procedure or 
something physical? (Chose one ) 
Behaviour / 
Procedure / 
physical 
Behaviour / 
Procedure / 
physical 
What was the subject of the sentence?   
Did the sentence refer to something that was 
dynamic or static?                                            
Dynamic = changing over time or could be 
seen                                                              
Static = unchanging or could not be seen  
Dynamic / 
Static 
Dynamic / 
Static 
Was the sentence specific to this accident or 
more general 
Specific / 
general 
Specific / 
general 
How was the cause of the accident  (Tick one 
from a, b or c)   
  
a. By failing to use an expected behaviour / 
rule 
a. a. 
b. By not having better behaviours or 
rules? 
c. By not giving any expected behaviours 
or rules ? 
b. b. 
c. c. 
If your ‘causal’  sentence referred to 
something that you specifically wrote in box 
1 write ‘known’ in the  column to the right, if 
not write ‘inferred’. 
Known / 
Inferred 
Known / 
Inferred 
Did your sentence refer to the day of the 
accident or to something earlier? 
On the day of 
the accident                                              
or 
Something 
earlier 
On the day of 
the accident                                
or 
Something 
earlier 
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6. Now please discuss and agree between yourselves one sentence which 
identifies the cause of the accident. 
 
 
 
 
Identifies how the accident could have been prevented  
 
 
 
  
And finally ... for safety practitioner or managers only  
7.  What will you do now to prevent accidents like this in the future? 
 
 
 
 
Signed  
Safety practitioner / Manager ____________________________ 
Accident Subject ____________________________________________ 
Date ______________________________________________________ 
We believe the accident was caused by .... 
We believe the accident could have been prevented by .... 
I will ...... 
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Appendix 4  
Copies of research scenario and questionnaire 
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Table 91  Questions in full and short questionnaire versions 
Question Full version 
–   Safety 
professionals 
Short 
version 
Manager 
Short version 
Accident 
subject 
Reasons for accident 
investigation 
    N/A 
How likely is a slip/trip in a 
supermarket in the next 6 
months 
  N/A N/A 
Confidence in making the 
judgment 
  N/A N/A 
Seriousness of slip /trip   N/A N/A 
“If only… “ sentence 
completion 
      
Who does sentence refer to?       
Week before – likelihood    N/A N/A 
Week before – confidence   N/A N/A 
Week before seriousness    N/A N/A 
Could scenario accident have 
been prevented 
      
How could accident have been 
prevented – free text answer 
      
Who does answer refer to?       
Rate and rank responsibility for 
prevention 
      
6 month in future – likelihood of 
another accident 
  N/A N/A 
6 months in future – confidence 
in judgement 
  N/A N/A 
6 months in future – seriousness   N/A N/A 
Cause of scenario accident – 
free text answer 
      
Who does answer best refer to?       
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Table 91  Questions in full and short questionnaire versions (continued)  
Question Full version –   
Safety 
professionals 
Short 
version 
Manager 
Short 
version 
Accident 
subject 
Rate and rank responsibility for 
causing accident 
      
Rate “Luck” at each stage of 
accident stage A to J 
    N/A 
Overall “Luck” rating     N/A 
Reasons for “Luck” rating      N/A 
Stage A-J normal/routine   N/A N/A 
Stage A-J accident certain   N/A N/A 
Stage A-J Mary have control   N/A N/A 
Stage A-J Manager control   N/A N/A 
Stage A-J Action important and 
who 
  N/A N/A 
Stage A-J Inaction important 
and who 
  N/A N/A 
Consideration of future 
consequences questions  
    N/A 
Personal info – staff numbers     N/A 
Personal info - gender       
Personal info – work 
organisation  
    N/A 
Respondents Age       
Location      N/A 
Questionnaire version check 
group 
      
Categorisation of own accident N/A N/A   
Counterfactual thinking after 
own accident 
N/A N/A   
“If only…” sentence completion 
– own accident 
N/A N/A   
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Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am conducting research into the way in which managers and supervisors think 
about accidents at work.   
 
I would be very grateful if you could spare about 10 -15 minutes to complete the 
attached questionnaire.  
 
Your participation is entirely voluntary and any information you provide will be 
confidential and you will be completely anonymous if you post the questionnaire back 
to me using the envelope provided. 
 
A summary of the results from the research may be published.  
 
Paul Lehane. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION  
Please try to answer as many questions as you can. 
Any answers that you can provide are helpful so please return your form to me even if 
you do not complete all the questions. 
Please write your answers in the grey shaded boxes or circle / tick the appropriate 
answer from the choices given.  
RETURN OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
BY POST 
If you have been sent the questionnaire by post a prepaid envelope should have been 
provided. Please use this to return the questionnaire. If not please return to:- 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY FAX 
You may Fax your completed questionnaire to me on  
 
Paul Lehane c/o  
EHTS  
London Borough of Bromley 
Civic Center Bromley England BR1 3UH 
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WHY ARE ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATED? 
People have different views about why accidents are investigated. 
Six reasons for accident investigation are given below. As a Manager or 
Supervisor please indicate how important each reason is to you. 
Circle / highlight one answer from the choices given for each question. 
1. To find out the cause and understand what happened. 
 
      Rank 
Score 
1-6 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
2. To prevent similar accidents from happening again. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
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3. To meet organizational requirements eg collection of statistics, make 
insurance claims, staff training etc. 
 
4. To find out if staff acted correctly or incorrectly.   
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
5. To find out if management acted correctly or incorrectly. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
6. To punish someone for breaking rules and regulations. (Enforce rules or 
law)  
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
7.  Now please Rank in order of importance the 6 reasons for accident 
investigation.  
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
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 Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the least  
important as = 6. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
THINKING ABOUT A SLIPPING ACCIDENT IN A SUPERMARKET 
In the section that follows you are asked to read about a slipping accident to Mary (a 
part time checkout operator at ABC Supermarkets) who slipped over on a spillage of 
milk near to the checkouts as she was going to the staff room for her mid morning 
break. 
 
When answering the questions that follow please do so as a manager or supervisor, 
responding in the same way as you would in your own workplace.  
Use your own knowledge or experience of slipping accidents to add to the information 
given about the accident.  
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THE ACCIDENT. 
Mary is a lady of about 55 years of age who has worked as a part time checkout 
operator for about 8 years. She usually works Monday Tuesday and Wednesday 
but had come in on this particular Thursday to cover for a friend who was on 
holiday.  
Please imagine that you are the Store Manager of ABC Supermarket and have just been 
given this message. 
 
ABC SUPERMARKET 
 
MESSAGE TO  STORE MANAGER 
FROM  BILL  SHOP FLOOR SUPERVISOR 
DATE    THURSDAY 10 AUGUST   TIME  11.30 HRS 
 
SUBJECT - ACCIDENT TO MARY 
At about 10.30am Mary went for her rest break and slipped over on some spilt milk and hurt her arm. 
An ambulance was called to take her to hospital.  She has broken her right arm, which has been 
plastered. She will be off work for at least 3 weeks. 
 
 
You speak to Jane one of the other checkout operators who witnessed the accident 
and Bill the Shop Floor Supervisor. These are the notes from your conversations. 
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 Mary does not usually work on Thursdays but was covering for a friend who was on 
holiday 
 Mary closed her checkout at the usual time for her mid morning break and waited for a 
friend on the checkout next to her to serve her last customer and they both went to 
their break together as usual. 
 They were walking together past the checkouts when Mary slipped over on some spilt 
milk and fell awkwardly on her right arm. 
 The First Aider attended and an ambulance was called to take Mary to hospital. 
 At hospital she was found to have a broken right arm. She will be off work for at least 
3 weeks with her arm in plaster.    
 A customer had seen the milk and reported it to Bill the Supervisor 
 Bill confirmed that the spillage had been reported by a customer and the cleaner had 
been asked to clear it up 5 minutes before the accident but had not got round to 
dealing with it. 
 No warning signs had been put out. 
 It is not known how long the milk had been on the floor before it was reported by the 
customer 
 Spillages around the checkouts are very common. 
 According to the Accident Book 4 other people had been injured in slipping accidents 
in the past 6 months 
 
Imagining yourself as the Store manager please answer the following questions using 
the information provided about Mary’s accident and your own experience of slipping 
accidents. 
IT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT     " IF ONLY……" 
 
After an unwanted outcome such as failing an exam, missing a flight or an accident people 
often think about how things could have been different.  
For example: - 
After failing an exam a student might say "If only … I had worked harder….I might have 
passed" and a family who miss their holiday flight might say " If only…. we had left 
earlier…… we might have caught the flight  
 
8. After Marys accident you found yourself thinking “If only……” .  
     How would you continue this to bring about a different outcome?  
 
If only…….. 
 
…. Things could have been different. 
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9. Which one of the following people does your answer to Question 8 best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
9 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
 
COULD MARY’S ACCIDENT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED? 
 
10.  As the Store Manager do you believe that Mary's accident could have been 
prevented ? 
 
 
 
Please Circle / highlight one answer.   
 
If you answered YES please go to question 11.  
If you answered "No" or "Not sure" please go to question 13  
 
 Please indicate how you believe Mary's slipping accident could have been prevented. 
 
 Yes  
(1) 
No   
(2) 
Not Sure   
(3) 
11 Mary’s accident could have been prevented…….. 
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Which one of the following people does your answer to question 11 best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
12 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
 
WHO HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREVENTING MARY’S ACCIDENT?  
 
As Store Manager please rate the level of responsibility of each of the following people 
for preventing Mary's accident. 
 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were. 
(0 = No responsibility, 4 = Maximum responsibility) 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
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  Responsibility for Preventing Mary's accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
13 Mary   
 
0 
 
1 2 3 4 
 
  
14 Bill the Shop 
floor Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
  
15 You as Manager 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
  
16 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
  
17 ABC 
Supermarkets 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
  
18 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4   
19 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4   
20 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4   
 
 
21  Now please Rank these 8 people in order of  importance in preventing Mary’s 
accident.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the least  
important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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THE CAUSE OF MARY’S ACCIDENT 
As the Store Manager what would you say was the cause of Mary's accident? 
 
22 The cause of Mary's accident was… 
 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does your answer to Question 22 best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
23 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
 
As Store Manager please rate the level of responsibility of each of the following people 
for causing Mary's accident. 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were. 
(0 = No responsibility, 4 = Maximum responsibility) 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
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  Responsibility for Causing Mary's accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
24 Mary   
 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
  
25 Bill the Shop 
floor Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
  
26 You as Manager 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
  
27 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
  
28 ABC 
Supermarkets 
The Employer 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
  
29 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4 
 
  
30 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4 
 
  
31 A Customer 0 
 
1 2 3 4 
 
  
  
 
32 Now please Rank these 8 people of importance in causing the accident.  
      Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the least       
important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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Overall how would you rate the outcome for Mary following her accident?  
Please Circle / highlight your answer. 
33 (1) 
Very Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
(3) 
Neither lucky 
or unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very Lucky 
 
Please give your reasons in the box below 
34  
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LUCKY OR UNLUCKY? 
 
Mary’s accident might be shown in a flow diagram something like the following 
one.  
Please enter a score in the grey boxes for how lucky or unlucky you feel Mary was 
at each stage. 
     Please circle / highlight your answer 
Thursday at 
10.30 Mary 
closed her 
checkout to go 
for her mid 
morning rest 
break  
▼ 35                                        Stage A 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
s usual Mary 
waited for her 
friend on the next 
checkout and 
they both walked 
along the front of 
the checkouts 
towards the staff 
room   
 
▼ 36                                         Stage B  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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Milk had been 
spilt on the floor 
▼ 37                                             Stage C  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
The spillage had 
been reported 5 
minutes ago by a 
customer. The 
cleaner had been 
requested to clear 
up but had not 
got round to it  
▼ 38                                            Stage D  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
Mary did not see 
the milk on the 
floor 
▼ 39                                        Stage E  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
Mary stepped on 
the milk 
▼ 40                                       Stage F  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
 
 
 Page | 367  
 
Mary slipped on 
the milk 
▼ 41                                        Stage G 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
Mary lost her 
balance and fell 
over 
▼ 42                                         Stage H  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
Mary fell 
awkwardly 
hurting her right 
arm. 
▼ 43                                         Stage I  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
Mary taken to 
hospital- her arm 
was x-rayed and 
found to be 
broken . She will 
be off work for 3 
weeks. 
▼ 44                                        Stage J  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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SAFETY NOW AND IN THE FUTURE  
 
For each of the following statements please indicate how well they describe you as a 
Manager or Supervisor. 
If the statement is a very good description of you (very like you) fill in a 1, if it is not a 
very good description of you (not at all like you) please fill in a 5.  
Use the other numbers if you fall between 1-5. 
 
Scale 
Very good 
description / Very 
like me 
1 
Quite a good 
description /Quite 
like me 
2 
Not sure if it 
describes me. 
 
3 
Quite poor 
description / 
Quite unlike me. 
4 
Very poor 
description / Very 
unlike me. 
5 
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(Please write in the grey areas to the right of each statement) 
 
  Score 
45 I think about safety in the future and try to influence things by 
my day to day behaviour 
 
 
46 I think about safety in the future and do things now to achieve 
safety in the years ahead  
 
 
47 Thinking about safety I only do things to deal with the 
immediate situation, not worrying about the future 
 
48 What I do about safety is only influenced by how things work 
out in the short term 
 
49 My convenience is a big factor in how I make decisions or  take 
actions about safety  
 
50 I am willing to put in extra time, effort and money now to ensure 
that the job is safe in the future.  
 
51 I think it is important to take warnings about safety seriously, 
even if it is unlikely that an accident will happen for many years.  
 
52 I think it is more important to do something about serious 
accidents in the future than minor accidents now. 
 
53 I generally ignore warnings about possible risks in the future, 
because they generally get sorted out before that happen 
 
54 I think it is unnecessary to change things now to prevent a 
possible future accident as problems can be dealt with nearer the 
time. 
 
55 I only act when there is an immediate risk, I prefer to take care 
of future problems that may occur at a later date 
 
56 I believe that safety today is more important than safety at some 
time in the future. 
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AND LASTLY SOME INFORMATION ABOUT YOU 
 
57. How many people do you have responsibility for either as a Manager or Supervisor 
Please tick against one answer 
1-5 
people 
(1)   31-35 people (8)  
6-10 
people 
(2)   36-40 people (9)  
11-15 
people 
(3)   41-45 people (10)  
16-20 
people 
(4)   46-50 people (11)  
21-25 
people 
(5)   More than 51 
people  
(12)  
26-30 
people 
(6)   Not applicable  (13)  
 
 
 
58.  Are you (Please Tick)       
Male  (1)  
Female  (2)  
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59. Which of the following categories best describes your organization.   (Please Tick) 
 
Retail Shop  (1)   Wholesale Shop or 
warehouse  
(7)  
Office  (2)   Catering, 
Restaurant  or Bar  
(8)  
Hotel/ B&B  (3)   Residential Care  (9)  
Leisure/ 
Cultural  
 
(4)   Consumer Services 
eg hairdresser/ 
beauty  
(10)  
Manufacturing  (5)   Construction 
Industry  
(11)  
Agriculture  (6)   Central or Local 
Government  
(12)  
    Other  (13)  
 
 
60. Please give your current age. 
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61. Which of the following best describes your current working location. (Please tick) 
United 
Kingdom  
 
(1)   Ireland  (6)  
Europe  (2)   North 
America / 
Canada  
(7)  
South 
America  
(3)   Australia/ 
New 
Zealand  
(8)  
Middle East  
 
(4)   Africa  (9)  
Far East  
 
(5)   Other  (10)  
 
62. Which of these best describes you. Please Circle / highlight 
 
Manager / 
Supervisor  
(1) 
Company 
Safety  
Officer  
(2) 
Health and Safety  
Enforcement 
Officer 
 (3)   
Someone who has  
had an accident at 
work (4) 
 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.  
I AM VERY GRATEFUL. 
PLEASE RETURN IT TO ME  BY POST  OR  FAX .
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PLEASE DETACH THIS SHEET AND KEEP IT 
 
 
 
 
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire.  
Research such as this cannot happen with out your help. 
 
 
 
 
 
This questionnaire forms part of a study in to the ways in which accidents at work 
are viewed by Mangers & Supervisors, Safety Professionals and Accident Subjects 
themselves. 
 
The same questions have been asked of each group and the results will be compared 
to see if there are any differences or similarities.  
 
This stage of the research is concerned with how people think about hazards before 
and after an accident has happened and how they see responsibility for cause and 
prevention. 
 
It is hoped that the results will help to improve our understanding of the ways these 
groups think about safety and accidents at work and will allow managers / 
supervisors and Safety Professionals to be better trained in accident investigation.  
 
It is proposed that the results will be published in a professional Safety Journal. All 
results will be summarized and no individual respondent or employer will be 
identified. All answers to the questionnaire are treated in the strictest confidence. 
The information collected will be stored and treated in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act.       
 
If you need to contact the researcher please do so by e-mail  
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MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS 
 
THINKING ABOUT ACCIDENTS 
 
 
RESEARCHER PAUL LEHANE 
 
SUPERVISOR DR. DAVID HARDMAN 
 
 
 
PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT 
 
CALCUTTA HOUSE 
OLD CASTLE STREET LONDON E1 7NT 
 
2S 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research supported by the  
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Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am conducting research into the way in which managers and supervisors think 
about accidents at work.   
 
I would be very grateful if you could spare about 10 -15 minutes to complete the 
attached questionnaire.  
 
Your participation is entirely voluntary and any information you provide will be 
confidential and you will be completely anonymous if you post the questionnaire back 
to me using the envelope provided. 
 
A summary of the results from the research may be published.  
 
Paul Lehane. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION  
Please try to answer as many questions as you can. 
Any answers that you can provide are helpful so please return your form to me even if 
you do not complete all the questions. 
Please write your answers in the grey shaded boxes or circle / tick the appropriate 
answer from the choices given.  
RETURN OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
BY POST 
If you have been sent the questionnaire by post a prepaid envelope should have been 
provided. Please use this to return the questionnaire. If not please return to:- 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
BY FAX 
You may Fax your completed questionnaire to me on  
 
 
Paul Lehane c/o  
EHTS  
London Borough of Bromley 
Civic Center Bromley England BR1 3UH 
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WHY ARE ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATED? 
People have different views about why accidents are investigated. 
Six reasons for accident investigation are given below. As a Manager or 
Supervisor please indicate how important each reason is to you. 
Circle / highlight one answer from the choices given for each question. 
1. To find out the cause and understand what happened. 
 
      Rank 
Score 
1-6 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
2. To prevent similar accidents from happening again. 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
3. To meet organizational requirements eg collection of statistics, make 
insurance claims, staff training etc. 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
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4. To find out if staff acted correctly or incorrectly.   
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
5. To find out if management acted correctly or incorrectly. 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
6. To punish someone for breaking rules and regulations. (Enforce rules or 
law)  
 
 
7.  Now please Rank in order of importance the 6 reasons for accident 
investigation.  
 Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the 
least    
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above. 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
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THINKING ABOUT A SLIPPING ACCIDENT IN A SUPERMARKET 
 
In the section that follows you are asked to read about a slipping accident to Mary (a part 
time checkout operator at ABC Supermarkets) who slipped over on a spillage of milk near 
to the checkouts as she was going to the staff room for her mid morning break. 
 
When answering the questions that follow please do so as a manager or supervisor, 
responding in the same way as you would in your own workplace.  
Use your own knowledge or experience of slipping accidents to add to the information 
given about the accident.  
 
THE ACCIDENT 
Mary is a lady of about 55 years of age who has worked for as a part time 
checkout operator for about 8 years. She usually works Monday Tuesday and 
Wednesday but had come in on this particular Thursday to cover for a friend who 
was on holiday.  
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Please imagine that you are the Store Manager of ABC Supermarket and have just been 
given this message. 
 
ABC SUPERMARKET 
 
MESSAGE TO  STORE MANAGER 
FROM  BILL  SHOP FLOOR SUPERVISOR 
DATE    THURSDAY 10 AUGUST   TIME  11.30 HRS 
 
SUBJECT - ACCIDENT TO MARY 
At about 10.30am Mary went for her rest break and slipped over on some spilt milk 
and hurt her arm. An ambulance was called to take her to hospital.  She has broken 
her right arm, which has been plastered. She will be off work for at least 3 
weeks. 
 
 
Imagining yourself as the Store manager please answer the following questions using 
the information provided about Mary’s accident and your own experience of slipping 
accidents. 
 
IT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT     " IF ONLY……" 
 
After an unwanted outcome such as failing an exam, missing a flight or an accident people 
often think about how things could have been different.  
For example: - 
After failing an exam a student might say "If only … I had worked harder….I might have 
passed" and a family who miss their holiday flight might say " If only…. we had left 
earlier…… we might have caught the flight  
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8. After Mary’s accident you found yourself thinking “If only……” .  
     How would you continue this to bring about a different outcome?  
 
If only…….. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…. Things could have been different. 
 
 
9. Which one of the following people does your answer to Question 8 best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
9 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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COULD MARY’S ACCIDENT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED? 
 
As the Store Manager do you believe that Mary's accident could have been prevented?  
 
Please Circle / highlight one answer.   
10 Yes  
(1) 
No   
(2) 
Not Sure   
(3) 
 
If you answered YES please go to question 11.  
If you answered "No" or "Not sure" please go to question 13  
 
 Please indicate how you believe Mary's slipping accident could have been prevented. 
11 Mary’s accident could have been prevented…….. 
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Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
12 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
 
WHO HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREVENTING MARY’S ACCIDENT?  
 
As Store Manager please rate the level of responsibility of each of the following people 
for preventing Mary's accident. 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were. 
(0 = No responsibility, 4 = Maximum responsibility) 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
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  Responsibility for Preventing Mary's accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
13 Mary   
 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
14 Bill the Shop 
floor Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
15 You as Manager 
 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
16 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
17 ABC 
Supermarkets 
(The Employer) 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
18 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
19 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
20 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
 
21  Now please Rank these 8 people in order of  importance in preventing Mary’s 
accident.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the least  
important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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THE CAUSE OF MARY’S ACCIDENT 
 
As the Store Manager what would you say was the cause of Mary's accident? 
 
22 The cause of Mary's accident was… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does your answer to question 22 best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
 
23 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
 
 
As Store Manager please rate the level of responsibility of each of the following people 
for causing Mary's accident. 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were. 
(0 = No responsibility, 4 = Maximum responsibility) 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
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  Responsibility for Causing Mary's accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
24 Mary   
 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
25 Bill the Shop 
floor Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
26 You as Manager 
 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
27 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
28 ABC 
Supermarkets 
The Employer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
29 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
30 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
31 A Customer  1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
  
32  Now please Rank these 8 people of importance in causing the accident.  
      Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the least   
important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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Overall how would you rate the outcome for Mary following her accident?  
Please Circle / highlight your answer. 
33 (1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very Lucky 
 
Please give your reasons in the box below 
34  
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LUCKY OR UNLUCKY? 
 
Mary’s accident might be shown in a flow diagram something like the following one.  
Please enter a score in the grey boxes for how lucky or unlucky you feel Mary was at 
each stage. 
 
Circle / highlight your answer 
Thursday at 
10.30 Mary went 
for  a rest break  
▼ 35                                        Stage A 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
 
 
Mary walked 
towards the Staff 
Room 
▼ 36                                         Stage B  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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Milk had been 
spilt on the floor 
▼ 37                                             Stage C  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
The spillage had 
not been cleared 
up  
▼ 38                                            Stage D  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
Mary did not see 
the milk on the 
floor 
▼ 39                                        Stage E  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
Mary stepped on 
the milk 
▼ 40                                       Stage F  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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Mary slipped on 
the milk 
▼ 41                                        Stage G 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
Mary lost her 
balance and fell 
over 
▼ 42                                         Stage H  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
Mary fell 
awkwardly 
hurting her right 
arm. 
▼ 43                                         Stage I  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
Mary taken to 
hospital- her arm 
was x-rayed and 
found to be 
broken. She will 
be off work for 3 
weeks. 
▼ 44                                        Stage J  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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SAFETY NOW AND IN THE FUTURE  
 
For each of the following statements please indicate how well they describe you as a 
Manager or Supervisor. 
If the statement is a very good description of you (very like you) fill in a 1, if it is not a 
very good description of you (not at all like you) please fill in a 5.  
Use the other numbers if you fall between 1-5. 
 
Scale 
Very good 
description / Very 
like me 
1 
Quite a good 
description /Quite 
like me 
2 
Not sure if it 
describes me. 
 
3 
Quite poor 
description / 
Quite unlike me. 
4 
Very poor 
description / Very 
unlike me. 
5 
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(Please write in the grey areas to the right of each statement) 
  Score 
45 I think about safety in the future and try to influence things by 
my day to day behavior 
 
 
46 I think about safety in the future and do things now to achieve 
safety in the years ahead  
 
 
47 Thinking about safety I only do things to deal with the 
immediate situation, not worrying about the future 
 
 
48 What I do about safety is only influenced by how things work 
out in the short term 
 
 
49 My convenience is a big factor in how I make decisions or  take 
actions about safety  
 
 
50 I am willing to put in extra time, effort and money now to 
ensure that the job is safe in the future.  
 
 
51 I think it is important to take warnings about safety seriously, 
even if it is unlikely that an accident will happen for many 
years.  
 
52 I think it is more important to do something about serious 
accidents in the future than minor accidents now. 
 
53 I generally ignore warnings about possible risks in the future, 
because they generally get sorted out before that happen 
 
54 I think it is unnecessary to change things now to prevent a 
possible future accident as problems can be dealt with nearer 
the time. 
 
55 I only act when there is an immediate risk, I prefer to take care 
of future problems that may occur at a later date 
 
56 I believe that safety today is more important than safety at some 
time in the future. 
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AND LASTLY SOME INFORMATION ABOUT YOU 
57. How many people do you have responsibility for either as a Manager or Supervisor 
Please tick against one answer 
1-5 
people 
(1)   31-35 people (8)  
6-10 
people 
(2)   36-40 people (9)  
11-15 
people 
(3)   41-45 people (10
) 
 
16-20 
people 
(4)   46-50 people (11
) 
 
21-25 
people 
(5)   More than 51 
people  
(12
) 
 
26-30 
people 
(6)   Not applicable  (13
) 
 
 
 
 
58.  Are you (Please Tick)       
Male  (1)  
Female  (2)  
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59. Which of the following categories best describes your organization.   (Please Tick) 
 
Retail Shop  (1)   Wholesale Shop or 
warehouse  
(7)  
Office  (2)   Catering, 
Restaurant  or Bar  
(8)  
Hotel/ B&B  (3)   Residential Care  (9)  
Leisure/ 
Cultural  
 
(4)   Consumer Services 
eg hairdresser/ 
beauty  
(10)  
Manufacturing  (5)   Construction 
Industry  
(11)  
Agriculture  (6)   Central or Local 
Government  
(12)  
    Other  (13)  
 
 
60. Please give your current age. 
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61. Which of the following best describes your current working location. (Please tick) 
United 
Kingdom  
 
(1)   Ireland  (6)  
Europe  (2)   North 
America / 
Canada  
(7)  
South 
America  
(3)   Australia/ 
New 
Zealand  
(8)  
Middle East  
 
(4)   Africa  (9)  
Far East  
 
(5)   Other  (10
) 
 
 
62. Which of these best describes you. Please Circle / highlight 
 
Manager / 
Supervisor  
(1) 
Company 
Safety  
Officer  
(2) 
Health and Safety  
Enforcement 
Officer 
 (3)   
Someone who has  
had an accident at 
work (4) 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.  
I AM VERY GRATEFUL. 
PLEASE RETURN IT TO ME  BY POST  OR  FAX . 
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PLEASE DETACH THIS SHEET AND KEEP IT 
 
 
 
 
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire.  
Research such as this cannot happen with out your help. 
 
 
 
 
 
This questionnaire forms part of a study in to the ways in which accidents at work 
are viewed by Mangers & Supervisors, Safety Professionals and Accident Subjects 
themselves. 
 
The same questions have been asked of each group and the results will be compared 
to see if there are any differences or similarities.  
 
This stage of the research is concerned with how people think about hazards before 
and after an accident has happened and how they see responsibility for cause and 
prevention. 
 
It is hoped that the results will help to improve our understanding of the ways these 
groups think about safety and accidents at work and will allow managers / 
supervisors and Safety Professionals to be better trained in accident investigation.  
 
It is proposed that the results will be published in a professional Safety Journal. All 
results will be summarized and no individual respondent or employer will be 
identified. All answers to the questionnaire are treated in the strictest confidence. 
The information collected will be stored and treated in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act.       
 
If you need to contact the researcher please  do so by e-mail  
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MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS 
 
THINKING ABOUT ACCIDENTS? 
 
 
RESEARCHER PAUL LEHANE 
 
SUPERVISOR DR. DAVID HARDMAN 
 
 
 
 
PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT 
 
CALCUTTA HOUSE 
OLD CASTLE STREET LONDON E1 7NT 
 
3S 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research supported by the  
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 Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am conducting research into the way in which managers and supervisors think 
about accidents at work.   
 
I would be very grateful if you could spare about 10 -15 minutes to complete the 
attached questionnaire.  
 
Your participation is entirely voluntary and any information you provide will be 
confidential and you will be completely anonymous if you post the questionnaire back 
to me using the envelope provided. 
 
A summary of the results from the research may be published.  
 
Paul Lehane. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION  
Please try to answer as many questions as you can. 
Any answers that you can provide are helpful so please return your form to me even if 
you do not complete all the questions. 
Please write your answers in the grey shaded boxes or circle / tick the appropriate 
answer from the choices given.  
RETURN OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
BY POST 
If you have been sent the questionnaire by post a prepaid envelope should have been 
provided. Please use this to return the questionnaire. If not please return to:- 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
BY FAX 
You may Fax your completed questionnaire to me on   
 
Paul Lehane c/o  
EHTS  
London Borough of Bromley 
Civic Center Bromley England BR1 3UH 
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WHY ARE ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATED? 
 
People have different views about why accidents are investigated. 
 
Six reasons for accident investigation are given below. As a Manager or 
Supervisor please indicate how important each reason is to you. 
 
Circle / highlight one answer from the choices given for each question. 
 
1. To find out the cause and understand what happened. 
 
      Rank 
Score 
1-6 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
2. To prevent similar accidents from happening again. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
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3. To meet organizational requirements eg collection of statistics, make 
insurance claims, staff training etc. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
4. To find out if staff acted correctly or incorrectly.   
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
5. To find out if management acted correctly or incorrectly. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
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6. To punish someone for breaking rules and regulations. (Enforce rules or 
law)  
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
7.  Now please Rank in order of importance the 6 reasons for accident 
investigation.  
 Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the 
least  important as = 6. 
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THINKING ABOUT A SLIPPING ACCIDENT IN A SUPERMARKET 
In the section that follows you are asked to read about a slipping accident to Mary (a 
part time checkout operator at ABC Supermarkets) who slipped over on a spillage of 
milk near to the checkouts as she was going to the staff room for her mid morning 
break. 
 
When answering the questions that follow please do so as a manager or 
supervisor, responding in the same way as you would in your own workplace.  
Use your own knowledge or experience of slipping accidents to add to the 
information given about the accident.  
 
Mary is a lady of about 55 years of age who has worked for as a part time 
checkout operator for about 8 years. She usually works Monday Tuesday and 
Wednesday but had come in on this particular Thursday to cover for a friend 
who was on holiday.  
Please imagine that you are the Store Manager of ABC Supermarket and have just 
been given this message. 
ABC SUPERMARKET 
 
MESSAGE TO  STORE MANAGER 
FROM  BILL  SHOP FLOOR SUPERVISOR 
DATE    THURSDAY 10 AUGUST   TIME  11.30 HRS 
SUBJECT - ACCIDENT TO MARY 
At about 10.30am Mary went for her rest break and slipped over on some spilt milk 
and hurt her arm. An ambulance was called to take her to hospital.  She has 
strained her right wrist, and she will be returning to work tomorrow. 
 
You speak to Jane one of the other checkout operators who witnessed the accident and 
Bill the Shop Floor Supervisor. These are your notes from your conversations. 
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 Mary does not usually work on Thursdays but was covering for a friend who was 
on holiday 
 Mary closed her checkout at the usual time for her mid morning break and waited 
for a friend on the checkout next to her to serve her last customer and they both 
went to their break together as usual. 
 They were walking together past the checkouts when Mary slipped over on some 
spilt milk and fell awkwardly on her right arm. 
 The First Aider attended and an ambulance was called to take Mary to hospital. 
 At hospital she was found to have strained her right wrist. She will be back at work 
tomorrow.    
 A customer  had seen the milk and reported it to Bill the Supervisor 
 Bill confirmed that the spillage had been reported by a customer and the cleaner 
had been asked to clear it up 5 minutes before the accident but had not got round to 
dealing with it. 
 No warning signs had been put out. 
 It is not known how long the milk had been on the floor before it was reported by 
the customer 
 Spillages around the checkouts are very common. 
 According to the Accident Book 4 other people had been injured in slipping 
accidents in the past 6 months 
 
Imagining yourself as the Store manager please answer the following questions using 
the information provided about Mary’s accident and your own experience of slipping 
accidents. 
IT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT     " IF ONLY……" 
 
After an unwanted outcome such as failing an exam, missing a flight or an accident people 
often think about how things could have been different.  
For example: - 
After failing an exam a student might say "If only … I had worked harder….I might have 
passed" and a family who miss their holiday flight might say " If only…. we had left 
earlier…… we might have caught the flight  
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8. After Mary’s accident you found yourself thinking “If only……” .  
     How would you continue this to bring about a different outcome?  
 
If only…….. 
 
…. Things could have been different. 
 
9. Which one of the following people does your answer to Question 8 best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
9 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
 
COULD MARY’S ACCIDENT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED? 
 
As the Store Manager do you believe that Mary's accident could have been prevented?  
Please Circle / highlight one answer.   
10 Yes  
(1) 
No   
(2) 
Not Sure   
(3) 
 
If you answered YES please go to question 11.  
If you answered "No" or "Not sure" please go to question 13  
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 Please indicate how you believe Mary's slipping accident could have been prevented. 
11 Mary’s accident could have been prevented…….. 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does your answer to Question 11 best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
12 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
 
 
WHO HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREVENTING MARY’S ACCIDENT?  
 
As Store Manager please rate the level of responsibility of each of the following people 
for preventing Mary's accident. 
 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were. 
(0 = No responsibility, 4 = Maximum responsibility) 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
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  Responsibility for Preventing Mary's accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
13 Mary   
 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
14 Bill the Shop 
floor Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
15 You as Manager 
 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
16 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
17 ABC 
Supermarkets 
(The Employer) 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
18 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
19 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
20 A Customer 0 1 2 3   (Rank) 
 
21  Now please Rank these 8 people in order of  importance in preventing Mary’s 
accident.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the least  
important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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THE CAUSE OF MARY’S ACCIDENT 
 
As the Store Manager what would you say was the cause of Mary's accident? 
 
22 The cause of Mary's accident was… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does your answer to question 22 best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
23 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
 
 
As Store Manager please rate the level of responsibility of each of the following people 
for causing Mary's accident. 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were. 
(0 = No responsibility, 4 = Maximum responsibility) 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
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  Responsibility for Causing Mary's accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
24 Mary   0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
25 Bill the Shop 
floor Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
26 You as Manager 
 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
27 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
28 ABC 
Supermarkets 
The Employer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
29 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4 
 
 (Rank) 
30 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
31 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4 
4 
 (Rank) 
  
32 Now please Rank these 8 people of importance in causing the accident.  
      Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the least  
important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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Overall how would you rate the outcome for Mary following her accident?  
Please Circle / highlight your answer. 
33 (1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
Please give your reasons in the box below 
34  
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LUCKY OR UNLUCKY 
 
Mary’s accident might be shown in a flow diagram something like the following one.  
Please enter a score in the grey boxes for how lucky or unlucky you feel Mary was at 
each stage. 
 
Thursday at 
10.30 Mary 
closed her 
checkout to go 
for her mid 
morning rest 
break  
▼ 35                                        Stage A 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
 
As usual Mary 
waited for her 
friend on the 
next checkout 
and they both 
walked along 
the front of the 
checkouts 
towards the 
staff room   
▼ 36                                         Stage B  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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Milk had been 
spilt on the 
floor 
▼ 37                                             Stage C  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
The spillage 
had been 
reported 5 
minutes ago by 
a customer. The 
cleaner had 
been requested 
to clear up but 
had not got 
round to it  
▼ 38                                            Stage D  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
Mary did not 
see the milk on 
the floor 
▼ 39                                        Stage E  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
 
Mary stepped 
on the milk 
▼ 40                                       Stage F  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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Mary slipped 
on the milk 
▼ 41                                        Stage G 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
Mary lost her 
balance and fell 
over 
▼ 42                                         Stage H  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
Mary fell 
awkwardly 
hurting her 
right arm. 
▼ 43                                         Stage I  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
 
Mary taken to 
hospital-  Right 
wrist found to 
be strained.  
She will return 
to work 
tomorrow 
▼ 44                                        Stage J  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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SAFETY NOW AND IN THE FUTURE  
 
For each of the following statements please indicate how well they describe you as a 
Manager or Supervisor. 
If the statement is a very good description of you (very like you) fill in a 1, if it is not a 
very good description of you (not at all like you) please fill in a 5.  
Use the other numbers if you fall between 1-5. 
 
Scale 
Very good 
description / Very 
like me 
1 
Quite a good 
description /Quite 
like me 
2 
Not sure if it 
describes me. 
 
3 
Quite poor 
description / 
Quite unlike me. 
4 
Very poor 
description / Very 
unlike me. 
5 
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(Please write in the grey areas to the right of each statement) 
 
  Score 
45 I think about safety in the future and try to influence things by 
my day to day behaviour 
 
 
46 I think about safety in the future and do things now to achieve 
safety in the years ahead  
 
 
47 Thinking about safety I only do things to deal with the 
immediate situation, not worrying about the future 
 
 
48 What I do about safety is only influenced by how things work 
out in the short term 
 
 
49 My convenience is a big factor in how I make decisions or  take 
actions about safety  
 
 
50 I am willing to put in extra time, effort and money now to ensure 
that the job is safe in the future.  
 
 
51 I think it is important to take warnings about safety seriously, 
even if it is unlikely that an accident will happen for many years.  
 
52 I think it is more important to do something about serious 
accidents in the future than minor accidents now. 
 
53 I generally ignore warnings about possible risks in the future, 
because they generally get sorted out before that happen 
 
54 I think it is unnecessary to change things now to prevent a 
possible future accident as problems can be dealt with nearer the 
time. 
 
55 I only act when there is an immediate risk, I prefer to take care 
of future problems that may occur at a later date 
 
56 I believe that safety today is more important than safety at some 
time in the future. 
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AND LASTLY SOME INFORMATION ABOUT YOU 
57. How many people do you have responsibility for either as a Manager or Supervisor 
Please tick against one answer 
1-5 
people 
(1)   31-35 people (8)  
6-10 
people 
(2)   36-40 people (9)  
11-15 
people 
(3)   41-45 people (10)  
16-20 
people 
(4)   46-50 people (11)  
21-25 
people 
(5)   More than 51 
people  
(12)  
26-30 
people 
(6)   Not applicable  (13)  
 
 
 
58.  Are you (Please Tick)       
Male  (1)  
Female  (2)  
 
 
 Page | 415  
 
59. Which of the following categories best describes your organization.   (Please Tick) 
Retail Shop  (1)   Wholesale Shop or 
warehouse  
(7)  
Office  (2)   Catering, Restaurant  
or Bar  
(8)  
Hotel/ B&B  (3)   Residential Care  (9)  
Leisure/ 
Cultural  
 
(4)   Consumer Services 
eg hairdresser/ 
beauty  
(10)  
Manufacturing  (5)   Construction 
Industry  
(11)  
Agriculture  (6)   Central or Local 
Government  
(12)  
    Other  (13)  
 
 
60. Please give your current age. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Page | 416  
 
61. Which of the following best describes your current working location. (Please tick) 
United 
Kingdom  
 
(1)   Ireland  (6)  
Europe  (2)   North 
America / 
Canada  
(7)  
South 
America  
(3)   Australia/ 
New 
Zealand  
(8)  
Middle 
East  
 
(4)   Africa  (9)  
Far East  
 
(5)   Other  (10)  
 
62. Which of these best describes you. Please Circle / highlight 
 
Manager / 
Supervisor  
(1) 
Company 
Safety  
Officer  
(2) 
Health and Safety  
Enforcement 
Officer 
 (3)   
Someone who has  
had an accident at 
work (4) 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.  
I AM VERY GRATEFUL. 
PLEASE RETURN IT TO ME  BY POST  OR  FAX . 
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PLEASE DETACH THIS SHEET AND KEEP IT 
 
 
 
 
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire.  
Research such as this cannot happen with out your help. 
 
 
 
 
 
This questionnaire forms part of a study in to the ways in which accidents at work 
are viewed by Mangers & Supervisors, Safety Professionals and Accident Subjects 
themselves. 
 
The same questions have been asked of each group and the results will be compared 
to see if there are any differences or similarities.  
 
This stage of the research is concerned with how people think about hazards before 
and after an accident has happened and how they see responsibility for cause and 
prevention. 
 
It is hoped that the results will help to improve our understanding of the ways these 
groups think about safety and accidents at work and will allow managers / 
supervisors and Safety Professionals to be better trained in accident investigation.  
 
It is proposed that the results will be published in a professional Safety Journal. All 
results will be summarized and no individual respondent or employer will be 
identified. All answers to the questionnaire are treated in the strictest confidence. 
The information collected will be stored and treated in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act.       
 
If you need to contact the researcher please  do so by e-mail  
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MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS 
 
THINKING ABOUT ACCIDENTS 
 
 
RESEARCHER PAUL LEHANE 
 
SUPERVISOR DR. DAVID HARDMAN 
 
 
 
PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT 
 
CALCUTTA HOUSE 
OLD CASTLE STREET LONDON E1 7NT 
 
4S 
 
 
 
Research supported by the  
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Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am conducting research into the way in which managers and supervisors think 
about accidents at work.   
 
I would be very grateful if you could spare about 10 -15 minutes to complete the 
attached questionnaire.  
 
Your participation is entirely voluntary and any information you provide will be 
confidential and you will be completely anonymous if you post the questionnaire back 
to me using the envelope provided. 
 
A summary of the results from the research may be published.  
 
Paul Lehane. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION  
Please try to answer as many questions as you can. 
Any answers that you can provide are helpful so please return your form to me even if 
you do not complete all the questions. 
Please write your answers in the grey shaded boxes or circle / tick the appropriate 
answer from the choices given.  
RETURN OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
BY POST 
If you have been sent the questionnaire by post a prepaid envelope should have been 
provided. Please use this to return the questionnaire. If not please return to:- 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
BY FAX 
You may Fax your completed questionnaire to me on  
Paul Lehane c/o  
EHTS  
London Borough of Bromley 
Civic Center Bromley England BR1 3UH 
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WHY ARE ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATED? 
People have different views about why accidents are investigated. 
Six reasons for accident investigation are given below. As a Manager or 
Supervisor please indicate how important each reason is to you. 
Circle / highlight one answer from the choices given for each question. 
 
1. To find out the cause and understand what happened. 
 
      Rank 
Score 
1-6 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
2. To prevent similar accidents from happening again. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
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3. To meet organizational requirements eg collection of statistics, make 
insurance claims, staff training etc. 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
4. To find out if staff acted correctly or incorrectly.   
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
5. To find out if management acted correctly or incorrectly. 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
6. To punish someone for breaking rules and regulations. (Enforce rules or 
law)  
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
7.  Now please Rank in order of importance the 6 reasons for accident 
investigation.  
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 Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the 
least  important as = 6. Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the 
questions above..   
INVESTIGATING A SLIPPING ACCIDENT IN A SUPERMARKET 
In the section that follows you are asked to read about a slipping accident to Mary (a 
part time checkout operator at ABC Supermarkets) who slipped over on a spillage of 
milk near to the checkouts as she was going to the staff room for her mid morning 
break. 
 
When answering the questions that follow please do so as a manager or 
supervisor, responding in the same way as you would in your own workplace.  
Use your own knowledge or experience of slipping accidents to add to the 
information given about the accident.  
 
THE ACCIDENT 
Mary is a lady of about 55 years of age who has worked for as a part time 
checkout operator for about 8 years. She usually works Monday Tuesday and 
Wednesday but had come in on this particular Thursday to cover for a friend 
who was on holiday.  
Please imagine that you are the Store Manager of ABC Supermarket and have just 
been given this message. 
 
ABC SUPERMARKET 
MESSAGE TO  STORE MANAGER 
FROM  BILL  SHOP FLOOR SUPERVISOR 
DATE    THURSDAY 10 AUGUST   TIME  11.30 HRS 
SUBJECT - ACCIDENT TO MARY 
At about 10.30am Mary went for her rest break and slipped over on some spilt milk and 
hurt her arm. An ambulance was called to take her to hospital.  She has strained her right 
wrist, and she will be returning to work tomorrow. 
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Imagining yourself as the Store manager please answer the following questions using 
the information provided about Mary’s accident and your own experience of slipping 
accidents. 
 
IT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT     " IF ONLY……" 
 
After an unwanted outcome such as failing an exam, missing a flight or an accident people 
often think about how things could have been different.  
For example:  
After failing an exam a student might say "If only … I had worked harder….I might have 
passed" and a family who miss their holiday flight might say " If only…. we had left 
earlier…… we might have caught the flight  
 
8. After Mary’s accident you found yourself thinking “If only……” .  
     How would you continue this to bring about a different outcome?  
 
If only…….. 
 
 
 
 
 
…. Things could have been different. 
 
9. Which one of the following people does your answer to Question 8 best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
9 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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COULD MARY’S ACCIDENT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED? 
 
As the Store Manager do you believe that Mary's accident could have been prevented?  
Please Circle / highlight one answer.   
10 Yes  
(1) 
No   
(2) 
Not Sure   
(3) 
 
If you answered YES please go to question 11.  
If you answered "No" or "Not sure" please go to question 13  
 
 Please indicate how you believe Mary's slipping accident could have been prevented. 
11 Mary’s accident could have been prevented…….. 
 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
12 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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WHO HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREVENTING MARY’S ACCIDENT?  
As Store Manager please rate the level of responsibility of each of the following people 
for preventing Mary's accident. 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were. 
(0 = No responsibility, 4 = Maximum responsibility) 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
  Responsibility for Preventing Mary's accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
13 Mary   0 1 2 3 4   (Rank) 
14 Bill the Shop 
floor Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
15 You as Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
16 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
17 ABC 
Supermarkets 
(The Employer) 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
18 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
19 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
20 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
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21  Now please Rank these 8 people in order of  importance in preventing Mary’s 
accident.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the least 
important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
THE CAUSE OF MARY’S ACCIDENT 
As the Store Manager what would you say was the cause of Mary's accident? 
 
22 The cause of Mary's accident was… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does your answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
23 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
 
As Store Manager please rate the level of responsibility of each of the following people 
for causing Mary's accident. 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were. 
(0 = No responsibility, 4 = Maximum responsibility) 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
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  Responsibility for Causing Mary's accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
24 Mary   0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
25 Bill the Shop 
floor Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
26 You as Manager 
 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
27 The Store 
Safety Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
28 ABC 
Supermarkets 
The Employer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
29 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
30 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
31 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
 
 32 Now please Rank these 8 people of importance in causing the accident.  
      Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the least  
important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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Overall how would you rate the outcome for Mary following her accident?  
Please Circle / highlight your answer. 
33 (1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
Please give your reasons in the box below 
34  
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LUCKY OR UNLUCKY 
 
Mary’s accident might be shown in a flow diagram something like the following 
one.  
Please enter a score in the grey boxes for how lucky or unlucky you feel Mary was 
at each stage. 
 
Circle / highlight your answers 
At 10.30 Mary 
went for her 
rest break  
▼ 35                                        Stage A 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
Mary walked 
towards the 
staff room   
▼ 36                                         Stage B  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
Milk had been 
spilt on the 
floor 
▼ 37                                             Stage C  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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The spillage 
had not been 
cleared up  
▼ 38                                            Stage D  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
Mary did not 
see the milk on 
the floor 
▼ 39                                        Stage E  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
Mary stepped 
on the milk 
▼ 40                                       Stage F  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
 
Mary slipped 
on the milk 
▼ 41                                        Stage G 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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Mary lost her 
balance and fell 
over 
▼ 42                                         Stage H  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
Mary fell 
awkwardly 
hurting her 
right arm. 
▼ 43                                         Stage I  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
Mary taken to 
hospital-  Right 
wrist found to 
be strained.  
She will return 
to work 
tomorrow 
 
▼ 44                                        Stage J  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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SAFETY NOW AND IN THE FUTURE  
 
For each of the following statements please indicate how well they describe you as a 
Manager or Supervisor. 
If the statement is a very good description of you (very like you) fill in a 1, if it is not a 
very good description of you (not at all like you) please fill in a 5.  
Use the other numbers if you fall between 1-5. 
 
Scale 
Very good 
description / Very 
like me 
1 
Quite a good 
description /Quite 
like me 
2 
Not sure if it 
describes me. 
 
3 
Quite poor 
description / 
Quite unlike me. 
4 
Very poor 
description / Very 
unlike me. 
5 
 
(Please write in the grey areas to the right of each statement) 
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  Score 
45 I think about safety in the future and try to influence things by 
my day to day behaviour 
 
 
46 I think about safety in the future and do things now to achieve 
safety in the years ahead  
 
 
47 Thinking about safety I only do things to deal with the 
immediate situation, not worrying about the future 
 
 
48 What I do about safety is only influenced by how things work 
out in the short term 
 
 
49 My convenience is a big factor in how I make decisions or  take 
actions about safety  
 
 
50 I am willing to put in extra time, effort and money now to ensure 
that the job is safe in the future.  
 
 
51 I think it is important to take warnings about safety seriously, 
even if it is unlikely that an accident will happen for many years.  
 
52 I think it is more important to do something about serious 
accidents in the future than minor accidents now. 
 
53 I generally ignore warnings about possible risks in the future, 
because they generally get sorted out before that happen 
 
54 I think it is unnecessary to change things now to prevent a 
possible future accident as problems can be dealt with nearer the 
time. 
 
55 I only act when there is an immediate risk, I prefer to take care 
of future problems that may occur at a later date 
 
56 I believe that safety today is more important than safety at some 
time in the future. 
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AND LASTLY SOME INFORMATION ABOUT YOU 
57. How many people do you have responsibility for either as a Manager or Supervisor 
Please tick against one answer 
1-5 
people 
(1)   31-35 people (8)  
6-10 
people 
(2)   36-40 people (9)  
11-15 
people 
(3)   41-45 people (10)  
16-20 
people 
(4)   46-50 people (11)  
21-25 
people 
(5)   More than 51 
people  
(12)  
26-30 
people 
(6)   Not applicable  (13)  
 
 
 
58.  Are you (Please Tick)       
Male  (1)  
Female  (2)  
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59. Which of the following categories best describes your organization.   (Please Tick) 
 
Retail Shop  (1)   Wholesale Shop or 
warehouse  
(7)  
Office  (2)   Catering, Restaurant  
or Bar  
(8)  
Hotel/ B&B  (3)   Residential Care  (9)  
Leisure/ 
Cultural  
 
(4)   Consumer Services 
eg hairdresser/ 
beauty  
(10)  
Manufacturing  (5)   Construction 
Industry  
(11)  
Agriculture  (6)   Central or Local 
Government  
(12)  
    Other  (13)  
 
 
60. Please give your current age. 
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61. Which of the following best describes your current working location. (Please tick) 
United 
Kingdom  
 
(1)   Ireland  (6)  
Europe  (2)   North 
America / 
Canada  
(7)  
South 
America  
(3)   Australia/ 
New 
Zealand  
(8)  
Middle 
East  
 
(4)   Africa  (9)  
Far East  
 
(5)   Other  (10
) 
 
 
62. Which of these best describes you. Please Circle / highlight 
 
Manager / 
Supervisor  
(1) 
Company 
Safety  
Officer  
(2) 
Health and Safety  
Enforcement 
Officer 
 (3)   
Someone who has  
had an accident at 
work (4) 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.  
I AM VERY GRATEFUL. 
PLEASE RETURN IT TO ME  BY POST  OR  FAX . 
 
 
 Page | 437  
 
PLEASE DETACH THIS SHEET AND KEEP IT 
 
 
 
 
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire.  
Research such as this cannot happen with out your help. 
 
 
 
 
 
This questionnaire forms part of a study in to the ways in which accidents at work 
are viewed by Mangers & Supervisors, Safety Professionals and Accident Subjects 
themselves. 
 
The same questions have been asked of each group and the results will be compared 
to see if there are any differences or similarities.  
 
This stage of the research is concerned with how people think about hazards before 
and after an accident has happened and how they see responsibility for cause and 
prevention. 
 
It is hoped that the results will help to improve our understanding of the ways these 
groups think about safety and accidents at work and will allow managers / 
supervisors and Safety Professionals to be better trained in accident investigation.  
 
It is proposed that the results will be published in a professional Safety Journal. All 
results will be summarized and no individual respondent or employer will be 
identified. All answers to the questionnaire are treated in the strictest confidence. 
The information collected will be stored and treated in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act.       
 
If you need to contact the researcher please  do so by e-mail  
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MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS 
 
THINKING ABOUT ACCIDENTS 
 
  
 
RESEARCHER PAUL LEHANE 
 
SUPERVISOR DR. DAVID HARDMAN 
 
 
 
PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT 
 
CALCUTTA HOUSE 
OLD CASTLE STREET LONDON E1 7NT 
  
5S 
 
 
 
 
 
Research supported by the  
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Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am conducting research into the way in which managers and supervisors think 
about accidents at work.   
 
I would be very grateful if you could spare about 10 -15 minutes to complete the 
attached questionnaire.  
 
Your participation is entirely voluntary and any information you provide will be 
confidential and you will be completely anonymous if you post the questionnaire back 
to me using the envelope provided. 
 
A summary of the results from the research may be published.  
 
Paul Lehane. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION  
Please try to answer as many questions as you can. 
Any answers that you can provide are helpful so please return your form to me even if 
you do not complete all the questions. 
Please write your answers in the grey shaded boxes or circle / tick the appropriate 
answer from the choices given.  
RETURN OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
BY POST 
If you have been sent the questionnaire by post a prepaid envelope should have been 
provided. Please use this to return the questionnaire. If not please return to:- 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
BY FAX 
You may Fax your completed questionnaire to me on  
Paul Lehane c/o  
EHTS  
London Borough of Bromley 
Civic Center Bromley England BR1 3UH 
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WHY ARE ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATED? 
 
People have different views about why accidents are investigated. 
 
Six reasons for accident investigation are given below. As a Manager or 
Supervisor please indicate how important each reason is to you. 
Circle / highlight one answer from the choices given for each question. 
1. To find out the cause and understand what happened. 
 
      Rank 
Score 
1-6 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
2. To prevent similar accidents from happening again. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
 
 Page | 441  
 
3. To meet organizational requirements eg collection of statistics, make 
insurance claims, staff training etc. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
4. To find out if staff acted correctly or incorrectly.   
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
5. To find out if management acted correctly or incorrectly. 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
6. To punish someone for breaking rules and regulations. (Enforce rules or 
law)  
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
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7.  Now please Rank in order of importance the 6 reasons for accident 
investigation.  
 Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the 
least important as = 6. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above. 
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THINKING ABOUT A TRIPPING ACCIDENT IN A SUPERMARKET 
In the section that follows you are asked to read about a tripping accident to Mary (a 
part time checkout operator at ABC Supermarkets) who tripped over on a box near to 
the checkouts as she was going to the staff room for her mid morning break. 
 
When answering the questions that follow please do so as a manager or 
supervisor, responding in the same way as you would in your own workplace.  
Use your own knowledge or experience of tripping accidents to add to the 
information given about the accident.  
 
Mary is a lady of about 55 years of age who has worked as a part time 
checkout operator for about 8 years. She usually works Monday Tuesday and 
Wednesday but had come in on this particular Thursday to cover for a friend 
who was on holiday.  
Please imagine that you are the Store Manager of ABC Supermarket and have just 
been given this message. 
 
ABC SUPERMARKET 
MESSAGE TO  STORE MANAGER 
FROM  BILL  SHOP FLOOR SUPERVISOR 
DATE    THURSDAY 10 AUGUST   TIME  11.30 HRS 
SUBJECT - ACCIDENT TO MARY 
At about 10.30am Mary went for her rest break and tripped over on a box and hurt 
her arm. An ambulance was called to take her to hospital.  She has broken her 
right arm, which has been plastered. She will be off work for at least 3 weeks. 
 
You speak to Jane one of the other checkout operators who witnessed the accident 
and Bill the Shop Floor Supervisor. These are the notes from your conversations. 
 Mary does not usually work on Thursdays but was covering for a friend who was on 
holiday 
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 Mary closed her checkout at the usual time for her mid morning break and waited for a 
friend on the checkout next to her to serve her last customer and they both went to 
their break together as usual. 
 They were walking together past the checkouts when Mary tripped over a box and fell 
awkwardly on her right arm. 
 The First Aider attended and an ambulance was called to take Mary to hospital. 
 At hospital she was found to have a broken right arm. She will be off work for at least 
3 weeks with her arm in plaster.    
 A customer had seen the box and reported it to Bill the Supervisor 
 Bill confirmed that the box had been reported by a customer and the cleaner had been 
asked to clear it up 5 minutes before the accident but had not got round to dealing with 
it. 
 No warning signs had been put out. 
 It is not known how long the box had been on the floor before it was reported by the 
customer 
 The area round the checkouts often gets untidy.. 
 According to the Accident Book 4 other people had been injured in tripping accidents 
in the past 6 months 
 
Imagining yourself as the Store Manager please answer the following questions using 
the information provided about Mary’s accident and your won experience of tripping 
accidents 
IT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT   “IF ONLY……” 
 
After an unwanted outcome such as failing an exam, missing a flight or an accident people 
often think about how things could have been different.  
For example: - 
After failing an exam a student might say "If only … I had worked harder….I might have 
passed" and a family who miss their holiday flight might say " If only…. we had left 
earlier…… we might have caught the flight  
 
 
8. After the accident you found yourself thinking “If only……” . How would you 
continue this thought?  
 
If only…….. 
 
 
…..things could have been different 
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Which one of the following people does your answer to question 8 best refer to? 
Please circle / highlight your answer 
9 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
 
COULD MARY’S ACCIDENT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED? 
As the Store Manager do you believe that Mary's accident could have been 
prevented?  
Please Circle / highlight one answer.   
10 Yes  
(1) 
No   
(2) 
Not Sure   
(3) 
 
If you answered YES please go to question 11.  
If you answered "No" or "Not sure" please go to question 13  
 
 Please indicate how you believe Mary's slipping accident could have been prevented. 
11 Mary’s accident could have been prevented…….. 
 
 
Which one of the following people does your answer to question 11 best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
12 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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WHO HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREVENTING MARY’S ACCIDENT?  
As Store Manager please rate the level of responsibility of each of the following 
people for preventing Mary's accident. 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were. 
(0 = No responsibility, 4 = Maximum responsibility) 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
  Responsibility for Preventing Mary's accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
13 Mary  0 1 2 3 4   
14 Bill the Shop 
floor Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4   
15 You as Manager 0 1 2 3 4   
16 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4   
17 ABC 
Supermarkets 
(The Employer) 
0 1 2 3 4   
18 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4   
19 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4   
20 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4   
 
21  Now please Rank these 8 people in order of  importance in preventing Mary’s 
accident.  
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Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the 
least important as = 8. Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the 
questions above.   
THE CAUSE OF MARY’S ACCIDENT 
As the Store Manager what would you say was the cause of Mary's accident? 
 
22 The cause of Mary's accident was… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does your answer to Question 22 best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
23 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
 
 
As Store Manager please rate the level of responsibility of each of the following 
people for causing Mary's accident. 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were. 
(0 = No responsibility, 4 = Maximum responsibility) 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
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  Responsibility for Causing Mary's accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
24 Mary   0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
25 Bill the Shop 
floor Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
26 You as Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
27 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
28 ABC 
Supermarkets 
The Employer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
29 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
30 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
31 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
  
32 Now please Rank these 8 people of importance in causing the accident.  
      Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the 
least  important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
Overall how would you rate the outcome for Mary following her accident?  
Please Circle / highlight your answer. 
33 (1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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Please give your reasons in the box below 
34  
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LUCKY OR UNLUCKY? 
Mary’s accident might be shown in a flow diagram something like the following 
one.  
Please enter a score in the grey boxes for how lucky or unlucky you feel Mary was 
at each stage. 
Thursday at 
10.30 Mary 
closed her 
checkout to go 
for her mid 
morning rest 
break  
▼ 35                                        Stage A 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
As usual Mary 
waited for her 
friend on the 
next checkout 
and they both 
walked along 
the front of the 
checkouts 
towards the 
staff room   
▼ 36                                         Stage B  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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A box had been 
left on the floor 
▼ 37                                             Stage C  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
The box had 
been reported 5 
minutes ago. 
The cleaner had 
been requested 
to clear up but 
had not got 
round to it  
▼ 38                                            Stage D  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
Mary did not 
see the box on 
the floor 
▼ 39                                        Stage E  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
Mary's foot 
caught the box 
▼ 40                                       Stage F  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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Mary tripped on 
the box  
▼ 41                                        Stage G 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
Mary lost her 
balance and fell 
over 
▼ 42                                         Stage H  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
Mary fell 
awkwardly 
hurting her 
right arm. 
▼ 43                                         Stage I  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
Mary taken to 
hospital- her 
arm was x-
rayed and found 
to be broken.   
She will be off 
work for 3 
weeks. 
▼ 44                                        Stage J  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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SAFETY NOW AND IN THE FUTURE  
 
For each of the following statements please indicate how well they describe you as a 
Manager or Supervisor. 
If the statement is a very good description of you (very like you) fill in a 1, if it is not a 
very good description of you (not at all like you) please fill in a 5.  
Use the other numbers if you fall between 1-5. 
Scale 
Very good 
description / 
Very like me 
1 
Quite a good 
description 
/Quite like me 
2 
Not sure if it 
describes me. 
 
3 
Quite poor 
description / 
Quite unlike 
me. 
4 
Very poor 
description / 
Very unlike 
me. 
5 
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(Please write in the grey areas to the right of each statement) 
 
  Score 
45 I think about safety in the future and try to influence things by 
my day to day behaviour 
 
 
46 I think about safety in the future and do things now to achieve 
safety in the years ahead  
 
 
47 Thinking about safety I only do things to deal with the 
immediate situation, not worrying about the future 
 
 
48 What I do about safety is only influenced by how things work 
out in the short term 
 
 
49 My convenience is a big factor in how I make decisions or  take 
actions about safety  
 
 
50 I am willing to put in extra time, effort and money now to ensure 
that the job is safe in the future.  
 
 
51 I think it is important to take warnings about safety seriously, 
even if it is unlikely that an accident will happen for many years.  
 
52 I think it is more important to do something about serious 
accidents in the future than minor accidents now. 
 
53 I generally ignore warnings about possible risks in the future, 
because they generally get sorted out before that happen 
 
54 I think it is unnecessary to change things now to prevent a 
possible future accident as problems can be dealt with nearer the 
time. 
 
55 I only act when there is an immediate risk, I prefer to take care 
of future problems that may occur at a later date 
 
56 I believe that safety today is more important than safety at some 
time in the future. 
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AND LASTLY SOME INFORMATION ABOUT YOU 
57. How many people do you have responsibility for either as a Manager or Supervisor 
Please tick against one answer 
1-5 
people 
(1)   31-35 people (8)  
6-10 
people 
(2)   36-40 people (9)  
11-15 
people 
(3)   41-45 people (10)  
16-20 
people 
(4)   46-50 people (11)  
21-25 
people 
(5)   More than 51 
people  
(12)  
26-30 
people 
(6)   Not applicable  (13)  
 
 
 
58.  Are you (Please Tick)       
Male  (1)  
Female  (2)  
 
 
 
 
59. Which of the following categories best describes your organization.   (Please Tick) 
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Retail Shop  (1)   Wholesale Shop or 
warehouse  
(7)  
Office  (2)   Catering, Restaurant  
or Bar  
(8)  
Hotel/ B&B  (3)   Residential Care  (9)  
Leisure/ 
Cultural  
 
(4)   Consumer Services 
eg hairdresser/ 
beauty  
(10)  
Manufacturing  (5)   Construction 
Industry  
(11)  
Agriculture  (6)   Central or Local 
Government  
(12)  
    Other  (13)  
 
 
60. Please give your current age. 
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61. Which of the following best describes your current working location. (Please tick) 
United 
Kingdom  
 
(1)   Ireland  (6)  
Europe  (2)   North 
America / 
Canada  
(7)  
South 
America  
(3)   Australia/ 
New 
Zealand  
(8)  
Middle East  
 
(4)   Africa  (9)  
Far East  
 
(5)   Other  (10
) 
 
 
62. Which of these best describes you. Please Circle / highlight 
 
Manager / 
Supervisor  
(1) 
Company 
Safety  
Officer  
(2) 
Health and Safety  
Enforcement 
Officer 
 (3)   
Someone who has  
had an accident at 
work (4) 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.  
I AM VERY GRATEFUL. 
PLEASE RETURN IT TO ME  BY POST  OR  FAX . 
. 
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PLEASE DETACH THIS SHEET AND KEEP IT 
 
 
 
 
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire.  
Research such as this cannot happen with out your help. 
 
 
 
 
 
This questionnaire forms part of a study in to the ways in which accidents at work 
are viewed by Mangers & Supervisors, Safety Professionals and Accident Subjects 
themselves. 
 
The same questions have been asked of each group and the results will be compared 
to see if there are any differences or similarities.  
 
This stage of the research is concerned with how people think about hazards before 
and after an accident has happened and how they see responsibility for cause and 
prevention. 
 
It is hoped that the results will help to improve our understanding of the ways these 
groups think about safety and accidents at work and will allow managers / 
supervisors and Safety Professionals to be better trained in accident investigation.  
 
It is proposed that the results will be published in a professional Safety Journal. All 
results will be summarized and no individual respondent or employer will be 
identified. All answers to the questionnaire are treated in the strictest confidence. 
The information collected will be stored and treated in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act.       
 
If you need to contact the researcher please do so by e-mail  
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MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS 
 
THINKING ABOUT ACCIDENTS 
 
 
 
 
RESEARCHER PAUL LEHANE 
 
SUPERVISOR DR. DAVID HARDMAN 
 
 
PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT 
 
CALCUTTA HOUSE 
OLD CASTLE STREET LONDON E1 7NT 
 
6S 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research supported by the  
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Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am conducting research into the way in which managers and supervisors think 
about accidents at work.   
 
I would be very grateful if you could spare about 10 -15 minutes to complete the 
attached questionnaire.  
 
Your participation is entirely voluntary and any information you provide will be 
confidential and you will be completely anonymous if you post the questionnaire back 
to me using the envelope provided. 
 
A summary of the results from the research may be published.  
 
Paul Lehane. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION  
Please try to answer as many questions as you can. 
Any answers that you can provide are helpful so please return your form to me even if 
you do not complete all the questions. 
Please write your answers in the grey shaded boxes or circle / tick the appropriate 
answer from the choices given.  
RETURN OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
BY POST 
If you have been sent the questionnaire by post a prepaid envelope should have been 
provided. Please use this to return the questionnaire. If not please return to:- 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
BY FAX 
You may Fax your completed questionnaire to me on  
 
 
 
Paul Lehane c/o  
EHTS  
London Borough of Bromley 
Civic Center Bromley England BR1 3UH 
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WHY ARE ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATED? 
People have different views about why accidents are investigated. 
Six reasons for accident investigation are given below. As a Manager or 
Supervisor please indicate how important each reason is to you. 
Circle / highlight one answer from the choices given for each question. 
1. To find out the cause and understand what happened. 
 
      Rank 
Score 
1-6 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
2. To prevent similar accidents from happening again. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
3. To meet organizational requirements eg collection of statistics, make 
insurance claims, staff training etc. 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
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4. To find out if staff acted correctly or incorrectly.   
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
5. To find out if management acted correctly or incorrectly. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
6. To punish someone for breaking rules and regulations. (Enforce rules or 
law)  
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
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7.  Now please Rank in order of importance the 6 reasons for accident 
investigation.  
 Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the 
least  important as = 6. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
INVESTIGATING A TRIPPING ACCIDENT IN A SUPERMARKET 
 
In the section that follows you are asked to read about a tripping accident to Mary (a 
part time checkout operator at ABC Supermarkets) who tripped over on a box near to 
the checkouts as she was going to the staff room for her mid morning break. 
 
When answering the questions that follow please do so as a manager or 
supervisor, responding in the same way as you would in your own workplace.  
Use your own knowledge or experience of tripping accidents to add to the 
information given about the accident.  
 
Mary is a lady of about 55 years of age who has worked for as a part time 
checkout operator for about 8 years. She usually works Monday Tuesday and 
Wednesday but had come in on this particular Thursday to cover for a friend 
who was on holiday.  
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Please imagine that you are the Store Manager of ABC Supermarket and have just 
been given this message. 
 
ABC SUPERMARKET 
 
MESSAGE TO  STORE MANAGER 
FROM  BILL  SHOP FLOOR SUPERVISOR 
DATE    THURSDAY 10 AUGUST   TIME  11.30 HRS 
 
SUBJECT - ACCIDENT TO MARY 
At about 10.30am Mary went for her rest break and tripped over on a box and 
hurt her arm. An ambulance was called to take her to hospital.  She has 
broken her right arm, which has been plastered. She will be off work for at 
least 3 weeks. 
 
 
Imagining yourself as the Store Manager please answer the following questions using 
the information provided about Mary’s accident and your own experience of tripping 
accidents 
 
IT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT  “IF ONLY…….” 
 
After an unwanted outcome such as failing an exam, missing a flight or an accident people 
often think about how things could have been different.  
For example: - 
After failing an exam a student might say "If only … I had worked harder….I might have 
passed" and a family who miss their holiday flight might say " If only…. we had left 
earlier…… we might have caught the flight  
 
 Page | 465  
 
8. After Mary’s accident you found yourself thinking “If only……” . How would you 
continue this thought?  
 
If only…….. 
 
 
 
 
…. Things could have been different. 
 
 
9 Which one of the following people does your answer to Question 8 best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
9 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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COULD MARY’S ACCIDENT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED? 
 
As the Store Manager do you believe that Mary's accident could have been 
prevented?  
Please Circle / highlight one answer.   
10 Yes  
(1) 
No   
(2) 
Not Sure   
(3) 
 
If you answered YES please go to question 11.  
If you answered "No" or "Not sure" please go to question 13  
 
 Please indicate how you believe Mary's slipping accident could have been prevented. 
11 Mary’s accident could have been prevented…….. 
 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does your answer to question 11 best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
12 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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WHO HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREVENTING MARY’S ACCIDENT?  
As Store Manager please rate the level of responsibility of each of the following people 
for preventing Mary's accident. 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were. 
(0 = No responsibility, 4 = Maximum responsibility) 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
  Responsibility for Preventing Mary's accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
13 Mary   0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
14 Bill the Shop 
floor Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
15 You as Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
16 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
 (Rank) 
17 ABC 
Supermarkets 
(The Employer) 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
18 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
19 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
20 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
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21  Now please Rank these 8 people in order of  importance in preventing Mary’s 
accident.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the least  
important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
THE CAUSE OF MARY’S ACCIDENT 
As the Store Manager what would you say was the cause of Mary's accident? 
 
22 The cause of Mary's accident was… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does your answer to Question 22 best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
23 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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As Store Manager please rate the level of responsibility of each of the following people 
for causing Mary's accident. 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were. 
(0 = No responsibility, 4 = Maximum responsibility) 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
 
  Responsibility for Causing Mary's 
accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
24 Mary   0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
25 Bill the Shop 
floor Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
26 You as Manager 
 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
27 The Store 
Safety Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
28 ABC 
Supermarkets 
The Employer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
29 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
30 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
31 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
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32 Now please Rank these 8 people of importance in causing the accident.  
      Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the least  
      important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
Overall how would you rate the outcome for Mary following her accident?  
Please Circle / highlight your answer. 
33 (1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
 
 
 
Please give your reasons in the box below 
34  
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LUCKY OR UNLUCKY 
Mary’s accident might be shown in a flow diagram something like the following 
one.  
Please enter a score in the grey boxes for how lucky or unlucky you feel Mary was 
at each stage. 
 
Thursday at 10.30 
Mary went for rest 
break  
▼ 35                                        Stage A 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
   
Mary walked 
towards the Staff 
Room 
▼ 36                                         Stage B  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
   
A box had been left 
on the floor 
▼ 37                                             Stage C  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
  
 Page | 472  
 
The box had not 
been cleared up  
▼ 38                                            Stage D  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
  
Mary did not see the 
box on the floor 
▼ 39                                        Stage E  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
  
Mary's foot caught 
the box  
▼ 40                                       Stage F  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
       
Mary tripped on the 
box 
▼ 41                                        Stage G 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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Mary lost her 
balance and fell 
over 
▼ 42                                         Stage H  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
       
Mary fell 
awkwardly hurting 
her right arm. 
▼ 43                                         Stage I  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
       
Mary taken to 
hospital- her arm 
was x-rayed and 
found to be broken.  
She will be off work 
for 3 weeks. 
▼ 44                                        Stage J  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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SAFETY NOW AND IN THE FUTURE  
 
For each of the following statements please indicate how well they describe you as a 
Manager or Supervisor. 
If the statement is a very good description of you (very like you) fill in a 1, if it is not a 
very good description of you (not at all like you) please fill in a 5.  
Use the other numbers if you fall between 1-5. 
 
Scale 
Very good 
description / 
Very like 
me 
1 
Quite a 
good 
description 
/Quite like 
me 
2 
Not sure if 
it describes 
me. 
 
3 
Quite poor 
description / 
Quite unlike 
me. 
4 
Very poor 
description / 
Very unlike 
me. 
5 
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(Please write in the grey areas to the right of each statement) 
 
  Score 
45 I think about safety in the future and try to influence things by 
my day to day behaviour 
 
 
46 I think about safety in the future and do things now to achieve 
safety in the years ahead  
 
 
47 Thinking about safety I only do things to deal with the 
immediate situation, not worrying about the future 
 
 
48 What I do about safety is only influenced by how things work 
out in the short term 
 
 
49 My convenience is a big factor in how I make decisions or  take 
actions about safety  
 
 
50 I am willing to put in extra time, effort and money now to ensure 
that the job is safe in the future.  
 
 
51 I think it is important to take warnings about safety seriously, 
even if it is unlikely that an accident will happen for many years.  
 
52 I think it is more important to do something about serious 
accidents in the future than minor accidents now. 
 
53 I generally ignore warnings about possible risks in the future, 
because they generally get sorted out before that happen 
 
54 I think it is unnecessary to change things now to prevent a 
possible future accident as problems can be dealt with nearer the 
time. 
 
55 I only act when there is an immediate risk, I prefer to take care 
of future problems that may occur at a later date 
 
56 I believe that safety today is more important than safety at some 
time in the future. 
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AND LASTLY SOME INFORMATION ABOUT YOU 
 
57. How many people do you have responsibility for either as a Manager or Supervisor 
Please tick against one answer 
1-5 
people 
(1)   31-35 people (8)  
6-10 
people 
(2)   36-40 people (9)  
11-15 
people 
(3)   41-45 people (10)  
16-20 
people 
(4)   46-50 people (11)  
21-25 
people 
(5)   More than 51 
people  
(12)  
26-30 
people 
(6)   Not applicable  (13)  
 
 
 
58.  Are you (Please Tick)       
Male  (1)  
Female  (2)  
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59. Which of the following categories best describes your organization.   (Please Tick) 
 
Retail Shop  (1)   Wholesale Shop or 
warehouse  
(7)  
Office  (2)   Catering, Restaurant  
or Bar  
(8)  
Hotel/ B&B  (3)   Residential Care  (9)  
Leisure/ Cultural  
 
(4)   Consumer Services eg 
hairdresser/ beauty  
(10)  
Manufacturing  (5)   Construction Industry  (11)  
Agriculture  (6)   Central or Local 
Government  
(12)  
    Other  (13)  
 
 
60. Please give your current age. 
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61. Which of the following best describes your current working location. (Please tick) 
United 
Kingdom  
 
(1)   Ireland  (6)  
Europe  (2)   North 
America / 
Canada  
(7)  
South 
America  
(3)   Australia/ 
New 
Zealand  
(8)  
Middle East  
 
(4)   Africa  (9)  
Far East  
 
(5)   Other  (10)  
 
62. Which of these best describes you. Please Circle / highlight 
 
Manager / 
Supervisor  
(1) 
Company 
Safety  
Officer  
(2) 
Health and Safety  
Enforcement 
Officer 
 (3)   
Someone who has  
had an accident at 
work (4) 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.  
I AM VERY GRATEFUL. 
PLEASE RETURN IT TO ME  BY POST  OR  FAX . 
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PLEASE DETACH THIS SHEET AND KEEP IT 
 
 
 
 
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire.  
Research such as this cannot happen with out your help. 
 
 
 
 
 
This questionnaire forms part of a study in to the ways in which accidents at work 
are viewed by Mangers & Supervisors, Safety Professionals and Accident Subjects 
themselves. 
 
The same questions have been asked of each group and the results will be compared 
to see if there are any differences or similarities.  
 
This stage of the research is concerned with how people think about hazards before 
and after an accident has happened and how they see responsibility for cause and 
prevention. 
 
It is hoped that the results will help to improve our understanding of the ways these 
groups think about safety and accidents at work and will allow managers / 
supervisors and Safety Professionals to be better trained in accident investigation.  
 
It is proposed that the results will be published in a professional Safety Journal. All 
results will be summarized and no individual respondent or employer will be 
identified. All answers to the questionnaire are treated in the strictest confidence. 
The information collected will be stored and treated in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act.       
 
If you need to contact the researcher please  do so by e-mail  
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MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS 
 
THINKING ABOUT ACCIDENTS 
 
  
 
RESEARCHER PAUL LEHANE 
 
SUPERVISOR DR. DAVID HARDMAN 
 
 
 
PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT 
 
CALCUTTA HOUSE 
OLD CASTLE STREET LONDON E1 7NT 
 
7S 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research supported by the  
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Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am conducting research into the way in which managers and supervisors think 
about accidents at work.   
 
I would be very grateful if you could spare about 10 -15 minutes to complete the 
attached questionnaire.  
 
Your participation is entirely voluntary and any information you provide will be 
confidential and you will be completely anonymous if you post the questionnaire back 
to me using the envelope provided. 
 
A summary of the results from the research may be published.  
 
Paul Lehane. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION  
Please try to answer as many questions as you can. 
Any answers that you can provide are helpful so please return your form to me even if 
you do not complete all the questions. 
Please write your answers in the grey shaded boxes or circle / tick the appropriate 
answer from the choices given.  
RETURN OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
BY POST 
If you have been sent the questionnaire by post a prepaid envelope should have been 
provided. Please use this to return the questionnaire. If not please return to:- 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY FAX 
You may Fax your completed questionnaire to me on  
Paul Lehane c/o  
EHTS  
London Borough of Bromley 
Civic Center Bromley England BR1 3UH 
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WHY ARE ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATED? 
People have different views about why accidents are investigated. 
 
Six reasons for accident investigation are given below. As a Manager or 
Supervisor please indicate how important each reason is to you. 
 
Circle / highlight one answer from the choices given for each question. 
1. To find out the cause and understand what happened. 
      Rank 
Score 
1-6 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
2. To prevent similar accidents from happening again. 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
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3. To meet organizational requirements eg collection of statistics, make 
insurance claims, staff training etc. 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
4. To find out if staff acted correctly or incorrectly.   
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
5. To find out if management acted correctly or incorrectly. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
6. To punish someone for breaking rules and regulations. (Enforce rules or 
law)  
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
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7.  Now please Rank in order of importance the 6 reasons for accident 
investigation.  
 Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the 
least  important as = 6. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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THINKING ABOUT A TRIPPING ACCIDENT IN A SUPERMARKET 
In the section that follows you are asked to read about a tripping accident to Mary (a 
part time checkout operator at ABC Supermarkets) who tripped over on a box near to 
the checkouts as she was going to the staff room for her mid morning break. 
 
When answering the questions that follow please do so as a manager or 
supervisor, responding in the same way as you would in your own workplace.  
Use your own knowledge or experience of tripping accidents to add to the 
information given about the accident.  
 
Mary is a lady of about 55 years of age who has worked for as a part time 
checkout operator for about 8 years. She usually works Monday Tuesday and 
Wednesday but had come in on this particular Thursday to cover for a friend 
who was on holiday.  
Please imagine that you are the Store Manager of ABC Supermarket and have just 
been given this message. 
 
ABC SUPERMARKET 
MESSAGE TO  STORE MANAGER 
FROM  BILL  SHOP FLOOR SUPERVISOR 
DATE    THURSDAY 10 AUGUST   TIME  11.30 HRS 
SUBJECT - ACCIDENT TO MARY 
At about 10.30am Mary went for her rest break and tripped over a box and hurt her 
arm. An ambulance was called to take her to hospital.  She has strained her right 
wrist, and she will be returning to work tomorrow. 
 
You speak to Jane one of the other checkout operators who witnessed the accident and 
Bill the Shop Floor Supervisor. These are your notes from your conversations. 
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 Mary does not usually work on Thursdays but was covering for a friend who was 
on holiday 
 Mary closed her checkout at the usual time for her mid morning break and waited 
for a friend on the checkout next to her to serve her last customer and they both 
went to their break together as usual. 
 They were walking together past the checkouts when Mary tripped over a box and 
fell awkwardly on her right arm. 
 The First Aider attended and an ambulance was called to take Mary to hospital. 
 At hospital she was found to have strained he right wrist. She will be back at work 
tomorrow.    
 A customer  had seen the box and reported it to Bill the Supervisor 
 Bill confirmed that the box had been reported by a customer and the cleaner had 
been asked to clear it up 5 minutes before the accident but had not got round to 
dealing with it. 
 No warning signs had been put out. 
 It is not known how long the box had been on the floor before it was reported by 
the customer 
 The area round the checkouts often gets untidy. 
 According to the Accident Book 4 other people had been injured in tripping 
accidents in the past 6 months 
Imagining yourself as  the Store Manager please answer the following questions 
using the information provided about Mary’s accident and your own experiences of 
tripping accidents 
 
IT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT  “IF ONLY…..” 
 
After an unwanted outcome such as failing an exam, missing a flight or an accident 
people often think about how things could have been different.  
For example: - 
After failing an exam a student might say "If only … I had worked harder….I might 
have passed" and a family who miss their holiday flight might say " If only…. we had 
left earlier…… we might have caught the flight  
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8. After the accident you found yourself thinking “If only……” . How would you 
continue this thought?  
 
If only…….. 
 
 
 
 
…. Things could have been different. 
 
9  Which one of the following people does your answer to Question 8 best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
9 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
 
COULD MARY’S ACCIDENT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED? 
 
As the Store Manager do you believe that Mary's accident could have been 
prevented?  
Please Circle / highlight one answer.   
10 Yes  
(1) 
No   
(2) 
Not Sure   
(3) 
 
If you answered YES please go to question 11.  
If you answered "No" or "Not sure" please go to question 13  
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 Please indicate how you believe Mary's slipping accident could have been prevented. 
11 Mary’s accident could have been prevented…….. 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does your answer to question 11 best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
12 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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WHO HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREVENTING MARY’S ACCIDENT?  
As Store Manager please rate the level of responsibility of each of the following people 
for preventing Mary's accident. 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were. 
(0 = No responsibility, 4 = Maximum responsibility) 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
  Responsibility for Preventing 
Mary's accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
13 Mary   0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
14 Bill the Shop 
floor 
Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
15 You as 
Manager 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
16 The Store 
Safety Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
17 ABC 
Supermarkets 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
18 Another 
worker 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
19 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
20 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
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21  Now please Rank these 8 people in order of  importance in preventing Mary’s 
accident.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the least 
important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
THE CAUSE OF MARY’S ACCIDENT 
As the Store Manager what would you say was the cause of Mary's accident? 
 
22 The cause of Mary's accident was… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does your answer to Question 22 best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
23 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
 
 
As Store Manager please rate the level of responsibility of each of the following people 
for causing Mary's accident. 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were. 
(0 = No responsibility, 4 = Maximum responsibility) 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
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  Responsibility for Causing Mary's 
accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
24 Mary  0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
25 Bill the Shop 
floor 
Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
26 You as 
Manager 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
27 The Store 
Safety Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
28 ABC 
Supermarkets 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
29 Another 
worker 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
30 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
31 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
  
32 Now please Rank these 8 people of importance in causing the accident.  
      Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the least       
important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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Overall how would you rate the outcome for Mary following her accident?  
Please Circle / highlight your answer. 
33 (1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very Lucky 
 
Please give your reasons in the box below 
34  
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LUCKY OR UNLUCKY 
 
Mary’s accident might be shown in a flow diagram something like the following 
one.  
Please enter a score in the grey boxes for how lucky or unlucky you feel Mary was 
at each stage. 
Thursday at 
10.30 Mary 
closed her 
checkout to go 
for her mid 
morning rest 
break  
▼ 35                                        Stage A 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
   
As usual Mary 
waited for her 
friend on the next 
checkout and 
they both walked 
along the front of 
the checkouts 
towards the staff 
room   
▼ 36                                         Stage B  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
   
A box had been 
left on the floor 
▼ 37                                             Stage C  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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The box had been 
reported 5 
minutes ago. The 
cleaner had been 
requested to clear 
up but had not 
got round to it  
▼ 38                                            Stage D  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
  
Mary did not see 
the box on the 
floor 
▼ 39                                        Stage E  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
  
Mary's foot 
caught the box 
▼ 40                                       Stage F  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
       
Mary tripped on 
the box 
▼ 41                                        Stage G 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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Mary lost her 
balance and fell 
over 
▼ 42                                         Stage H  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
       
Mary fell 
awkwardly 
hurting her right 
arm. 
▼ 43                                         Stage I  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
       
Mary taken to 
hospital-  Right 
wrist found to be 
strained.  She 
will return to 
work tomorrow 
▼ 44                                        Stage J  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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SAFETY NOW AND IN THE FUTURE  
For each of the following statements please indicate how well they describe you as a 
Manager or Supervisor. 
If the statement is a very good description of you (very like you) fill in a 1, if it is not a 
very good description of you (not at all like you) please fill in a 5.  
Use the other numbers if you fall between 1-5. 
 
Scale 
Very good 
description / 
Very like me 
1 
Quite a good 
description 
/Quite like me 
2 
Not sure if it 
describes me. 
 
3 
Quite poor 
description / 
Quite unlike 
me. 
4 
Very poor 
description / 
Very unlike 
me. 
5 
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(Please write in the grey areas to the right of each statement) 
 
  Score 
45 I think about safety in the future and try to influence things by 
my day to day behaviour 
 
 
46 I think about safety in the future and do things now to achieve 
safety in the years ahead  
 
 
47 Thinking about safety I only do things to deal with the 
immediate situation, not worrying about the future 
 
 
48 What I do about safety is only influenced by how things work 
out in the short term 
 
 
49 My convenience is a big factor in how I make decisions or  take 
actions about safety  
 
 
50 I am willing to put in extra time, effort and money now to ensure 
that the job is safe in the future.  
 
 
51 I think it is important to take warnings about safety seriously, 
even if it is unlikely that an accident will happen for many years.  
 
52 I think it is more important to do something about serious 
accidents in the future than minor accidents now. 
 
53 I generally ignore warnings about possible risks in the future, 
because they generally get sorted out before that happen 
 
54 I think it is unnecessary to change things now to prevent a 
possible future accident as problems can be dealt with nearer the 
time. 
 
55 I only act when there is an immediate risk, I prefer to take care 
of future problems that may occur at a later date 
 
56 I believe that safety today is more important than safety at some 
time in the future. 
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AND LASTLY SOME INFORMATION ABOUT YOU 
57. How many people do you have responsibility for either as a Manager or Supervisor 
 
Please tick against one answer 
1-5 
people 
(1)   31-35 people (8)  
6-10 
people 
(2)   36-40 people (9)  
11-15 
people 
(3)   41-45 people (10)  
16-20 
people 
(4)   46-50 people (11)  
21-25 
people 
(5)   More than 51 
people  
(12)  
26-30 
people 
(6)   Not applicable  (13)  
 
 
 
58.  Are you (Please Tick)       
Male  (1)  
Female  (2)  
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59. Which of the following categories best describes your organization.   (Please Tick) 
 
Retail Shop  (1)   Wholesale Shop or 
warehouse  
(7)  
Office  (2)   Catering, Restaurant  
or Bar  
(8)  
Hotel/ B&B  (3)   Residential Care  (9)  
Leisure/ Cultural  
 
(4)   Consumer Services eg 
hairdresser/ beauty  
(1
0) 
 
Manufacturing  (5)   Construction Industry  (1
1) 
 
Agriculture  (6)   Central or Local 
Government  
(1
2) 
 
    Other  (1
3) 
 
 
 
60. Please give your current age. 
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61. Which of the following best describes your current working location. (Please tick) 
United 
Kingdom  
 
(1)   Ireland  (6)  
Europe  (2)   North 
America / 
Canada  
(7)  
South 
America  
(3)   Australia/ 
New 
Zealand  
(8)  
Middle East  
 
(4)   Africa  (9)  
Far East  
 
(5)   Other  (10)  
 
62. Which of these best describes you. Please Circle / highlight 
 
Manager / 
Supervisor  
(1) 
Company 
Safety  
Officer  
(2) 
Health and Safety  
Enforcement 
Officer 
 (3)   
Someone who has  
had an accident at 
work (4) 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.  
I AM VERY GRATEFUL. 
PLEASE RETURN IT TO ME  BY POST  OR  FAX . 
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PLEASE DETACH THIS SHEET AND KEEP IT 
 
 
 
 
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire.  
Research such as this cannot happen with out your help. 
 
 
 
 
 
This questionnaire forms part of a study in to the ways in which accidents at work 
are viewed by Mangers & Supervisors, Safety Professionals and Accident Subjects 
themselves. 
 
The same questions have been asked of each group and the results will be compared 
to see if there are any differences or similarities.  
 
This stage of the research is concerned with how people think about hazards before 
and after an accident has happened and how they see responsibility for cause and 
prevention. 
 
It is hoped that the results will help to improve our understanding of the ways these 
groups think about safety and accidents at work and will allow managers / 
supervisors and Safety Professionals to be better trained in accident investigation.  
 
It is proposed that the results will be published in a professional Safety Journal. All 
results will be summarized and no individual respondent or employer will be 
identified. All answers to the questionnaire are treated in the strictest confidence. 
The information collected will be stored and treated in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act.       
 
If you need to contact the researcher please  do so by e-mail  
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MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS 
 
THINKING ABOUT ACCIDENTS 
 
 
 
RESEARCHER PAUL LEHANE 
 
SUPERVISOR DR. DAVID HARDMAN 
 
 
PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT 
 
CALCUTTA HOUSE 
OLD CASTLE STREET LONDON E1 7NT 
 
 
8S 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
  
Research supported by the  
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I am conducting research into the way in which managers and supervisors think 
about accidents at work.   
 
I would be very grateful if you could spare about 10 -15 minutes to complete the 
attached questionnaire.  
 
Your participation is entirely voluntary and any information you provide will be 
confidential and you will be completely anonymous if you post the questionnaire back 
to me using the envelope provided. 
 
A summary of the results from the research may be published.  
 
Paul Lehane. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION  
Please try to answer as many questions as you can. 
Any answers that you can provide are helpful so please return your form to me even if 
you do not complete all the questions. 
Please write your answers in the grey shaded boxes or circle / tick the appropriate 
answer from the choices given.  
RETURN OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
BY POST 
If you have been sent the questionnaire by post a prepaid envelope should have been 
provided. Please use this to return the questionnaire. If not please return to:- 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
BY FAX 
You may Fax your completed questionnaire to me on  
 
Paul Lehane c/o  
EHTS  
London Borough of Bromley 
Civic Center Bromley England BR1 3UH 
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WHY ARE ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATED? 
People have different views about why accidents are investigated. 
Six reasons for accident investigation are given below. As a Manager or 
Supervisor please indicate how important each reason is to you. 
Circle / highlight one answer from the choices given for each question. 
 
1. To find out the cause and understand what happened. 
 
      Rank 
Score  
1-6 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
2. To prevent similar accidents from happening again. 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
3. To meet organizational requirements eg collection of statistics, make 
insurance claims, staff training etc. 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
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4. To find out if staff acted correctly or incorrectly.   
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
5. To find out if management acted correctly or incorrectly. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
6. To punish someone for breaking rules and regulations. (Enforce rules or 
law)  
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4) 
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
7.  Now please Rank in order of importance the 6 reasons for accident 
investigation.  
 Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the 
least  important as = 6. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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INVESTIGATING A TRIPPING ACCIDENT IN A SUPERMARKET 
In the section that follows you are asked to read about a tripping accident to Mary (a 
part time checkout operator at ABC Supermarkets) who tripped over on a box near to 
the checkouts as she was going to the staff room for her mid morning break. 
 
When answering the questions that follow please do so as a manager or 
supervisor, responding in the same way as you would in your own workplace.  
Use your own knowledge or experience of tripping accidents to add to the 
information given about the accident.  
 
Mary is a lady of about 55 years of age who has worked for as a part time 
checkout operator for about 8 years. She usually works Monday Tuesday and 
Wednesday but had come in on this particular Thursday to cover for a friend 
who was on holiday.  
Please imagine that you are the Store Manager of ABC Supermarket and have just 
been given this message. 
 
ABC SUPERMARKET 
MESSAGE TO  STORE MANAGER 
FROM  BILL  SHOP FLOOR SUPERVISOR 
DATE    THURSDAY 10 AUGUST   TIME  11.30 HRS 
SUBJECT - ACCIDENT TO MARY 
At about 10.30am Mary went for her rest break and tripped over a box and hurt her 
arm. An ambulance was called to take her to hospital.  She has strained her right 
wrist, and she will be returning to work tomorrow. 
 
Imagining yourself as the Store Manager please answer the following questions 
using the information provided about Mary’s accident and your won experiences of 
tripping accidents. 
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IT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT   "IF ONLY……"   
 
After an unwanted outcome such as failing an exam, missing a flight or an accident 
people often think about how things could have been different.  
For example: - 
After failing an exam a student might say "If only … I had worked harder….I might 
have passed" and a family who miss their holiday flight might say " If only…. we had 
left earlier…… we might have caught the flight  
 
8. After the accident you found yourself thinking “If only……” . How would you 
continue this thought?  
 
If only…….. 
 
 
 
 
…. Things could have been different. 
 
9.  Which one of the following people does your answer to Question 8 best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
9 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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COULD MARY’S ACCIDENT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED? 
 
As the Store Manager do you believe that Mary's accident could have been 
prevented?  
Please Circle / highlight one answer.   
10 Yes  
(1) 
No   
(2) 
Not Sure   
(3) 
 
If you answered YES please go to question 11.  
If you answered "No" or "Not sure" please go to question 13  
 
 Please indicate how you believe Mary's slipping accident could have been prevented. 
11 Mary’s accident could have been prevented…….. 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does your answer to question 11 best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
12 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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WHO HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREVENTING MARY’S ACCIDENT?  
As Store Manager please rate the level of responsibility of each of the following people 
for preventing Mary's accident. 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were. 
(0 = No responsibility, 4 = Maximum responsibility) 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
  Responsibility for Preventing Mary's accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
13 Mary   0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
14 Bill the Shop floor 
Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
15 You as Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
16 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
17 ABC 
Supermarkets 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
18 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
19 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
20 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
 
21  Now please Rank these 8 people in order of  importance in preventing Mary’s 
accident.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the least 
important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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THE CAUSE OF MARY’S ACCIDENT 
As the Store Manager what would you say was the cause of Mary's accident? 
 
22 The cause of Mary's accident was… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does your answer to Question 22 best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
23 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
 
As Store Manager please rate the level of responsibility of each of the following people 
for causing Mary's accident. 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were. 
(0 = No responsibility, 4 = Maximum responsibility) 
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Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
 
  Responsibility for Causing Mary's accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
24 Mary   0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
25 Bill the Shop 
floor Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
26 You as Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
27 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
28 ABC 
Supermarkets 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
29 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
30 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
31 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
  
32 Now please Rank these 8 people of importance in causing the accident.  
      Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the least  
important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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Overall how would you rate the outcome for Mary following her accident?  
Please Circle / highlight your answer. 
33 (1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very Lucky 
 
Please give your reasons in the box below 
34  
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LUCKY OR UNLUCKY 
 
Mary’s accident might be shown in a flow diagram something like the following 
one.  
Please enter a score in the grey boxes for how lucky or unlucky you feel Mary was 
at each stage. 
 
 
Thursday at 
10.30 Mary went 
for her rest break  
▼ 35                                        Stage A 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
   
Mary walked 
towards the staff 
room   
▼ 36                                         Stage B  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
   
A box had been 
left on the floor 
▼ 37                                             Stage C  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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The box had not 
been cleared up  
▼ 38                                            Stage D  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
  
Mary did not see 
the box on the 
floor 
▼ 39                                        Stage E  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
  
Mary's foot 
caught the box 
▼ 40                                       Stage F  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
 
 
Mary tripped on 
the box 
▼ 41                                        Stage G 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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Mary lost her 
balance and fell 
over 
▼ 42                                         Stage H  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
       
Mary fell 
awkwardly 
hurting her right 
arm. 
▼ 43                                         Stage I  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
 
Mary taken to 
hospital-  Right 
wrist found to be 
strained.  She 
will return to 
work tomorrow 
 
▼ 44                                        Stage J  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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SAFETY NOW AND IN THE FUTURE  
 
For each of the following statements please indicate how well they describe you as a 
Manager or Supervisor. 
If the statement is a very good description of you (very like you) fill in a 1, if it is not a 
very good description of you (not at all like you) please fill in a 5.  
Use the other numbers if you fall between 1-5. 
 
Scale 
Very good 
description / Very 
like me 
1 
Quite a good 
description /Quite 
like me 
2 
Not sure if it 
describes me. 
 
3 
Quite poor 
description / 
Quite unlike me. 
4 
Very poor 
description / Very 
unlike me. 
5 
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(Please write in the grey areas to the right of each statement) 
 
  Score 
45 I think about safety in the future and try to influence things by 
my day to day behaviour 
 
 
46 I think about safety in the future and do things now to achieve 
safety in the years ahead  
 
 
47 Thinking about safety I only do things to deal with the 
immediate situation, not worrying about the future 
 
 
48 What I do about safety is only influenced by how things work 
out in the short term 
 
 
49 My convenience is a big factor in how I make decisions or  take 
actions about safety  
 
 
50 I am willing to put in extra time, effort and money now to ensure 
that the job is safe in the future.  
 
 
51 I think it is important to take warnings about safety seriously, 
even if it is unlikely that an accident will happen for many years.  
 
52 I think it is more important to do something about serious 
accidents in the future than minor accidents now. 
 
53 I generally ignore warnings about possible risks in the future, 
because they generally get sorted out before that happen 
 
54 I think it is unnecessary to change things now to prevent a 
possible future accident as problems can be dealt with nearer the 
time. 
 
55 I only act when there is an immediate risk, I prefer to take care 
of future problems that may occur at a later date 
 
56 I believe that safety today is more important than safety at some 
time in the future. 
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AND LASTLY SOME INFORMATION ABOUT YOU 
57. How many people do you have responsibility for either as a Manager or Supervisor 
Please tick against one answer 
1-5 
people 
(1)   31-35 people (8)  
6-10 
people 
(2)   36-40 people (9)  
11-15 
people 
(3)   41-45 people (10)  
16-20 
people 
(4)   46-50 people (11)  
21-25 
people 
(5)   More than 51 
people  
(12)  
26-30 
people 
(6)   Not applicable  (13)  
 
 
 
58.  Are you (Please Tick)       
Male  (1)  
Female  (2)  
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59. Which of the following categories best describes your organization.   (Please Tick) 
 
Retail Shop  (1)   Wholesale Shop or 
warehouse  
(7)  
Office  (2)   Catering, Restaurant  
or Bar  
(8)  
Hotel/ B&B  (3)   Residential Care  (9)  
Leisure/ 
Cultural  
(4)   Consumer Services eg 
hairdresser/ beauty  
(10)  
Manufacturing  (5)   Construction Industry  (11)  
Agriculture  (6)   Central or Local 
Government  
(12)  
    Other  (13)  
 
 
60. Please give your current age. 
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61. Which of the following best describes your current working location. (Please tick) 
United 
Kingdom  
 
(1)   Ireland  (6)  
Europe  (2)   North 
America / 
Canada  
(7)  
South 
America  
(3)   Australia/ 
New 
Zealand  
(8)  
Middle East  
 
(4)   Africa  (9)  
Far East  
 
(5)   Other  (10)  
 
62. Which of these best describes you. Please Circle / highlight 
 
Manager / 
Supervisor  
(1) 
Company 
Safety  
Officer  
(2) 
Health and Safety  
Enforcement 
Officer 
 (3)   
Someone who has  
had an accident at 
work (4) 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.  
I AM VERY GRATEFUL. 
PLEASE RETURN IT TO ME  BY POST  OR  FAX . 
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PLEASE DETACH THIS SHEET AND KEEP IT 
 
 
 
 
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire.  
Research such as this cannot happen with out your help. 
 
 
 
 
 
This questionnaire forms part of a study in to the ways in which accidents at work 
are viewed by Mangers & Supervisors, Safety Professionals and Accident Subjects 
themselves. 
 
The same questions have been asked of each group and the results will be compared 
to see if there are any differences or similarities.  
 
This stage of the research is concerned with how people think about hazards before 
and after an accident has happened and how they see responsibility for cause and 
prevention. 
 
It is hoped that the results will help to improve our understanding of the ways these 
groups think about safety and accidents at work and will allow managers / 
supervisors and Safety Professionals to be better trained in accident investigation.  
 
It is proposed that the results will be published in a professional Safety Journal. All 
results will be summarized and no individual respondent or employer will be 
identified. All answers to the questionnaire are treated in the strictest confidence. 
The information collected will be stored and treated in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act.       
 
If you need to contact the researcher please  do so by e-mail  
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ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
FOR SAFETY PROFESSIONALS 
 
 
 
 
RESEARCHER PAUL LEHANE 
 
SUPERVISOR DR. DAVID HARDMAN 
 
 
 
 
PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT 
 
CALCUTTA HOUSE 
OLD CASTLE STREET LONDON E1 7NT 
 
9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research supported by the  
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Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am conducting research into the way in which safety professionals think about 
accidents at work.   
 
I am interested in your views and would be very grateful if you could spare about 15-
20 minutes to complete the attached questionnaire. Your participation is entirely 
voluntary and any information you provide will be confidential, although overall 
questionnaire results may be published in summary form. In addition, questionnaire 
completion is anonymous unless you are responding by e-mail or fax. If you have 
received this electronically but wish to respond anonymously, then simply print the 
questionnaire off and return by post. 
 
Thank you, 
 
Paul Lehane. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION  
Please complete by hand if the questionnaire has been posted to you, writing your 
answers in the grey shaded boxes or circle / tick the appropriate answer from the 
choices given.  
If you have received the questionnaire by E-mail or downloaded it from the University 
Internet site you may print the questionnaire and complete by hand or complete as 
Word Document.  
COMPLETION AS A WORD DOCUMENT. 
 
Please HIGHLIGHT your answer using the Highlight Button where options are given 
otherwise please type your answers in to the grey boxes.  
When the questionnaire is complete please attach it to an E-mail and send to me at the 
address below. 
RETURN OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
BY POST 
If you have been sent the questionnaire by post a prepaid envelope should have been 
provided. Please use this to return the questionnaire. If not please return to:- 
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BY FAX 
You may Fax your completed questionnaire to me on
 
BY E-MAIL 
You can return the questionnaire to me at  
 
Paul Lehane c/o  
EHTS  
London Borough of Bromley 
Civic Centre Bromley England BR1 3UH 
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WHY ARE ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATED? 
People have different views about why accidents are investigated. 
 
Six reasons for accident investigation are given below. As a safety professional 
please indicate how important each reason is to you. 
Circle / highlight one answer from the choices given for each question. 
1. To find out the cause and understand what happened. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
2. To prevent similar accidents from happening again. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
 
3. To meet organizational requirements eg collection of statistics, make 
insurance claims, staff training etc. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
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4. To find out if staff acted correctly or incorrectly.   
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
5. To find out if management acted correctly or incorrectly. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
6. To punish someone for breaking rules and regulations. (Enforce rules or 
law)  
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
7.  Please Rank in order of importance the 6 reasons for accident investigation.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the least 
important as = 6. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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HOW LIKELY IS IT THAT AN ACCIDENT WILL HAPPEN?  
 
This section asks you to think about slipping hazards in a typical Supermarket and 
how likely you think an accident might be. I have chosen a Supermarket as I hope it 
will be familiar to most people. 
Thinking about a spillage of milk as a slipping hazard please complete questions 9, 
10 & 11.   
Please Circle / highlight your answer. 
9. Please indicate how likely it is that a spillage of milk will lead to an accident 
to a member of staff during the next 6 months. 
 
(1) 
Extremel
y 
Unlikely 
(2) 
Very 
Unlikel
y 
(3) 
Fairly 
Unlikel
y 
(4) 
Fairly 
Likely 
(5) 
Very 
Likely 
(6) 
Extremel
y Likely 
 
10. Please also score how confident you feel making this judgement.  
(1) 
Not at all confident 
(2) 
Not very 
confiden
t 
(3) 
A little 
confiden
t 
(4) 
Quite 
confide
nt 
(5) 
Very 
confide
nt 
(6) 
Certain  
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11. And lastly how serious do you think the outcome of the accident might be.   
(1) 
Trivial 
(2) 
Minor 
(3) 
Quite 
Serious 
(4) 
Serious 
(5) 
Very 
serious 
(6) 
Extremel
y serious 
 
INVESTIGATING A SLIPPING ACCIDENT IN A SUPERMARKET 
 
In the section that follows you are asked to read about a slipping accident to Mary (a 
part time checkout operator at ABC Supermarkets) who slipped over on a spillage of 
milk near to the checkouts as she was going to the staff room for her mid morning 
break. 
 
When answering the questions that follow please do so as a safety professional, 
responding in the same way as you would in your own workplace.  
Use your own knowledge or experience of slipping accidents to add to the 
information given about the accident.  
Mary is a lady of about 55 years of age who has worked as a part time 
checkout operator for about 8 years. She usually works Monday Tuesday and 
Wednesday but had come in on this particular Thursday to cover for a friend 
who was on holiday.  
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As a safety professional you have received a report on an accident to Mary in ABC 
Supermarkets 
 
ABC SUPERMARKET 
 
MESSAGE TO  SAFETY OFFICER 
FROM  BILL  SHOP FLOOR SUPERVISOR 
DATE    THURSDAY 10 AUGUST   TIME  11.30 HRS 
 
SUBJECT - ACCIDENT TO MARY 
At about 10.30am Mary went for her rest break and slipped over on some spilt milk 
and hurt her arm. An ambulance was called to take her to hospital.  She has broken 
her right arm, which has been plastered. She will be off work for at least 3 weeks. 
 
 
You speak to Jane one of the other checkout operators who witnessed the accident and 
Bill the Shop Floor Supervisor. These are your notes from your conversations. 
 
 Mary does not usually work on Thursdays but was covering for a friend who was 
on holiday 
 Mary closed her checkout at the usual time for her mid morning break and waited 
for a friend on the checkout next to her to serve her last customer and they both 
went to their break together as usual. 
 They were walking together past the checkout when Mary slipped over on some 
spilt milk and fell awkwardly on her right arm. 
 The First Aider attended and an ambulance was called to take Mary to hospital. 
 At hospital she was found to have a broken right arm. She will be off work for at 
least 3 weeks with her arm in plaster.    
 A customer  had seen the milk and reported it to Bill the Supervisor 
 Bill confirmed that the spillage had been reported by a customer and the cleaner 
had been asked to clear it up 5 minutes before the accident but had not got round to 
dealing with it. 
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 No warning signs had been put out. 
 It is not known how long the milk had been on the floor before it was reported by 
the customer 
 Spillages around the checkouts are very common. 
 According to the Accident Book 4 other people had been injured in slipping 
accidents in the past 6 months 
 
Using the information provided about Mary’s accident and your own experience of 
slipping accidents as a Safety Professional please answer the following questions. 
IT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT 
 
After an unwanted outcome such as failing an exam, missing a flight or an accident people 
often think about how things could have been different.  
For example: - 
After failing an exam a student might say "If only … I had worked harder….I might have 
passed" and a family who miss their holiday flight might say " If only…. we had left 
earlier…… we might have caught the flight  
 
12. After Mary’s accident you found yourself thinking “If only……” . How would you 
continue this thought?  
 
 
If only…….. 
 
 
 
…. Things could have been different. 
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13 Which one of the following people does the sentence above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
13 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
 
As a Safety Professional please think back to a point in time a week before Mary's 
accident and complete questions 14,15 & 16. 
 Please Circle / highlight one option in each row. 
 
 A week before Mary’s accident I would have rated the likelihood (risk) of a slipping accident 
from a spillage of milk as 
14 (1) 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
 
(2) 
Very 
Unlikely 
(3) 
Fairly 
Unlikely 
(4) 
Fairly 
Likely 
(5) 
Very 
Likely 
(6) 
Extremely 
Likely 
 
 Score how confident you feel making this judgement 
15 (1) 
Not at all 
confident 
(2) 
Not very 
confident 
(3) 
A little 
confident 
(4) 
Quite 
confident 
(5) 
Very 
confident 
(6) 
Certain  
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 A week before Mary’s accident I would have rated the seriousness of a slipping accident 
on a spillage of milk as 
16 (1) 
Trivial 
(2) 
Minor 
(3) 
Quite  
Serious 
(4) 
Serious 
(5) 
Very 
serious 
(6) 
Extremely 
serious 
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COULD MARY’S ACCIDENT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED? 
 
As a Safety Professional do you believe that Mary's accident could have been 
prevented?  
Please Circle / highlight one answer.   
17 Yes  
(1) 
No   
(2) 
Not Sure   
(3) 
 
If you answered YES please go to question 18.  If you answered "No" or "Not sure" 
please go to question 29  
 
 Please indicate how you believe Mary's slipping accident could have been 
prevented. 
18 Mary’s accident could have been prevented…….. 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
19 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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WHO HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREVENTING MARY’S ACCIDENT?  
 
As a Safety Professional please rate the level of responsibility of the following 
people for preventing Mary's accident. 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were. 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
 
  Responsibility for Preventing Mary's 
accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
20 Mary   0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
21 Bill the Shop 
floor Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
22 The Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
23 The Store 
Safety Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
24 ABC 
Supermarkets 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
25 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
26 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
27 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
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28  Please Rank these 8 people in order of  importance in preventing Mary’s 
accident.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the 
least important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
Knowing that a slipping accident has just happened. How would you rate/score the 
chance of another slipping accident happening again on spilt milk in the next 6 
months?  
Please Circle / highlight your answer 
 The Likelihood of having another slipping accident on spilt milk in the next 6 months 
29 (1) 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
(2) 
Very  
Unlikely 
(3) 
Fairly 
Unlikely 
(4) 
Fairly 
Likely 
(5) 
Very 
Likely 
(6) 
Extremely 
Likely 
 
 The Seriousness of an another slipping accident on spilt milk in the next 6 months. 
31 (1) 
Trivial 
2 
Minor 
3 
Quite 
Serious 
4 
Serious 
5 
Very 
serious 
6 
Extremely 
serious 
 Score how confident you feel making this judgment 
30 (1) 
Not at all 
confident 
(2) 
Not very 
confident 
(3) 
Confident 
(4) 
Quite 
confident 
(5) 
Very 
confident 
(6) 
Certain 
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RESPONSIBILITY FOR CAUSING THE ACCIDENT 
As Safety Professional what would you say was the cause of Mary's accident? 
 
32 The cause of Mary's accident was… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
33 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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As a Safety Professional please rate the level of responsibility of the following 
people for causing Mary's accident. 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were. 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
  Responsibility for Causing Mary's 
accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
34 Mary   0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
35 Bill the Shop 
floor 
Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
36 The Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
37 The Store 
Safety Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
38 ABC 
Supermarkets 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
39 Another 
worker 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
40 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
41 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
 
Please Rank these 8 people in order of importance in causing the accident.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the least 
important as = 8. Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions 
above.   
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LUCKY OR UNLUCKY? 
 
Mary’s accident might be shown in a flow diagram something like the following 
one.  
Please enter a score in the grey boxes for how lucky or unlucky you feel Mary was 
at each stage. 
 
Thursday at 
10.30 Mary 
closed her 
checkout to go 
for her usual mid 
morning rest 
break  
▼ 42                                        Stage A 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
As usual Mary 
waited for her 
friend on the next 
checkout and 
they both walked 
along the front of 
the checkouts 
towards the staff 
room   
▼ 43                                         Stage B  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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Milk had been 
spilt on the floor 
▼ 44                                             Stage C  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
  
The spillage had 
been reported 5 
minutes ago. The 
cleaner had been 
requested to clear 
up but had not 
got round to it  
▼ 45                                            Stage D  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
  
Mary did not see 
the milk on the 
floor 
▼ 46                                        Stage E  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
  
Mary stepped on 
the milk 
▼ 47                                       Stage F  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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Mary slipped on 
the milk 
▼ 48                                        Stage G 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
       
Mary lost her 
balance and fell 
over 
▼ 49                                         Stage H  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
       
Mary fell 
awkwardly 
hurting her right 
arm. 
▼ 50                                         Stage I  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
       
Mary taken to 
hospital- her arm 
was x-rayed and 
found to be 
broken . She will 
be off work for 3 
weeks. 
▼ 51                                        Stage J  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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Overall how would you rate the outcome for Mary following her accident?  
Please Circle / highlight your answer. 
 
52 (1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
Please give your reasons in the box below 
53  
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Using the Stages A to J in the flowchart please answer questions 54 to 61. Circle or 
highlight your answer  
  Stages A-J 
54 At which stage 
did the 
sequence of 
events change 
from being 
normal/routine?  
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
        
55 At which stage 
did Mary’s 
accident 
become 
certain? 
 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
  
 
 
      
56 At which 
stage(s) did 
Mary have 
control over the 
situation? 
 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
        
57 At which 
stage(s) did the 
Manager have 
control over the 
situation 
 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
        
58 At which stage 
or stages did an 
action of any 
person become 
an important 
factor in Mary's 
accident 
 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
        
59 Who took the 
action 
Mary Bill Manager Safety 
Officer 
  
 Another 
worker 
Cleaner Customer None   
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60 At which stage 
or stages did an 
inaction ( 
failure to act) 
of any person 
become an 
important 
factor in Mary's 
accident 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
 F G H I J  
        
61 Who failed to 
take an action 
Mary Bill Manager Safety 
Officer 
  
  Another 
worker 
Cleaner Customer None   
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SAFETY NOW AND IN THE FUTURE  
 
For each of the following statements please indicate how well they describe you as 
a Safety Professional. 
If the statement is a very good description of you (very like you) fill in a 1, if it is 
not a very good description of you (not at all like you) please fill in a 5.  
Use the other numbers if you fall between 1-5. 
Scale 
Very good 
description / 
Very like me 
1 
Quite a good 
description 
/Quite like me 
2 
Not sure if it 
describes me. 
 
3 
Quite poor 
description / 
Quite unlike 
me. 
4 
Very poor 
description / 
Very unlike 
me. 
5 
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(Please write in the grey areas to the right of each statement) 
 
  Score 
62 I think about safety in the future and try to influence things by 
my day to day behaviour 
 
63 I think about safety in the future and do things now to achieve 
safety in the years ahead  
 
 
64 Thinking about safety I only do things to deal with the 
immediate situation, not worrying about the future 
 
65 What I do about safety is only influenced by how things work 
out in the short term 
 
66 My convenience is a big factor in how I make decisions or  take 
actions about safety  
 
67 I am willing to put in extra time, effort and money now to ensure 
that the job is safe in the future. 
 
 
68 I think it is important to take warnings about safety seriously, 
even if it is unlikely that an accident will happen for many years.  
 
69 I think it is more important to do something about serious 
accidents in the future than minor accidents now. 
 
70 I generally ignore warnings about possible risks in the future, 
because they generally get sorted out before that happen 
 
71 I think it is unnecessary to change things now to prevent a 
possible future accident as problems can be dealt with nearer the 
time. 
 
72 I only act when there is an immediate risk, I prefer to take care 
of future problems that may occur at a later date 
 
73 I believe that safety today is more important than safety at some 
time in the future. 
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AND LASTLY SOME INFORMATION ABOUT YOU 
74. How many people do you have responsibility for either as a Manager or 
Supervisor 
Please tick against one answer 
1-5 
people 
(1)   31-35 people (8)  
6-10 
people 
(2)   36-40 people (9)  
11-15 
people 
(3)   41-45 people (10)  
16-20 
people 
(4)   46-50 people (11)  
21-25 
people 
(5)   More than 51 
people  
(12)  
26-30 
people 
(6)   Not applicable  (13)  
 
75  Are you (Please Tick)       
Male  (1)  
Female  (2)  
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76. Which of the following categories best describes your organization.   (Please 
Tick) 
 
Retail Shop  (1)   Wholesale Shop or 
warehouse  
(7)  
Office  (2)   Catering, Restaurant  
or Bar  
(8)  
Hotel/ B&B  (3)   Residential Care  (9)  
Leisure/ 
Cultural 
(4)   Consumer Services eg 
hairdresser/ beauty  
(10)  
Manufacturing  (5)   Construction Industry  (11)  
Agriculture  (6)   Central or Local 
Government  
(12)  
    Other  (13)  
 
 
77. Please give your current age. 
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78. Which of the following best describes your current working location. (Please tick) 
United 
Kingdom  
(1)   Ireland  (6)  
Europe (2)   North 
America / 
Canada  
(7)  
South 
America  
(3)   Australia/ 
New 
Zealand  
(8)  
Middle East  
 
(4)   Africa  (9)  
Far East  
 
(5)   Other  (10)  
 
79. Which of these best describes you. Please Circle / highlight 
Manager / 
Supervisor  
(1) 
Company 
Safety  
Officer  
(2) 
Health and 
Safety  
Enforcement 
Officer 
 (3)   
Someone who 
has  
had an accident 
at work (4) 
University 
or Nebosh  
Student 
studying 
occupational 
health/safety  
(5) 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.  
I AM VERY GRATEFUL. 
PLEASE RETURN IT TO ME  BY POST,  FAX OR E-MAIL. 
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PLEASE DETACH THIS SHEET AND KEEP IT 
 
 
 
 
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire.  
Research such as this cannot happen with out your help. 
 
 
 
 
 
This questionnaire forms part of a study in to the ways in which accidents at work 
are viewed by Mangers & Supervisors, Safety Professionals and Accident Subjects 
themselves. 
 
The same questions have been asked of each group and the results will be compared 
to see if there are any differences or similarities.  
 
This stage of the research is concerned with how people think about hazards before 
and after an accident has happened and how they see responsibility for cause and 
prevention. 
 
It is hoped that the results will help to improve our understanding of the ways these 
groups think about safety and accidents at work and will allow managers / 
supervisors and Safety Professionals to be better trained in accident investigation.  
 
It is proposed that the results will be published in a professional Safety Journal. All 
results will be summarized and no individual respondent or employer will be 
identified. All answers to the questionnaire are treated in the strictest confidence. 
The information collected will be stored and treated in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act.       
 
If you need to contact the researcher please do so by e-mail  
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ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
FOR SAFETY PROFESSIONALS 
 
 
 
 
 
RESEARCHER PAUL LEHANE 
 
SUPERVISOR DR. DAVID HARDMAN 
 
 
 
 
PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT 
 
CALCUTTA HOUSE 
OLD CASTLE STREET LONDON E1 7NT 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research supported by the  
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Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am conducting research into the way in which safety professionals think about 
accidents at work.   
 
I would be very grateful if you could spare about 15-20 minutes to complete the 
attached questionnaire. Your participation is entirely voluntary and any information 
you provide will be confidential, although overall questionnaire results may be 
published in summary form. In addition, questionnaire completion is anonymous unless 
you are responding by e-mail or fax. If you have received this electronically but wish to 
respond anonymously, then simply print the questionnaire off and return by post. 
 
Thank you, 
 
Paul Lehane. 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION  
 
Please complete by hand if the questionnaire has been posted to you, writing your 
answers in the grey shaded boxes or circle / tick the appropriate answer from the 
choices given.  
If you have received the questionnaire by E-mail or downloaded it from the University 
Internet site you may print the questionnaire and complete by hand or complete as 
Word Document.  
 
COMPLETION AS A WORD DOCUMENT. 
 
Please HIGHLIGHT your answer using the Highlight Button where options are given 
otherwise please type your answers in to the grey boxes.  
When the questionnaire is complete please attach it to an E-mail and send to me at the 
address below. 
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RETURN OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
BY POST 
If you have been sent the questionnaire by post a prepaid envelope should have been 
provided. Please use this to return the questionnaire. If not please return to:- 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY FAX 
You may Fax your completed questionnaire to me on
 
BY E-MAIL 
You can return the questionnaire to me at  
 
Paul Lehane c/o  
EHTS  
London Borough of Bromley 
Civic Centre Bromley England BR1 3UH 
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WHY ARE ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATED? 
People have different views about why accidents are investigated. 
 
Six reasons for accident investigation are given below. As a safety professional 
please indicate how important each reason is to you. 
Circle / highlight one answer from the choices given for each question. 
 
7. To find out the cause and understand what happened. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
8. To prevent similar accidents from happening again. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
9. To meet organizational requirements e.g. collection of statistics, make 
insurance claims, staff training etc. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
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10. To find out if staff acted correctly or incorrectly.   
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
11. To find out if management acted correctly or incorrectly. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
12. To punish someone for breaking rules and regulations. (Enforce rules or 
law)  
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
7.  Please Rank in order of importance the 6 reasons for accident investigation.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the least 
important as = 6. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
HOW LIKELY IS IT THAT AN ACCIDENT WILL HAPPEN?  
This section asks you to think about slipping hazards in a typical Supermarket and 
how likely you think an accident might be. I have chosen a Supermarket as I hope it 
will be familiar to most people. 
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Thinking about a spillage of milk as a slipping hazard please complete questions 9, 
10 & 11.   
Please Circle / highlight your answer. 
9. Please indicate how likely it is that a spillage of milk will lead to an accident 
to a member of staff during the next 6 months. 
 
(1) 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
(2) 
Very 
Unlikely 
(3) 
Fairly 
Unlikely 
(4) 
Fairly 
Likely 
(5) 
Very 
Likely 
(6) 
Extremely 
Likely 
 
10. Please also score how confident you feel making this prediction.  
 
1) 
Not at all confident 
(2) 
Not very 
confident 
(3) 
A little 
confident 
(4) 
Quite 
confident 
(5) 
Very 
confident 
(6) 
Certain  
 
11. And lastly how serious do you think the outcome of the accident might be.   
 
(1) 
Trivial 
(2) 
Minor 
(3) 
Quite 
Serious 
(4) 
Serious 
(5) 
Very 
serious 
(6) 
Extremely 
serious 
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INVESTIGATING A SLIPPING ACCIDENT IN A SUPERMARKET 
In the section that follows you are asked to read about a slipping accident to Mary (a 
part time checkout operator at ABC Supermarkets) who slipped over on a spillage of 
milk near to the checkouts as she was going to the staff room for her mid morning 
break. 
 
When answering the questions that follow please do so as a safety professional, 
responding in the same way as you would in your own workplace.  
Use your own knowledge or experience of slipping accidents to add to the 
information given about the accident.  
 
Mary is a lady of about 55 years of age who has worked for as a part time 
checkout operator for about 8 years. She usually works Monday Tuesday and 
Wednesday but had come in on this particular Thursday to cover for a friend 
who was on holiday.  
As a safety professional you have received a report on an accident to Mary in ABC 
Supermarkets 
ABC SUPERMARKET 
MESSAGE TO  SAFETY OFFICER 
FROM  BILL  SHOP FLOOR SUPERVISOR 
DATE    THURSDAY 10 AUGUST   TIME  11.30 HRS 
SUBJECT - ACCIDENT TO MARY 
At about 10.30am Mary went for her rest break and slipped over on some spilt milk 
and hurt her arm. An ambulance was called to take her to hospital.  She has broken 
her right arm, which has been plastered. She will be off work for at least 3 weeks. 
 
Using the information provided about Mary’s accident and your own experience of 
slipping accidents as a Safety Professional please answer the following questions. 
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IT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT 
 
After an unwanted outcome such as failing an exam, missing a flight or an accident people 
often think about how things could have been different.  
For example: - 
After failing an exam a student might say "If only … I had worked harder….I might have 
passed" and a family who miss their holiday flight might say " If only…. we had left 
earlier…… we might have caught the flight  
 
12. After Mary’s accident you found yourself thinking “If only……” . How would you 
continue this thought?  
 
If only…….. 
 
 
 
 
 
…. Things could have been different. 
 
13 Which one of the following people does the sentence above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
 
13 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
 
As a Safety Professional please think back to a point in time a week before Mary's 
accident and complete questions 14,15 & 16. 
 Please Circle / highlight one option in each row. 
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 A week before Mary’s accident I would have rated the likelihood (risk) of a slipping 
accident from a spillage of milk as 
14 (1 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
 
(2) 
Very 
Unlikely 
(3) 
Fairly 
Unlikely 
(4) 
Fairly 
Likely 
(5) 
Very 
Likely 
(6) 
Extremely 
Likely 
 
 Score how confident you feel making this judgement 
15 (1) 
Not at all 
confident 
(2) 
Not very 
confident 
(3) 
A little 
confident 
(4) 
Quite 
confident 
(5) 
Very 
confident 
(6) 
Certain  
 
 
 A week before Mary’s accident I would have rated the seriousness of a 
slipping accident on a spillage of milk as 
16 (1) 
Trivial 
(2) 
Minor 
(3) 
Quite  
Serious 
(4) 
Serious 
(5) 
Very 
serious 
(6) 
Extremely 
serious 
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COULD MARY’S ACCIDENT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED? 
 
As a Safety Professional do you believe that Mary's accident could have been 
prevented?  
Please Circle / highlight one answer.   
17 Yes  
(1) 
No   
(2) 
Not Sure   
(3) 
 
If you answered YES please go to question 18.  If you answered "No" or "Not sure" 
please go to question 29  
 
 Please indicate how you believe Mary's slipping accident could have been 
prevented. 
18 Mary’s accident could have been prevented…….. 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
19 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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WHO HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREVENTING MARY’S ACCIDENT?  
As a Safety Professional please rate the level of responsibility of the following 
people for preventing Mary's accident. 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were. 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
  Responsibility for Preventing Mary's 
accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
20 Mary   0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
21 Bill the Shop 
floor Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
22 The Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
23 The Store 
Safety Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
24 ABC 
Supermarkets 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
25 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
26 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
27 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
28  Please Rank these 8 people in order of  importance in preventing Mary’s 
accident.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the 
least important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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Knowing that a slipping accident has just happened. How would you rate/score the 
chance of another slipping accident happening again on spilt milk in the next 6 
months?  
 
Please Circle / highlight your answer 
 The Likelihood of having another slipping accident on spilt milk in the next 6 
months 
.29 (1) 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
(2) 
Very  
Unlikely 
(3) 
Fairly 
Unlikely 
(4) 
Fairly 
Likely 
(5) 
Very 
Likely 
(6) 
Extremely 
Likely 
 
 Score how confident you feel making this judgment 
30 (1) 
Not at all 
confident 
(2) 
Not very 
confident 
(3) 
Confident 
(4) 
Quite 
confident 
(5) 
Very 
confident 
(6) 
Certain 
 
 The Seriousness of an another slipping accident on spilt milk in the next 6 
months. 
31 (1) 
Trivial 
2 
Minor 
3 
Quite 
Serious 
4 
Serious 
5 
Very 
serious 
6 
Extremely 
serious 
 Page | 562  
 
 
 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR CAUSING THE ACCIDENT 
 
As Safety Professional what would you say was the cause of Mary's accident? 
 
32 The cause of Mary's accident was… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
 
33 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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As a Safety Professional please rate the level of responsibility of the following 
people for causing Mary's accident. 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were. 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
  Responsibility for Causing Mary's accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
34 Mary  0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
35 Bill the Shop 
floor Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
36 The Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
37 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
38 ABC 
Supermarkets 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
39 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
40 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
41 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
 
Please Rank these 8 people in order of importance in causing the accident.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the least 
important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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LUCKY OR UNLUCKY? 
 
Mary’s accident might be shown in a flow diagram something like the following 
one.  
Please enter a score in the grey boxes for how lucky or unlucky you feel Mary was 
at each stage. 
 
Thursday at 
10.30 Mary went 
for her rest break  
▼ 42                                        Stage A 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
Mary walked 
towards the Staff 
Room   
▼ 43                                         Stage B  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
 
Milk had been 
spilt on the floor 
▼ 44                                             Stage C  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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The spillage had 
not been cleared 
up.  
▼ 45                                            Stage D  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
  
Mary did not see 
the milk on the 
floor 
▼ 46                                        Stage E  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
  
Mary stepped on 
the milk 
▼ 47                                       Stage F  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
 
      
Mary slipped on 
the milk 
▼ 48                                        Stage G 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
   
 
    
 Page | 566  
 
Mary lost her 
balance and fell 
over 
▼ 49                                         Stage H  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
       
Mary fell 
awkwardly 
hurting her right 
arm. 
▼ 50                                         Stage I  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
 
Mary taken to 
hospital- her arm 
was x-rayed and 
found to be 
broken. She will 
be off work for 3 
weeks. 
▼ 51                                        Stage J  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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Overall how would you rate the outcome for Mary following her accident?  
Please Circle / highlight your answer. 
52 (1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very Lucky 
 
Please give your reasons in the box below 
 
53  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using the Stages A to J in the flowchart please answer questions 54 to 61. Circle or 
highlight your answer 
 
  Stages A-J 
54 At which stage 
did the 
sequence of 
events change 
from being 
normal/routine?  
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
        
55 At which stage 
did Mary’s 
accident 
become 
certain? 
 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
        
56 At which 
stage(s) did 
Mary have 
control over the 
situation? 
 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
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57 At which 
stage(s) did the 
Manager have 
control over the 
situation 
 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
        
58 At which stage 
or stages did an 
action of any 
person become 
an important 
factor in Mary's 
accident 
 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
        
59 Who took the 
action 
Mary Bill Manager Safety 
Officer 
  
 Another 
worker 
Cleaner Customer None   
        
60 At which stage 
or stages did an 
inaction ( 
failure to act) 
of any person 
become an 
important 
factor in Mary's 
accident 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
 F G H I J  
        
61 Who failed to 
take an action 
Mary Bill Manager Safety 
Officer 
  
  Another 
worker 
Cleaner Customer None   
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SAFETY NOW AND IN THE FUTURE  
 
For each of the following statements please indicate how well they describe you as 
a Safety Professional. 
If the statement is a very good description of you (very like you) fill in a 1, if it is 
not a very good description of you (not at all like you) please fill in a 5.  
Use the other numbers if you fall between 1-5. 
Scale 
Very good 
description / Very 
like me 
1 
Quite a good 
description /Quite 
like me 
2 
Not sure if it 
describes me. 
 
3 
Quite poor 
description / 
Quite unlike me. 
4 
Very poor 
description / Very 
unlike me. 
5 
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(Please write in the grey areas to the right of each statement) 
  Score 
62 I think about safety in the future and try to influence things by 
my day to day behaviour 
 
63 I think about safety in the future and do things now to achieve 
safety in the years ahead  
 
 
64 Thinking about safety I only do things to deal with the 
immediate situation, not worrying about the future 
 
65 What I do about safety is only influenced by how things work 
out in the short term 
 
66 My convenience is a big factor in how I make decisions or  take 
actions about safety  
 
67 I am willing to put in extra time, effort and money now to ensure 
that the job is safe in the future.  
 
68 I think it is important to take warnings about safety seriously, 
even if it is unlikely that an accident will happen for many years.  
 
69 I think it is more important to do something about serious 
accidents in the future than minor accidents now. 
 
70 I generally ignore warnings about possible risks in the future, 
because they generally get sorted out before that happen 
 
71 I think it is unnecessary to change things now to prevent a 
possible future accident as problems can be dealt with nearer the 
time. 
 
72 I only act when there is an immediate risk, I prefer to take care 
of future problems that may occur at a later date 
 
73 I believe that safety today is more important than safety at some 
time in the future. 
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AND LASTLY SOME INFORMATION ABOUT YOU 
74. How many people do you have responsibility for either as a Manager or 
Supervisor 
 
Please tick against one answer 
1-5 
people 
(1)   31-35 people (8)  
6-10 
people 
(2)   36-40 people (9)  
11-15 
people 
(3)   41-45 people (10)  
16-20 
people 
(4)   46-50 people (11)  
21-25 
people 
(5)   More than 51 
people  
(12)  
26-30 
people 
(6)   Not applicable  (13)  
 
75.  Are you (Please Tick)       
Male  (1)  
Female  (2)  
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76. Which of the following categories best describes your organization.   (Please 
Tick) 
 
Retail Shop  (1)   Wholesale Shop or 
warehouse  
(7)  
Office  (2)   Catering, Restaurant  
or Bar  
(8)  
Hotel/ B&B  (3)   Residential Care  (9)  
Leisure/ Cultural  
 
(4)   Consumer Services 
eg hairdresser/ 
beauty  
(1
0) 
 
Manufacturing  (5)   Construction 
Industry  
(1
1) 
 
Agriculture  (6)   Central or Local 
Government  
(1
2) 
 
    Other  (1
3) 
 
 
 
77. Please give your current age. 
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78. Which of the following best describes your current working location. (Please tick) 
United 
Kingdom  
(1)   Ireland  (6)  
Europe  (2)   North America 
/ Canada  
(7)  
South 
America  
(3)   Australia/ New 
Zealand  
(8)  
Middle East  (4)   Africa  (9)  
Far East  (5)   Other  (10)  
 
79. Which of these best describes you. Please Circle / highlight 
 
Manager / 
Supervisor  
(1) 
Company 
Safety  
Officer  
(2) 
Health and Safety  
Enforcement 
Officer 
 (3)   
Someone who has  
had an accident at 
work (4) 
University 
or Nebosh  
Student 
studying 
occupational 
health 
/safety  
(5) 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.  
I AM VERY GRATEFUL. 
PLEASE RETURN IT TO ME  BY POST,  FAX OR E-MAIL. 
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PLEASE DETACH THIS SHEET AND KEEP IT 
 
 
 
 
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire.  
Research such as this cannot happen with out your help. 
 
 
 
 
 
This questionnaire forms part of a study in to the ways in which accidents at work 
are viewed by Mangers & Supervisors, Safety Professionals and Accident Subjects 
themselves. 
 
The same questions have been asked of each group and the results will be compared 
to see if there are any differences or similarities.  
 
This stage of the research is concerned with how people think about hazards before 
and after an accident has happened and how they see responsibility for cause and 
prevention. 
 
It is hoped that the results will help to improve our understanding of the ways these 
groups think about safety and accidents at work and will allow managers / 
supervisors and Safety Professionals to be better trained in accident investigation.  
 
It is proposed that the results will be published in a professional Safety Journal. All 
results will be summarized and no individual respondent or employer will be 
identified. All answers to the questionnaire are treated in the strictest confidence. 
The information collected will be stored and treated in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act.       
 
If you need to contact the researcher please  do so by e-mail  
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ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
FOR SAFETY PROFESSIONALS 
 
 
SEARCHER PAUL LEHANE 
 
SUPERVISOR DR. DAVID HARDMAN 
 
 
 
PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT 
 
CALCUTTA HOUSE 
OLD CASTLE STREET LONDON E1 7NT 
 
11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research supported by the  
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Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am conducting research into the way in which safety professionals think about 
accidents at work.   
 
I would be very grateful if you could spare about 15-20 minutes to complete the 
attached questionnaire. Your participation is entirely voluntary and any information 
you provide will be confidential, although overall questionnaire results may be 
published in summary form. In addition, questionnaire completion is anonymous unless 
you are responding by e-mail or fax. If you have received this electronically but wish to 
respond anonymously, then simply print the questionnaire off and return by post. 
 
Thank you, 
 
Paul Lehane. 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION  
 
Please complete by hand if the questionnaire has been posted to you, writing your 
answers in the grey shaded boxes or circle / tick the appropriate answer from the 
choices given.  
If you have received the questionnaire by E-mail or downloaded it from the University 
Internet site you may print the questionnaire and complete by hand or complete as 
Word Document.  
 
COMPLETION AS A WORD DOCUMENT. 
 
Please HIGHLIGHT your answer using the Highlight Button where options are given 
otherwise please type your answers in to the grey boxes.  
When the questionnaire is complete please attach it to an E-mail and send to me at the 
address below. 
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RETURN OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
BY POST 
If you have been sent the questionnaire by post a prepaid envelope should have been 
provided. Please use this to return the questionnaire. If not please return to:- 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY FAX 
You may Fax your completed questionnaire to me on
 
BY E-MAIL 
You can return the questionnaire to me at  
 
Paul Lehane c/o  
EHTS  
London Borough of Bromley 
Civic Centre Bromley England BR1 3UH 
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WHY ARE ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATED? 
 
People have different views about why accidents are investigated. 
 
Six reasons for accident investigation are given below. As a safety professional 
please indicate how important each reason is to you. 
 
Circle / highlight one answer from the choices given for each question. 
1 To find out the cause and understand what happened. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
2 To prevent similar accidents from happening again. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
3 To meet organizational requirements eg collection of statistics, make insurance 
claims, staff training etc. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
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4 To find out if staff acted correctly or  incorrectly.   
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
5 To find out if management acted correctly or  incorrectly. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
6 To punish someone for breaking rules and regulations. (Enforce the rules 
or law)  
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
7.  Please Rank  in order of importance the 6 reasons for accident investigation .  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the least 
important as = 6. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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HOW LIKELY IS IT THAT AN ACCIDENT WILL HAPPEN?  
This section asks you to think about slipping hazards in a typical Supermarket and 
how likely you think an accident might be. I have chosen a Supermarket as I hope it 
will be familiar to most people. 
Thinking about a spillage of milk as a slipping hazard please complete questions 9, 
10 & 11.   
Please Circle / highlight your answer. 
9. Please indicate how likely it is that a spillage of milk will lead to an accident 
to a member of staff during the next 6 months. 
 
(1) 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
(2) 
Very 
Unlikely 
(3) 
Fairly 
Unlikely 
(4) 
Fairly 
Likely 
(5) 
Very 
Likely 
(6) 
Extremely 
Likely 
 
10. Please also score how confident you feel making this prediction.  
 
(1) 
Not at all confident 
(2) 
Not very 
confident 
(3) 
A little 
confident 
(4) 
Quite 
confident 
(5) 
Very 
confident 
(6) 
Certain  
 
11. And lastly how serious do you think the outcome of the accident might be.   
(1) 
Trivial 
(2) 
Minor 
(3) 
Quite 
Serious 
(4) 
Serious 
(5) 
Very 
serious 
(6) 
Extremely 
serious 
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INVESTIGATING A SLIPPING ACCIDENT IN A SUPERMARKET 
In the section that follows you are asked to read about a slipping accident to Mary (a 
part time checkout operator at ABC Supermarkets) who slipped over on a spillage of 
milk near to the checkouts as she was going to the staff room for her mid morning 
break. 
 
When answering the questions that follow please do so as a safety professional, 
responding in the same way as you would in your own workplace.  
Use your own knowledge or experience of slipping accidents to add to the 
information given about the accident.  
 
Mary is a lady of about 55 years of age who has worked for as a part time 
checkout operator for about 8 years. She usually works Monday Tuesday and 
Wednesday but had come in on this particular Thursday to cover for a friend 
who was on holiday.  
 
As a safety professional you have received a report on an accident to Mary in ABC 
Supermarkets 
 
ABC SUPERMARKET 
MESSAGE TO  SAFETY OFFICER 
FROM  BILL  SHOP FLOOR SUPERVISOR 
DATE    THURSDAY 10 AUGUST   TIME  11.30 HRS 
SUBJECT - ACCIDENT TO MARY 
At about 10.30am Mary went for her rest break and slipped over on some spilt milk 
and hurt her arm. An ambulance was called to take her to hospital.  She has strained 
her right wrist, and she will be returning to work tomorrow. 
 
You speak to Jane one of the other checkout operators who witnessed the accident and 
Bill the Shop Floor Supervisor. These are the notes from your conversations. 
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 Mary does not usually work on Thursdays but was covering for a friend who was 
on holiday 
 Mary closed her checkout at the usual time for her mid morning break and waited 
for a friend on the checkout next to her to serve her last customer and they both 
went to their break together as usual. 
 They were walking together past the checkouts when Mary slipped over on some 
spilt milk and fell awkwardly on her right arm. 
 The First Aider attended and an ambulance was called to take Mary to hospital. 
 At hospital she was found to have strained he right wrist. She will be back at work 
tomorrow.    
 A customer  had seen the milk and reported it to Bill the Supervisor 
 Bill confirmed that the spillage had been reported by a customer and the cleaner 
had been asked to clear it up 5 minutes before the accident but had not got round to 
dealing with it. 
 No warning signs had been put out. 
 It is not known how long the milk had been on the floor before it was reported by 
the customer 
 Spillage's around the checkouts are very common. 
 According to the Accident Book 4 other people had been injured in slipping 
accidents in the past 6 months 
 
Using the information provided about Mary’s accident and your own experience of 
slipping accidents as a Safety Professional please answer the following questions. 
IT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT 
 
After an unwanted outcome such as failing an exam, missing a flight or an accident people 
often think about how things could have been different.  
For example: - 
After failing an exam a student might say "If only … I had worked harder….I might have 
passed" and a family who miss their holiday flight might say " If only…. we had left 
earlier…… we might have caught the flight  
 
 
12. After Mary’s accident you found yourself thinking “If only……” . How would you 
continue this thought?  
 
If only…….. 
 
 
…. Things could have been different. 
 Page | 583  
 
 
13  Which one of the following people does the sentence above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
13 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
 
As a Safety Professional please think back to a point in time a week before Mary's 
accident and complete questions 14,15 & 16. 
 Please Circle / highlight one option in each row. 
 A week before Mary’s accident I would have rated the likelihood (risk) of a slipping 
accident from a spillage of milk as 
14 (1) 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
 
(2) 
Very 
Unlikely 
(3) 
Fairly 
Unlikely 
(4) 
Fairly 
Likely 
(5) 
Very 
Likely 
(6) 
Extremely 
Likely 
 
 
 Score how confident you feel making this judgement 
15 (1) 
 
Not at all 
confident 
(2) 
 
Not very 
confident 
(3) 
 
A little 
confident 
(4) 
 
Quite 
confident 
(5) 
 
Very 
confident 
(6) 
 
Certain  
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 A week before Mary’s accident I would have rated the seriousness of a 
slipping accident on a spillage of milk as 
16 (1) 
 
Trivial 
(2) 
 
Minor 
(3) 
 
Quite  
Serious 
(4) 
 
Serious 
(5) 
 
Very 
serious 
(6) 
 
Extremely 
serious 
  
 
COULD MARY’S ACCIDENT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED? 
 
As a Safety Professional do you believe that Mary's accident could have been 
prevented?  
Please Circle / highlight one answer.   
17 Yes  
(1) 
No   
(2) 
Not Sure   
(3) 
 
If you answered YES please go to question 18.  If you answered "No" or "Not 
Sure" please go to question 29  
 
 Please indicate how you believe Mary's slipping accident could have been 
prevented. 
 
18 Mary’s accident could have been prevented…….. 
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Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
19 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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WHO HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREVENTING MARY’S ACCIDENT?  
As a Safety Professional please rate the level of responsibility of the following 
people for preventing Mary's accident. 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were. 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
 
  Responsibility for Preventing Mary's accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
20 Mary   0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
21 Bill the Shop 
floor Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
22 The Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
23 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
24 ABC 
Supermarkets 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
25 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
26 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
27 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
 
28  Please Rank these 8 people in order of  importance in preventing Mary’s 
accident.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the 
least important as = 8. Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the 
questions above.   
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Knowing that a slipping accident has just happened. How would you rate/score the 
chance of another slipping accident happening again on spilt milk in the next 6 
months?  
Please Circle / highlight your answer 
 The Likelihood of having another slipping accident on spilt milk in the next 6 
months 
29 (1) 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
(2) 
Very  
Unlikely 
(3) 
Fairly 
Unlikely 
(4) 
Fairly 
Likely 
(5) 
Very 
Likely 
(6) 
Extremely 
Likely 
 
 Score how confident you feel making this judgment 
30 (1) 
Not at all 
confident 
(2) 
Not very 
confident 
(3) 
Confident 
(4) 
Quite 
confident 
(5) 
Very 
confident 
(6) 
Certain 
 
 The Seriousness of an another slipping accident on spilt milk in the next 6 
months. 
31 (1) 
Trivial 
2 
Minor 
3 
Quite 
Serious 
4 
Serious 
5 
Very 
serious 
6 
Extremely 
serious 
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RESPONSIBILITY FOR CAUSING THE ACCIDENT 
 
As Safety Professional what would you say was the cause of Mary's accident? 
 
32 The cause of Mary's accident was… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
33 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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As a Safety Professional please rate the level of responsibility of the following 
people for causing Mary's accident. 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were. 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
 
  Responsibility for Causing Mary's accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
34 Mary   0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
35 Bill the Shop 
floor Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
36 The Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
37 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
38 ABC 
Supermarkets) 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
39 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
40 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
41 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
 
 
Please Rank these 8 people in order of  importance in causing the accident.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2  through to the least 
important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
 Page | 590  
 
LUCKY OR UNLUCKY? 
Mary’s accident might be shown in a flow diagram something like the following 
one.  
Please enter a score in the grey boxes for how lucky or unlucky you feel Mary was 
at each stage. 
 
Thursday at 10.30 
Mary closed her till to 
go for her usual mid 
morning rest break  
▼ 42                                        Stage A 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
   
As usual Mary waited 
for her friend on the 
next checkout and they 
both walked along the 
front of the tills 
towards the staff room   
▼ 43                                         Stage B  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
   
Milk had been spilt on 
the floor 
▼ 44                                             Stage C  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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The spillage had been 
reported 5 minutes 
ago. The cleaner had 
been requested to clear 
up but had not got 
round to it  
▼ 45                                            Stage D  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
  
Mary did not see the 
milk on the floor 
▼ 46                                        Stage E  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
  
Mary stepped on the 
milk 
▼ 47                                       Stage F  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
 
Mary slipped on the 
milk 
▼ 48                                        Stage G 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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Mary lost her balance 
and fell over 
▼ 49                                         Stage H  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
       
Mary fell awkwardly 
hurting her right arm. 
▼ 50                                         Stage I  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
       
Mary taken to hospital-  
Right wrist found to be 
strained.  She will 
return to work 
tomorrow 
 
▼ 51                                        Stage J  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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Overall how would you rate the outcome for Mary following her accident?  
Please Circle / highlight your answer. 
52 (1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very Lucky 
 
 
 
Please give your reasons in the box below 
 
53  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using the Stages A to J in the flowchart please answer questions 54 to 61. Circle or 
highlight your answers  
  Stages A-J 
54 At which stage 
did the 
sequence of 
events change 
from being 
normal/routine?  
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
        
55 At which stage 
did Mary’s 
accident 
become certain? 
 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
        
56 At which 
stage(s) did 
Mary have 
control over the 
situation? 
 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
        
57 At which 
stage(s) did the 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
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Manager have 
control over the 
situation 
 
F G H I J  
        
58 At which stage 
or stages did an 
action of any 
person become 
an important 
factor in Mary's 
accident 
 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
        
59 Who took the 
action 
Mary Bill Manager Safety 
Officer 
  
 Another 
worker 
Cleaner Customer None   
        
60 At which stage 
or stages did an 
inaction ( 
failure to act) of 
any person 
become an 
important factor 
in Mary's 
accident 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
 F G H I J  
        
61 Who failed to 
take an action 
Mary Bill Manager Safety 
Officer 
  
  Another 
worker 
Cleaner Customer None   
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SAFETY NOW AND IN THE FUTURE  
 
For each of the following statements please indicate how well they describe you as 
a Safety Professional. 
If the statement is a very good description of you (very like you) fill in a 1, if it is 
not a very good description of you (not at all like you) please fill in a 5.  
Use the other numbers if you fall between 1-5. 
 
Scale 
Very good 
description / 
Very like me 
1 
Quite a good 
description 
/Quite like me 
2 
Not sure if it 
describes me. 
 
3 
Quite poor 
description / 
Quite unlike 
me. 
4 
Very poor 
description / 
Very unlike 
me. 
5 
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(Please write in the grey areas to the right of each statement) 
  Score 
62 I think about safety in the future and try to influence things by 
my day to day behaviour 
 
63 I think about safety in the future and do things now to achieve 
safety in the years ahead  
 
 
64 Thinking about safety I only do things to deal with the 
immediate situation, not worrying about the future 
 
65 What I do about safety is only influenced by how things work 
out in the short term 
 
66 My convenience is a big factor in how I make decisions or  take 
actions about safety  
 
67 I am willing to put in extra time, effort and money now to ensure 
that the job is safe in the future.  
 
68 I think it is important to take warnings about safety seriously, 
even if it is unlikely that an accident will happen for many years.  
 
69 I think it is more important to do something about serious 
accidents in the future than minor accidents now. 
 
70 I generally ignore warnings about possible risks in the future, 
because they generally get sorted out before that happen 
 
71 I think it is unnecessary to change things now to prevent a 
possible future accident as problems can be dealt with nearer the 
time. 
 
72 I only act when there is an immediate risk, I prefer to take care 
of future problems that may occur at a later date 
 
73 I believe that safety today is more important than safety at some 
time in the future. 
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AND LASTLY SOME INFORMATION ABOUT YOU 
74. How many people do you have responsibility for either as a Manager or 
Supervisor 
Please tick against one answer 
1-5 
people 
(1)   31-35 people (8)  
6-10 
people 
(2)   36-40 people (9)  
11-15 
people 
(3)   41-45 people (10)  
16-20 
people 
(4)   46-50 people (11)  
21-25 
people 
(5)   More than 51 
people  
(12)  
26-30 
people 
(6)   Not applicable  (13)  
 
75.  Are you (Please Tick)       
Male  (1)  
Female  (2)  
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76. Which of the following categories best describes your organization.   (Please 
Tick) 
 
Retail Shop  (1)   Wholesale Shop or 
warehouse  
(7)  
Office  (2)   Catering, Restaurant  
or Bar  
(8)  
Hotel/ B&B  (3)   Residential Care  (9)  
Leisure/ Cultural  (4)   Consumer Services eg 
hairdresser/ beauty  
(10)  
Manufacturing  (5)   Construction Industry  (11)  
Agriculture  (6)   Central or Local 
Government  
(12)  
    Other  (13)  
 
 
77. Please give your current age. 
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78. Which of the following best describes your current working location. (Please tick) 
United 
Kingdom  
(1)   Ireland  (6)  
Europe  (2)   North 
America / 
Canada  
(7)  
South 
America  
(3)   Australia/ 
New 
Zealand  
(8)  
Middle East  (4)   Africa  (9)  
Far East  (5)   Other  (10)  
 
 
 
79. Which of these best describes you. Please Circle / highlight 
Manager / 
Supervisor  
(1) 
Company 
Safety  
Officer  
(2) 
Health and 
Safety  
Enforcement 
Officer 
 (3)   
Someone who 
has  
had an accident 
at work (4) 
University 
or Nebosh  
Student 
studying 
occupational 
health 
/safety  
(5) 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.  
I AM VERY GRATEFUL. 
PLEASE RETURN IT TO ME  BY POST,  FAX OR E-MAIL. 
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PLEASE DETACH THIS SHEET AND KEEP IT 
 
 
 
 
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire.  
Research such as this cannot happen with out your help. 
 
 
 
 
 
This questionnaire forms part of a study in to the ways in which accidents at work 
are viewed by Mangers & Supervisors, Safety Professionals and Accident Subjects 
themselves. 
 
The same questions have been asked of each group and the results will be compared 
to see if there are any differences or similarities.  
 
This stage of the research is concerned with how people think about hazards before 
and after an accident has happened and how they see responsibility for cause and 
prevention. 
 
It is hoped that the results will help to improve our understanding of the ways these 
groups think about safety and accidents at work and will allow managers / 
supervisors and Safety Professionals to be better trained in accident investigation.  
 
It is proposed that the results will be published in a professional Safety Journal. All 
results will be summarized and no individual respondent or employer will be 
identified. All answers to the questionnaire are treated in the strictest confidence. 
The information collected will be stored and treated in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act.       
 
If you need to contact the researcher please  do so by e-mail  
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ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
FOR SAFETY PROFESSIONALS 
 
  
 
 
RESEARCHER PAUL LEHANE 
 
SUPERVISOR DR. DAVID HARDMAN 
 
 
 
 
PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT 
 
CALCUTTA HOUSE 
OLD CASTLE STREET LONDON E1 7NT 
 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Research supported by the  
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Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am conducting research into the way in which safety professionals think about 
accidents at work.   
 
I would be very grateful if you could spare about 15-20 minutes to complete the 
attached questionnaire. Your participation is entirely voluntary and any information 
you provide will be confidential, although overall questionnaire results may be 
published in summary form. In addition, questionnaire completion is anonymous unless 
you are responding by e-mail or fax. If you have received this electronically but wish to 
respond anonymously, then simply print the questionnaire off and return by post. 
 
Thank you, 
 
Paul Lehane. 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION  
 
Please complete by hand if the questionnaire has been posted to you, writing your 
answers in the grey shaded boxes or circle / tick the appropriate answer from the 
choices given.  
If you have received the questionnaire by E-mail or downloaded it from the University 
Internet site you may print the questionnaire and complete by hand or complete as 
Word Document.  
 
COMPLETION AS A WORD DOCUMENT. 
 
Please HIGHLIGHT your answer using the Highlight Button where options are given 
otherwise please type your answers in to the grey boxes.  
When the questionnaire is complete please attach it to an E-mail and send to me at the 
address below. 
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RETURN OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
BY POST 
If you have been sent the questionnaire by post a prepaid envelope should have been 
provided. Please use this to return the questionnaire. If not please return to:- 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY FAX 
You may Fax your completed questionnaire to me on
 
BY E-MAIL 
You can return the questionnaire to me at  
 
Paul Lehane c/o  
EHTS  
London Borough of Bromley 
Civic Centre Bromley England BR1 3UH 
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WHY ARE ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATED? 
 
People have different views about why accidents are investigated. 
 
Six reasons for accident investigation are given below. As a safety professional 
please indicate how important each reason is to you. 
Circle / highlight one answer from the choices given for each question. 
 
7 To find out the cause and understand what happened. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
8 To prevent similar accidents from happening again. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
9 To meet organizational requirements eg collection of statistics, make 
insurance claims, staff training etc. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
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10 To find out if  staff acted correctly or  incorrectly.   
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
11 To find out if management acted correctly or incorrectly. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
12 To punish someone for breaking rules and regulations. (Enforce rules or 
law)  
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
7.  Please Rank in order of importance the 6 reasons for accident investigation.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the least 
important as = 6. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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HOW LIKELY IS IT THAT AN ACCIDENT WILL HAPPEN?  
 
This section asks you to think about slipping hazards in a typical Supermarket and 
how likely you think an accident might be. I have chosen a Supermarket as I hope it 
will be familiar to most people. 
Thinking about a spillage of milk as a slipping hazard please complete questions 9, 
10 & 11.   
Please Circle / highlight your answer. 
9. Please indicate how likely it is that a spillage of milk will lead to an accident 
to a member of staff during the next 6 months. 
 
(1) 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
(2) 
Very 
Unlikely 
(3) 
Fairly 
Unlikely 
(4) 
Fairly 
Likely 
(5) 
Very 
Likely 
(6) 
Extremely 
Likely 
 
10. Please also score how confident you feel making this prediction.  
(1) 
Not at all confident 
(2) 
Not very 
confident 
(3) 
A little 
confident 
(4) 
Quite 
confident 
(5) 
Very 
confident 
(6) 
Certain  
 
11. And lastly how serious do you think the outcome of the accident might be.   
(1) 
Trivial 
(2) 
Minor 
(3) 
Quite 
Serious 
(4) 
Serious 
(5) 
Very 
serious 
(6) 
Extremely 
serious 
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INVESTIGATING A SLIPPING ACCIDENT IN A SUPERMARKET 
In the section that follows you are asked to read about a slipping accident to Mary (a 
part time checkout operator at ABC Supermarkets) who slipped over on a spillage of 
milk near to the checkouts as she was going to the staff room for her mid morning 
break. 
 
When answering the questions that follow please do so as a safety professional, 
responding in the same way as you would in your own workplace.  
Use your own knowledge or experience of slipping accidents to add to the 
information given about the accident.  
 
Mary is a lady of about 55 years of age who has worked for as a part time 
checkout operator for about 8 years. She usually works Monday Tuesday and 
Wednesday but had come in on this particular Thursday to cover for a friend 
who was on holiday.  
 
As a safety professional you have received a report on an accident to Mary in ABC 
Supermarkets 
 
ABC SUPERMARKET 
MESSAGE TO  SAFETY OFFICER 
FROM  BILL  SHOP FLOOR SUPERVISOR 
DATE    THURSDAY 10 AUGUST   TIME  11.30 HRS 
SUBJECT - ACCIDENT TO MARY 
At about 10.30am Mary went for her rest break and slipped over on some spilt milk 
and hurt her arm. An ambulance was called to take her to hospital.  She has strained 
her right wrist, and she will be returning to work tomorrow. 
 
Using the information provided about Mary’s accident and your own experience of 
slipping accidents as a Safety Professional please answer the following questions. 
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IT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT 
 
After an unwanted outcome such as failing an exam, missing a flight or an accident people 
often think about how things could have been different.  
For example: - 
After failing an exam a student might say "If only … I had worked harder….I might have 
passed" and a family who miss their holiday flight might say " If only…. we had left 
earlier…… we might have caught the flight  
 
12. After Mary’s accident you found yourself thinking “If only……” . How would you 
continue this thought?  
 
 
If only…….. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…. Things could have been different. 
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13  Which one of the following people does the sentence above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
13 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
 
As a Safety Professional please think back to a point in time a week before Mary's 
accident and complete questions 14,15 & 16. 
 Please Circle / highlight one option in each row. 
 A week before Mary’s accident I would have rated the likelihood (risk) of a slipping 
accident from a spillage of milk as 
14 (1) 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
 
(2) 
Very 
Unlikely 
(3) 
Fairly 
Unlikely 
(4) 
Fairly 
Likely 
(5) 
Very 
Likely 
(6) 
Extremely 
Likely 
 
 Score how confident you feel making this judgement 
15 (1) 
Not at all 
confident 
(2) 
Not very 
confident 
(3) 
A little 
confident 
(4) 
Quite 
confident 
(5) 
Very 
confident 
(6) 
Certain  
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 A week before Mary’s accident I would have rated the seriousness of a slipping accident 
on a spillage of milk as 
16 (1) 
Trivial 
(2) 
Minor 
(3) 
Quite  
Serious 
(4) 
Serious 
(5) 
Very 
serious 
(6) 
Extremely 
serious 
  
COULD MARY’S ACCIDENT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED? 
 
As a Safety Professional do you believe that Mary's accident could have been 
prevented?  
Please Circle / highlight one answer.   
17 Yes  
(1) 
No   
(2) 
Not Sure   
(3) 
 
If you answered YES please go to question 18.  If you answered "No" or "Not 
Sure" please go to question 29  
 
 Please indicate how you believe Mary's slipping accident could have been 
prevented. 
18 Mary’s accident could have been prevented…….. 
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Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
 
A week before Mary’s accident I would have rated the seriousness of a slipping 
accident on a spillage of milk as 
19 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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WHO HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREVENTING MARY’S ACCIDENT?  
As a Safety Professional please rate the level of responsibility of the following 
people for preventing Mary's accident. 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were. 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
  Responsibility for Preventing Mary's 
accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
20 Mary   0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
21 Bill the Shop 
floor Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
22 The Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
23 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
24 ABC 
Supermarkets 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
25 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
26 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
27 A Customer 0 1 2 3   (Rank) 
 
28  Please Rank these 8 people in order of  importance in preventing Mary’s 
accident.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the 
least important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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Knowing that a slipping accident has just happened. How would you rate/score the 
chance of another slipping accident happening again on spilt milk in the next 6 
months?  
 
 Please Circle / highlight your answer 
. 
 
 Score how confident you feel making this judgment 
30 (1) 
Not at all 
confident 
(2) 
Not very 
confident 
(3) 
Confident 
(4) 
Quite 
confident 
(5) 
Very 
confident 
(6) 
Certain 
 
 The Seriousness of an another slipping accident on spilt milk in the next 6 months. 
31 (1) 
Trivial 
2 
Minor 
3 
Quite 
Serious 
4 
Serious 
5 
Very 
serious 
6 
Extremely 
serious 
 
 
 The Likelihood of having another slipping accident on spilt milk in the next 6 months 
29 (1) 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
(2) 
Very  
Unlikely 
(3) 
Fairly 
Unlikely 
(4) 
Fairly 
Likely 
(5) 
Very 
Likely 
(6) 
Extremely 
Likely 
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RESPONSIBILITY FOR CAUSING THE ACCIDENT 
 
As Safety Professional what would you say was the cause of Mary's accident? 
 
32 The cause of Mary's accident was… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
33 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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As a Safety Professional please rate the level of responsibility of the following 
people for causing Mary's accident. 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were. 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
 
  Responsibility for Causing Mary's accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
34 Mary   0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
35 Bill the Shop 
floor Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
36 The Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
37 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
38 ABC 
Supermarkets 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
39 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
40 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
41 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
 
Please Rank these 8 people in order of  importance in causing the accident.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2  through to the least 
important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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LUCKY OR UNLUCKY? 
Mary’s accident might be shown in a flow diagram something like the following 
one.  
Please enter a score in the grey boxes for how lucky or unlucky you feel Mary was 
at each stage. 
 
Thursday at 10.30 
Mary went for her rest 
break  
▼ 42                                        Stage A 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
   
Mary walked towards 
the Staff Room  
▼ 43                                         Stage B  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
   
Milk had been spilt on 
the floor 
▼ 44                                             Stage C  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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The spillage had not 
been cleared up  
▼ 45                                            Stage D  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
  
Mary did not see the 
milk on the floor 
▼ 46                                        Stage E  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
  
Mary stepped on the 
milk 
▼ 47                                       Stage F  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
       
Mary slipped on the 
milk 
▼ 48                                        Stage G 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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Mary lost her balance 
and fell over 
▼ 49                                         Stage H  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
       
Mary fell awkwardly 
hurting her right arm. 
▼ 50                                         Stage I  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
       
Mary taken to hospital-  
Right wrist found to be 
strained.  She will 
return to work 
tomorrow 
 
▼ 51                                        Stage J  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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Overall how would you rate the outcome for Mary following her accident?  
Please Circle / highlight your answer. 
52 (1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very Lucky 
 
Please give your reasons in the box below 
53  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using the Stages A to J in the flowchart please answer questions 54 to 61. Circle or 
highlight your answers 
  Stages A-J 
54 At which stage 
did the 
sequence of 
events change 
from being 
normal/routine?  
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
        
55 At which stage 
did Mary’s 
accident 
become certain? 
 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
        
56 At which 
stage(s) did 
Mary have 
control over the 
situation? 
 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
  
 
 
 
 
 
      
57 At which 
stage(s) did the 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
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Manager have 
control over the 
situation 
 
F G H I J  
        
58 At which stage 
or stages did an 
action of any 
person become 
an important 
factor in Mary's 
accident 
 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
        
59 Who took the 
action 
Mary Bill Manager Safety 
Officer 
  
 Another 
worker 
Cleaner Customer None   
        
60 At which stage 
or stages did an 
inaction ( 
failure to act) of 
any person 
become an 
important factor 
in Mary's 
accident 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
 F G H I J  
        
61 Who failed to 
take an action 
Mary Bill Manager Safety 
Officer 
  
  Another 
worker 
Cleaner Customer None   
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SAFETY NOW AND IN THE FUTURE  
 
For each of the following statements please indicate how well they describe you as 
a Safety Professional. 
If the statement is a very good description of you (very like you) fill in a 1, if it is 
not a very good description of you (not at all like you) please fill in a 5.  
Use the other numbers if you fall between 1-5. 
Scale 
Very good 
description / 
Very like me 
1 
Quite a good 
description 
/Quite like me 
2 
Not sure if it 
describes me. 
 
3 
Quite poor 
description / 
Quite unlike 
me. 
4 
Very poor 
description / 
Very unlike 
me. 
5 
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(Please write in the grey areas to the right of each statement) 
 
  Score 
62 I think about safety in the future and try to influence things by 
my day to day behaviour 
 
63 I think about safety in the future and do things now to achieve 
safety in the years ahead  
 
 
64 Thinking about safety I only do things to deal with the 
immediate situation, not worrying about the future 
 
65 What I do about safety is only influenced by how things work 
out in the short term 
 
66 My convenience is a big factor in how I make decisions or  take 
actions about safety  
 
67 I am willing to put in extra time, effort and money now to ensure 
that the job is safe in the future.  
 
68 I think it is important to take warnings about safety seriously, 
even if it is unlikely that an accident will happen for many years.  
 
69 I think it is more important to do something about serious 
accidents in the future than minor accidents now. 
 
70 I generally ignore warnings about possible risks in the future, 
because they generally get sorted out before that happen 
 
71 I think it is unnecessary to change things now to prevent a 
possible future accident as problems can be dealt with nearer the 
time. 
 
72 I only act when there is an immediate risk, I prefer to take care 
of future problems that may occur at a later date 
 
73 I believe that safety today is more important than safety at some 
time in the future. 
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AND LASTLY SOME INFORMATION ABOUT YOU 
74. How many people do you have responsibility for either as a Manager or 
Supervisor 
Please tick against one answer 
1-5 
people 
(1)   31-35 people (8)  
6-10 
people 
(2)   36-40 people (9)  
11-15 
people 
(3)   41-45 people (10)  
16-20 
people 
(4)   46-50 people (11)  
21-25 
people 
(5)   More than 51 
people  
(12)  
26-30 
people 
(6)   Not applicable  (13)  
 
75.  Are you (Please Tick)       
Male  (1)  
Female  (2)  
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76. Which of the following categories best describes your organization.   (Please 
Tick) 
 
Retail Shop  (1)   Wholesale Shop or 
warehouse  
(7)  
Office  (2)   Catering, Restaurant  
or Bar  
(8)  
Hotel/ B&B  (3)   Residential Care  (9)  
Leisure/ 
Cultural  
(4)   Consumer Services eg 
hairdresser/ beauty  
(10)  
Manufacturing  (5)   Construction Industry  (11)  
Agriculture  (6)   Central or Local 
Government  
(12)  
    Other  (13)  
 
 
77. Please give your current age. 
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78. Which of the following best describes your current working location. (Please tick) 
United 
Kingdom  
(1)   Ireland  (6)  
Europe  (2)   North 
America / 
Canada  
(7)  
South 
America  
(3)   Australia/ 
New 
Zealand  
(8)  
Middle East  (4)   Africa  (9)  
Far East  (5)   Other  (10
) 
 
 
 
 
79. Which of these best describes you. Please Circle / highlight 
Manager / 
Supervisor  
(1) 
Company 
Safety  
Officer  
(2) 
Health and 
Safety  
Enforcement 
Officer 
 (3)   
Someone who 
has  
had an accident 
at work (4) 
University 
or Nebosh  
Student 
studying 
occupational 
safety 
/health  
(5) 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.  
I AM VERY GRATEFUL. 
PLEASE RETURN IT TO ME  BY POST,  FAX OR E-MAIL. 
PLEASE DETACH THIS SHEET AND KEEP IT 
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ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire.  
Research such as this cannot happen with out your help. 
 
 
 
 
 
This questionnaire forms part of a study in to the ways in which accidents at work 
are viewed by Mangers & Supervisors, Safety Professionals and Accident Subjects 
themselves. 
 
The same questions have been asked of each group and the results will be compared 
to see if there are any differences or similarities.  
 
This stage of the research is concerned with how people think about hazards before 
and after an accident has happened and how they see responsibility for cause and 
prevention. 
 
It is hoped that the results will help to improve our understanding of the ways these 
groups think about safety and accidents at work and will allow managers / 
supervisors and Safety Professionals to be better trained in accident investigation.  
 
It is proposed that the results will be published in a professional Safety Journal. All 
results will be summarized and no individual respondent or employer will be 
identified. All answers to the questionnaire are treated in the strictest confidence. 
The information collected will be stored and treated in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act.       
 
If you need to contact the researcher please  do so by e-mail  
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ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
FOR SAFETY PROFESSIONALS 
 
 
 
RESEARCHER PAUL LEHANE 
 
SUPERVISOR DR. DAVID HARDMAN 
 
 
 
 
PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT 
 
CALCUTTA HOUSE 
OLD CASTLE STREET LONDON E1 7NT 
 
13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Research supported by the  
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Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am conducting research into the way in which safety professionals think about 
accidents at work.   
 
I would be very grateful if you could spare about 15-20 minutes to complete the 
attached questionnaire. Your participation is entirely voluntary and any information 
you provide will be confidential, although overall questionnaire results may be 
published in summary form. In addition, questionnaire completion is anonymous unless 
you are responding by e-mail or fax. If you have received this electronically but wish to 
respond anonymously, then simply print the questionnaire off and return by post. 
 
Thank you, 
 
Paul Lehane. 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION  
 
Please complete by hand if the questionnaire has been posted to you, writing your 
answers in the grey shaded boxes or circle / tick the appropriate answer from the 
choices given.  
If you have received the questionnaire by E-mail or downloaded it from the University 
Internet site you may print the questionnaire and complete by hand or complete as 
Word Document.  
 
COMPLETION AS A WORD DOCUMENT. 
 
Please HIGHLIGHT your answer using the Highlight Button where options are given 
otherwise please type your answers in to the grey boxes.  
When the questionnaire is complete please attach it to an E-mail and send to me at the 
address below. 
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RETURN OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
BY POST 
If you have been sent the questionnaire by post a prepaid envelope should have been 
provided. Please use this to return the questionnaire. If not please return to:- 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY FAX 
You may Fax your completed questionnaire to me on
 
BY E-MAIL 
You can return the questionnaire to me at  
 
Paul Lehane c/o  
EHTS  
London Borough of Bromley 
Civic Center Bromley England BR1 3UH 
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WHY ARE ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATED? 
People have different views about why accidents are investigated. 
Six reasons for accident investigation are given below. As a safety professional 
please indicate how important each reason is to you. 
Circle / highlight one answer from the choices given for each question. 
1. To find out the cause and understand what happened. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
2. To prevent similar accidents from happening again. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
3. To meet organizational requirements eg collection of statistics, make 
insurance claims, staff training etc. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
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4. To find out if staff acted correctly or incorrectly.   
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
5. To find out if management acted correctly or incorrectly. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
6. To punish someone for breaking rules and regulations. (Enforce rules or 
law)  
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
7.  Please Rank in order of importance the 6 reasons for accident investigation.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the least 
important as = 6. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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HOW LIKELY IS IT THAT AN ACCIDENT WILL HAPPEN?  
This section asks you to think about tripping hazards in a typical Supermarket and 
how likely you think an accident might be. I have chosen a Supermarket as I hope it 
will be familiar to most people. 
Thinking about a box as a tripping hazard please complete questions 9, 10 & 11.   
Please Circle / highlight your answer. 
9. Please indicate how likely it is that a box will lead to an accident to a member 
of staff during the next 6 months. 
 
(1) 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
(2) 
Very 
Unlikely 
(3) 
Fairly 
Unlikely 
(4) 
Fairly 
Likely 
(5) 
Very 
Likely 
(6) 
Extremely 
Likely 
 
10. Please also score how confident you feel making this judgment.  
(1) 
Not at all 
confident 
(2) 
Not very 
confident 
(3) 
A little 
confident 
(4) 
Quite 
confident 
(5) 
Very 
confident 
(6) 
Certain  
 
11. And lastly how serious do you think the outcome of the accident might be.   
(1) 
Trivial 
(2) 
Minor 
(3) 
Quite 
Serious 
(4) 
Serious 
(5) 
Very 
serious 
(6) 
Extremely 
serious 
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INVESTIGATING A TRIPPING ACCIDENT IN A SUPERMARKET 
In the section that follows you are asked to read about a tripping accident to Mary (a 
part time checkout operator at ABC Supermarkets) who tripped over on a box near to 
the checkouts as she was going to the staff room for her mid morning break. 
 
When answering the questions that follow please do so as a safety professional, 
responding in the same way as you would in your own workplace.  
Use your own knowledge or experience of tripping accidents to add to the 
information given about the accident.  
 
Mary is a lady of about 55 years of age who has worked as a part time 
checkout operator for about 8 years. She usually works Monday Tuesday and 
Wednesday but had come in on this particular Thursday to cover for a friend 
who was on holiday.  
As a safety professional you have received a report on an accident to Mary in ABC 
Supermarkets 
 
ABC SUPERMARKET 
MESSAGE TO  SAFETY OFFICER 
FROM  BILL  SHOP FLOOR SUPERVISOR 
DATE    THURSDAY 10 AUGUST   TIME  11.30 HRS 
SUBJECT - ACCIDENT TO MARY 
At about 10.30am Mary went for her rest break and tripped over on a box and hurt 
her arm. An ambulance was called to take her to hospital.  She has broken her right 
arm, which has been plastered. She will be off work for at least 3 weeks. 
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You speak to Jane one of the other checkout operators who witnessed the 
accident and Bill the Shop Floor Supervisor. These are the notes from your 
conversations. 
 Mary does not usually work on Thursdays but was covering for a friend who was 
on holiday 
 Mary closed her checkout at the usual time for her mid morning break and waited 
for a friend on the checkout next to her to serve her last customer and they both 
went to their break together as usual. 
 They were walking together past the checkouts when Mary tripped over a box and 
fell awkwardly on her right arm. 
 The First Aider attended and an ambulance was called to take Mary to hospital. 
 At hospital she was found to have a broken right arm. She will be off work for at 
least 3 weeks with her arm in plaster.    
 A customer  had seen the box and reported it to Bill the Supervisor 
 Bill confirmed that the box had been reported by a customer and the cleaner had 
been asked to clear it up 5 minutes before the accident but had not got round to 
dealing with it. 
 No warning signs had been put out. 
 It is not known how long the box had been on the floor before it was reported by 
the customer 
 The area round the checkouts often gets untidy. 
 According to the Accident Book 4 other people had been injured in tripping 
accidents in the past 6 months 
 
Using the information provided about Mary’s accident and your own experience of 
tripping accidents as a Safety Professional please answer the following questions. 
 
IT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT 
 
After an unwanted outcome such as failing an exam, missing a flight or an accident people 
often think about how things could have been different.  
For example: - 
After failing an exam a student might say "If only … I had worked harder….I might have 
passed" and a family who miss their holiday flight might say " If only…. we had left 
earlier…… we might have caught the flight  
 
12. After Mary’s accident you found yourself thinking “If only……” . How would you 
continue this thought?  
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If only…….. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…. Things could have been different. 
 
13 Which one of the following people does the sentence above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
13 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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As a Safety Professional please think back to a point in time a week before Mary's 
accident and complete questions 14,15 & 16. 
 
Please Circle / highlight one option in each row. 
 
 A week before Mary’s accident I would have rated the likelihood (risk) of a tripping 
accident from a box on the floor as 
14 (1) 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
 
(2) 
Very 
Unlikely 
(3) 
Fairly 
Unlikely 
(4) 
Fairly 
Likely 
(5) 
Very 
Likely 
(6) 
Extremely 
Likely 
 
 
 score how confident you feel making this judgment. 
15 (1) 
Not at all 
confident 
(2) 
Not very 
confident 
(3) 
A little 
confident 
(4) 
Quite 
confident 
(5) 
Very 
confident 
(6) 
Certain  
 
 A week before Mary’s accident I would have rated the seriousness of a tripping accident 
on a box on the floor as 
16 (1) 
Trivial 
(2) 
Minor 
(3) 
Quite  
Serious 
(4) 
Serious 
(5) 
Very 
serious 
(6) 
Extremely 
serious 
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COULD MARY’S ACCIDENT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED? 
 
As a Safety Professional do you believe that Mary's accident could have been 
prevented?  
Please Circle / highlight one answer.   
17 Yes  
(1) 
No   
(2) 
Not Sure   
(3) 
 
If you answered YES please go to question 18.  If you answered "No" or "Not sure" 
please go to question 29  
 
 Please indicate how you believe Mary's tripping accident could have been 
prevented. 
18 Mary’s accident could have been prevented…….. 
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Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
19 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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WHO HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREVENTING MARY’S ACCIDENT?  
As a Safety Professional please rate the level of responsibility for the following 
people for preventing Mary’s accident  
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were.  
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
  Responsibility for Preventing Mary's 
accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
20 Mary   0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
21 Bill the Shop 
floor Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
22 The Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
23 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
24 ABC 
Supermarkets 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
25 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
26 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3   (Rank) 
27 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
 
28  Please Rank these 8 people in order of  importance in preventing Mary’s 
accident.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the 
least important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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Knowing that a tripping accident has just happened. How would you rate/score 
the chance of another tripping accident happening again on a box in the next 6 
months?  
Please Circle / highlight your answer 
 The Likelihood of having another tripping accident from a box on the floor in the next 6 
months 
29 (1) 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
(2) 
Very 
Unlikely 
(3) 
Fairly 
Unlikely 
(4) 
Fairly 
Likely 
(5) 
Very 
Likely 
(6) 
Extremely 
Likely 
 
 How confident you feel making this judgment 
30 (1) 
Not at all 
confident 
(2) 
Not very 
confident 
(3) 
Confident 
(4) 
Quite 
confident 
(5) 
Very 
confident 
(6) 
Certain 
 
 The Seriousness of an another tripping accident from a box on the floor in the next 6 
months. 
31 (1) 
Trivial 
2 
Minor 
3 
Quite 
Serious 
4 
Serious 
5 
Very 
serious 
6 
Extremely 
serious 
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RESPONSIBILITY FOR CAUSING THE ACCIDENT 
As Safety Professional what would you say was the cause of Mary's accident? 
 
32 The cause of Mary's accident was… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
33 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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As a Safety Professional please rate the level of responsibility for the following 
people in causing this tripping accident   
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were. 
Please circle a number along side each of the people in the table below  
  Responsibility for Causing Mary's 
accident0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 1-8 
34 Mary   0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
35 Bill the Shop 
floor Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
36 The Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
37 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
38 ABC 
Supermarkets 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
39 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
40 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
41 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
 
Please Rank these 8 people in order of importance in causing the accident.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the least 
important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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LUCKY OR UNLUCKY? 
 
Mary’s accident might be shown in a flow diagram something like the following 
one.  
Please enter a score in the grey boxes for how lucky or unlucky you feel Mary was 
at each stage. 
 
Thursday at 10.30 
Mary closed her 
checkout to go for her 
usual mid morning rest 
break  
▼ 42                                        Stage A 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
   
As usual Mary waited 
for her friend on the 
next checkout and they 
both walked along the 
front of the checkouts 
towards the staff room   
▼ 43                                         Stage B  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
 
A box had been left on 
the floor 
▼ 44                                             Stage C  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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The box had been 
reported 5 minutes 
ago. The cleaner had 
been requested to clear 
up but had not got 
round to it  
▼ 45                                            Stage D  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
  
Mary did not see the 
box on the floor 
▼ 46                                        Stage E  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
  
Mary 's foot caught the 
box 
▼ 47                                       Stage F  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
       
Mary tripped over the 
box 
▼ 48                                        Stage G 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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Mary lost her balance 
and fell over 
▼ 49                                         Stage H  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
       
Mary fell awkwardly 
hurting her right arm. 
▼ 50                                         Stage I  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
       
Mary taken to hospital- 
her arm was x-rayed 
and found to be 
broken. She will be off 
work for 3 weeks. 
▼ 51                                        Stage J  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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Overall how would you rate the outcome for Mary following her accident?  
Please Circle / highlight your answer. 
52 (1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very Lucky 
 
Please give your reasons in the box below 
 
53  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using the Stages A to J in the flowchart please answer questions 54 to 61. Circle or 
highlight your answers  
  Stages A-J 
54 At which stage 
did the 
sequence of 
events change 
from being 
normal/routine?  
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
        
55 At which stage 
did Mary’s 
accident 
become certain? 
 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
        
56 At which 
stage(s) did 
Mary have 
control over the 
situation? 
 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
  
 
 
 
      
57 At which 
stage(s) did the 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
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Manager have 
control over the 
situation 
 
F G H I J  
        
58 At which stage 
or stages did an 
action of any 
person become 
an important 
factor in Mary's 
accident 
 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
        
59 Who took the 
action 
Mary Bill Manager Safety 
Officer 
  
 Another 
worker 
Cleaner Customer None   
        
60 At which stage 
or stages did an 
inaction ( 
failure to act) of 
any person 
become an 
important factor 
in Mary's 
accident 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
 F G H I J  
        
61 Who failed to 
take an action 
Mary Bill Manager Safety 
Officer 
  
  Another 
worker 
Cleaner Customer None   
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SAFETY NOW AND IN THE FUTURE  
 
For each of the following statements please indicate how well they describe you as 
a Safety Professional. 
If the statement is a very good description of you (very like you) fill in a 1, if it is 
not a very good description of you (not at all like you) please fill in a 5.  
Use the other numbers if you fall between 1-5. 
 
Scale 
Very good 
description / 
Very like me 
1 
Quite a good 
description 
/Quite like me 
2 
Not sure if it 
describes me. 
 
3 
Quite poor 
description / 
Quite unlike 
me. 
4 
Very poor 
description / 
Very unlike 
me. 
5 
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(Please write in the grey areas to the right of each statement) 
 
  Score 
62 I think about safety in the future and try to influence things by 
my day to day behaviour 
 
63 I think about safety in the future and do things now to achieve 
safety in the years ahead  
 
 
64 Thinking about safety I only do things to deal with the 
immediate situation, not worrying about the future 
 
65 What I do about safety is only influenced by how things work 
out in the short term 
 
66 My convenience is a big factor in how I make decisions or  take 
actions about safety  
 
67 I am willing to put in extra time, effort and money now to ensure 
that the job is safe in the future.  
 
68 I think it is important to take warnings about safety seriously, 
even if it is unlikely that an accident will happen for many years.  
 
69 I think it is more important to do something about serious 
accidents in the future than minor accidents now. 
 
70 I generally ignore warnings about possible risks in the future, 
because they generally get sorted out before that happen 
 
71 I think it is unnecessary to change things now to prevent a 
possible future accident as problems can be dealt with nearer the 
time. 
 
72 I only act when there is an immediate risk, I prefer to take care 
of future problems that may occur at a later date 
 
73 I believe that safety today is more important than safety at some 
time in the future. 
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AND LASTLY SOME INFORMATION ABOUT YOU 
74 How many people do you have responsibility for either as a Manager or 
Supervisor 
 
Please tick against one answer 
1-5 
people 
(1)   31-35 people (8)  
6-10 
people 
(2)   36-40 people (9)  
11-15 
people 
(3)   41-45 people (10)  
16-20 
people 
(4)   46-50 people (11)  
21-25 
people 
(5)   More than 51 
people  
(12)  
26-30 
people 
(6)   Not applicable  (13)  
 
 
75.  Are you (Please Tick)       
Male  (1)  
Female  (2)  
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76. Which of the following categories best describes your organization.   (Please 
Tick) 
 
Retail Shop  (1)   Wholesale Shop or 
warehouse  
(7)  
Office  (2)   Catering, Restaurant  
or Bar  
(8)  
Hotel/ B&B  (3)   Residential Care  (9)  
Leisure/ 
Cultural  
 
(4)   Consumer Services eg 
hairdresser/ beauty  
(10)  
Manufacturing  (5)   Construction Industry  (11)  
Agriculture  (6)   Central or Local 
Government  
(12)  
    Other  (13)  
 
 
77. Please give your current age. 
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78. Which of the following best describes your current working location. (Please tick) 
United 
Kingdom  
(1)   Ireland  (6)  
Europe  (2)   North 
America / 
Canada  
(7)  
South 
America  
(3)   Australia/ 
New 
Zealand  
(8)  
Middle East  (4)   Africa  (9)  
Far East  (5)   Other  (10)  
 
 
79. Which of these best describes you. Please Circle / highlight 
Manager / 
Supervisor  
(1) 
Company 
Safety  
Officer  
(2) 
Health and 
Safety  
Enforcement 
Officer 
 (3)   
Someone who 
has  
had an accident 
at work (4) 
University 
or Nebosh  
Student 
studying 
occupational 
health / 
safety 
(5) 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.  
I AM VERY GRATEFUL. 
PLEASE RETURN IT TO ME  BY POST,  FAX OR E-MAIL. 
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PLEASE DETACH THIS SHEET AND KEEP IT 
 
 
 
 
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire.  
Research such as this cannot happen with out your help. 
 
 
 
 
 
This questionnaire forms part of a study in to the ways in which accidents at work 
are viewed by Mangers & Supervisors, Safety Professionals and Accident Subjects 
themselves. 
 
The same questions have been asked of each group and the results will be compared 
to see if there are any differences or similarities.  
 
This stage of the research is concerned with how people think about hazards before 
and after an accident has happened and how they see responsibility for cause and 
prevention. 
 
It is hoped that the results will help to improve our understanding of the ways these 
groups think about safety and accidents at work and will allow managers / 
supervisors and Safety Professionals to be better trained in accident investigation.  
 
It is proposed that the results will be published in a professional Safety Journal. All 
results will be summarized and no individual respondent or employer will be 
identified. All answers to the questionnaire are treated in the strictest confidence. 
The information collected will be stored and treated in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act.       
 
If you need to contact the researcher please do so by e-mail  
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ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
FOR SAFETY PROFESSIONALS 
 
 
  
 
 
 
RESEARCHER PAUL LEHANE 
 
SUPERVISOR DR. DAVID HARDMAN 
 
 
 
 
PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT 
 
CALCUTTA HOUSE 
OLD CASTLE STREET LONDON E1 7NT 
 
14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research supported by the  
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Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am conducting research into the way in which safety professionals think about 
accidents at work.   
 
I would be very grateful if you could spare about 15-20 minutes to complete the 
attached questionnaire. Your participation is entirely voluntary and any information 
you provide will be confidential, although overall questionnaire results may be 
published in summary form. In addition, questionnaire completion is anonymous unless 
you are responding by e-mail or fax. If you have received this electronically but wish to 
respond anonymously, then simply print the questionnaire off and return by post. 
 
Thank you, 
 
Paul Lehane. 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION  
 
Please complete by hand if the questionnaire has been posted to you, writing your 
answers in the grey shaded boxes or circle / tick the appropriate answer from the 
choices given.  
If you have received the questionnaire by E-mail or downloaded it from the University 
Internet site you may print the questionnaire and complete by hand or complete as 
Word Document.  
 
COMPLETION AS A WORD DOCUMENT. 
 
Please HIGHLIGHT your answer using the Highlight Button where options are given 
otherwise please type your answers in to the grey boxes.  
When the questionnaire is complete please attach it to an E-mail and send to me at the 
address below. 
 
RETURN OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
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BY POST 
If you have been sent the questionnaire by post a prepaid envelope should have been 
provided. Please use this to return the questionnaire. If not please return to:- 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY FAX 
You may Fax your completed questionnaire to me on
 
BY E-MAIL 
You can return the questionnaire to me at  
 
Paul Lehane c/o  
EHTS  
London Borough of Bromley 
Civic Centre Bromley England BR1 3UH 
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WHY ARE ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATED? 
People have different views about why accidents are investigated. 
Six reasons for accident investigation are given below. As a safety professional 
please indicate how important each reason is to you. 
Circle / highlight one answer from the choices given for each question. 
1 To find out the cause and understand what happened. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
2 To prevent similar accidents from happening again. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
3  To meet organizational requirements e.g. collection of statistics, make insurance 
claims, staff training etc. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
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4 To find out if staff acted correctly or incorrectly.   
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
5 To find out if management acted correctly or incorrectly. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
6 To punish someone for breaking rules and regulations. (Enforce rules or law)  
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
7.  Please Rank in order of importance the 6 reasons for accident investigation.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the least 
important as = 6. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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HOW LIKELY IS IT THAT AN ACCIDENT WILL HAPPEN?  
This section asks you to think about tripping hazards in a typical Supermarket and 
how likely you think an accident might be. I have chosen a Supermarket as I hope it 
will be familiar to most people. 
Thinking about a box as a tripping hazard please complete questions 9, 10 & 11.   
Please Circle / highlight your answer. 
8. Please indicate how likely it is that a box will lead to an accident to a member 
of staff during the next 6 months. 
 
(1) 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
(2) 
Very 
Unlikely 
(3) 
Fairly 
Unlikely 
(4) 
Fairly 
Likely 
(5) 
Very 
Likely 
(6) 
Extremely 
Likely 
 
9 Please also score how confident you feel making this prediction.  
(1) 
Not at all 
confident 
(2) 
Not very 
confident 
(3) 
A little 
confident 
(4) 
Quite 
confident 
(5) 
Very 
confident 
(6) 
Certain  
 
10 And lastly how serious do you think the outcome of the accident might be.   
(1) 
Trivial 
(2) 
Minor 
(3) 
Quite 
Serious 
(4) 
Serious 
(5) 
Very 
serious 
(6) 
Extremely 
serious 
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INVESTIGATING A TRIPPING ACCIDENT IN A SUPERMARKET 
In the section that follows you are asked to read about a tripping accident to Mary (a 
part time checkout operator at ABC Supermarkets) who tripped over on a box near to 
the checkouts as she was going to the staff room for her mid morning break. 
 
When answering the questions that follow please do so as a safety professional, 
responding in the same way as you would in your own workplace.  
Use your own knowledge or experience of tripping accidents to add to the 
information given about the accident.  
 
Mary is a lady of about 55 years of age who has worked for as a part time 
checkout operator for about 8 years. She usually works Monday Tuesday and 
Wednesday but had come in on this particular Thursday to cover for a friend 
who was on holiday.  
 
As a safety professional you have received a report on an accident to Mary in ABC 
Supermarkets 
ABC SUPERMARKET 
MESSAGE TO  SAFETY OFFCICER 
FROM  BILL  SHOP FLOOR SUPERVISOR 
DATE    THURSDAY 10 AUGUST   TIME  11.30 HRS 
SUBJECT - ACCIDENT TO MARY 
At about 10.30am Mary went for her rest break and tripped over a box and hurt her 
arm. An ambulance was called to take her to hospital.  She has broken her right 
arm, which has been plastered. She will be off work for at least 3 weeks. 
 
Using the information provided about Mary’s accident and your own experience of 
tripping accidents as a Safety Professional please answer the following questions. 
 Page | 661  
 
IT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT 
 
After an unwanted outcome such as failing an exam, missing a flight or an accident people 
often think about how things could have been different.  
For example: - 
After failing an exam a student might say "If only … I had worked harder….I might have 
passed" and a family who miss their holiday flight might say " If only…. we had left 
earlier…… we might have caught the flight  
11. After Mary’s accident you found yourself thinking “If only……” . How would you 
continue this thought?  
 
If only…….. 
 
 
 
 
…. Things could have been different. 
 
12 Which one of the following people does the sentence above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
 
13 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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As a Safety Professional please think back to a point in time a week before Mary's 
accident and complete questions 14,15 & 16. 
 Please Circle / highlight one option in each row. 
 
 A week before Mary’s accident I would have rated the likelihood (risk) of a tripping 
accident from a box on the floor as 
14 (1) 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
(2) 
Very 
Unlikely 
(3) 
Fairly 
Unlikely 
(4) 
Fairly 
Likely 
(5) 
Very 
Likely 
(6) 
Extremely 
Likely 
 
 score how confident you feel making this prediction. 
15 (1) 
Not at all 
confident 
(2) 
Not very 
confident 
(3) 
A little 
confident 
(4) 
Quite 
confident 
(5) 
Very 
confident 
(6) 
Certain  
 
 A week before Mary’s accident I would have rated the seriousness of a 
tripping accident on a box on  the floor as 
16 (1) 
Trivial 
(2) 
Minor 
(3) 
Quite  
Serious 
(4) 
Serious 
(5) 
Very 
serious 
(6) 
Extremely 
serious 
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COULD MARY’S ACCIDENT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED? 
 
As a Safety Professional do you believe that Mary's accident could have been 
prevented?  
Please Circle / highlight one answer.   
17 Yes  
(1) 
No   
(2) 
Not Sure   
(3) 
 
If you answered YES please go to question 18.  If you answered "No" or "Not sure" 
please go to question 29  
 
 Please indicate how you believe Mary's tripping accident could have been 
prevented. 
18 Mary’s accident could have been prevented…….. 
 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
19 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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WHO HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREVENTING MARY’S ACCIDENT?  
As a Safety Professional please rate the level of responsibility for the following 
people for preventing Mary’s accident  
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were.  
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
  Responsibility for Preventing Mary's accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
20 Mary   0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
21 Bill the Shop 
floor Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
22 The Manager 0 1 2 3 4   (Rank) 
23 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4   (Rank) 
24 ABC 
Supermarkets 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
25 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
26 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
27 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
 
28  Please Rank these 8 people in order of  importance in preventing Mary’s 
accident.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the 
least important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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Knowing that a tripping accident has just happened. How would you rate/score the 
chance of another tripping accident happening again a box on the floor in the next 
6 months?  
 
Please Circle / highlight your answer 
 The Likelihood of having another tripping accident from a box on the floor  in the next 6 
months 
.29 (1) 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
(2) 
Very  
Unlikely 
(3) 
Fairly 
Unlikely 
(4) 
Fairly 
Likely 
(5) 
Very 
Likely 
(6) 
Extremely 
Likely 
 
 Score how confident you feel making this judgment 
30 (1) 
Not at all 
confident 
(2) 
Not very 
confident 
(3) 
Confident 
(4) 
Quite 
confident 
(5) 
Very 
confident 
(6) 
Certain 
 
 The Seriousness of an another tripping accident from a box on the floor in the next 6 
months. 
31 (1) 
Trivial 
2 
Minor 
3 
Quite 
Serious 
4 
Serious 
5 
Very 
serious 
6 
Extremely 
serious 
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RESPONSIBILITY FOR CAUSING THE ACCIDENT 
 
As Safety Professional what would you say was the cause of Mary's accident? 
 
32 The cause of Mary's accident was… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
33 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
 
 
 Page | 667  
 
 
As a Safety Professional please rate the level of responsibility for the following 
people in causing this tripping accident   
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were. 
Please circle a number along side each of the people in the table below  
  Responsibility for Causing Mary's accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
34 Mary   0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
35 Bill the Shop 
floor Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
36 The Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
37 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
38 ABC 
Supermarkets 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
39 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
40 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
41 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
 
Please Rank these 8 people in order of importance in causing the accident.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the least 
important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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LUCKY OR UNLUCKY? 
Mary’s accident might be shown in a flow diagram something like the following 
one.  
Please enter a score in the grey boxes for how lucky or unlucky you feel Mary was 
at each stage. 
 
Thursday at 10.30 
Mary went for her rest 
break  
▼ 42                                        Stage A 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
   
Mary walked towards 
the Staff Room   
▼ 43                                         Stage B  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
   
A box had been left on 
the floor  
▼ 44                                             Stage C  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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The box had not been 
cleared up.  
▼ 45                                            Stage D  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
  
Mary did not see the 
box on the floor 
▼ 46                                        Stage E  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
  
Mary's foot caught the 
box  
▼ 47                                       Stage F  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
       
Mary tripped on the 
box 
▼ 48                                        Stage G 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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Mary lost her balance 
and fell over 
▼ 49                                         Stage H  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
       
Mary fell awkwardly 
hurting her right arm. 
▼ 50                                         Stage I  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
       
Mary taken to hospital- 
her arm was x-rayed 
and found to be 
broken. She will be off 
work for 3 weeks. 
▼ 51                                        Stage J  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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Overall how would you rate the outcome for Mary following her accident?  
Please Circle / highlight your answer. 
52 (1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very Lucky 
 
Please give your reasons in the box below 
53  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using the Stages A to J in the flowchart please answer questions 54 to 61. Circle or 
highlight your answers  
  Stages A-J 
54 At which stage 
did the 
sequence of 
events change 
from being 
normal/routine?  
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
        
55 At which stage 
did Mary’s 
accident 
become certain? 
 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
        
56 At which 
stage(s) did 
Mary have 
control over the 
situation? 
 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
        
57 At which 
stage(s) did the 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
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Manager have 
control over the 
situation 
 
F G H I J  
        
58 At which stage 
or stages did an 
action of any 
person become 
an important 
factor in Mary's 
accident 
 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
        
59 Who took the 
action 
Mary Bill Manager Safety 
Officer 
  
 Another 
worker 
Cleaner Customer None   
        
60 At which stage 
or stages did an 
inaction ( 
failure to act) of 
any person 
become an 
important factor 
in Mary's 
accident 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
 F G H I J  
        
61 Who failed to 
take an action 
Mary Bill Manager Safety 
Officer 
  
  Another 
worker 
Cleaner Customer None   
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SAFETY NOW AND IN THE FUTURE  
 
For each of the following statements please indicate how well they describe you as 
a Safety Professional. 
If the statement is a very good description of you (very like you) fill in a 1, if it is 
not a very good description of you (not at all like you) please fill in a 5.  
Use the other numbers if you fall between 1-5. 
 
Scale 
Very good 
description / Very 
like me 
1 
Quite a good 
description /Quite 
like me 
2 
Not sure if it 
describes me. 
 
3 
Quite poor 
description / 
Quite unlike me. 
4 
Very poor 
description / Very 
unlike me. 
5 
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(Please write in the grey areas to the right of each statement) 
 
  Score 
62 I think about safety in the future and try to influence things by my day to day 
behaviour 
 
 
63 I think about safety in the future and do things now to achieve safety in the 
years ahead  
 
 
64 Thinking about safety I only do things to deal with the immediate situation, not 
worrying about the future 
 
 
65 What I do about safety is only influenced by how things work out in the short 
term 
 
 
66 My convenience is a big factor in how I make decisions or  take actions about 
safety  
 
 
67 I am willing to put in extra time, effort and money now to ensure that the job is 
safe in the future.  
 
 
68 I think it is important to take warnings about safety seriously, even if it is 
unlikely that an accident will happen for many years.  
 
69 I think it is more important to do something about serious accidents in the 
future than minor accidents now. 
 
70 I generally ignore warnings about possible risks in the future, because they 
generally get sorted out before that happen 
 
71 I think it is unnecessary to change things now to prevent a possible future 
accident as problems can be dealt with nearer the time. 
 
72 I only act when there is an immediate risk, I prefer to take care of future 
problems that may occur at a later date 
 
73 I believe that safety today is more important than safety at some time in the 
future. 
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AND LASTLY SOME INFORMATION ABOUT YOU 
 
74. How many people do you have responsibility for either as a Manager or 
Supervisor 
 
Please tick against one answer 
1-5 
people 
(1)   31-35 people (8)  
6-10 
people 
(2)   36-40 people (9)  
11-15 
people 
(3)   41-45 people (10)  
16-20 
people 
(4)   46-50 people (11)  
21-25 
people 
(5)   More than 51 
people  
(12)  
26-30 
people 
(6)   Not applicable  (13)  
 
 
75.  Are you (Please Tick)       
Male  (1)  
Female  (2)  
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76. Which of the following categories best describes your organization.   (Please 
Tick) 
 
Retail Shop  (1)   Wholesale Shop or 
warehouse  
(7)  
Office  (2)   Catering, Restaurant  
or Bar  
(8)  
Hotel/ B&B  (3)   Residential Care  (9)  
Leisure/ 
Cultural  
 
(4)   Consumer Services eg 
hairdresser/ beauty  
(10)  
Manufacturing  (5)   Construction Industry  (11)  
Agriculture  (6)   Central or Local 
Government  
(12)  
    Other  (13)  
 
 
77. Please give your current age. 
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78. Which of the following best describes your current working location. (Please tick) 
United 
Kingdom  
(1)   Ireland  (6)  
Europe  (2)   North 
America / 
Canada  
(7)  
South 
America  
(3)   Australia/ 
New 
Zealand  
(8)  
Middle East  
 
(4)   Africa  (9)  
Far East  (5)   Other  (10)  
 
 
 
 
 
79. Which of these best describes you. Please Circle / highlight 
Manager / 
Supervisor  
(1) 
Company 
Safety  
Officer  
(2) 
Health and Safety  
Enforcement 
Officer 
 (3)   
Someone who has  
had an accident at 
work (4) 
University 
or Nebosh  
Student 
studying 
occupational 
health / 
safety 
(5) 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.  
I AM VERY GRATEFUL. 
PLEASE RETURN IT TO ME  BY POST,  FAX OR E-MAIL. 
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PLEASE DETACH THIS SHEET AND KEEP IT 
 
 
 
 
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire.  
Research such as this cannot happen with out your help. 
 
 
 
 
 
This questionnaire forms part of a study in to the ways in which accidents at work 
are viewed by Mangers & Supervisors, Safety Professionals and Accident Subjects 
themselves. 
 
The same questions have been asked of each group and the results will be compared 
to see if there are any differences or similarities.  
 
This stage of the research is concerned with how people think about hazards before 
and after an accident has happened and how they see responsibility for cause and 
prevention. 
 
It is hoped that the results will help to improve our understanding of the ways these 
groups think about safety and accidents at work and will allow managers / 
supervisors and Safety Professionals to be better trained in accident investigation.  
 
It is proposed that the results will be published in a professional Safety Journal. All 
results will be summarized and no individual respondent or employer will be 
identified. All answers to the questionnaire are treated in the strictest confidence. 
The information collected will be stored and treated in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act.       
 
If you need to contact the researcher please  do so by e-mail  
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ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
FOR SAFETY PROFESSIONALS 
 
 
 
RESEARCHER PAUL LEHANE 
 
SUPERVISOR DR. DAVID HARDMAN 
 
 
 
 
PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT 
 
CALCUTTA HOUSE 
OLD CASTLE STREET LONDON E1 7NT 
 
15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research supported by the  
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Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am conducting research into the way in which safety professionals think about 
accidents at work.   
 
I would be very grateful if you could spare about 15-20 minutes to complete the 
attached questionnaire. Your participation is entirely voluntary and any information 
you provide will be confidential, although overall questionnaire results may be 
published in summary form. In addition, questionnaire completion is anonymous unless 
you are responding by e-mail or fax. If you have received this electronically but wish to 
respond anonymously, then simply print the questionnaire off and return by post. 
 
Thank you, 
 
Paul Lehane. 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION  
 
Please complete by hand if the questionnaire has been posted to you, writing your 
answers in the grey shaded boxes or circle / tick the appropriate answer from the 
choices given.  
If you have received the questionnaire by E-mail or downloaded it from the University 
Internet site you may print the questionnaire and complete by hand or complete as 
Word Document.  
 
COMPLETION AS A WORD DOCUMENT. 
 
 Please HIGHLIGHT your answer using the Highlight Button where options are given 
otherwise please type your answers in to the grey boxes.  
When the questionnaire is complete please attach it to an E-mail and send to me at the 
address below. 
 
RETURN OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
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BY POST 
If you have been sent the questionnaire by post a prepaid envelope should have been 
provided. Please use this to return the questionnaire. If not please return to:- 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY FAX 
You may Fax your completed questionnaire to me on
 
BY E-MAIL 
You can return the questionnaire to me at  
 
Paul Lehane c/o  
EHTS  
London Borough of Bromley 
Civic Centre Bromley England BR1 3UH 
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WHY ARE ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATED? 
People have different views about why accidents are investigated. 
Six reasons for accident investigation are given below. As a safety professional 
please indicate how important each reason is to you. 
Circle / highlight one answer from the choices given for each question. 
1 To find out the cause and understand what happened. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
2 To prevent similar accidents from happening again. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
3 To meet organizational requirements eg collection of statistics, make insurance 
claims, staff training etc. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
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4 To find out if staff acted correctly or  incorrectly.   
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
5 To find out if management acted correctly or  incorrectly. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
6 To punish someone for breaking rules and regulations. (Enforce the rules or law)  
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
7.  Please Rank  in order of importance the 6 reasons for accident investigation .  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the least 
important as = 6. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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HOW LIKELY IS IT THAT AN ACCIDENT WILL HAPPEN?  
 
This section asks you to think about tripping hazards in a typical Supermarket and 
how likely you think an accident might be. I have chosen a Supermarket as I hope it 
will be familiar to most people. 
Thinking about a box as a tripping hazard please complete questions 9, 10 & 11.   
Please Circle / highlight your answer. 
 
8 Please indicate how likely it is that a box will lead to an accident to a member of 
staff during the next 6 months. 
 
(1) 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
(2) 
Very 
Unlikely 
(3) 
Fairly 
Unlikely 
(4) 
Fairly 
Likely 
(5) 
Very 
Likely 
(6) 
Extremely 
Likely 
 
9 Please also score how confident you feel making this judgement.  
 
(1) 
Not at all confident 
(2) 
Not very 
confiden
t 
(3) 
A little 
confiden
t 
(4) 
Quite 
confide
nt 
(5) 
Very 
confide
nt 
(6) 
Certain  
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10. And lastly how serious do you think the outcome of the accident might be.   
 
(1) 
Trivial 
(2) 
Minor 
(3) 
Quite 
Serious 
(4) 
Serious 
(5) 
Very 
serious 
(6) 
Extremel
y serious 
 
INVESTIGATING A TRIPPING ACCIDENT IN A SUPERMARKET 
In the section that follows you are asked to read about a tripping accident to Mary (a 
part time checkout operator at ABC Supermarkets) who tripped over on a box near to 
the checkouts as she was going to the staff room for her mid morning break. 
 
When answering the questions that follow please do so as a safety professional, 
responding in the same way as you would in your own workplace.  
Use your own knowledge or experience of tripping accidents to add to the 
information given about the accident.  
 
Mary is a lady of about 55 years of age who has worked for as a part time 
checkout operator for about 8 years. She usually works Monday Tuesday and 
Wednesday but had come in on this particular Thursday to cover for a friend 
who was on holiday.  
As a safety professional you have received a report on an accident to Mary in ABC 
Supermarkets 
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ABC SUPERMARKET 
MESSAGE TO  SAFETY OFFICER 
FROM  BILL  SHOP FLOOR SUPERVISOR 
DATE    THURSDAY 10 AUGUST   TIME  11.30 HRS 
SUBJECT - ACCIDENT TO MARY 
At about 10.30am Mary went for her rest break and tripped over a box and hurt her 
arm. An ambulance was called to take her to hospital.  She has strained her right 
wrist, and she will be returning to work tomorrow. 
 
You speak to Jane one of the other checkout operators who witnessed the accident and 
Bill the Shop Floor Supervisor. These are the notes from your conversations. 
 
 Mary does not usually work on Thursdays but was covering for a friend who was 
on holiday 
 Mary closed her checkout at the usual time for her mid morning break and waited 
for a friend on the checkout next to her to serve her last customer and they both 
went to their break together as usual. 
 They were walking together past the checkouts when Mary tripped over on a box 
and fell awkwardly on her right arm. 
 The First Aider attended and an ambulance was called to take Mary to hospital. 
 At hospital she was found to have strained he right wrist. She will be back at work 
tomorrow.    
 A customer  had seen the box and reported it to Bill the Supervisor 
 Bill confirmed that the box had been reported by a customer and the cleaner had 
been asked to clear it up 5 minutes before the accident but had not got round to 
dealing with it. 
 No warning signs had been put out. 
 It is not known how long the box had been on the floor before it was reported by 
the customer 
 The area round the checkouts often gets untidy. 
 According to the Accident Book 4 other people had been injured in tripping 
accidents in the past 6 months 
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Using the information provided about Mary’s accident and your own experience of 
tripping accidents as a Safety Professional please answer the following questions. 
IT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT 
 
After an unwanted outcome such as failing an exam, missing a flight or an accident people 
often think about how things could have been different.  
For example: - 
After failing an exam a student might say "If only … I had worked harder….I might have 
passed" and a family who miss their holiday flight might say " If only…. we had left 
earlier…… we might have caught the flight  
 
11. After Mary’s accident you found yourself thinking “If only……” . How would you 
continue this thought?  
 
If only…….. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…. Things could have been different. 
 
12  Which one of the following people does the sentence above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
12 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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As a Safety Professional please think back to a point in time a week before Mary's 
accident and complete questions 13, 14,& 15. 
 Please Circle / highlight one option in each row. 
 Score how confident you feel making this judgement.  
13 (1) 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
 
(2) 
Very 
Unlikely 
(3) 
Fairly 
Unlikely 
(4) 
Fairly 
Likely 
(5) 
Very 
Likely 
(6) 
Extremely 
Likely 
 
 
 A week before Mary’s accident I would have rated my confidence for judging the 
likelihood (risk) of an accident from a box on the floor as 
14 (1) 
Not at all 
confident 
(2) 
Not very 
confident 
(3) 
A little 
confident 
(4) 
Quite 
confident 
(5) 
Very 
confident 
(6) 
Certain  
 
 A week before Mary’s accident I would have rated the seriousness of a 
tripping accident on a box on the floor  as 
15 (1) 
 
Trivial 
(2) 
 
Minor 
(3) 
 
Quite  
Serious 
(4) 
 
Serious 
(5) 
 
Very 
serious 
(6) 
 
Extremely 
serious 
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COULD MARY’S ACCIDENT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED? 
 
As a Safety Professional do you believe that Mary's accident could have been 
prevented?  
Please Circle / highlight one answer.   
16 Yes  
(1) 
No   
(2) 
Not Sure   
(3) 
 
If you answered YES please go to question 18.  If you answered "No" or "Not 
Sure" please go to question 29  
 
 Please indicate how you believe Mary's tripping accident could have been 
prevented. 
17 Mary’s accident could have been prevented…….. 
 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
18 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
 Page | 690  
 
WHO HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREVENTING MARY’S ACCIDENT?  
 
As a Safety Professional please rate the level of responsibility for the following 
people for preventing Mary’s accident  
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were.  
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
 
 
  Responsibility for Preventing Mary's 
accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
19 Mary   0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
20 Bill the Shop 
floor Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
21 The Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
22 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
23 ABC 
Supermarkets 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
24 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
25 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
26 A Customer 0 1 2 3   (Rank) 
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27  Please Rank these 8 people in order of  importance in preventing Mary’s 
accident.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the 
least important as = 8. Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the 
questions above.   
Knowing that a tripping accident has just happened. How would you rate/score the 
chance of another tripping accident happening again on a box in the next 6 
months?  
 
Please Circle / highlight your answer 
. 
 
 How confident you feel making this judgment 
29 (1) 
Not at all 
confident 
(2) 
Not very 
confident 
(3) 
Confident 
(4) 
Quite 
confident 
(5) 
Very 
confident 
(6) 
Certain 
 
 
 
 The Likelihood of having another tripping accident from a box on the floor in the next 6 
months 
28 (1) 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
(2) 
Very  
Unlikely 
(3) 
Fairly 
Unlikely 
(4) 
Fairly 
Likely 
(5) 
Very 
Likely 
(6) 
Extremely 
Likely 
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 The Seriousness of an another tripping from a box on the floor in the next 6 months. 
30 (1) 
Trivial 
2 
Minor 
3 
Quite 
Serious 
4 
Serious 
5 
Very 
serious 
6 
Extremely 
serious 
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RESPONSIBILITY FOR CAUSING THE ACCIDENT 
 
As Safety Professional what would you say was the cause of Mary's accident? 
 
31 The cause of Mary's accident was… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
32 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
 
 
As a Safety Professional please rate responsibility for the following people in 
causing this tripping accident   
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were for the 
accident happening. 
Please circle a number along side each of the people in the table below  
 
 Page | 694  
 
  Responsibility for Causing Mary's accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
33 Mary   
 
0 
None 
1 2 3 4 
Maximum 
 (Rank) 
34 Bill the Shop 
floor Supervisor 
0 
None 
1 2 3 4 
Maximum 
 (Rank) 
35 The Manager 
 
0 
None 
1 2 3 4 
Maximum 
 (Rank) 
36 The Store 
Safety Officer 
0 
None 
1 2 3 4 
Maximum 
 (Rank) 
37 ABC 
Supermarkets 
The Employer 
0 
None 
1 2 3 4 
Maximum 
 (Rank) 
38 Another worker 0 
None 
1 2 3 4 
Maximum 
 (Rank) 
39 The Cleaner 0 
None 
1 2 3 4 
Maximum 
 (Rank) 
40 A Customer 0 
None 
1 2 3 4 
Maximum 
 (Rank) 
Please Rank these 8 people in order of  importance in causing the accident.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2  through to the least 
important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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LUCKY OR UNLUCKY? 
Mary’s accident might be shown in a flow diagram something like the following 
one.  
Please enter a score in the grey boxes for how lucky or unlucky you feel Mary was 
at each stage. 
 
Thursday at 10.30 
Mary closed her 
checkout to go for her 
usual mid morning rest 
break  
▼ 41                                        Stage A 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
   
As usual Mary waited 
for her friend on the 
next checkout and they 
both walked along the 
front of the checkouts 
towards the staff room   
▼ 42                                         Stage B  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
   
A box had been left on 
the floor 
▼ 43                                             Stage C  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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The box had been 
reported 5 minutes 
ago. The cleaner had 
been requested to clear 
up but had not got 
round to it  
▼ 44                                            Stage D  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
  
Mary did not see the 
box on the floor 
▼ 45                                        Stage E  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
  
Mary's foot caught the 
box 
▼ 46                                       Stage F  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
       
Mary tripped on the 
box 
▼ 47                                        Stage G 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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Mary lost her balance 
and fell over 
▼ 48                                         Stage H  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
       
Mary fell awkwardly 
hurting her right arm. 
▼ 49                                         Stage I  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
       
Mary taken to hospital-  
Right wrist found to be 
strained.  She will 
return to work 
tomorrow 
 
▼ 50                                        Stage J  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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Overall how would you rate the outcome for Mary following her accident?  
Please Circle / highlight your answer. 
51 (1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very Lucky 
 
Please give your reasons in the box below 
52  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using the Stages A to J in the flowchart please answer questions 54 to 61. Circle or 
highlight your answer. 
  Stages A-J 
53 At which stage 
did the sequence 
of events change 
from being 
normal/routine?  
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
        
54 At which stage 
did Mary’s 
accident become 
certain? 
 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
        
55 At which stage(s) 
did Mary have 
control over the 
situation? 
 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
        
56 At which stage(s) 
did the Manager 
have control over 
the situation 
 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
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57 At which stage or 
stages did an 
action of any 
person become an 
important factor 
in Mary's accident 
 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
        
58 Who took the 
action 
Mary Bill Manager Safety 
Officer 
  
 Another 
worker 
Cleaner Customer None   
        
59 At which stage or 
stages did an 
inaction ( failure 
to act) of any 
person become an 
important factor 
in Mary's accident 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
 F G H I J  
        
60 Who failed to 
take an action 
Mary Bill Manager Safety 
Officer 
  
  Another 
worker 
Cleaner Customer None   
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SAFETY NOW AND IN THE FUTURE  
 
For each of the following statements please indicate how well they describe you as 
a Safety Professional. 
If the statement is a very good description of you (very like you) fill in a 1, if it is 
not a very good description of you (not at all like you) please fill in a 5.  
Use the other numbers if you fall between 1-5. 
 
Scale 
Very good 
description / 
Very like me 
1 
Quite a good 
description 
/Quite like me 
2 
Not sure if it 
describes me. 
 
3 
Quite poor 
description / 
Quite unlike 
me. 
4 
Very poor 
description / 
Very unlike 
me. 
5 
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(Please write in the grey areas to the right of each statement) 
 
  Score 
61 I think about safety in the future and try to influence things by my day to day 
behaviour 
 
 
62 I think about safety in the future and do things now to achieve safety in the 
years ahead  
 
 
63 Thinking about safety I only do things to deal with the immediate situation, not 
worrying about the future 
 
 
64 What I do about safety is only influenced by how things work out in the short 
term 
 
 
65 My convenience is a big factor in how I make decisions or  take actions about 
safety  
 
 
66 I am willing to put in extra time, effort and money now to ensure that the job is 
safe in the future.  
 
 
67 I think it is important to take warnings about safety seriously, even if it is 
unlikely that an accident will happen for many years.  
 
68 I think it is more important to do something about serious accidents in the 
future than minor accidents now. 
 
69 I generally ignore warnings about possible risks in the future, because they 
generally get sorted out before that happen 
 
70 I think it is unnecessary to change things now to prevent a possible future 
accident as problems can be dealt with nearer the time. 
 
71 I only act when there is an immediate risk, I prefer to take care of future 
problems that may occur at a later date 
 
72 I believe that safety today is more important than safety at some time in the 
future. 
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AND LASTLY SOME INFORMATION ABOUT YOU 
73. How many people do you have responsibility for either as a Manager or 
Supervisor 
Please tick against one answer 
1-5 
people 
(1)   31-35 people (8)  
6-10 
people 
(2)   36-40 people (9)  
11-15 
people 
(3)   41-45 people (10)  
16-20 
people 
(4)   46-50 people (11)  
21-25 
people 
(5)   More than 51 
people  
(12)  
26-30 
people 
(6)   Not applicable  (13)  
 
 
 
74  Are you (Please Tick)       
Male  (1)  
Female  (2)  
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75. Which of the following categories best describes your organization.   (Please 
Tick) 
Retail Shop  (1)   Wholesale Shop or 
warehouse  
(7)  
Office  (2)   Catering, Restaurant  
or Bar  
(8)  
Hotel/ B&B  (3)   Residential Care  (9)  
Leisure/ Cultural  
 
(4)   Consumer Services eg 
hairdresser/ beauty  
(10)  
Manufacturing  (5)   Construction Industry  (11)  
Agriculture  (6)   Central or Local 
Government  
(12)  
    Other  (13)  
 
 
76. Please give your current age. 
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77. Which of the following best describes your current working location. (Please tick) 
United 
Kingdom  
(1)   Ireland  (6)  
Europe  (2)   North 
America / 
Canada  
(7)  
South 
America  
(3)   Australia/ 
New 
Zealand  
(8)  
Middle East  (4)   Africa  (9)  
Far East  (5)   Other  (10)  
 
78. Which of these best describes you. Please Circle / highlight 
Manager / 
Supervisor  
(1) 
Company 
Safety  
Officer  
(2) 
Health and Safety  
Enforcement 
Officer 
 (3)   
Someone who has  
had an accident at 
work (4) 
University 
or Nebosh 
Student 
studying 
occupational 
health 
/safety 
(5) 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.  
I AM VERY GRATEFUL. 
PLEASE RETURN IT TO ME  BY POST,  FAX OR E-MAIL. 
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PLEASE DETACH THIS SHEET AND KEEP IT 
 
 
 
 
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire.  
Research such as this cannot happen with out your help. 
 
 
 
 
 
This questionnaire forms part of a study in to the ways in which accidents at work 
are viewed by Mangers & Supervisors, Safety Professionals and Accident Subjects 
themselves. 
 
The same questions have been asked of each group and the results will be compared 
to see if there are any differences or similarities.  
 
This stage of the research is concerned with how people think about hazards before 
and after an accident has happened and how they see responsibility for cause and 
prevention. 
 
It is hoped that the results will help to improve our understanding of the ways these 
groups think about safety and accidents at work and will allow managers / 
supervisors and Safety Professionals to be better trained in accident investigation.  
 
It is proposed that the results will be published in a professional Safety Journal. All 
results will be summarized and no individual respondent or employer will be 
identified. All answers to the questionnaire are treated in the strictest confidence. 
The information collected will be stored and treated in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act.       
 
If you need to contact the researcher please  do so by e-mail  
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ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
FOR SAFETY PROFESSIONALS 
 
 
 
 
RESEARCHER PAUL LEHANE 
 
SUPERVISOR DR. DAVID HARDMAN 
 
 
 
 
PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT 
 
CALCUTTA HOUSE 
OLD CASTLE STREET LONDON E1 7NT 
 
16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research supported by the  
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Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am conducting research into the way in which safety professionals think about 
accidents at work.   
 
I would be very grateful if you could spare about 15-20 minutes to complete the 
attached questionnaire. Your participation is entirely voluntary and any information 
you provide will be confidential, although overall questionnaire results may be 
published in summary form. In addition, questionnaire completion is anonymous unless 
you are responding by e-mail or fax. If you have received this electronically but wish to 
respond anonymously, then simply print the questionnaire off and return by post. 
 
Thank you, 
 
Paul Lehane. 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION  
Please complete by hand if the questionnaire has been posted to you, writing your 
answers in the grey shaded boxes or circle / tick the appropriate answer from the 
choices given.  
If you have received the questionnaire by E-mail or downloaded it from the University 
Internet site you may print the questionnaire and complete by hand or complete as 
Word Document.  
COMPLETION AS A WORD DOCUMENT. 
Please HIGHLIGHT your answer using the Highlight Button where options are given 
otherwise please type your answers in to the grey boxes.  
When the questionnaire is complete please attach it to an E-mail and send to me at the 
address below. 
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RETURN OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
BY POST 
If you have been sent the questionnaire by post a prepaid envelope should have been 
provided. Please use this to return the questionnaire. If not please return to:- 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY FAX 
You may Fax your completed questionnaire to me on
 
BY E-MAIL 
You can return the questionnaire to me at  
 
Paul Lehane c/o  
EHTS  
London Borough of Bromley 
Civic Center Bromley England BR1 3UH 
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WHY ARE ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATED? 
People have different views about why accidents are investigated. 
Six reasons for accident investigation are given below. As a safety professional 
please indicate how important each reason is to you. 
Circle / highlight one answer from the choices given for each question. 
1.To find out the cause and understand what happened. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
2 To prevent similar accidents from happening again. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
3 To meet organizational requirements eg collection of statistics, make insurance 
claims, staff training etc. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
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4 To find out if staff acted correctly or incorrectly.   
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
5 To find out if management acted correctly or incorrectly. 
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
6 To punish someone for breaking rules and regulations. (Enforce rules or law)  
 
(5) 
Very 
Important 
(4)                
Fairly 
Important 
(3) 
Important 
(2) 
Not very 
Important 
(1)  
Of no 
Importance 
 Rank 
 
7.  Please Rank in order of importance the 6 reasons for accident investigation.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the least 
important as = 6. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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HOW LIKELY IS IT THAT AN ACCIDENT WILL HAPPEN?  
 
This section asks you to think about tripping hazards in a typical Supermarket and 
how likely you think an accident might be. I have chosen a Supermarket as I hope it 
will be familiar to most people. 
Thinking about a box  as a tripping hazard please complete questions 9, 10 & 11.   
Please Circle / highlight your answer. 
9. Please indicate how likely it is that a box will lead to an accident to a member 
of staff during the next 6 months. 
 
(1) 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
(2) 
Very 
Unlikely 
(3) 
Fairly 
Unlikely 
(4) 
Fairly 
Likely 
(5) 
Very 
Likely 
(6) 
Extremely 
Likely 
 
10. Please also score how confident you feel making this judgement.  
(1) 
Not at all 
confident 
(2) 
Not very 
confident 
(3) 
A little 
confident 
(4) 
Quite 
confident 
(5) 
Very 
confident 
(6) 
Certain  
 
11. And lastly how serious do you think the outcome of the accident might be.   
(1) 
Trivial 
(2) 
Minor 
(3) 
Quite 
Serious 
(4) 
Serious 
(5) 
Very 
serious 
(6) 
Extremely 
serious 
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INVESTIGATING A TRIPPING ACCIDENT IN A SUPERMARKET 
 
In the section that follows you are asked to read about a tripping accident to Mary (a 
part time checkout operator at ABC Supermarkets) who tripped over on a box near to 
the checkouts as she was going to the staff room for her mid morning break. 
 
When answering the questions that follow please do so as a safety professional, 
responding in the same way as you would in your own workplace.  
Use your own knowledge or experience of tripping accidents to add to the 
information given about the accident.  
 
Mary is a lady of about 55 years of age who has worked for as a part time 
checkout operator for about 8 years. She usually works Monday Tuesday and 
Wednesday but had come in on this particular Thursday to cover for a friend 
who was on holiday.  
 
As a safety professional you have received a report on an accident to Mary in ABC 
Supermarkets 
ABC SUPERMARKET 
MESSAGE TO  SAFETY OFICER 
FROM  BILL  SHOP FLOOR SUPERVISOR 
DATE    THURSDAY 10 AUGUST   TIME  11.30 HRS 
SUBJECT - ACCIDENT TO MARY 
At about 10.30am Mary went for her rest break and tripped over a box and hurt her 
arm. An ambulance was called to take her to hospital.  She has strained her right 
wrist, and she will be returning to work tomorrow. 
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Using the information provided about Mary’s accident and your own experience of 
tripping accidents as a Safety Professional please answer the following questions. 
IT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT 
 
After an unwanted outcome such as failing an exam, missing a flight or an accident people 
often think about how things could have been different.  
For example: - 
After failing an exam a student might say "If only … I had worked harder….I might have 
passed" and a family who miss their holiday flight might say " If only…. we had left 
earlier…… we might have caught the flight  
 
12. After Mary’s accident you found yourself thinking “If only……” . How would you 
continue this thought?  
 
If only…….. 
 
 
 
 
…. Things could have been different. 
 
 
13  Which one of the following people does the sentence above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
13 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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As a Safety Professional please think back to a point in time a week before Mary's 
accident and complete questions 14,15 & 16. 
 Please Circle / highlight one option in each row. 
 
 
 Score how confident you feel making this prediction 
15 (1) 
Not at all 
confident 
(2) 
Not very 
confident 
(3) 
A little 
confident 
(4) 
Quite 
confident 
(5) 
Very 
confident 
(6) 
Certain  
 
 A week before Mary’s accident I would have rated the seriousness of a 
tripping accident on a box on the floor  as 
16 (1) 
Trivial 
(2) 
Minor 
(3) 
Quite  
Serious 
(4) 
Serious 
(5) 
Very 
serious 
(6) 
Extremely 
serious 
  
 
COULD MARY’S ACCIDENT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED? 
 
 A week before Mary’s accident I would have rated the likelihood (risk) of a 
tripping accident from a box on the floor as 
14  (1) 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
 
(2) 
Very 
Unlikely 
(3) 
Fairly 
Unlikely 
(4) 
Fairly 
Likely 
(5) 
Very 
Likely 
(6) 
Extremely 
Likely 
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As a Safety Professional do you believe that Mary's accident could have been 
prevented?  
Please Circle / highlight one answer.   
 
17 Yes  
(1) 
No   
(2) 
Not Sure   
(3) 
 
If you answered YES please go to question 18.  If you answered "No" or "Not 
Sure" please go to question 29  
 
 Please indicate how you believe Mary's tripping accident could have been 
prevented. 
 
18 Mary’s accident could have been prevented…….. 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
 
19 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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WHO HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREVENTING MARY’S ACCIDENT?  
 
As a Safety Professional please rate the level of responsibility for the following 
people for preventing Mary’s accident  
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were.  
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
 
  Responsibility for Preventing Mary's accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
20 Mary   0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
21 Bill the Shop floor 
Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
22 The Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
23 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
24 ABC 
Supermarkets) 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
25 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
26 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
27 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
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28  Please Rank these 8 people in order of  importance in preventing Mary’s 
accident.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 through to the 
least important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
 
Knowing that a tripping accident has just happened. How would you rate/score the 
chance of another tripping accident happening again on a box in the next 6 
months?  
 
Please Circle / highlight your answer 
. 
 The Likelihood of having another tripping accident from a box on the floor in the next 6 
months 
29 (1) 
Extremely 
Unlikely 
(2) 
Very  
Unlikely 
(3) 
Fairly 
Unlikely 
(4) 
Fairly 
Likely 
(5) 
Very 
Likely 
(6) 
Extremely 
Likely 
 
 Score how confident you feel making this judgment 
30 (1) 
Not at all 
confident 
(2) 
Not very 
confident 
(3) 
Confident 
(4) 
Quite 
confident 
(5) 
Very 
confident 
(6) 
Certain 
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 The Seriousness of an another tripping accident from a bx on the floor in 
the next 6 months. 
31  (1) 
 
Trivial 
2 
 
Minor 
3 
 
Quite 
Serious 
4 
 
Serious 
5 
 
Very 
serious 
6 
 
Extremely 
serious 
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RESPONSIBILITY FOR CAUSING THE ACCIDENT 
 
As Safety Professional what would you say was the cause of Mary's accident? 
 
32 The cause of Mary's accident was… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
33 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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As a Safety Professional please rate the level of responsibility for the following 
people in causing this tripping accident   
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were. 
Please circle a number along side each of the people in the table below  
 
  Responsibility for Causing Mary's accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
34 Mary   0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
35 Bill the Shop 
floor Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
36 The Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
37 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
38 ABC 
Supermarkets 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
39 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
40 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
41 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
Please Rank these 8 people in order of  importance in causing the accident.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2  through to the least 
important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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LUCKY OR UNLUCKY? 
 
Mary’s accident might be shown in a flow diagram something like the following 
one.  
Please enter a score in the grey boxes for how lucky or unlucky you feel Mary was 
at each stage. 
 
Thursday at 10.30 
Mary went for her rest 
break  
▼ 42                                        Stage A 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
   
Mary walked towards 
the Staff Room  
▼ 43                                         Stage B  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
   
A box had been left on 
the floor 
▼ 44                                             Stage C  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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The box had not been 
cleared up  
▼ 45                                            Stage D  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
  
Mary did not see the 
box on the floor 
▼ 46                                        Stage E  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
  
Mary stepped on the 
box 
▼ 47                                       Stage F  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
       
Mary tripped on the 
box 
▼ 48                                        Stage G 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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Mary lost her balance 
and fell over 
▼ 49                                         Stage H  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
       
Mary fell awkwardly 
hurting her right arm. 
▼ 50                                         Stage I  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
       
Mary taken to hospital-  
Right wrist found to be 
strained.  She will 
return to work 
tomorrow 
 
▼ 51                                        Stage J  
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky 
or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very 
Lucky 
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Overall how would you rate the outcome for Mary following her accident?  
Please Circle / highlight your answer. 
52 (1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very Lucky 
 
Please give your reasons in the box below 
53  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using the Stages A to J in the flowchart please answer questions 54 to 61. Circle or 
highlight your answers 
  Stages A-J 
54 At which stage 
did the 
sequence of 
events change 
from being 
normal/routine?  
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
        
55 At which stage 
did Mary’s 
accident 
become certain? 
 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
        
56 At which 
stage(s) did 
Mary have 
control over the 
situation? 
 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
        
57 At which 
stage(s) did the 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
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Manager have 
control over the 
situation 
 
F G H I J  
        
58 At which stage 
or stages did an 
action of any 
person become 
an important 
factor in Mary's 
accident 
 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
F G H I J  
        
59 Who took the 
action 
Mary Bill Manager Safety 
Officer 
  
 Another 
worker 
Cleaner Customer None   
        
60 At which stage 
or stages did an 
inaction ( 
failure to act) of 
any person 
become an 
important factor 
in Mary's 
accident 
Before 
A 
A B C D 
 
E 
 F G H I J  
        
61 Who failed to 
take an action 
Mary Bill Manager Safety 
Officer 
  
  Another 
worker 
Cleaner Customer None   
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SAFETY NOW AND IN THE FUTURE  
 
For each of the following statements please indicate how well they describe you as 
a Safety Professional. 
If the statement is a very good description of you (very like you) fill in a 1, if it is 
not a very good description of you (not at all like you) please fill in a 5.  
Use the other numbers if you fall between 1-5. 
 
Scale 
Very good 
description / 
Very like me 
1 
Quite a good 
description 
/Quite like me 
2 
Not sure if it 
describes me. 
 
3 
Quite poor 
description / 
Quite unlike 
me. 
4 
Very poor 
description / 
Very unlike 
me. 
5 
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(Please write in the grey areas to the right of each statement) 
 
  Score 
62 I think about safety in the future and try to influence things by my day to day 
behaviour. 
 
 
63 I think about safety in the future and do things now to achieve safety in the 
years ahead  
 
 
64 Thinking about safety I only do things to deal with the immediate situation, not 
worrying about the future 
 
 
65 What I do about safety is only influenced by how things work out in the short 
term 
 
 
66 My convenience is a big factor in how I make decisions or  take actions about 
safety  
 
 
67 I am willing to put in extra time, effort and money now to ensure that the job is 
safe in the future.  
 
 
68 I think it is important to take warnings about safety seriously, even if it is 
unlikely that an accident will happen for many years.  
 
69 I think it is more important to do something about serious accidents in the 
future than minor accidents now. 
 
70 I generally ignore warnings about possible risks in the future, because they 
generally get sorted out before that happen 
 
71 I think it is unnecessary to change things now to prevent a possible future 
accident as problems can be dealt with nearer the time. 
 
72 I only act when there is an immediate risk, I prefer to take care of future 
problems that may occur at a later date 
 
73 I believe that safety today is more important than safety at some time in the 
future. 
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AND LASTLY SOME INFORMATION ABOUT YOU 
 
74. How many people do you have responsibility for either as a Manager or 
Supervisor 
Please tick against one answer 
1-5 
people 
(1)   31-35 people (8)  
6-10 
people 
(2)   36-40 people (9)  
11-15 
people 
(3)   41-45 people (10)  
16-20 
people 
(4)   46-50 people (11)  
21-25 
people 
(5)   More than 51 
people  
(12)  
26-30 
people 
(6)   Not applicable  (13)  
 
75.  Are you (Please Tick)       
Male  (1)  
Female  (2)  
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76 Which of the following categories best describes your organization.   (Please 
Tick) 
 
Retail Shop  (1)   Wholesale Shop or 
warehouse  
(7)  
Office  (2)   Catering, Restaurant  or 
Bar  
(8)  
Hotel/ B&B  (3)   Residential Care  (9)  
Leisure/ Cultural  
 
(4)   Consumer Services eg 
hairdresser/ beauty  
(10)  
Manufacturing  (5)   Construction Industry  (11)  
Agriculture  (6)   Central or Local 
Government  
(12)  
    Other  (13)  
 
 
77.  Please give your current age. 
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78. Which of the following best describes your current working location. (Please tick) 
United 
Kingdom  
(1)   Ireland  (6)  
Europe (2)   North 
America / 
Canada  
(7)  
South 
America  
(3)   Australia/ 
New 
Zealand  
(8)  
Middle East  (4)   Africa  (9)  
Far East  (5)   Other  (10
) 
 
 
79. Which of these best describes you. Please Circle / highlight 
Manager / 
Supervisor  
(1) 
Company 
Safety  
Officer  
(2) 
Health and 
Safety  
Enforcement 
Officer 
 (3)   
Someone who 
has  
had an accident 
at work (4) 
University 
or Nebosh  
Student 
studying 
occupational 
health 
/safety 
(5) 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.  
I AM VERY GRATEFUL. 
PLEASE RETURN IT TO ME  BY POST,  FAX OR E-MAIL. 
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PLEASE DETACH THIS SHEET AND KEEP IT 
 
 
 
 
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire.  
Research such as this cannot happen with out your help. 
 
 
 
 
 
This questionnaire forms part of a study in to the ways in which accidents at work 
are viewed by Mangers & Supervisors, Safety Professionals and Accident Subjects 
themselves. 
 
The same questions have been asked of each group and the results will be compared 
to see if there are any differences or similarities.  
 
This stage of the research is concerned with how people think about hazards before 
and after an accident has happened and how they see responsibility for cause and 
prevention. 
 
It is hoped that the results will help to improve our understanding of the ways these 
groups think about safety and accidents at work and will allow managers / 
supervisors and Safety Professionals to be better trained in accident investigation.  
 
It is proposed that the results will be published in a professional Safety Journal. All 
results will be summarized and no individual respondent or employer will be 
identified. All answers to the questionnaire are treated in the strictest confidence. 
The information collected will be stored and treated in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act.       
 
If you need to contact the researcher please  do so by e-mail  
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THINKING ABOUT ACCIDENTS 
 
A QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PEOPLE WHO HAVE HAD AN 
ACCIDENT 
 
  
RESEARCHER PAUL LEHANE 
 
SUPERVISOR DR. DAVID HARDMAN 
 
 
PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT 
 
CALCUTTA HOUSE 
OLD CASTLE STREET LONDON E1 7NT 
 
17S 
 
Research supported by the 
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Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am conducting research into how people think about accidents after they have 
happened.   
 
I am particularly interested in your views, as you have been involved in an accident of 
some type in the last year. 
 
I would be very grateful if you could spare about 10 minutes to complete the attached 
questionnaire. Your participation is entirely voluntary and any information you provide 
will be confidential, although questionnaire results may be published summarizing the 
findings. In addition, questionnaire completion is anonymous if you use the envelope 
provided. 
 
Thank you, 
 
Paul Lehane. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION  
Please try to answer as many of the questions as you can.  
Any answers that you can provide are helpful so please return your form to me even if 
you do not complete all the questions. 
Please write your answers in the grey shaded boxes or circle / tick the appropriate 
answer from the choices given.  
RETURN OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
BY POST 
If you have been sent the questionnaire by post a prepaid envelope should have been 
provided. Please use this to return the questionnaire. If not please return to:- 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
BY FAX 
You may Fax your completed questionnaire to me on  
Paul Lehane c/o  
EHTS  
London Borough of Bromley 
Civic Centre Bromley England BR1 3UH 
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THINKING ABOUT A SLIPPING ACCIDENT IN A SUPERMARKET 
In the section that follows you are asked to read about a slipping accident to Mary (a 
part time checkout operator at ABC Supermarkets) who slipped over on a spillage of 
milk near to the checkouts as she was going to the staff room for her mid morning 
break. 
 
Please try to imagine how you would feel if you were "Mary" and had been involved 
in the accident in the way it is described. It may help you to read the information 
several times to help you to do this  
 
Use your own knowledge or experience of slipping accidents to add to the 
information given about the accident. 
 
THE ACCIDENT. 
Mary is a lady of about 55 years of age who has worked as a part time 
checkout operator for about 8 years. She usually works Monday Tuesday and 
Wednesday but had come in on this particular Thursday to cover for a friend 
who was on holiday.  
Please imagine that you are "Mary" the person who has had an accident at ABC 
Supermarket  
ABC SUPERMARKET 
MESSAGE TO  STORE MANAGER 
FROM  BILL  SHOP FLOOR SUPERVISOR 
DATE    THURSDAY 10 AUGUST   TIME  11.30 HRS 
SUBJECT - ACCIDENT TO MARY 
At about 10.30am Mary went for her rest break and slipped over on some spilt milk 
and hurt her arm. An ambulance was called to take her to hospital.  She has broken 
her right arm, which has been plastered. She will be off work for at least 3 
weeks. 
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The Store Manager spoke to Jane one of the other checkout operators who witnessed your 
accident and Bill the Shop Floor Supervisor. These are the notes from his conversations. 
 
 Mary does not usually work on Thursdays but was covering for a friend who was on 
holiday 
 Mary closed her checkout at the usual time for her mid morning break and waited for a 
friend on the checkout next to her to serve her last customer and they both went to 
their break together as usual. 
 They were walking together past the checkouts when Mary slipped over on some spilt 
milk and fell awkwardly on her right arm. 
 The First Aider attended and an ambulance was called to take Mary to hospital. 
 At hospital she was found to have a broken right arm. She will be off work for at least 
3 weeks with her arm in plaster.    
 A customer  had seen the milk and reported it to Bill the Supervisor 
 Bill confirmed that the spillage had been reported by a customer and the cleaner had 
been asked to clear it up 5 minutes before the accident but had not got round to 
dealing with it. 
 No warning signs had been put out. 
 It is not known how long the milk had been on the floor before it was reported by the 
customer 
 Spillages around the checkouts are very common. 
 According to the Accident Book 4 other people had been injured in slipping accidents 
in the past 6 months  
Imagining yourself as Mary and using your own experience of slipping accidents 
please answer the following questions. 
 
IT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT     "IF ONLY……….." 
 
After an unwanted outcome such as failing an exam, missing a flight or an accident, 
people often think about how things could have been different.  
For example: - 
After failing an exam a student might say "If only … I had worked harder….I might 
have passed" and a family who miss their holiday flight might say " If only…. we had 
left earlier…… we might have caught the flight  
 
1. Following your (Mary's) accident you found yourself thinking “If only……” . 
How would you continue this to bring about a different outcome?  
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If only…….. 
 
 
 
…. Things could have been different. 
 
2. Which one of the following people does the sentence above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
2 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
 
 COULD MARY’S ACCIDENT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED? 
 
Imagining yourself as Mary do you believe your accident could have been 
prevented?  
Please Circle / highlight one answer.   
3 Yes  
(1) 
No   
(2) 
Not Sure   
(3) 
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If you answered YES please go to question 4.  If you answered "No" or "Not Sure" 
please go to question 6 
 
 Please indicate how you believe Mary's (your) slipping accident could have been 
prevented. 
4 Mary’s (My) accident could have been prevented…….. 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
5 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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WHO HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREVENTING MARY’S ACCIDENT?  
Imagining yourself as Mary please rate the level responsibility for each of the 
following people for preventing your (Mary’s) accident. 
 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were.  
(0= No responsibility, 4 = maximum responsibility) 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
  Responsibility for Preventing Mary's accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
6 Mary  (You) 
 
0 
None 
1 2 3 4 
Maximum 
 (Rank) 
7 Bill the Shop 
floor 
Supervisor 
0 
None 
1 2 3 4 
Maximum 
 (Rank) 
8 The Manager 
 
0 
None 
1 2 3 4 
Maximum 
 (Rank) 
9 The Store 
Safety Officer 
0 
None 
1 2 3 4 
Maximum 
 (Rank) 
10 ABC 
Supermarkets 
(The 
Employer) 
0 
None 
1 2 3 4 
Maximum 
 (Rank) 
11 Another 
worker 
0 
None 
1 2 3 4 
Maximum 
 (Rank) 
12 The Cleaner 0 
None 
1 2 3 4 
Maximum 
 (Rank) 
13 A Customer 0 
None 
1 2 3 4 
Maximum 
 (Rank) 
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14.  Now please Rank these 8 people in order of importance in preventing 
Mary’s accident.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 and the least 
important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR CAUSING MARY’S ACCIDENT 
 
Imagining yourself as Mary, what would you say was the cause of  your (Mary's) 
accident? 
15 The cause of Mary's accident was… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
16 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
 
 
Imagining yourself as Mary please rate the level responsibility for each of the 
following people in causing your (Mary's) accident. 
 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were.  
(0= No responsibility, 4 = maximum responsibility) 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
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  Responsibility for Causing Mary's 
accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
17 Mary  (You) 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
18 Bill the Shop 
floor Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
19 The Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
20 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
21 ABC 
Supermarkets 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
22 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
23 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
24 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
 
25. Now please Rank these 8 people in order of importance in causing the accident. 
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2  through to the least 
important as = 8. 
     Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
Overall how lucky or unlucky would you rate yourself  (Mary) following the accident?  
Please Circle / highlight your answer. 
     
26 
(1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2U 
unlucky 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very Lucky 
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AND LASTLY SOME INFORMATION ABOUT YOU AND YOUR 
ACCIDENT 
27.  Are you (Please Tick)    28    
  
Male  (1)   Please give your 
current age. 
 
Female  (2)     
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Thinking about your own recent accident, which of the following best describes what 
happened? Please tick the box   
29 Hit by a moving, flying or 
falling object  
1  Contact with moving 
machinery or material 
being machined  
2 
 Injured while handling, 
lifting or carrying 
3  Slipped, tripped or fell on 
the same level 
4 
 Hit by a moving vehicle 5  Hit something fixed or 
stationary 
6 
 Fell from a height 7  Trapped by something 
collapsing 
8 
 Drowned or asphyxiated 9  Exposed to, or in contact 
with, a harmful substance 
10 
 Exposed to fire 
 
11  Exposed to an explosion 12 
 Contact with electricity or 
an electrical discharge 
13  Injured by an animal 14 
 Physically assaulted by a 
person 
15  other 16 
 
After your accident did you think about how things could have been different.  
30 Yes (1) No (2) Cannot 
remember (3) 
 
If you answered "Yes" please answer question 31 
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31.  If after your accident you found yourself thinking “If only……”  how did you 
continue this thought?  
 
If only…….. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…. Things could have been different. 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.  
I AM VERY GRATEFUL. 
PLEASE RETURN IT TO ME  BY POST,  FAX. 
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PLEASE DETACH THIS SHEET AND KEEP IT 
 
 
 
 
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire.  
Research such as this cannot happen with out your help. 
 
 
 
 
 
This questionnaire forms part of a study in to the ways in which accidents at work 
are viewed by Mangers & Supervisors, Safety Professionals and Accident Subjects 
themselves. 
 
The same questions have been asked of each group and the results will be compared 
to see if there are any differences or similarities.  
 
This stage of the research is concerned with how people think about an accident has 
happened and how they see responsibility for cause and prevention. 
 
It is hoped that the results will help to improve our understanding of the ways these 
groups think about safety and accidents at work and will allow managers / 
supervisors and Safety Professionals to be better trained in accident investigation.  
 
It is proposed that the results will be published in a professional Safety Journal. All 
results will be summarized and no individual respondent or employer will be 
identified. All answers to the questionnaire are treated in the strictest confidence. 
The information collected will be stored and treated in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act.       
 
If you need to contact the researcher please  do so by e-mail  
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Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am conducting research into how people think about accidents after they have 
happened.   
 
I am particularly interested in your views, as you have been involved in an accident of 
some type in the last year. 
 
I would be very grateful if you could spare about 10 minutes to complete the attached 
questionnaire. Your participation is entirely voluntary and any information you provide 
will be confidential, although questionnaire results may be published summarizing the 
findings. In addition, questionnaire completion is anonymous if you use the envelope 
provided. 
 
Thank you, 
 
Paul Lehane. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION  
Please try to answer as many of the questions as you can.  
Any answers that you can provide are helpful so please return your form to me even if 
you do not complete all the questions. 
Please write your answers in the grey shaded boxes or circle / tick the appropriate 
answer from the choices given.  
RETURN OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
BY POST 
If you have been sent the questionnaire by post a prepaid envelope should have been 
provided. Please use this to return the questionnaire. If not please return to:- 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
BY FAX 
You may Fax your completed questionnaire to me on  
Paul Lehane c/o  
EHTS  
London Borough of Bromley 
Civic Centre Bromley England BR1 3UH 
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THINKING ABOUT A SLIPPING ACCIDENT IN A SUPERMARKET 
In the section that follows you are asked to read about a slipping accident to Mary (a part 
time checkout operator at ABC Supermarkets) who slipped over on a spillage of milk near 
to the checkouts as she was going to the staff room for her mid morning break. 
 
Please try to imagine how you would feel if you were "Mary" and had been involved in 
the accident in the way it is described. It may help you to read the information several 
times to help you to do this  
 
Use your own knowledge or experience of slipping accidents to add to the information 
given about the accident. 
 
Mary is a lady of about 55 years of age who has worked as a part time 
checkout operator for about 8 years. She usually works Monday Tuesday and 
Wednesday but had come in on this particular Thursday to cover for a friend 
who was on holiday.  
 
Please imagine that you are "Mary" the person who has had an accident at ABC 
Supermarket  
 
ABC SUPERMARKET 
MESSAGE TO  STORE MANAGER 
FROM  BILL  SHOP FLOOR SUPERVISOR 
DATE    THURSDAY 10 AUGUST   TIME  11.30 HRS 
SUBJECT - ACCIDENT TO MARY 
At about 10.30am Mary went for her rest break and slipped over on some spilt milk 
and hurt her arm. An ambulance was called to take her to hospital.  She has broken 
her right arm, which has been plastered. She will be off work for at least 3 
weeks. 
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Imagining yourself as Mary and using your own experience of slipping accidents 
please answer the following questions. 
IT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT     “IF ONLY…..” 
 
After an unwanted outcome such as failing an exam, missing a flight or an accident, 
people often think about how things could have been different.  
For example: - 
After failing an exam a student might say "If only … I had worked harder….I might have 
passed" and a family who miss their holiday flight might say " If only…. we had left 
earlier…… we might have caught the flight  
 
1. Following your (Mary's) accident you found yourself thinking “If only……” . How 
would you continue this to bring about a different outcome?  
If only…….. 
 
 
 
 
…. Things could have been different. 
 
 
2. Which one of the following people does the sentence above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
2 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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COULD MARY’S ACCIDENT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED? 
 
Imagining yourself as Mary do you believe that your accident could have been 
prevented?  
Please Circle / highlight one answer.   
3 Yes  
(1) 
No   
(2) 
Not Sure   
(3) 
 
If you answered YES please go to question 4.  If you answered "No" or "Not Sure" 
please go to question 6  
 
 Please indicate how you believe Mary's (your) slipping accident could have been 
prevented. 
 
4 Mary’s accident could have been prevented…….. 
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Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
 
5 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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WHO HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREVENTING MARY’S ACCIDENT?  
Imagining yourself as Mary please rate the level responsibility for each of the 
following people for preventing your (Mary’s) accident. 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were.  
(0= No responsibility, 4 = maximum responsibility) 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
  Responsibility for Preventing Mary's 
accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
6 Mary  (You) 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
7 Bill  
Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
8 The Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
9 The Store 
Safety Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
10 ABC 
Supermarkets 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
11 Another 
worker 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
12 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
13 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
 
14.  Now please Rank these 8 people in order of importance in preventing 
Mary’s accident. Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 
2 and the least important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.  
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WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR CAUSING MARY’S ACCIDENT 
 
Imagining yourself as Mary, what would you say was the cause of  your (Mary's) 
accident? 
15 The cause of Mary's accident was… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
16 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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Imagining yourself as Mary please rate the level responsibility for each of the 
following people in causing your (Mary's) accident. 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were.  
(0= No responsibility, 4 = maximum responsibility) 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
 
  Responsibility for Causing Mary's 
accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
17 Mary  (You) 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
18 Bill the Shop 
floor Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
19 The Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
20 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
21 ABC 
Supermarkets 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
22 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
23 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
24 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
 
25. Now please Rank these 8 people in order of importance in causing the accident. 
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2  through to the least 
important as = 8. 
     Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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Overall how lucky or unlucky would you rate yourself  (Mary) following the accident?  
Please Circle / highlight your answer. 
26 (1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very Lucky 
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AND LASTLY SOME INFORMATION ABOUT YOU AND YOUR 
ACCIDENT 
27.  Are you (Please Tick)    28    
  
Male  (1)   Please give your 
current age. 
 
Female  (2)     
 
Thinking about your own recent accident, which of the following best describes what 
happened? Please tick the box   
 
29 Hit by a moving, flying or 
falling object  
1  Contact with moving machinery 
or material being machined  
2 
 Injured while handling, lifting 
or carrying 
3  Slipped, tripped or fell on the 
same level 
4 
 Hit by a moving vehicle 5  Hit something fixed or 
stationary 
6 
 Fell from a height 7  Trapped by something 
collapsing 
8 
 Drowned or asphyxiated 9  Exposed to, or in contact with, a 
harmful substance 
10 
 Exposed to fire 
 
11  Exposed to an explosion 12 
 Contact with electricity or an 
electrical discharge 
13  Injured by an animal 14 
 Physically assaulted by a 
person 
15  other 16 
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After your accident did you think about how things could have been different.  
 
3
0 
Yes (1) No (2) Cannot 
remember (3) 
 
If you answered "Yes" please answer question 31 
 
31.  If after your accident you found yourself thinking “If only……”  how did you 
continue this thought?  
 
If only…….. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…. Things could have been different. 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.  
I AM VERY GRATEFUL. 
PLEASE RETURN IT TO ME  BY POST,  FAX. 
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PLEASE DETACH THIS SHEET AND KEEP IT 
 
 
 
 
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire.  
Research such as this cannot happen with out your help. 
 
 
 
 
 
This questionnaire forms part of a study in to the ways in which accidents at work 
are viewed by Mangers & Supervisors, Safety Professionals and Accident Subjects 
themselves. 
 
The same questions have been asked of each group and the results will be compared 
to see if there are any differences or similarities.  
 
This stage of the research is concerned with how people think about hazards before 
and after an accident has happened and how they see responsibility for cause and 
prevention. 
 
It is hoped that the results will help to improve our understanding of the ways these 
groups think about safety and accidents at work and will allow managers / 
supervisors and Safety Professionals to be better trained in accident investigation.  
 
It is proposed that the results will be published in a professional Safety Journal. All 
results will be summarized and no individual respondent or employer will be 
identified. All answers to the questionnaire are treated in the strictest confidence. 
The information collected will be stored and treated in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act.       
 
If you need to contact the researcher please  do so by e-mail  
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THINKING ABOUT ACCIDENTS 
 
A QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PEOPLE WHO HAVE HAD AN 
ACCIDENT 
 
 
 
RESEARCHER PAUL LEHANE 
 
SUPERVISOR DR. DAVID HARDMAN 
 
 
PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT 
 
CALCUTTA HOUSE 
OLD CASTLE STREET LONDON E1 7NT 
 
19S 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Research supported by the  
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Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am conducting research into how people think about accidents after they have 
happened.   
 
I am particularly interested in your views, as you have been involved in an accident of 
some type in the last year. 
 
I would be very grateful if you could spare about 10 minutes to complete the attached 
questionnaire. Your participation is entirely voluntary and any information you provide 
will be confidential, although questionnaire results may be published summarizing the 
findings. In addition, questionnaire completion is anonymous if you use the envelope 
provided. 
 
Thank you, 
 
Paul Lehane. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION  
Please try to answer as many of the questions as you can.  
Any answers that you can provide are helpful so please return your form to me even if 
you do not complete all the questions. 
Please write your answers in the grey shaded boxes or circle / tick the appropriate 
answer from the choices given.  
RETURN OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
BY POST 
If you have been sent the questionnaire by post a prepaid envelope should have been 
provided. Please use this to return the questionnaire. If not please return to:- 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY FAX 
You may Fax your completed questionnaire to me on  
Paul Lehane c/o  
EHTS  
London Borough of Bromley 
Civic Centre Bromley England BR1 3UH 
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THINKING ABOUT A SLIPPING ACCIDENT IN A SUPERMARKET 
In the section that follows you are asked to read about a slipping accident to Mary (a 
part time checkout operator at ABC Supermarkets) who slipped over on a spillage of 
milk near to the checkouts as she was going to the staff room for her mid morning 
break. 
 
Please try to imagine how you would feel if you were "Mary" and had been involved 
in the accident in the way it is described. It may help you to read the information 
several times to help you to do this  
 
Use your own knowledge or experience of slipping accidents to add to the 
information given about the accident. 
 
THE ACCIDENT 
Mary is a lady of about 55 years of age who has worked as a part time 
checkout operator for about 8 years. She usually works Monday Tuesday and 
Wednesday but had come in on this particular Thursday to cover for a friend 
who was on holiday.  
Please imagine that you are "Mary" the person who has had an accident at ABC 
Supermarket  
ABC SUPERMARKET 
MESSAGE TO  STORE MANAGER 
FROM  BILL  SHOP FLOOR SUPERVISOR 
DATE    THURSDAY 10 AUGUST   TIME  11.30 HRS 
SUBJECT - ACCIDENT TO MARY 
At about 10.30am Mary went for her rest break and slipped over on some spilt milk 
and hurt her arm. An ambulance was called to take her to hospital.  She has 
strained her right wrist, and she will be returning to work tomorrow. 
 
The Store Manager spoke to Jane one of the other checkout operators who witnessed your 
accident and Bill the Shop Floor Supervisor. These are the notes from his conversations. 
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 Mary does not usually work on Thursdays but was covering for a friend who was on 
holiday 
 Mary closed her checkout at the usual time for her mid morning break and waited for a 
friend on the checkout next to her to serve her last customer and they both went to 
their break together as usual. 
 They were walking together past the checkouts when Mary slipped over on some spilt 
milk and fell awkwardly on her right arm. 
 The First Aider attended and an ambulance was called to take Mary to hospital. 
 At hospital she was found to have strained her right wrist. She will be returning to 
work tomorrow.    
 A customer had seen the milk and reported it to Bill the Supervisor 
 Bill confirmed that the spillage had been reported by a customer and the cleaner had 
been asked to clear it up 5 minutes before the accident but had not got round to 
dealing with it. 
 No warning signs had been put out. 
 It is not known how long the milk had been on the floor before it was reported by the 
customer 
 Spillages around the checkouts are very common. 
 According to the Accident Book 4 other people had been injured in slipping accidents 
in the past 6 months  
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Imagining yourself as Mary and using your own experience of slipping accidents 
please answer the following questions. 
IT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT       “IF ONLY……….” 
 
After an unwanted outcome such as failing an exam, missing a flight or an accident, 
people often think about how things could have been different.  
For example: - 
After failing an exam a student might say "If only … I had worked harder….I might 
have passed" and a family who miss their holiday flight might say " If only…. we had 
left earlier…… we might have caught the flight  
 
1. Following your (Mary's) accident you found yourself thinking “If only……” . How 
would you continue this to bring about a different outcome?  
 
If only…….. 
 
 
 
 
…. Things could have been different. 
 
2. Which one of the following people does the sentence above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
2 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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COULD MARY’S ACCIDENT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED? 
 
Imagining yourself as Mary do you believe that the accident could have been 
prevented?  
Please Circle / highlight one answer.   
3 Yes  
(1) 
No   
(2) 
Not Sure   
(3) 
 
If you answered YES please go to question 4.  If you answered "No" or "Not Sure" 
please go to question 6  
 
 Please indicate how you believe Mary's slipping accident could have been 
prevented. 
4 Mary’s accident could have been prevented…….. 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
5 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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WHO HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREVENTING MARY’S ACCIDENT?  
Imagining yourself as Mary please rate the level responsibility for each of the 
following people for preventing your (Mary’s) accident  
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were.  
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
  Responsibility for Preventing Mary's accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
6 Mary  (You) 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
7 Bill the Shop 
floor Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
8 The Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
9 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
10 ABC 
Supermarkets 
(The Employer) 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
11 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
12 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
13 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
 
14.  Now please Rank these 8 people in order of importance in preventing 
Mary’s accident.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 and the least 
important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR CAUSING MARY’S ACCIDENT 
Imagining yourself as Mary, what would you say was the cause of  your (Mary's) 
accident? 
 
15 The cause of Mary's accident was… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
 
16 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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Imagining yourself as Mary please  rate the level responsibility for each of the 
following people for causing your (Mary’s) accident  
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were.  
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
  Responsibility for Causing Mary's accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
17 Mary  (You) 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
18 Bill the Shop 
floor 
Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
19 The Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
20 The Store 
Safety Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
21 ABC 
Supermarkets 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
22 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
23 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
24 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
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25. Now Please Rank these 8 people in order of importance in causing the accident.  
     Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2  through to the least 
important as = 8. Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
Overall how lucky or unlucky would you rate yourself (Mary) following the accident?  
Please Circle /tick your answer. 
26 (1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very Lucky 
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AND LASTLY SOME INFORMATION ABOUT YOU AND YOUR 
ACCIDENT 
27.  Are you (Please Tick)    28    
  
Male  (1)   Please give your 
current age. 
 
 
Female  (2)     
 
 
Thinking about your own recent accident, which of the following best describes what 
happened? Please tick the box   
29 Hit by a moving, flying or 
falling object  
1  Contact with moving machinery 
or material being machined  
2 
 Injured while handling, lifting 
or carrying 
3  Slipped, tripped or fell on the 
same level 
4 
 Hit by a moving vehicle 5  Hit something fixed or 
stationary 
6 
 Fell from a height 7  Trapped by something 
collapsing 
8 
 Drowned or asphyxiated 9  Exposed to, or in contact with, a 
harmful substance 
10 
 Exposed to fire 
 
11  Exposed to an explosion 12 
 Contact with electricity or an 
electrical discharge 
13  Injured by an animal 14 
 Physically assaulted by a 
person 
15  other 16 
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After your accident did you think about how things could have been different.  
 
30 Yes (1) No (2) Cannot remember 
(3) 
 
If you answered "Yes" please answer question 31 
31.  If after your accident you found yourself thinking “If only……”  how did you 
continue this thought?  
 
If only…….. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…. Things could have been different. 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.  
I AM VERY GRATEFUL. 
PLEASE RETURN IT TO ME  BY POST,  FAX. 
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PLEASE DETACH THIS SHEET AND KEEP IT 
 
 
 
 
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire.  
Research such as this cannot happen with out your help. 
 
 
 
 
 
This questionnaire forms part of a study in to the ways in which accidents at work 
are viewed by Mangers & Supervisors, Safety Professionals and Accident Subjects 
themselves. 
 
The same questions have been asked of each group and the results will be compared 
to see if there are any differences or similarities.  
 
This stage of the research is concerned with how people think about hazards before 
and after an accident has happened and how they see responsibility for cause and 
prevention. 
 
It is hoped that the results will help to improve our understanding of the ways these 
groups think about safety and accidents at work and will allow managers / 
supervisors and Safety Professionals to be better trained in accident investigation.  
 
It is proposed that the results will be published in a professional Safety Journal. All 
results will be summarized and no individual respondent or employer will be 
identified. All answers to the questionnaire are treated in the strictest confidence. 
The information collected will be stored and treated in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act.       
 
If you need to contact the researcher please  do so by e-mail  
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Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am conducting research into how people think about accidents after they have 
happened.   
 
I am particularly interested in your views, as you have been involved in an accident of 
some type in the last year. 
 
I would be very grateful if you could spare about 10 minutes to complete the attached 
questionnaire. Your participation is entirely voluntary and any information you provide 
will be confidential, although questionnaire results may be published summarizing the 
findings. In addition, questionnaire completion is anonymous if you use the envelope 
provided. 
 
Thank you, 
 
Paul Lehane. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION  
Please try to answer as many of the questions as you can.  
Any answers that you can provide are helpful so please return your form to me even if 
you do not complete all the questions. 
Please write your answers in the grey shaded boxes or circle / tick the appropriate 
answer from the choices given.  
RETURN OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
BY POST 
If you have been sent the questionnaire by post a prepaid envelope should have been 
provided. Please use this to return the questionnaire. If not please return to:- 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY FAX 
You may Fax your completed questionnaire to me on  
Paul Lehane c/o  
EHTS  
London Borough of Bromley 
Civic Centre Bromley England BR1 3UH 
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THINKING ABOUT A SLIPPING ACCIDENT IN A SUPERMARKET 
In the section that follows you are asked to read about a slipping accident to Mary (a 
part time checkout operator at ABC Supermarkets) who slipped over on a spillage of 
milk near to the checkouts as she was going to the staff room for her mid morning 
break. 
 
Please try to imagine how you would feel if you were "Mary" and had been involved 
in the accident in the way it is described. It may help you to read the information 
several times to help you to do this  
 
Use your own knowledge or experience of slipping accidents to add to the 
information given about the accident. 
 
THE ACCIDENT 
Mary is a lady of about 55 years of age who has worked as a part time 
checkout operator for about 8 years. She usually works Monday Tuesday and 
Wednesday but had come in on this particular Thursday to cover for a friend 
who was on holiday.  
Please imagine that you are "Mary" the person who has had an accident at ABC 
Supermarket  
 
ABC SUPERMARKET 
MESSAGE TO  STORE MANAGER 
FROM  BILL  SHOP FLOOR SUPERVISOR 
DATE    THURSDAY 10 AUGUST   TIME  11.30 HRS 
SUBJECT - ACCIDENT TO MARY 
At about 10.30am Mary went for her rest break and slipped over on some spilt milk 
and hurt her arm. An ambulance was called to take her to hospital.  She has 
strained her right wrist, and she will be returning to work tomorrow. 
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Imagining yourself as Mary and using your own experience of slipping accidents 
please answer the following questions. 
 
IT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT    “IF ONLY..….” 
 
After an unwanted outcome such as failing an exam, missing a flight or an accident, 
people often think about how things could have been different.  
 
For example: - 
After failing an exam a student might say "If only … I had worked harder….I might have 
passed" and a family who miss their holiday flight might say " If only…. we had left 
earlier…… we might have caught the flight  
 
1. Following your (Mary's) accident you found yourself thinking “If only……” . How 
would you continue this thought to bring about a different outcome?  
 
If only…….. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…. Things could have been different. 
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2.  Which one of the following people does the sentence above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
 
2 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
 
COULD MARY’S ACCIDENT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED? 
Imagining yourself as Mary do you believe that the accident could have been 
prevented?  
Please Circle / highlight one answer.   
 
3 Yes  
(1) 
No   
(2) 
Not Sure   
(3) 
 
If you answered YES please go to question 4.  If you answered "No" or "Not Sure" 
please go to question 6  
 
 Please indicate how you believe Mary's slipping accident could have been 
prevented. 
4 Mary’s accident could have been prevented…….. 
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Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
 
5 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
 
WHO HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREVENTING MARY’S ACCIDENT?  
Imagining yourself as Mary please rate the level responsibility for each of the 
following people for preventing your (Mary’s) accident. 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were.  
(0= No responsibility, 4 = maximum responsibility) 
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Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
 
  Responsibility for Preventing Mary's 
accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
6 Mary  (You) 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
7 Shop floor 
Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
8 The Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
9 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
10 ABC 
Supermarkets 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
11 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
12 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
13 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
 
14  Now please Rank these 8 people in order of  importance in preventing Mary’s 
accident.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2  through to the 
least important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR CAUSING MARY’S ACCIDENT 
 
Imagining yourself as Mary, what would you say was the cause of  your (Mary's) 
accident? 
15 The cause of Mary's accident was… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
 
16 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
 
 
Imagining yourself as Mary please rate the level responsibility for each of the 
following people in causing your (Mary's) accident. 
 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were.  
(0= No responsibility, 4 = maximum responsibility) 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
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  Responsibility for Causing Mary's accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
17 Mary  (You) 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
18 Shop floor 
Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
19 The Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
20 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
21 ABC 
Supermarkets 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
22 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
23 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
24 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
 
25. Now please Rank these 8 people in order of importance in causing the accident. 
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2  through to the least 
important as = 8. 
     Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
 
Overall how lucky or unlucky would you rate yourself  (Mary) following the accident?  
Please Circle / highlight your answer. 
26 (1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very Lucky 
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AND LASTLY SOME INFORMATION ABOUT YOU AND YOUR 
ACCIDENT 
27.  Are you (Please Tick)    28     
Male  (1)   Please give your 
current age. 
 
Female  (2)     
 
Thinking about your own recent accident, which of the following best describes what 
happened? Please tick the box   
29 Hit by a moving, flying 
or falling object  
1  Contact with moving 
machinery or material 
being machined  
2 
 Injured while handling, 
lifting or carrying 
3  Slipped, tripped or fell 
on the same level 
4 
 Hit by a moving vehicle 5  Hit something fixed or 
stationary 
6 
 Fell from a height 7  Trapped by something 
collapsing 
8 
 Drowned or asphyxiated 9  Exposed to, or in 
contact with, a harmful 
substance 
10 
 Exposed to fire 
 
11  Exposed to an 
explosion 
12 
 Contact with electricity 
or an electrical 
discharge 
13  Injured by an animal 14 
 Physically assaulted by 
a person 
15  other 16 
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After your accident did you think about how things could have been different.  
30 Yes (1) No (2) Cannot 
remember (3) 
 
If you answered "Yes" please answer question 31 
 
31.  If after your accident you found yourself thinking “If only……”  how did you 
continue this thought?  
 
If only…….. 
 
 
…. Things could have been different. 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.  
I AM VERY GRATEFUL. 
PLEASE RETURN IT TO ME  BY POST,  FAX. 
 
PLEASE DETACH THIS SHEET AND KEEP IT 
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ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire.  
Research such as this cannot happen with out your help. 
 
 
 
 
 
This questionnaire forms part of a study in to the ways in which accidents at work 
are viewed by Mangers & Supervisors, Safety Professionals and Accident Subjects 
themselves. 
 
The same questions have been asked of each group and the results will be compared 
to see if there are any differences or similarities.  
 
This stage of the research is concerned with how people think about hazards before 
and after an accident has happened and how they see responsibility for cause and 
prevention. 
 
It is hoped that the results will help to improve our understanding of the ways these 
groups think about safety and accidents at work and will allow managers / 
supervisors and Safety Professionals to be better trained in accident investigation.  
 
It is proposed that the results will be published in a professional Safety Journal. All 
results will be summarized and no individual respondent or employer will be 
identified. All answers to the questionnaire are treated in the strictest confidence. 
The information collected will be stored and treated in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act.       
 
If you need to contact the researcher please  do so by e-mail  
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Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am conducting research into how people think about accidents after they have 
happened.   
 
I am particularly interested in your views, as you have been involved in an accident of 
some type in the last year. 
 
I would be very grateful if you could spare about 10 minutes to complete the attached 
questionnaire. Your participation is entirely voluntary and any information you provide 
will be confidential, although questionnaire results may be published summarizing the 
findings. In addition, questionnaire completion is anonymous if you use the envelope 
provided. 
 
Thank you, 
 
Paul Lehane. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION  
Please try to answer as many of the questions as you can.  
Any answers that you can provide are helpful so please return your form to me even if 
you do not complete all the questions. 
Please write your answers in the grey shaded boxes or circle / tick the appropriate 
answer from the choices given.  
RETURN OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
BY POST 
If you have been sent the questionnaire by post a prepaid envelope should have been 
provided. Please use this to return the questionnaire. If not please return to:- 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
BY FAX 
You may Fax your completed questionnaire to me on  
 
 
Paul Lehane c/o  
EHTS  
London Borough of Bromley 
Civic Centre Bromley England BR1 3UH 
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THINKING ABOUT A TRIPPING ACCIDENT IN A SUPERMARKET 
In the section that follows you are asked to read about a tripping accident to Mary (a part 
time checkout operator at ABC Supermarkets) who tripped over a box near to the 
checkouts as she was going to the staff room for her mid morning break. 
 
Please try to imagine how you would feel if you were "Mary" and had been involved in 
the accident in the way it is described. It may help you to read the information several 
times to help you to do this  
 
Use your own knowledge or experience of tripping accidents to add to the information 
given about the accident. 
 
THE ACCIDENT 
Mary is a lady of about 55 years of age who has worked as a part time 
checkout operator for about 8 years. She usually works Monday Tuesday and 
Wednesday but had come in on this particular Thursday to cover for a friend 
who was on holiday.  
 
Please imagine that you are "Mary" the person who has had an accident at ABC 
Supermarket  
ABC SUPERMARKET 
MESSAGE TO  STORE MANAGER 
FROM  BILL  SHOP FLOOR SUPERVISOR 
DATE    THURSDAY 10 AUGUST   TIME  11.30 HRS 
SUBJECT - ACCIDENT TO MARY 
At about 10.30am Mary went for her rest break and tripped over on a box and hurt 
her arm. An ambulance was called to take her to hospital.  She has broken her 
right arm, which has been plastered. She will be off work for at least 3 weeks. 
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The Store Manager spoke to Jane one of the other checkout operators who witnessed 
your accident and Bill the Shop Floor Supervisor. These are the notes from his 
conversations. 
 
 Mary does not usually work on Thursdays but was covering for a friend who was 
on holiday 
 Mary closed her checkout at the usual time for her mid morning break and waited 
for a friend on the checkout next to her to serve her last customer and they both 
went to their break together as usual. 
 They were walking together past the checkouts when Mary tripped over a box on 
the floor and fell awkwardly on her right arm. 
 The First Aider attended and an ambulance was called to take Mary to hospital. 
 At hospital she was found to have a broken right arm. She will be off work for at 
least 3 weeks with her arm in plaster.    
 A customer  had seen the box and reported it to Bill the Supervisor 
 Bill confirmed that the box had been reported by a customer and the cleaner had 
been asked to clear it up 5 minutes before the accident but had not got round to 
dealing with it. 
 No warning signs had been put out. 
 It is not known how long the box had been on the floor before it was reported by 
the customer 
 The area round the checkouts often gets untidy.  
 According to the Accident Book 4 other people had been injured in tripping 
accidents in the past 6 months  
Imagining yourself as Mary and using your own experience of tripping accidents 
please answer the following questions. 
 
IT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT     “IF ONLY……..” 
 
After an unwanted outcome such as failing an exam, missing a flight or an accident 
people often think about how things could have been different.  
For example: - 
After failing an exam a student might say, "If only … I had worked harder….I might 
have passed" and a family who miss their holiday flight might say " If only…. we had 
left earlier…… we might have caught the flight  
 
1. Following your (Mary's) accident you found yourself thinking “If only……” . 
How would you continue this to bring about a different outcome?  
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If only…….. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…. Things could have been different. 
 
 
2. Which one of the following people does the sentence above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
 
2 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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COULD MARY’S ACCIDENT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED? 
 
Imagining yourself as Mary do you believe that your accident could have been 
prevented?  
Please Circle / highlight one answer.   
3 Yes  
(1) 
No   
(2) 
Not Sure   
(3) 
 
If you answered YES please go to question 4.  If you answered "No" or "Not sure" 
please go to question 6  
 
 Please indicate how you believe Mary's (your) tripping accident could have been 
prevented. 
4 Mary’s accident could have been prevented…….. 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
 
5 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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WHO HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREVENTING MARY’S ACCIDENT?  
Imagining yourself as Mary please rate the responsibility for each of the following 
people for preventing your (Mary’s) accident. 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were.  
(0= No responsibility, 4 = maximum responsibility) 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
 
  Responsibility for Preventing Mary's 
accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
6 Mary  (You) 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
7 Shop floor 
Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
8 The Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
9 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
10 ABC 
Supermarkets 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
11 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
12 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
13 A Customer 0 1 2 3   (Rank) 
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14.  Now please Rank these 8 people in order of importance in preventing 
Mary’s accident. Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 
2 and the least important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR CAUSING MARY’S ACCIDENT 
 
Imagining yourself as Mary, what would you say was the cause of your (Mary's) 
accident? 
 
15 The cause of Mary's accident was… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
16 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
 
Imagining yourself as Mary please rate responsibility for each of the following people 
in causing your (Mary's) accident 
 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were.  
(0= No responsibility, 4 = maximum responsibility) 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
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  Responsibility for Causing Mary's 
accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
17 Mary  (You) 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
18 Shop floor 
Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
19 The Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
20 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
21 ABC 
Supermarkets) 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
22 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
23 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
24 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
 
25. Now please Rank these 8 people in order of importance in preventing 
Mary’s accident.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 and the least 
important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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Overall how lucky or unlucky would you rate yourself (Mary) following the accident?  
Please Circle / highlight your answer. 
26 (1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very Lucky 
 
AND LASTLY SOME INFORMATION ABOUT YOU AND YOUR 
ACCIDENT 
27.  Are you (Please Tick)    28    
  
Male  (1)   Please give your 
current age. 
 
Female  (2)     
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Thinking about your own recent accident, which of the following best describes what 
happened? Please tick the box   
 
29 Hit by a moving, flying or 
falling object  
1  Contact with moving 
machinery or material being 
machined  
2 
 Injured while handling, 
lifting or carrying 
3  Slipped, tripped or fell on the 
same level 
4 
 Hit by a moving vehicle 5  Hit something fixed or 
stationary 
6 
 Fell from a height 7  Trapped by something 
collapsing 
8 
 Drowned or asphyxiated 9  Exposed to, or in contact 
with, a harmful substance 
10 
 Exposed to fire 
 
11  Exposed to an explosion 12 
 Contact with electricity or 
an electrical discharge 
13  Injured by an animal 14 
 Physically assaulted by a 
person 
15  other 16 
 
After your accident did you think about how things could have been different.  
 
30 Yes (1) No (2) Cannot 
remember 
(3) 
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If you answered "Yes" please answer question 31 
 
31.  If after your accident you found yourself thinking “If only……”  how did you 
continue this thought?  
 
If only…….. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…. Things could have been different. 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.  
I AM VERY GRATEFUL. 
PLEASE RETURN IT TO ME  BY POST,  FAX. 
 
. 
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PLEASE DETACH THIS SHEET AND KEEP IT 
 
 
 
 
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire.  
Research such as this cannot happen with out your help. 
 
 
 
 
 
This questionnaire forms part of a study in to the ways in which accidents at work 
are viewed by Mangers & Supervisors, Safety Professionals and Accident Subjects 
themselves. 
 
The same questions have been asked of each group and the results will be compared 
to see if there are any differences or similarities.  
 
This stage of the research is concerned with how people think about hazards before 
and after an accident has happened and how they see responsibility for cause and 
prevention. 
 
It is hoped that the results will help to improve our understanding of the ways these 
groups think about safety and accidents at work and will allow managers / 
supervisors and Safety Professionals to be better trained in accident investigation.  
 
It is proposed that the results will be published in a professional Safety Journal. All 
results will be summarized and no individual respondent or employer will be 
identified. All answers to the questionnaire are treated in the strictest confidence. 
The information collected will be stored and treated in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act.       
 
If you need to contact the researcher please do so by e-mail  
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THINKING ABOUT ACCIDENTS 
 
A QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PEOPLE WHO HAVE HAD AN 
ACCIDENT 
 
 
RESEARCHER PAUL LEHANE 
 
SUPERVISOR DR. DAVID HARDMAN 
 
 
PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT 
 
CALCUTTA HOUSE 
OLD CASTLE STREET LONDON E1 7NT 
 
22S 
 
Research supported by the 
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Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am conducting research into how people think about accidents after they have 
happened.   
 
I am particularly interested in your views, as you have been involved in an accident of 
some type in the last year. 
 
I would be very grateful if you could spare about 10 minutes to complete the attached 
questionnaire. Your participation is entirely voluntary and any information you provide 
will be confidential, although questionnaire results may be published summarizing the 
findings. In addition, questionnaire completion is anonymous if you use the envelope 
provided. 
 
Thank you, 
 
Paul Lehane. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION  
Please try to answer as many of the questions as you can.  
Any answers that you can provide are helpful so please return your form to me even if 
you do not complete all the questions. 
Please write your answers in the grey shaded boxes or circle / tick the appropriate 
answer from the choices given.  
RETURN OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
BY POST 
If you have been sent the questionnaire by post a prepaid envelope should have been 
provided. Please use this to return the questionnaire. If not please return to:- 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
BY FAX 
You may Fax your completed questionnaire to me on  
Paul Lehane c/o  
EHTS  
London Borough of Bromley 
Civic Centre Bromley England BR1 3UH 
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THINKING ABOUT A TRIPPING ACCIDENT IN A SUPERMARKET 
In the section that follows you are asked to read about a tripping accident to Mary (a 
part time checkout operator at ABC Supermarkets) who tripped over on a box near to 
the checkouts as she was going to the staff room for her mid morning break. 
 
Please try to imagine how you would feel if you were "Mary" and had been involved 
in the accident in the way it is described. It may help you to read the information 
several times to help you to do this  
 
Use your own knowledge or experience of tripping accidents to add to the 
information given about the accident. 
THE ACCIDENT 
Mary is a lady of about 55 years of age who has worked as a part time 
checkout operator for about 8 years. She usually works Monday Tuesday and 
Wednesday but had come in on this particular Thursday to cover for a friend 
who was on holiday.  
Please imagine that you are "Mary" the person who has had an accident at ABC 
Supermarket  
ABC SUPERMARKET 
MESSAGE TO  STORE MANAGER 
FROM  BILL  SHOP FLOOR SUPERVISOR 
DATE    THURSDAY 10 AUGUST   TIME  11.30 HRS 
SUBJECT - ACCIDENT TO MARY 
At about 10.30am Mary went for her rest break and tripped over on a box and hurt 
her arm. An ambulance was called to take her to hospital.  She has broken her 
right arm, which has been plastered. She will be off work for at least 3 weeks. 
 
Imagining yourself as Mary and using your own experience of tripping accidents 
please answer the following questions. 
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IT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT   “IF ONLY……” 
 
After an unwanted outcome such as failing an exam, missing a flight or an accident 
people often think about how things could have been different.  
For example: - 
After failing an exam a student might say "If only … I had worked harder….I might 
have passed" and a family who miss their holiday flight might say " If only…. we had 
left earlier…… we might have caught the flight  
 
1. Following your (Mary's) accident you found yourself thinking “If only……” . How 
would you continue this to bring about a different outcome?  
 
If only…….. 
 
 
 
 
…. Things could have been different. 
 
2.  Which one of the following people does the sentence above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
 
2 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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COULD MARY’S ACCIDENT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED? 
 
Imagining yourself as Mary do you believe that your accident could have been 
prevented?  
Please Circle / highlight one answer.   
3 Yes  
(1) 
No   
(2) 
Not Sure   
(3) 
 
If you answered YES please go to question 4.  If you answered "No" or "Not Sure" 
please go to question 6  
 
 Please indicate how you believe Mary's tripping accident could have been prevented. 
 
4 Mary’s (My) accident could have been prevented…….. 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
 
5 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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WHO HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREVENTING MARY’S ACCIDENT?  
 
Imagining yourself as Mary please rate the level of responsibility for each of the 
following people for preventing your (Mary’s) accident.  
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were.  
(0= No responsibility, 4 = maximum responsibility) 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
 
  Responsibility for Preventing Mary's 
accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
6 Mary  (You) 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
7 Shop floor 
Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
8 The Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
9 The Store 
Safety Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
10 ABC 
Supermarkets 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
11 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
12 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
13 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
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14.  Now please Rank these 8 people in order of importance in preventing 
Mary’s accident.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 and the least 
important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
WHO HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR CAUSING THE ACCIDENT 
Imagining yourself as Mary, what would you say was the cause of your (Mary's) 
accident? 
 
15 The cause of Mary's accident was… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
16 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
 
Imagining yourself as Mary please rate the level of responsibility for each of the 
following people in causing your (Mary's) accident 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were.  
(0= No responsibility, 4 = maximum responsibility) 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
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  Responsibility for Causing Mary's accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
17 Mary  (You) 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
18 Bill the Shop 
floor Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
19 The Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
20 The Store Safety 
Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
21 ABC 
Supermarkets 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
22 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
23 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
24 A Customer 0 1 2 3   (Rank) 
 
25. Now please Rank these 8 people in order of importance in causing the accident. 
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2  through to the least 
important as = 8. 
      Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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Overall how lucky or unlucky would you rate yourself  (Mary) following the accident?  
Please Circle / highlight your answer. 
 
26 (1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very Lucky 
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AND LASTLY SOME INFORMATION ABOUT YOU AND YOUR 
ACCIDENT 
27.  Are you (Please Tick)    28    
  
Male  (1)   Please give your 
current age. 
 
Female  (2)     
 
 
Thinking about your own recent accident, which of the following best describes what 
happened? Please tick the box   
29 Hit by a moving, flying or 
falling object  
1  Contact with moving 
machinery or material 
being machined  
2 
 Injured while handling, lifting 
or carrying 
3  Slipped, tripped or fell 
on the same level 
4 
 Hit by a moving vehicle 5  Hit something fixed or 
stationary 
6 
 Fell from a height 7  Trapped by something 
collapsing 
8 
 Drowned or asphyxiated 9  Exposed to, or in contact 
with, a harmful 
substance 
10 
 Exposed to fire 
 
11  Exposed to an explosion 12 
 Contact with electricity or an 
electrical discharge 
13  Injured by an animal 14 
 Physically assaulted by a 
person 
15  other 16 
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After your accident did you think about how things could have been different.  
 
30 Yes (1) No (2) Cannot 
remember (3) 
 
If you answered "Yes" please answer question 31 
 
31.  If after your accident you found yourself thinking “If only……”  how did you 
continue this thought?  
 
If only…….. 
 
 
 
 
…. Things could have been different. 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.  
I AM VERY GRATEFUL. 
PLEASE RETURN IT TO ME  BY POST,  FAX. 
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PLEASE DETACH THIS SHEET AND KEEP IT 
 
 
 
 
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire.  
Research such as this cannot happen with out your help. 
 
 
 
 
 
This questionnaire forms part of a study in to the ways in which accidents at work 
are viewed by Mangers & Supervisors, Safety Professionals and Accident Subjects 
themselves. 
 
The same questions have been asked of each group and the results will be compared 
to see if there are any differences or similarities.  
 
This stage of the research is concerned with how people think about hazards before 
and after an accident has happened and how they see responsibility for cause and 
prevention. 
 
It is hoped that the results will help to improve our understanding of the ways these 
groups think about safety and accidents at work and will allow managers / 
supervisors and Safety Professionals to be better trained in accident investigation.  
 
It is proposed that the results will be published in a professional Safety Journal. All 
results will be summarized and no individual respondent or employer will be 
identified. All answers to the questionnaire are treated in the strictest confidence. 
The information collected will be stored and treated in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act.       
 
If you need to contact the researcher please  do so by e-mail  
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A QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PEOPLE WHO HAVE HAD AN 
ACCIDENT 
 
 
RESEARCHER PAUL LEHANE 
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Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am conducting research into how people think about accidents after they have happened.   
 
I am particularly interested in your views, as you have been involved in an accident of some type in 
the last year. 
 
I would be very grateful if you could spare about 10 minutes to complete the attached questionnaire. 
Your participation is entirely voluntary and any information you provide will be confidential, 
although questionnaire results may be published summarizing the findings. In addition, 
questionnaire completion is anonymous if you use the envelope provided. 
 
Thank you, 
 
Paul Lehane. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION  
Please try to answer as many of the questions as you can.  
Any answers that you can provide are helpful so please return your form to me even if you do not 
complete all the questions. 
Please write your answers in the grey shaded boxes or circle / tick the appropriate answer from the 
choices given.  
RETURN OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
BY POST 
If you have been sent the questionnaire by post a prepaid envelope should have been provided. 
Please use this to return the questionnaire. If not please return to:- 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
BY FAX 
You may Fax your completed questionnaire to me on  
 
Paul Lehane c/o  
EHTS  
London Borough of Bromley 
Civic Centre Bromley England BR1 3UH 
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THINKING ABOUT A TRIPPING ACCIDENT IN A SUPERMARKET 
 
In the section that follows you are asked to read about a tripping accident to Mary (a part 
time checkout operator at ABC Supermarkets) who tripped over on a box near to the 
checkouts as she was going to the staff room for her mid morning break. 
 
Please try to imagine how you would feel if you were "Mary" and had been involved in 
the accident in the way it is described. It may help you to read the information several 
times to help you to do this  
 
Use your own knowledge or experience of tripping accidents to add to the information 
given about the accident. 
 
THE ACCIDENT 
Mary is a lady of about 55 years of age who has worked as a part time checkout 
operator for about 8 years. She usually works Monday Tuesday and Wednesday 
but had come in on this particular Thursday to cover for a friend who was on 
holiday.  
 
Please imagine that you are "Mary" the person who has had an accident at ABC 
Supermarket  
ABC SUPERMARKET 
MESSAGE TO  STORE MANAGER 
FROM  BILL  SHOP FLOOR SUPERVISOR 
DATE    THURSDAY 10 AUGUST   TIME  11.30 HRS 
SUBJECT - ACCIDENT TO MARY 
At about 10.30am Mary went for her rest break and tripped over on a box and hurt 
her arm. An ambulance was called to take her to hospital.  She has strained her 
right wrist, and she will be returning to work tomorrow. 
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The Store Manager spoke to Jane one of the other checkout operators who witnessed 
your accident and Bill the Shop Floor Supervisor. These are the notes from his 
conversations. 
 
 Mary does not usually work on Thursdays but was covering for a friend who was 
on holiday 
 Mary closed her checkout at the usual time for her mid morning break and waited 
for a friend on the checkout next to her to serve her last customer and they both 
went to their break together as usual. 
 They were walking together past the tills when Mary tripped over on a box and fell 
awkwardly on her right arm. 
 The First Aider attended and an ambulance was called to take Mary to hospital. 
 At hospital she was found to have strained her right wrist. She will be returning to 
work tomorrow.    
 A customer  had seen the box  and reported it to Bill the Supervisor 
 Bill confirmed that the box had been reported by a customer and the cleaner had 
been asked to clear it up 5 minutes before the accident but had not got round to 
dealing with it. 
 No warning signs had been put out. 
 It is not known how long the box had been on the floor before it was reported by 
the customer 
 The area round the checkouts often gets untidy. 
 According to the Accident Book 4 other people had been injured in tripping 
accidents in the past 6 months  
Imagining yourself as Mary and using your own experience of tripping accidents 
please answer the following questions. 
 
IT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT    “IF ONLY……” 
 
After an unwanted outcome such as failing an exam, missing a flight or an accident 
people often think about how things could have been different.  
For example: - 
After failing an exam a student might say "If only … I had worked harder….I might 
have passed" and a family who miss their holiday flight might say " If only…. we had 
left earlier…… we might have caught the flight  
 
1. Following your (Mary's) accident you found yourself thinking “If only……” . How 
would you continue this to bring about a different outcome?  
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If only…….. 
 
 
 
 
 
…. Things could have been different. 
 
 
2.  Which one of the following people does the sentence above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer. 
2 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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COULD MARY’S ACCIDENT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED? 
 
Imagining yourself as Mary do you believe that your accident could have been 
prevented?  
Please Circle / highlight one answer.   
3 Yes  
(1) 
No   
(2) 
Not Sure   
(3) 
 
If you answered YES please go to question 4.  If you answered "No" or "Not Sure" 
please go to question 6  
 
 Please indicate how you believe (your) Mary's tripping accident could have been 
prevented. 
4 Mary’s accident could have been prevented…….. 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer. 
5 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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WHO HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREVENTING MARY’S ACCIDENT?  
Imagining yourself as Mary please rate the level of responsibility of each of the 
following people for preventing your (Mary’s) accident. 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were.  
(0= No responsibility, 4 = maximum responsibility) 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
  Responsibility for Preventing Mary's accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
6 Mary  (You) 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
7 Bill the 
Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
8 The Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
9 Safety Officer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
10 ABC 
Supermarkets 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
11 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
12 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
13 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
 
14.  Now please Rank these 8 people in order of importance in preventing 
Mary’s accident.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 and the least 
important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR CAUSING MARY’S ACCIDENT 
 
Imagining yourself as Mary, what would you say was the cause of  your (Mary's) 
accident? 
 
15 The cause of Mary's accident was… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
16 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
 
 
Imagining yourself as Mary please rate the level of responsibility for the following 
people in causing your (Mary's) accident 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were.  
(0= No responsibility, 4 = maximum responsibility) 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
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  Responsibility for Causing Mary's accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
17 Mary  (You) 
 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
18 Bill the Shop 
floor 
Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
19 The Manager 
 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
20 The Store 
Safety Officer 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
21 ABC 
Supermarkets 
(The 
Employer) 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
22 Another 
worker 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
23 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
24 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
 
25. Now please Rank these 8 people in order of importance in causing the accident. 
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2  through to the least 
important as = 8. 
      Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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Overall how lucky or unlucky would you rate yourself  (Mary) following the accident?  
Please Circle / highlight your answer. 
 
26 (1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very Lucky 
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AND LASTLY SOME INFORMATION ABOUT YOU AND YOUR 
ACCIDENT 
 
27.  Are you (Please Tick)    28    
  
Male  (1)   Please give your 
current age. 
 
Female  (2)     
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Thinking about your own recent accident, which of the following best describes what 
happened? Please tick the box   
 
29 Hit by a moving, flying 
or falling object  
1  Contact with moving 
machinery or material 
being machined  
2 
 Injured while handling, 
lifting or carrying 
3  Slipped, tripped or fell on 
the same level 
4 
 Hit by a moving vehicle 5  Hit something fixed or 
stationary 
6 
 Fell from a height 7  Trapped by something 
collapsing 
8 
 Drowned or asphyxiated 9  Exposed to, or in contact 
with, a harmful substance 
10 
 Exposed to fire 
 
11  Exposed to an explosion 12 
 Contact with electricity 
or an electrical discharge 
13  Injured by an animal 14 
 Physically assaulted by a 
person 
15  other 16 
 
After your accident did you think about how things could have been different.  
 
30 Yes (1) No (2) Cannot 
remember (3) 
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If you answered "Yes" please answer question 31 
 
31.  If after your accident you found yourself thinking “If only……”  how did you 
continue this thought?  
 
If only…….. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…. Things could have been different. 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.  
I AM VERY GRATEFUL. 
PLEASE RETURN IT TO ME  BY POST,  FAX. 
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PLEASE DETACH THIS SHEET AND KEEP IT 
 
 
 
 
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire.  
Research such as this cannot happen with out your help. 
 
 
 
 
 
This questionnaire forms part of a study in to the ways in which accidents at work 
are viewed by Mangers & Supervisors, Safety Professionals and Accident Subjects 
themselves. 
 
The same questions have been asked of each group and the results will be compared 
to see if there are any differences or similarities.  
 
This stage of the research is concerned with how people think about hazards before 
and after an accident has happened and how they see responsibility for cause and 
prevention. 
 
It is hoped that the results will help to improve our understanding of the ways these 
groups think about safety and accidents at work and will allow managers / 
supervisors and Safety Professionals to be better trained in accident investigation.  
 
It is proposed that the results will be published in a professional Safety Journal. All 
results will be summarized and no individual respondent or employer will be 
identified. All answers to the questionnaire are treated in the strictest confidence. 
The information collected will be stored and treated in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act.       
 
If you need to contact the researcher please  do so by e-mail  
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THINKING ABOUT ACCIDENTS 
 
A QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PEOPLE WHO HAVE HAD AN 
ACCIDENT 
 
 
RESEARCHER PAUL LEHANE 
 
SUPERVISOR DR. DAVID HARDMAN 
 
 
 
PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT 
 
CALCUTTA HOUSE 
OLD CASTLE STREET LONDON E1 7NT 
 
24S 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research supported by the  
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Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am conducting research into how people think about accidents after they have 
happened.   
 
I am particularly interested in your views, as you have been involved in an accident of 
some type in the last year. 
 
I would be very grateful if you could spare about 10 minutes to complete the attached 
questionnaire. Your participation is entirely voluntary and any information you provide 
will be confidential, although questionnaire results may be published summarizing the 
findings. In addition, questionnaire completion is anonymous if you use the envelope 
provided. 
 
Thank you, 
 
Paul Lehane. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION  
Please try to answer as many of the questions as you can.  
Any answers that you can provide are helpful so please return your form to me even if 
you do not complete all the questions. 
Please write your answers in the grey shaded boxes or circle / tick the appropriate 
answer from the choices given.  
RETURN OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
BY POST 
If you have been sent the questionnaire by post a prepaid envelope should have been 
provided. Please use this to return the questionnaire. If not please return to:- 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
BY FAX 
You may Fax your completed questionnaire to me on  
Paul Lehane c/o EHTS  
London Borough of Bromley 
Civic Centre Bromley England BR1 3UH 
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THINKING ABOUT A TRIPPING ACCIDENT IN A SUPERMARKET 
In the section that follows you are asked to read about a tripping accident to Mary (a 
part time checkout operator at ABC Supermarkets) who tripped over on a box near to 
the checkouts as she was going to the staff room for her mid morning break. 
 
Please try to imagine how you would feel if you were "Mary" and had been involved 
in the accident in the way it is described. It may help you to read the information 
several times to help you to do this  
 
Use your own knowledge or experience of tripping accidents to add to the 
information given about the accident. 
 
THE ACCIDENT 
Mary is a lady of about 55 years of age who has worked as a part time 
checkout operator for about 8 years. She usually works Monday Tuesday and 
Wednesday but had come in on this particular Thursday to cover for a friend 
who was on holiday.  
Please imagine that you are "Mary" the person who has had an accident at ABC 
Supermarket  
ABC SUPERMARKET 
MESSAGE TO  STORE MANAGER 
FROM  BILL  SHOP FLOOR SUPERVISOR 
DATE    THURSDAY 10 AUGUST   TIME  11.30 HRS 
SUBJECT - ACCIDENT TO MARY 
At about 10.30am Mary went for her rest break and tripped over on a box and hurt 
her arm. An ambulance was called to take her to hospital.  She has strained her 
right wrist, and she will be returning to work tomorrow. 
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Imagining yourself as Mary and using your own experience of tripping accidents 
please answer the following questions. 
 
 
IT COULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT  “IF ONLY……” 
 
After an unwanted outcome such as failing an exam, missing a flight or an accident 
people often think about how things could have been different.  
For example: - 
After failing an exam a student might say "If only … I had worked harder….I might 
have passed" and a family who miss their holiday flight might say " If only…. we had 
left earlier…… we might have caught the flight  
 
1. Following your (Mary's) accident you found yourself thinking “If only……” . How 
would you continue this thought to bring about a different outcome?  
 
If only…….. 
 
 
 
 
…. Things could have been different. 
 
2.  Which one of the following people does the sentence above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer. 
 
2 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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COULD MARY’S ACCIDENT HAVE BEEN PREVENTED? 
Imagining yourself as Mary do you believe that your accident could have been 
prevented?  
Please Circle / highlight one answer.   
3 Yes  
(1) 
No   
(2) 
Not Sure   
(3) 
 
If you answered YES please go to question 4.  If you answered "No" or "Not Sure" 
please go to question 6  
 
 Please indicate how you believe (your) Mary's tripping accident could have been 
prevented. 
4 Mary’s accident could have been prevented…….. 
 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer. 
 
5 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
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WHO HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR PREVENTING MARY’S ACCIDENT?  
Imagining yourself as Mary please rate the level of responsibility of the following 
people for preventing your (Mary’s) accident  
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were.  
(0= No responsibility, 4 = maximum responsibility) 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
  Responsibility for Preventing Mary's 
accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
6 Mary  (You) 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
7 Bill the 
Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
8 The Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
9 Safety Officer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
10 ABC 
Supermarkets 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
11 Another worker 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
12 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
13 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
14.  Now please Rank these 8 people in order of importance in preventing 
Mary’s accident.  
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2 and the least 
important as = 8. 
Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
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WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR CAUSING THE ACCIDENT 
 
Imagining yourself as Mary, what would you say was the cause of  your (Mary's) 
accident? 
 
15 The cause of Mary's accident was… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which one of the following people does the answer above best refer to?  
Please circle / highlight your answer 
16 Mary Bill Shop Supervisor Store Manager  
 Safety Officer ABC Supermarket Another worker  
 The cleaner  A customer  None of these  
 
 
Imagining yourself as Mary please rate the level of responsibility for the following 
people in causing your (Mary's) accident 
 
The higher the number of points the more responsible you believe they were.  
(0= No responsibility, 4 = maximum responsibility) 
Please circle a number for each of the people in the table below  
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  Responsibility for Causing Mary's 
accident 
0 = minimum & 4 = Maximum 
 Rank 
Score 
1-8 
17 Mary  (You) 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
18 Bill the 
Supervisor 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
19 The Manager 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
20 Safety Officer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
21 ABC 
Supermarkets 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
22 Another 
worker 
0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
23 The Cleaner 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
24 A Customer 0 1 2 3 4  (Rank) 
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25. Now please Rank these 8 people in order of importance in causing the accident. 
Rank the most important as =1, the next most important as 2  through to the least 
important as = 8. 
     Please write in the "Rank" boxes to the right of the questions above.   
Overall how lucky or unlucky would you rate yourself  (Mary) following the accident?  
Please Circle / highlight your answer. 
26 (1) 
Very 
Unlucky 
(2) 
Unlucky 
(3) 
Neither 
lucky or 
unlucky 
(4) 
Lucky 
(5) 
Very Lucky 
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AND LASTLY SOME INFORMATION ABOUT YOU AND YOUR 
ACCIDENT 
 
27.  Are you (Please Tick)    28    
  
Male 
(1)  
  Please give your 
current age. 
 
Female 
(2)  
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Thinking about your own recent accident, which of the following best describes what 
happened? Please tick the box   
 
29 Hit by a moving, flying 
or falling object  
1  Contact with moving 
machinery or material 
being machined  
2 
 Injured while handling, 
lifting or carrying 
3  Slipped, tripped or fell on 
the same level 
4 
 Hit by a moving vehicle 5  Hit something fixed or 
stationary 
6 
 Fell from a height 7  Trapped by something 
collapsing 
8 
 Drowned or asphyxiated 9  Exposed to, or in contact 
with, a harmful substance 
10 
 Exposed to fire 11  Exposed to an explosion 12 
 Contact with electricity 
or an electrical 
discharge 
13  Injured by an animal 14 
 Physically assaulted by 
a person 
15  other 16 
 
After your accident did you think about how things could have been different.  
30 Yes (1) No (2) Cannot 
remember (3) 
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If you answered "Yes" please answer question 31 
 
31.  If after your accident you found yourself thinking “If only……”  how did you 
continue this thought?  
 
If only…….. 
 
…. Things could have been different. 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.  
I AM VERY GRATEFUL. 
PLEASE RETURN IT TO ME  BY POST,  FAX. 
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PLEASE DETACH THIS SHEET AND KEEP IT 
 
 
 
 
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire.  
Research such as this cannot happen with out your help. 
 
 
 
 
 
This questionnaire forms part of a study in to the ways in which accidents at work 
are viewed by Mangers & Supervisors, Safety Professionals and Accident Subjects 
themselves. 
 
The same questions have been asked of each group and the results will be compared 
to see if there are any differences or similarities.  
 
This stage of the research is concerned with how people think about hazards before 
and after an accident has happened and how they see responsibility for cause and 
prevention. 
 
It is hoped that the results will help to improve our understanding of the ways these 
groups think about safety and accidents at work and will allow managers / 
supervisors and Safety Professionals to be better trained in accident investigation.  
 
It is proposed that the results will be published in a professional Safety Journal. All 
results will be summarized and no individual respondent or employer will be 
identified. All answers to the questionnaire are treated in the strictest confidence. 
The information collected will be stored and treated in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act.       
 
If you need to contact the researcher please  do so by e-mail  
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Appendix 5  
Respondents’ completed counterfactual, 
prevention and causal sentences  
 
 Appendix 5 Respondents Completed Sentences 
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  Counterfactual Sentence Prevention Sentence  Causal Sentence  Own Accident  
1 
 
13 
sp 
The accident book previous records 
had been taken into consideration 
and addressed the issue of previous 
trips 
By person training employees 
regarding the potential seriousness of 
leaving boxes unattended. If as 
happened the box was replaced it 
should be emphasised in training the 
need for immediate removal of box 
The poor safety culture in ABC 
Supermarkets 
 
2 13 
sp 
Lessons were learnt from the 
accidents that took place in the last 
6 months. Measures should have 
been put in place to prevent 
materials being left in walkways by 
staff training etc 
By control measures being put in 
place, the history of the company 
shows that these kinds of accidents 
happened several times before 
Inadequate training by 
management. There were no 
control measures in place 
 
3 16 
sp 
Someone in management had given 
instructions to employees that 
boxes should not be left in 
passageways 
Tool box talks to all employees on the 
need to store boxes in a safe place. 
Management to provide the facility 
and supervisors to monitor its 
implementation 
Perhaps management had not 
introduced /implemented a good 
housekeeping regime 
 
4 13 
sp 
Mary had been concentrating more 
on where she was going and that 
Bill had acted in amore positive 
manner and the management 
system had been more aware of the 
general untidiness of the area 
If Bill had acted on the information 
received and not attempted to delegate 
responsibility 
Poor management systems and 
implementation 
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5 5 
man 
 
He had checked his instructions 
had been carried out including 
placing warning signs 
Supervisor checked stacking staff clear 
up as they unpack and all ancillary 
boxes and wrappings are cleaned as 
they go 
Shelf staff careless with materials  
6 21 
as 
I hadn’t changed my shift I 
wouldn’t have been there. And if 
they kept the area tidy I would not 
have tripped over 
If we had more staff the area would 
have been tidied up more frequently 
A box causing an obstruction I had not slipped on the ice or it 
had been gritted before hand 
7 18 
as 
   I had seen the ramp. But as I am 
in my late 70’s I did not see it 
8 20 
as 
   I hadn’t gone to ASDA to shop 
9 10 
sp 
 
The person who spilt the milk had 
informed the cleaner 
Good signage – informing customers 
and staff to report all spillages. Better 
system of work eg staff member to 
stand over spillage until cleaner arrives 
The spilt milk  
10 10 
sp 
Somebody / anybody had cleaned 
up the spillage 
By encouraging staff to actively hazard 
spot 
By encouraging public to report to 
staff 
By staff not thinking that’s not my job 
–there are cleaners 
Lack of housekeeping  
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11 10 
sp 
Not completed If there were procedures / courses of 
action to be taken in the event of a 
spillage 
Mary lost her footing 
 
 
12 13 
sp 
Bill had made sure that the cleaner 
removed the box immediately 
By risk assessment concerning the 
potential hazard being carried out by 
the company and a protocol in place to 
minimise the risk giving procedures 
and staff responsible 
The absence of a risk assessment 
and action protocol or failure to 
adhere to a workplace protocol 
regarding trips and slips by 
supervisor 
 
 
 
 
 
13 7 
man 
Signs had been put out to make 
Mary aware of the box, or the box 
had been moved straight away or 
the box had not been left there in 
the first place 
As for CFT That a box had been left in the 
walk way 
 
 
 
 
 
14 10 
sp 
The person who spilt the milk 
informed a member of staff who 
could have taken action to clear it 
or cordon it 
Customer 
By better communication and 
awareness. Letting customers know 
you need to know. warning staff to be 
more vigilant 
Manager 
Slipping on the milk which was 
split and not cleared away or 
cordoned off to warn staff and 
customers to avoid the area until 
cleared. This process should have 
been in place. 
customer  
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15 16 
sp 
The box hadn’t been there in the 
first place 
Manager 
Boxes put away so they do not cause a 
tripping hazard 
employer 
Boxes being placed where people 
could trip over them. No one 
checking that this doesn’t happen. 
Management and staff to take all 
responsibility 
Employer 
 
 
16 14 
sp 
Mary had moved the box out of the 
area from the checkout and put it in 
a storage area on her way to the 
canteen and if the supervisor had 
checked the area regularly 
Bill 
If there was regular spot checks by the 
supervisor or another worker 
designated to patrol the area and if 
there was an area to put boxes 
allocated by the manager and if Mary 
could have moved the box 
bill 
Lack of supervision, training 
awareness implementation of 
company policies and procedures 
 
employer 
 
17 14 
sp min 
A risk assessment had taken place 
involving the area and storage etc 
… all staff were aware of storage 
hazards 
Safety officer 
Informing all staff at induction and 
continuous training re storage clear 
pathways etc 
Adequate signage  
Store manager staff and cleaner being 
more aware of risks and removing 
hazards asap 
Another 
Poor housekeeping 
another 
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18 11 
sp max 
A system was in place for an 
immediate response to the spillage 
plus a regular check on the area 
where milk is likely to be spilt so 
problem can be identified before a 
customer reports it 
Supervisor 
Reassessment of procedure for 
prevention, immediate clear up regular 
observation and action plan 
Bill / manager 
The reason for the milk spilling 
on to the floor 
manager 
 
 
 
 
19 11 
sp max 
The management organisation has 
responded to the fact that spillages 
around the checkouts are very 
common and 4 other people had 
been injured in the past 6 months. 
They should have set up a system 
to regularly check the area by staff 
and the shop floor supervisor have 
signage adjacent to the area to 
isolate it, have means to 
temporarily mop up till cleaner can 
attend. The cleaner should also 
regularly check that area. 
Employer   
Had there been a system in place to 
check the area for spillages and a 
response to the find that worked fairly 
quickly. The cleaner should target the 
area due to spillages 
Employer  
 
Management failure to carry out 
A suitable and sufficient risk 
assessment with the knowledge of 
previous accidents of this nature 
Safety officer    
 
20 9 
sp max 
We as a company found out why 
there were so many spillages 
around the checkout and put 
controls in place 
Employer 
By putting controls in place as there 
were 4 previous accidents 
Employer 
 
That a customer’s carton or milk 
was leaking. ABC put no controls 
against this 
employer 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix 5 Respondents Completed Sentences 
 
Page | 843  
 
21 9 
Sp max 
 
We had a better safety culture we 
would not have to rely on a 
customer to point out spillages we 
would all be aware that the 
checkouts are a common slip 
hazard and signage would be 
provided at each one 
Safety officer 
By increased staff awareness 
Safety officer 
Carelessness on behalf of the staff 
of ABC Supermarkets 
Employer 
 
 
22 9 
sp 
max 
Warning signs had been put out 
immediately after the milk was 
spilled and if only this was 
standard practice. If only the 
accident record book had been 
investigated as to why other people 
had been injured in slipping 
accidents in past 6 months 
Safety officer 
By analysing why so many people had 
slipping accidents in the previous 6 
months, identifying the hazard (hazard 
analysis) and putting a system in place 
to prevent further slippages. 
Safety officer 
Existing hazards of spillage being 
evident from accident records, not 
analysed and action taken to  
avoid further accidents 
Safety officer 
 
 
23 22s 
as 
min 
I hadn’t gone to work that day, I 
was working as a favour. Mind you 
if I was stupid enough not to look 
where I was going it really was my 
fault on the other hand health and 
safety rules should always be 
followed at work 
AS 
By following basic health and safety 
rules and not leave boxes laying 
around 
? 
My carelessness 
AS 
I had not attempted to carry or 
lift things to heavy for me 
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24 22s 
as 
min 
99 99 99 99 
25 22 
as 
min 
I had not come in to work on 
Thursday to help my friend 
AS 
If she had been looking at the path in 
front of her and not rushing to her 
break 
AS 
The person who left the box lying 
about on the floor 
Another worker 
 
I had not worn my floppy 
slippers coming down the stairs 
26 9  
sp max 
99 If action was soon taken from two 
previous accidents. 
Supervisor  
Due to the spillage, which was 
not signed off cleared up quickly 
Employer 
 
 
27 22 
as min 
I had not come in to work to cover 
for my friend on Thursday 
AS 
If the supermarket had always kept a 
hard and fast rule that boxes must 
never be left on the floor of the store 
anywhere people walk. 
Safety officer 
Negligence on behalf of the 
person who put box there 
Another worker 
I had not rushed the job and if 
someone had been helping me 
 
28 21 
as 
max 
I had been watching where I was 
going and not talking. And the 
supervisor had made it more urgent 
in his message to the cleaner to 
remove it or remove it themselves 
AS / supervisor/ safety officer/ 
cleaner 
By a response time on cleaning and 
supervisors roaming and checking 
more on passages , fire exits and doors 
and a willingness on all staff to tidy up 
Supervisor/ safety officer/ another 
 
Not looking where you walk and 
management not making clear the 
response time to cleaners and 
other staff to be vigilant 
Supervisor 
 
 
 
99 
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29 2 
manage
r 
min 
Someone had reported the spillage 
and or cleaned up 
Other worker 
By staff or public reporting spillage 
and cleaning staff clearing the milk 
Other worker 
Failure by staff to notice and take 
action over slippage, failure of 
management to plan risk 
assessments and ensure staff 
would monitor area. 
Manager 
 
 
30 1s 
manage
r 
max 
The supervisor had cleared it up 
immediately 
supervisor 
Bill could have cleared it up straight 
away or had a staff member stand over 
the spillage until the cleaner arrived 
Supervisor 
 
Poor procedural training 
manager  
 
31 13 
sp 
max 
Management had managed health 
and safety 
manager 
Management developing a safety 
culture throughout the organisation 
Employer 
 
Lack of management control 
employer 
 
 
 
 
32 13 
sp 
max 
All staff had this mental attitude 
that safety is ever ones 
responsibility then this unsafe 
condition (box) would never have 
been there in the first place 
An other worker 
Positive attitude to safety by all staff 
Employer 
 
Lack of safety awareness 
employer 
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33 14 
sp 
min 
Supervision and training had been 
given to all employees a box nay 
not have been left in the gangway 
and had been looked at in a risk 
assessment by the company 
Manager 
By boxes being put in an enclosed area 
or warnings signs being put in place 
Safety officer 
Poor training 
bill 
 
34 15s 
sp max 
Bill had ensured the spill was 
cleaned up immediately, if not 
barriers and warning notices in 
place 
Safety officer 
If the box had been removed or not 
placed there, why wait for a cleaner if 
the hazard is obvious 
Bill 
Allowing rubbish to build up 
around checkout, poor 
housekeeping regimen poor 
supervision poor response to spill  
bill 
 
 
35 15s 
sp max 
The company took hsw more 
seriously 
employer 
By the company taking hsw more 
seriously 
employer 
Failure to keep floor free of 
obstructions 
employer 
 
36 16 sp 
min 
Mary had seen the box 
mary 
By ensuring boxes are not left on the 
floor 
manager 
Lack of management control / 
supervision 
manager 
 
 
37 9 
sp 
max 
Bill had ensured that the spillage 
was cleaned up immediately 
bill 
if there was a procedure in place to 
make sure that spillages are dealt with 
immediately and the shop floor is 
regularly inspected 
employer  
Not ensuring that the shop floor is 
kept clean al all times 
Manager 
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38 9 sp 
max 
Store had assigned staff to spill 
duty.  procedure should state that if 
staff cannot attend immediately 
thena warning notice should be 
posted by supervisor 
Manager 
Taking immediate corrective measures 
on being notified of spill, 2 stage 
corrective measures permanent / 
temporary 
Manager 
 
Failure to put in place an effective 
policy for dealing with inevitable 
spillages at checkouts  
employer 
 
39 10 sp 
min 
The milk had been cleared up / 
warning signs had been put out 
employer 
Spillage being reported / seen. Slipping 
floor signs being put out. Spillage 
being mopped wet floor signs in area 
until floor dry 
employer 
Lack of effective systems for 
monitoring the store for spillages, 
so spillage remained on the floor. 
employer 
 
40 10 sp 
min 
The store had a procedure to deal 
with spillages which staff were 
trained to implement 
Manager 
Procedure for clearing up spillages  
Training of staff 
Checking its happening (monitoring)  
Manager 
Such spillages are known to occur 
–therefore  need procedure to deal 
with the hazard and reduce as far 
a is reasonably practicable. 
Cause was failure to deal with 
spillage 
not answered 
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41 11sp 
max 
Someone had done something 
about it earlier 
Employer 
Company involvement. Management 
need to take responsibility and the 
lead. Accidents have been occurring 
before, nothing has been done 
effectively to make staff aware or 
procedures for preventative training 
employer 
Poor management systems 
employer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 11 sp 
max 
It had been cleaned up 
cleaner 
Spilt items taken seriously –mopped 
up correctly 
employer 
Staff/ employer not taking 
slipping accidents seriously 
employer 
 
 
43 12 sp 
min 
We had identified the spillage 
hazard (we had taken precautions 
and set procedures for employees) 
employer 
If the spillage hazard was included in 
the risk assessment with 
recommendations and control 
measures and that this was 
communicated to all employees at 
induction on the systems in place 
Safety officer 
The milk spillage. The lack of 
safe systems of work and training 
with staff. 
employer 
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44 12 sp 
min 
Basic staff training had instilled a 
greater level of action by staff to 
identify and control such spillages 
or get the person who caused the 
spillage to report it, sufficient 
corrective action could have been 
put in place 
employer 
By identifying the hazard sooner and 
reacting accordingly. Report the 
spillage –isolate the spillage clean up 
the spillage. 
mary  
Immediate cause unsafe condition 
slippy floor and unsafe act – not 
reporting /cleaning up spillage 
 
Basic cause =lack of safe system 
of work – training  - from lack of 
control 
employer  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 13 sp 
max 
There was greater supervision 
around the checkout area where 
according to the accident book 4 
other people had become injured 
Supervisor 
Because of previous accidents that 
happened the area had been identified 
yet no action was taken to maintain 
and supervise the area properly 
manager 
Both neglect and inadequate 
supervision. 
 
manager 
 
 
 
46 Sp 13 
max 
Bill had taken the initiative and 
removed the box , instead of 
passing responsibility to some one 
else. 
bill 
If there was good house keeping 
procedures. Proper storage of goods 
manager 
 
Poor housekeeping and not 
immediate response to hazard that 
was identified by customer 
bill 
 
 
47 Sp  14 
max 
The box wasn’t there 
mary 
By removing the box 
none 
Not seeing the box 
mary 
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48 Sp 14 
min 
Someone had not placed the box 
there and mary had looked where 
she was going 
Another worker 
By proper training and supervision of 
staff in health and safety matters 
manager 
The placing of the box on the 
floor near checkouts and the 
failure to remove it quickly 
bill 
 
  
49 Sp 15 
max 
The area around the checkouts 
were maintained in a clear and tidy 
condition 
employer 
By stock control, clearance/cleaning, 
safety culture, h&s actions at all levels, 
Mary looking where she was going 
none 
A failure in safety practices re 
tripping hazard at many levels 
none  
 
 
 
 
50 Sp 15 
max 
Bill had moved the box 
Bill  
by training after the previous 
accidents, you must be proactive and 
not reactive 
manager 
Lack of safety standards by 
management. poor housekeeping, 
a relaxed attitude to hsw 
manager 
 
 
51 Man 6 
min 
The box had been put away safely 
bill 
The box should have been placed 
where it was unlikely to cause 
accidents 
bill 
The box being placed in an unsafe 
position 
Safety officer 
 
 
52 As 22 
min 
I had said I could not fill in for my 
friend then I wouldn’t be in this 
position now 
mary 
If the person who left the box on the 
floor had taken the trouble to put it 
where no one could fall over it 
Another worker 
 
The box being left on the floor 
where people walk 
Safety officer 
 
The bloody council put the paving 
slabs back down properly when 
they re-laid them 
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53 As 22 
min 
I had looked where I was going not 
in such a hurry to get to my cuppa 
mary 
By not being in such a hurry, by 
feeling cross that I had taken on an 
extra shift when I had so much to do at 
home 
mary 
Herself 
mary 
Paying more attention to what I 
was doing 
54 As 21 
max 
People put things away in their 
proper place 
Other worker 
If I had not been chatting to my 
colleague 
mary 
Someone not putting box away 
Another worker 
Cannot remember 
55 Manage
r 7 max 
Instructions had been 
communicated to staff following 
the first incident, clearly stating 
that boxes were not to be left 
laying about and all areas kept tidy 
manager  
Instructions had been communicated to 
staff following the first incident, 
clearly stating that boxes were not to 
be left laying about and all areas kept 
tidy 
manger 
Mary not looking where she was 
going 
Mary 
 
 
 
 
56 Manage
r 7 max 
The cleaner had put warning signs 
out or removed the box 
immediately this accident would 
not have happened and I should 
have been notified that the area 
hadn’t been cleaned so I could have 
prevented this from happening 
manager 
By daily checks carried out by Bill 
(supervisor) or making sure the area 
was kept clear and the till area should 
be kept tidy at all times 
Bill 
Because health and safety had 
lapsed at this store and employees 
hadn’t done their job properly 
cleaner 
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57 Manage
r 7 max 
People would follow instruction 
cleaner 
More observant and efficient staff : 
priority of jobs to be done by cleaner 
cleaner 
Staff priorities , the box should 
have been moved immediately 
after being reported 
cleaner 
 
 
58 Manage
r 6 min 
Someone had seen that box there 
and moved it out of the way 
An other  
By somebody seeing the box and 
moving it out of the way 
Not specified 
Carelessness / lack of attention 
An other  
 
59 Sp 13 
Max 
The box had been removed I may 
not have tripped 
bill 
Ensuring employees are given 
responsibility for ensuring that either 
items are removed and that the area 
round the checkouts kept tidy.  
Bill and employer 
The lack of a robust system for 
ensuring tripping hazards are 
dealt with after being identified 
and reported 
employer 
 
60 Sp 9 
max 
There has been a greater emphasis 
put on the necessity to clean up the 
spillage and the cleaner had been 
more aware of the severity of the 
risk involved. 
If only the accident book had been 
heeded and its results acted upon  
employer 
Had there been better staff awareness 
and attention to safety. Responsible 
staff be it at management level or not 
have a duty to ensure the safety of 
others 
Bill 
A lack of care obviously the milk 
caused it, however the way in 
which this v basic controllable 
hazard was dealt with showed a 
luke warm attitude to safety 
bill 
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61 Sp 9 
max 
Slippy floor signs had been put in 
place until such time as the slip 
could be cleaned  
Bill / employer 
If proper procedures had been put in 
place to ensure that as soon as a spill 
occurred that it was cordoned off or 
protected in some way so as to prevent 
customers or staff walking on or over 
the spill 
Safety officer  
down to lack of training and 
supervision. The spill should  
have been dealt with or made safe 
 
bill 
 
62 As18 
Min 
I had seen the spillage, I would 
have alerted the cleaner and no one 
would have had an accident 
Accident subject 
The person who spilt the mile could 
have alerted the cleaner to clean it up 
and make it safe 
cleaner 
The spilt milk that wasn’t 
reported before the accident, the 
supervisor who should be 
watching all that’s going on 
around 
Supervisor 
 
 
 
 
63 As18 
Min 
The milk spill had been reported 
and dealt with 
Another worker 
By the person spilling the milk 
reporting the spill and it being cleaned 
up 
Another worker 
The spilt milk not being cleared 
Another worker 
 
 
64 Man7 
max 
I was more aware of what was 
going on on the shop floor 
manager 
If everyone did their job effectively 
Supervisor 
Bad management 
manager 
 
65 As23mi
n 
I had taken the time to stop and 
deal with the spillage by calling the 
cleaner or dealing with the matter 
myself the whole episode / accident 
could have been prevented 
Mary /AS 
By taking immediate action myself 
Mary 
Negligence on my part , 
carelessness , lack of immediate 
response , lack of observation 
Mary 
I hadn’t been so stupid 
66 As 24 
min 
I hadn’t come in to work today 
mary 
If the boxes had been stacked or stored 
properly 
Another worker 
Not looking where she was going 
Mary 
Na 
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67 As21 
max 
Only the cleaner had moved the 
box when requested 
cleaner 
If the cleaner had moved the box, if 
Bill had checked that it was cleared 
and if Mary had looked where she was 
going 
Cleaner/bill/Mary 
 
Carelessness 
cleaner 
My head didn’t hurt  so much 
68 As24 
min 
The manager of the store had 
ensured all staff had been given 
some health and safety awareness 
training specifically the shop floor 
manager.  
As an older employee with some hsw 
awareness training  would not have 
expected to find the boxes in the 
position they were in. They certainly 
would not have been there on my usual 
working days and I had no knowledge 
of a change in routine 
manager  
Boxes left in an unexpected 
position 
Bill  
 
I had worn stronger shoes I 
would have had more support to 
my foot and it may not have 
been so badly injured 
 
69 As17 
max 
I had noticed the spilt milk and 
walked around it, if only someone 
had put a sign out quicker to make 
the spill more obvious, if only 
someone knew the spill was there 
had told us 
Mary 
If someone had told her or a sign had 
been erected 
 
Bill / safety officer/ another 
worker/cleaner 
 
The spilt milk, I had not noticed 
it, there were no signs  
Mary 
I had been concentrating , 
looking where I was stepping 
 
 
 
70 As20 
min 
The cleaner had cleaned up the 
spillage immediately it happened 
cleaner 
If a barrier had been placed around the 
spillage and the cleaner or other 
member of staff had cleaned up the 
liquid 
Bill supervisor 
The slip on the wet floor caused 
by the spillage of milk. 
customer 
 
The driver of the other vehicle 
crossing a major road had seen 
me coming and stopped 
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71 AS 20 
min 
The milk had been cleaned up or a 
hazard board put up 
Safety officer 
By all staff being made aware of 
reporting any hazards immediately to 
the safety officer and notices instore 
for customers to also report hazards 
Safety officer 
Lack of concern for other peoples 
welfare 
Safety officer 
 
The contractors had taken more 
care whilst building and the 
borough inspectors had carried 
out a more thorough inspection 
72 As 20 
min 
I hadn’t gone to work on my day 
off 
mary 
If the spillage had been dealt with 
promptly then no accident would have 
occurred 
cleaner 
Due to the spillage not being 
observed and immediately dealt 
with 
Supervisor 
The management had taken 
notice of the many complaints 
from the shop floor about oil 
spillage on the workshop floor 
73 24 AS 
max 
The box had not been left on the 
shop floor / or had been clearly 
marked as a hazard 
Bill/ another worker 
Not answered  The box being left in an 
unexpected position without clear 
markings 
supervisor/ another worker 
 
If I had warmed up adequately 
for the hurdles event in which  I 
was taking part (for as 
promotional video). I should 
have insisted that we had time 
to warm up and a coach 
  
74 As 24 
min 
The box had not been obstructing 
the way. Someone had mentioned 
/noticed/warned before hand 
Safety officer 
Box had not been left where it was, if 
it was somewhere not usual place , or 
dangerously placed, if someone had 
noticed and moved it or warned 
someone 
Supervisor 
Box left obstructing walkway, 
where it should not have been. It 
had not been removed or placed 
in a safe place. Whoever left the 
box caused the accident 
Other worker 
The icy pavements had been 
gritted to prevent the snow / ice 
freezing. If only I had not taken 
my attention off walking on ice 
I would have probably not 
slipped 
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75 AS 20  
Min  
I hadn’t come in this would not 
have happened as its my day off 
Mary 
The spillage of milk should have been 
reported 
If it was reported it should have been 
cleared away as soon as possible 
Customer / cleaner  
 
The spillage of milk not being 
cleaned up 
cleaner 
 
 Not stated 
 
76 9 SP 
max5 
She had gone on her break and not 
waited for her friend she may have 
paid more attention to her 
surroundings 
Mary 
If this area was attended more 
frequently by a cleaner 
manager 
Area not being cleaned up 
quickly enough 
supervisor 
N/a 
 
77 SP 9 
max 
Bill the supervisor put our warning 
signs straight after the spillage had 
been reported by a customer and 
that the cleaner had got round to 
clean it up 
Supervisor 
By having more observation on the 
shop floor by staff and supervisors, 
and having warning signs available as 
this spillage has occurred before. 
Employer 
 
Not enough supervision of the 
floor area 
employer 
 
N/a 
78 As21 
max 
Whoever had spilt the milk had 
cleaned it up 
Another worker 
If Mary had spotted the spilt milk 
If the person who spilt the milk had 
reported it to the supervisor or cleaner 
Mary 
Depending on how the milk had 
been spilt it would involve 
original “spillee” supervisor and 
cleaner  but Mary should have 
spotted the milk 
Mary 
The person who loaded my 
vehicle had done it properly I 
wouldn’t not have had a barrel 
of beer fall on me   
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79 As 17 
max 
I had attended to the spillage 
straight away 
Supervisor  
 
by prompt action , by cordoning off / 
cleaning up 
supervisor 
Spilt milk causing slippery 
surface and not cleaned up 
supervisor 
 
The ice had been treated I 
would not now be inured 
 
80 As18 
min 
The management were stricter on 
reporting / identifying and reducing 
the risks associated with hazards in 
the workplace such as milk 
manager  
By the store manager encouraging 
effective identification and reporting of 
hazards in the workplace using 
appropriate training procedures and 
communication between all employees 
agents and customers 
manager 
 
Lack of adequate hazard / 
accident prevention procedures 
manager 
I had taken more time to 
prepare / warm up for the game 
of badminton ( it may not have 
made any difference though) 
 
81 AS 18 
min 
The milk had been cleaned up 
Another worker 
By cleaning up the mess and putting a 
wet floor hazard sign up 
Another worker 
Lack of organisation at the work 
place 
manager 
 
Not answered 
 
82 As 18 
min 
The floor had been kept clean and 
clear of spills 
Cleaner 
If the floor had been kept clean ( ie the 
supervisor and cleaner were not doing 
their job) 
supervisor 
Either Mary,s lack of care or the 
responsibility staff (in that part of 
the store) not arranging a clean up 
Safety Officer 
 
The paving slabs had been level 
and the seat had not been 
vandalised 
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83 AS18 
min 
I hadn’t gone to the toilets I would 
not have slipped on the milk 
cleaner 
If the cleaner had made sure the floors 
were dried before leaving or put a sign 
saying !wet floors! 
cleaner 
Wet floor 
cleaner 
I had stayed at home 
 
 
84 As 18 
min 
There was a notice warning me 
mary 
By adequate slip notice 
supervisor 
Spillage of milk 
manager 
Maintenance of building was 
better 
85 AS23 
max 
Not completed Not completed Not completed We had shopped elsewhere 
86 AS 18 
min 
Not completed Not completed Not completed The modifications made to the 
office took into consideration 
the wishes and needs of staff 
87 As 18 
min 
Not completed Not completed Not completed Government and local councils 
were more responsible for road 
maintenance and pavement 
conditions  
88 As 21 Not completed  Not completed Not completed A rail had been fixed along the 
length of the wall 
89 As18 Not completed Not completed Not completed The floor had been dry and the 
leaky roof had been repaired 
90 As 18 Not completed Not completed Not completed (employer) policy on certain 
good was adhered to 
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91 As 18 I had been more careful I might not 
have slipped 
Customer 
If the staff had noticed the milk and 
attended to it this would not have 
happened 
Safety officer 
A careless person spilling the 
milk and not reporting it 
Safety officer 
Not completed 
92 As 17 The milk had been cleaned up 
sooner or a sign was put out 
immediately 
cleaner 
 
If the cleaner had acted properly 
cleaner 
Spilt milk that was not cleaned 
promptly 
cleaner 
 
I played a non contact sport 
93 As17 
max 
Bill the supervisor had made sure 
the milk had been cleaned up 
immediately it was reported , even 
if that meant doing it himself 
supervisor 
 If Bill had acted quicker 
supervisor 
The milk not being cleaned up as 
soon as it was reported 
supervisor 
 
The oil had been cleaned up 
when the spillage was found 
previous 
 
94 As17ma
x 
Warning signs had been placed at 
spillage when the spillage occurred 
supervisor 
If bill the store supervisor had placed 
warning signs at spillage 
supervisor 
 
The initial spillage not being dealt 
with properly 
supervisor 
The stainless steel edging had 
been treaded instead of smooth 
95 SP12 
min 
A system of work was in place to 
ensure all spillages were cleaned up 
as soon as they occurred 
manager 
If the spillage had not occurred or had 
been cleared up as soon as it happened 
manager 
 
Lack of procedure to monitor 
contain and clean spills 
employer 
 
na 
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96 SP 10 
min 
The milk was in a stronger 
container. The milk was stored 
better. If there were rubber mats 
that you were unable to slip 
employer 
By a better floor surface 
employer 
Workplace design /storage 
employer 
 
Na 
97 Sp 9 
max 
Bill the shop floor supervisor had 
taken immediate action when the 
spill was first reported 
supervisor 
Bill should have taken immediate 
action … close checkout, place cone 
near spill, stand near spill until cleaner 
arrived 
supervisor 
Failure of management to take 
immediate action and create a 
proactive safety culture 
Supervisor 
 
Na 
98 SP14 The box had been stored properly ( 
ie away from obstructing the access 
route) 
manager 
If items were stored in their correct 
places and staff members were aware 
of this 
Manager 
Staff members unclear as to 
properly store items , the 
company had not identified the 
hazard 
employer 
 
99 SP16 
min 
I had put the box on the shelf 
instead of leaving it on the ground 
while I went to the bathroom 
Another worker  
If her co worker had thought about 
fellow employees who use isles of the 
shop as well 
Another worker 
Incompetence b y co-worker who 
just leaves down the box and 
walks away 
Another worker 
Na 
 
100 SP 16 
min 
The box had been stored in a safer 
position 
Another worker  
The box could have been stored in a 
safe position where people could not 
trip over it 
Another worker 
Lack o f safety training of other 
employees, poor management 
control , poor housekeeping 
manager 
Na 
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101 AS24 
min 
I had not agreed to work  on 
Thursday for holiday cover 
Mary 
The store had a safety policy that was 
enforced 
Safety officer 
Either lack of safety standards 
that would have protected staff 
adequately , or negligence in 
enforcing them 
Safety Officer 
 
My own car  had been fixed by 
the garage on time. I would 
have been  
a. less flustered by 
unfamiliar car 
b. less pressured by time 
c. less distracted  
102 AS24 
min 
The passage way had been left 
clear of obstructions 
Store manager 
If someone had been given the 
responsibility to ensure that 
passageways were free of obstructions 
at all times 
manager 
 
A box was left in an area where 
people walk and which was 
below the line of sight. 
manager 
 
The manager of Holland and 
Barrett had not put a box just 
inside their entrance 
 
103 As 23 
MAX 
The cleaner had done what she was 
supposed to do 
cleaner 
If the box was not put on the floor in 
the first place 
Supervisor 
That the box was in an unsafe 
place and Mary was walking 
talking to her friend and not 
keeping her eyes on the floor 
Mary 
Not completed 
 
104 AS21 
max 
I had not decided to work on 
Thursday  and perhaps not waited 
for my friend or if I had removed 
the box myself 
Mary 
If she had removed the box herself and 
perhaps paid more attention to where 
she was stepping. 
mary 
The box being on the floor near 
the checkout which was known to 
be an untidy area and should not 
have been left 
Safety Officer 
 
I had not gone to kick boxing 
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105 AS19 
max 
The milk had been cleared up  
when reported 
cleaner 
If the cleaner had done her job 
cleaner 
The spillage not being attended to 
cleaner 
There had been a warning sign 
to alert people to keep to the 
sides of the raised area 
 
106 AS19 
max 
It had been cleaned away when the 
milk was first reported 
Cleaner 
The milk would have been cleaned up 
and a warning sign would have been 
put up to let her know to walk around 
that area. 
Cleaner 
Milk on the floor which should 
not be there 
Safety officer 
The floor was cleaned or a 
warning sign was put up 
 
107 As17 
max 
She was looking on where she was 
going or if someone had told her 
that the floor was wet 
supervisor 
If the person who spill the milk would 
have cleaned the mess 
supervisor 
No action on cleaning and no 
caution (warning) on the area 
supervisor 
 
 
I did not water the plants. 
108 AS17 
max 
Incorrectly completed Incorrectly completed Incorrectly completed I had had help 
109 As 18 
min 
People did their jobs correctly. The 
people who caused the spillage had 
cleaned it up themselves or put a 
spillage sign out. 
If other people did their jibs correctly , 
cleaning up after themselves, putting a 
spillage sign out 
Safety officer 
People not doing their jobs. Not answered correctly 
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110 As 18 
min 
Not answered correctly Not answered correctly Not answered correctly I had not ventured (out) through 
necessity that day. My arm 
would not have been broken 
and caused me an awful lot of 
inconvenience 
111 AS18 
min 
There was no water on the floor the 
accident would not have appended  
Another worker 
Special care was taken whilst cleaning 
floors, also signs put up if wet spilt. 
Another worker 
Drops of water was spilt on the 
floor had no wet signs beside it 
Other worker 
There was no water on the floor 
I would not have slipped and 
broke my wrist 
112 As 18 
min 
Not answered correctly Not answered correctly Not answered correctly I had checked platform and 
steps 
113 As18 
min 
I had not covered for my friend and 
if only the milk had been cleaned 
up 
mary 
If the staff had been alert to the 
potential danger of the spillage 
supervisor 
Failure for the milk to be cleaned 
up as soon as it was spilt 
supervisor 
There had been protective  mats 
round the soft fruit are of the 
sales floor – I had not gone in 
that store at that time  
 
114 AS19 
max 
Not completed properly Not completed properly Not completed properly Coffee had not been spilt on the 
floor by the coffee machine I 
would not have slipped and 
broken my wrist 
115 As19 
max 
Warning signs had been put out 
Supervisor 
If warning signs should have been put 
out , cleaner should have reacted 
immediately 
Supervisor 
No warning signs 
Safety officer 
 
The speed hump hadn’t been 
uneven I would not have 
tripped. 
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116 SP15 
max 
The person discovering the box had  
removed it or stayed with it until it 
was removed to a safer place 
If only Mary had been more 
observant   
employer 
Safety procedures for clearing 
walkways, informed employees and 
monitoring of safety procedures by 
management 
employer 
Failure of the management to 
ensure that the safety procedures 
for removing tripping hazards 
from walkways . lack of attention 
on Marys part 
manager 
Na 
117 SP 15 
max 
The spilt milk had been cleaned up 
immediately 
supervisor 
If systems had been in place to ensure 
that the store is kept tidy at all times 
(including checkouts) and that spills 
are either cleaned up or segregated 
from people immediately 
manager 
Lack of action to ensure that 
systems are in place to clear areas 
in the store – no systems in place 
to react when  incidents occur 
manager 
Na 
118 SP 15 
max 
Somebody had removed the box 
Store staff appreciated the potential 
hazard 
supervisor 
If staff especially bill were more safety 
conscious 
supervisor 
 
Her inability to see the box. Bills 
failure to pick it up 
Mary 
 
Na 
119 SP 15 
max 
There was a system to monitor 
housekeeping standards 
employer 
Management system –housekeeping 
employer 
 
Lack of management control 
Inattention 
employer 
 
Na 
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120 AS24 
min 
I had taken more notice of /been 
more aware of where I was walking 
and what was on the floor 
Mary 
The box not being there, being more 
observant 
Bill / another worker 
Not observant enough, 
carelessness by whoever 
responsible for the box being 
there 
Mary. 
I had insisted the stairs were  
inspected by a professional and 
altered as they have been now 
121 As24 
min 
I had not come in on over time to 
cover for my friend the accident 
would not have happened 
Mary 
By whoever left the box near the 
checkouts. 
supervisor 
Carelessness 
Another worker 
Another member of staff had 
seen the spillage it should have 
been cleared up. This included 
managers  
122 AS23 
max 
 Staff took health and safety 
more seriously 
employer 
By ensuring all staff were made aware 
of potential dangers and the risk they 
pose, and emphasising that staff and 
management were active in accident 
prevention 
employer 
 
As the area round the tills was 
often untidy , poor management 
and lack of attention to health and 
safety caused the accident 
manager 
No CFT 
123 AS23 
max 
While waiting for my friend to go 
on our break I (Mary ) had moved 
the boxes to a safer area to be 
properly disposed of  by a cleaner 
Mary 
If the supervisor had warned Mary of 
the hazard and then put  out some 
warning signs until the cleaner arrived 
to remove the box 
Supervisor 
 
Poor housekeeping due to lack of 
staff and poor health and safety 
training 
employer 
I had waited for assistance to 
carry the heavy case instead of 
trying to do it by myself 
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124 Manage
r 4 min 
Incorrectly answered Because she already worked there fo r8 
years she knows the ins and outs of the 
ABC store 
Bill 
She might be rushing to her chair 
or a customer might have spilt 
milk while loading her trolley and 
the can might be open and she did 
not inform her supervisor 
NA 
Na 
125 AS24 
min 
 The person who left the box on the 
floor was more safety conscious 
and management pressed home the 
relevance of safety in work 
Another worker 
The person who left the box on the 
floor was more safety conscious and 
management pressed home the 
relevance of safety in work 
Another worker 
Somebody not being safety 
conscious by leaving the box 
where they did . Management not 
pressing health and safety 
Another worker 
 
People in work and 
management pushed home 
work health and safety my 
accident wouldn’t have 
happened 
 
126 AS22 
min 
I was looking where I was going or 
I was not on rushing 
Mary 
By the box not being in the wrong 
place 
Supervisor 
The box 
supervisor 
I was looking where I was 
going 
127 AS23 
max 
We were all more aware of 
potential hazards and removed 
them “now” instead of waiting for 
someone else to do it. 
“All employees” 
By making sure all potential hazards 
are removed immediately 
“All employees” 
 
The box should have been cleared 
away 
(Whoever left it there) 
They had kept the car parks 
clean and tidy 
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128 AS19 
max 
I had paid more attention 
Mary 
By better spillage control ie 
immediately that a spillage is reported 
it should be sealed off or if in a 
checkout the checkout should be 
closed then cleaned up  
Supervisor 
Negligence 
Supervisor 
 
No CFT  
 
 
 
 
129 AS19 
max 
Its fate ! just the way it is, wrong 
place , wrong time  
The person who spilt the milk should 
have done something about it 
immediately 
 
Lack of responsibility , whoever 
spilt the milk should have done 
something about it immediate. 
 
No cft 
130 AS19 
max 
For health and safety reasons the 
area was inspected on a regular 
basis, there was a previous history 
of slipping accidents over a very 
short period. . 
If only Bill had put up a hazard 
notice at the time it was reported. 
Supervisor 
 
If proper health and safety regulations 
were adhered to 
Supervisor 
 
The person who spilt the milk, the 
safety officer, bill the supervisor. 
There were no written policies 
and procedures I presume 
Supervisor 
 
I had insisted on a blood test, if 
only I had not taken the 
medicine. If only I went to aq 
different doctor 
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131 AS17m
ax 
Not answered 
Supervisor 
Bill the supervisor should have made 
arrangements after the customer 
reported the spillage  or put a barrier so 
customers and staff would not walk 
there until it was cleaned and allow the 
floor to dry before removing the 
barrier 
Cleaner 
Not answered 
 
I had walked round the tank 
instead of using the small step 
 
 
132 AS17 
max 
Bill the supervisor has put a hazard 
sign by the milk I would have 
avoided slipping on it as it would 
have been clearly marked 
supervisor 
If bill the supervisor had put a hazard 
sign next to the spillage or gay a 
member of staff to stand near the 
spillage while he got the cleaner 
Supervisor 
Bill the supervisor for not taking 
immediate action 
Supervisor 
Noel hadn’t pushed the door so 
hard he wouldn’t have knocked 
me against the wall banging my 
head against it giving me 
concussion 
 
133 AS17 
max 
Someone had put a wet floor sign 
down I would have seen the wet 
area 
Supervisor 
By the area being cleaned or closed off 
Supervisor 
Improper health and safety on 
Bills part for not blocking the wet 
area until it was cleaned 
Supervisor  
my supervisor had not broken 
the draw that broke my hand. If 
only the management had fixed 
it during the 8 months that I  
had been complaining. 
134 As17 
max 
The spill had been dealt with 
immediately 
Supervisor  
If the spill had been dealt with right 
away 
Supervisor 
Negligence in clearing the spill 
right away 
Supervisor 
Not answered 
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135 As17 
max 
The spilt milk had been cleared up 
or had a warning sign against it , I 
would not have gone near it 
Supervisor 
If the milk had been cleared up when 
the cleaner was told to , also if there 
were signs up 
Supervisor 
Incompetence by managers 
Supervisor 
 
The lights above the cooker had 
been fixed when they were 
reported 
136 SP15 
Max 
Someone had taken responsibility 
and moved the box 
Employer 
If the company had a strong safety 
culture where tripping hazards were a 
high priority 
Manager 
There was more than one cause 
however the proximate cause was 
the box on the floor. 
Employer 
N/A 
137 SP13 
Max 
There was a more pro-active 
approach by everyone to taking 
responsibility for safety and when 
the customer reported the box to 
Bill he should have removed it and 
not waited for someone else to take 
care of it.  Furthermore if only the 
person who left the box there in the 
first place was not in the habit of 
leaving boxes near the check out or 
any walkway. 
Supervisor 
By ensuring good housekeeping 
around check out area. 
Manager 
The box being left on the floor. 
The Company. 
N/A 
138 MAN6 
Min 
Good Housekeeping standards had 
been adhered to and a box had not 
been left out 
Manager 
Thorough training of safety officer and 
staff to not leave hazards on the shop 
floor. 
Manager 
Poor Training 
Manager 
N/A 
139 SP13 
Max 
I had cleared the box away 
immediately 
Supervisor 
By keeping check out areas clear 
Supervisor 
Checkout partially blocked 
Supervisor 
N/A 
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140 AS24 
Min 
The box had not been left in such a 
silly place 
Another Worker 
If the box had not been left where it 
was but put in its appropriate place. 
Another Worker 
The inappropriate positioning of a 
box 
Another Worker 
The shelving had not had a lip 
around its base that my knee hit 
when I knelt down 
141 MAN7 
Max 
We had set up a rota to regularly 
keep the area round the checkouts 
clear. 
Supervisor 
By clearing the shop floor at regular 
intervals. 
Another Worker 
Negligence 
Supervisor 
N/A 
142 MAN1 
Max 
Facilities for immediate marking of 
spillage hazards until they are 
cleared.  Set target times for 
clearing up spillages etc 
Manager 
Had immediate marking of spillage 
hazards and setting target times for 
clearing up spillages etc. been in place. 
Manager 
Failure to have an affective 
strategy for clearing hazards 
The Company 
N/A 
143 MAN2 
Min 
Staff had been alert to the danger 
and acted to prevent accident 
Safety Officer 
If Staff had been alert to the danger 
and acted to prevent accident 
Safety Officer 
Staff had not being alert to the 
danger and not acting to prevent 
accident 
Safety Officer 
N/A 
144 MAN7 
Max 
The area around the checkout was 
kept tidy 
Store Manager 
If area around checkout was kept tidy 
Store Manager 
Mary not looking where she was 
going 
Accident subject 
N/A 
145 MAN4 
Min 
I knew what the circumstances 
were that led Mary to fall.  Was she 
running? Was she wearing 
inappropriate shoes? Is the floor 
unsafe when wet? How did the 
milk leak? I shall have to discuss 
the circumstances with Mary. 
-Mary 
-Store Manager 
-Don’t sell milk 
-Only sell milk in 
leakproof/breakproof containers 
-slip proof flooring 
-slip resistant footwear 
The Company 
-To be determined  
 
 
-Dependent on previous column 
(Q32)  
N/A 
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146 MAN4 
Min 
There was a notice in place, if only 
the cleaner had cleaned the mess.  
If only staff were aware of Health 
and Safety 
Supervisor 
Store Manager 
Safety Officer 
The Company 
The Cleaner 
If the milk was cleaned up 
immediately it was spilt 
 
 
Supervisor 
Store Manager 
Safety Officer 
The Cleaner 
Milk spillage not being cleared up 
 
 
Supervisor 
Safety Officer 
Cleaner 
N/A 
147 MAN3 
Max 
The warning signs had been put out 
and that the cleaner had cleared it 
up more promptly 
Supervisor 
By having warning signs placed in the 
area 
Supervisor 
The lack of immediate action by 
the store supervisor and store 
cleaner 
Supervisor 
N/A 
148 MAN3 
Max 
If supervisor and cleaner realised 
the urgency of cleaning up the 
spillage and if only warning signs 
had been put up as soon as the 
customer reported the spillage. 
Store Manager 
If the warning signs had been put out 
as soon as the customer reported it and 
there was a sense of urgency about 
clearing it up. 
The Supervisor 
That people did not understand 
the importance of clearing up the 
mess as soon as possible and at 
least putting warning signs out. 
-Supervisor 
-Store manager 
-Safety Officer 
N/A 
149 MAN2 
Min 
Mary had looked where she was 
treading.  As a member of staff she 
should be on the look out for 
customer hazards 
Mary 
If she had looked where she had trod 
Mary 
Customer for spilling milk, mary 
for not looking where she trod. 
Mary 
N/A 
150 SP10 
Min 
The spillage had been cleaned up 
immediately or cordoned off. 
 
None of these -The person that 
caused the spill  
If the spillage had been reported 
immediately, cleaned up or cordoned 
off 
None of these -The person that caused 
the spill 
The spilt milk and the fact that it 
was not reported and cleaned up – 
root cause insufficient safety 
awareness lack of supervision 
None of these- the person 
responsible for spilling the milk 
N/A 
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151 AS21 
Max 
I had been more observant and that 
the store manager and/or safety 
officer had noticed that several 
people had been injured by te same 
cause then this should have been 
dealt with before my accident 
 
The Store Manager  
If the repetition of the same accident 
had been noticed by management. 
 
The Store Manager 
People failing to follow through 
historic accidents with a common 
cause. 
 
The Store Manager 
That managers had listened to 
what I had to say and had left 
me to finish my work rather 
than giving me “help” to fulfil 
their criteria other than safety. 
152 AS22 
Min 
The person or persons had have put 
the equipment back in their correct 
place 
Another Worker 
If people would only consider others, 
and be properly trained. 
Another worker. 
Laziness, incompetence, 
negligence, thoughtlessness, lack 
of training. 
 
Another worker. 
They had taken heed of 
previous near misses and 
prevented equipment being 
stored inappropriately. 
153 AS22 
Min 
I had not placed the box that I 
tripped over where it was. 
 
Mary 
Had I not placed the box on the floor 
 
Mary 
Mary leaving the box that she 
tripped over on the floor. 
 
Mary. 
I had asked for help to cope 
with increased amount of stock 
delivered the morning of the 
accident, I would not have left 
the box where it was. 
154 AS22 
Min 
I had not agreed to do the day for 
my friend who was on holiday. 
 
Mary. 
By not having a box on the floor which 
was obviously there and had been put 
there a) by accident b) by mistake c) 
for a reason.  Therefore Safety officer 
should ensure all workers know not to 
put boxes on the floor. 
 
Safety Officer 
Someone had left a box on the 
floor – management should have 
informed workers not to do so – 
inform safety supervisor and 
safety officer – who should know 
this already and inform others. 
 
The Store manager 
The Year 2’s had been at school 
instead of an educational visit, I 
would have had gym club and 
my preparation for the dance 
performance would not have 
taken place.  I would not have 
injured myself. 
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155 AS22 
Min 
(Assuming the box was not usually 
there) 
a) Someone hadn’t left the box 
lying there or (assuming box 
was part of usual display 
b) I hadn’t come in today 
 
 
a) Another worker 
b) Mary 
If she had been looking where she was 
going 
 
Mary 
Her not seeing a box on the floor 
(presumably in a walkway) 
perhaps she was rushing to take 
her break as the shop is too strict 
on time. 
 
Mary 
I had not gone out in the snow 
to fetch a prescription for a 
neighbour I might not have 
slipped on a complete sheet of 
bus shelter plastic window left 
lying on the grass behind the 
shelter and completely invisible 
under a layer of snow!! If  only 
I had kept to the pavement and 
not crossed the green. 
156 AS22 
Min 
a) I had seen the box 
b) The box had not been left on 
my route 
c) I had not agreed to cover for 
my friend 
 
Mary 
If I had been more vigilant. 
 
Mary 
A box being left in the wrong 
place 
 
Another worker 
The pavement had been 
properly repaired 
157 AS21 
Max 
That box had not been left lying 
about and “if only” I not 
“covered” that day 
 
The cleaner 
If cleaner cleared boxes more regular 
and ensured boxes not left lying about 
where people can trip over them 
cleaner 
Whoever left the box in the first 
place and the cleaner for not 
keeping clear 
 
Another worker 
That empty crate had been 
stacked away and not left in 
walkway but at same time if I 
had not been rushing I might 
not have fallen quite so heavily. 
158 AS21 
Max 
I had paid more attention to where 
I was going I might have seen the 
box and…… 
 
Mary 
If the box had been removed by Bill as 
soon as the customer had reported it. 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
A Box being left where it 
shouldn’t have been 
 
Another Worker 
I hadn’t been rushing to get a 
job done I would have taken 
more care about where I was 
going and would have seen the 
step 
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159 AS21 
Max 
I had checked the cleaner had 
removed the box 
 
Bill – Supervisor 
If as soon as the customer had reported 
the hazard it should have been 
removed 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
The lack of action in dealing with 
the hazard(s) after previous 
incidents 
 
Safety Officer  
Edges of ramps/steps had been 
highlighted 
160 AS23 
Max 
I had looked where I was going.  
If only I went up straight away 
and not waited for my friend – Bill 
should have made sure the cleaner 
removed the hazard. 
Mary 
If Bill had ensured the cleaner 
removed the hazard.  Further 
precautions were taken knowing 4 
other people had similar accidents.  
Listening to the customer and worse 
comes to the worst, Bill could have 
removed the hazard if the cleaner was 
busy. 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
The delayed response from the 
cleaner also Bill because he could 
have put hazard signs out or even 
cleaned it himself. 
 
The Cleaner 
I had waited 5 minutes before 
walking over to the counter, if 
only someone  had realised 
water was spilt and cleaned it 
up. If only I had looked at the 
floor  
161 AS20 
Min 
I had walked in a different 
direction, perhaps down a 
different aisle I would not have 
slipped on the milk. 
 
Mary 
If there had been an in-store cleaner 
who was notified immediately of the 
spilt milk. 
 
The cleaner 
The failure of the store safety 
officer to ensure that procedures 
are in place within the store to 
clear up any spillages 
immediately 
 
Safety Officer 
The wet floor had been clearly 
marked/signposted 
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162 AS20 
Min 
The spillage had been reported 
and cleared up. 
none 
 
 
If the spillage had been reported and 
cleared up.  
None of these – I do not have enough 
information to apportion blame 
none 
The failure to clear up the 
spillage.  If the customer was 
aware of the spillage they had a 
duty to report it; if it was reported 
there was a duty to clear up the 
spillage and maintain safety. 
 
No – one named 
1) We had not been 
so busy and there 
were more staff 
to care for the 
patients I might 
have noticed the 
wet floor prior to 
my foot slipping 
on it. 
2) If sickness levels 
were not so bad 
at present we 
would not have 
been robbing one 
shift to cover 
another. 
3) Management 
would improve 
our establishment 
so that 
sickness/pregnan
cy was 
absorbable. 
163  AS20 
Min 
The milk was wiped as soon as it 
was spilled 
 
 
Bill The Supervisor 
If Bill the supervisor cleaned the floor 
then Mary would be safe 
 
Bill The Supervisor 
The person who spilt the milk and 
left it 
 
 
None named 
If he person who put the boxes 
on the cage did it the way it 
should have been done it would 
not have happened.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
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164 AS20 
Min 
Sign to say spillage cleaned up 
sooner & sectioned off 
 
Store Manager 
Milk spillage reported and seen.  
Hazard warning. Cleared quicker. Act 
quickly urgently. 
 
Another worker (first on scene) 
Lack of training lack of 
awareness. Slow response. Lack 
of responsibility.  Insufficient 
teamwork. Laziness 
 
Safety Officer and Thhe 
Company 
Ihad not carried out instructions 
to make the building safe by 
closing that window.  I wish it 
had not been my job.  I wish 
there was someone to contact 
surely they could employ a 
caretaker- we never touch those 
windows. 
165 AS23 
Max 
1) Drivers had reported where 
vehicles had been parked in the 
yard and then I would not have 
been out doing a visual check. 
2) There had been more office 
staff then I would not have been 
rushing back to th e office to 
answer the phone 
3) There had been proper 
pedestrian walkways in the 
yard. 
Safety Officer 
The Company 
By having more office staff on duty 
and proper walkways along with better 
procedures for debriefing drivers 
 
Safety Officer 
The Company 
The Company See Column 1  If only 
……….Things could have been 
different. 
166 AS19 
Max 
If the cleaner had cleaned the 
spillage up 5 minutes before 
 
The Cleaner 
As previous column 
 
The Cleaner 
Milk Spillage 
 
The Cleaner 
Wet – etc – If Dry …………… 
Things could have been 
different. 
167 SP14 
Min 
Not completed –  
      Left Blank 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
Accident Prevention Programme – 
Management Prevention Active 
System 
 
None named 
See Previous column and failure 
to enforce monitor and review 
 
The Manager and the Company 
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168 SP16  
Min 
There had been better house 
keeping practices 
 
The Company 
By better housekeeping systems 
 
The Company (If the Safety Officer 
reported a Housekeeping problem or 
indicated this on a risk assessment then 
top management should have received 
it and acted upon it. 
Bad housekeeping – congested 
workspace – did safety officer 
recommend the problem? 
Did Management know? 
If so did they ignore the problem? 
Did cleaner know of the problem? 
Did she care? Was she drunk? Or 
an alien – who knows? I’m not 
there. 
 
169 SP16  
Min 
Box had been moved 
 
The Store Manager 
Good Housekeeping had been 
maintained 
 
Safety Officer 
Poor workplace housekeeping 
 
Safety Officer 
 
170 SP16 
Min 
I had kept a check on the shop 
floor more regularly and issued 
warnings about leaving empty 
boxes on floor – stocking shelves 
to the store shelf stackers. 
 
The Store Manager 
 
By making the staff aware of the 
necessity of house cleaning in all 
things not only for the staff but also 
the public 
 
The Store Manager 
The Safety Officer 
Lack of attention by Mary – lack 
of forethought by management 
 
171 SP16 
Min 
The person using the box had 
removed it or at least highlighted 
its presence to Mary 
The Store Manager 
By better working arrangements i.e. 
boxes off the floor while shop is 
operating – all boxes stored on trolleys 
Bill the Supervisor 
Poor work practices 
Lack of supervision control 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
 
172 SP14 
Min 
The box had not been left in a 
thoroughfare 
Bill the supervisor 
Better housekeeping 
Bill the Supervisor 
Box was kept in thoroughfare – 
poor housekeeping 
Bill the Supervisor 
 
173 SP14 
Min 
Management had controlled the 
work area better in relation to H & 
S 
The Store Manager 
The Store Manager should have 
ensured staff kept walkways clear from 
obstruction. 
The Store Manager 
Tripping hazard left in a walkway 
 
The Store Manager 
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174 SP14 
Min 
The box had not been in Mary’s 
way 
The Store Manager 
By making sure at regular intervals 
that loose boxes were not in the 
walkways 
Bill the Supervisor 
Someone leaving a box in a 
pedestrian walkway 
 
Another worker 
 
175 SP14 
Min 
A supervisor had his/her eyes 
open 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
By a greater awareness of supervisors 
and staff of need to keep floor free 
from obstructions 
The Company 
A collective failure to have( 
senior management) a system for 
keeping floors clean and to 
implement the system (supervisor 
and staff) – The Company 
 
176 SP14 
Min 
General housekeeping and floor 
supervision were maintained 
Bill the Supervisor 
If the general safety policy of the 
company was upheld through 
maintenance and housekeeping, basis 
supervision and safety awareness 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
Negligence on 
supervisor/manager/cleaners part 
not to keep/maintain a safe place 
of work.  Mary should have been 
more aware for her own safety – 
all provided a good safe system of 
work is in place. 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
 
177 SP9 
Max 
The spillage had been cleaned up 
immediately 
The Company 
By cleaning up the spillage 
immediately – the company 
The spillage was not cleaned up 
immediately 
The company 
 
178 SP9 
Max 
The milk had been cleared up 
quickly 
The cleaner 
If safe system and procedure had been 
implemented after review of previous 
accidents occurred 
The Store Manager 
Lack of safe system and 
procedure to ensure a safe 
working environment for 
employees. 
The store manager 
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179 SP9 
Max 
 The reasons for spills had 
been identified.   
 A spill procedure had 
ensured immediate action 
 The accident book had 
been reviewed earlier.  
 The importance of slips 
and trips had been high 
priority 
 
Bill the supervisor 
Suitable packaging and spill 
procedures 
 
The Company 
Slippery floor surface 
 
Bill the supervisor 
 
180 SP10 
Min 
There had been a floor supervisor 
on duty, he/she would have 
spotted the milk and had it cleared 
up by the cleaners 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
If a store supervisor was on duty which 
when he/she saw the danger of the 
spillage would have got a cleaner to 
clean the spilt milk 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
Carelessness on the part of the 
supervisor, should have spotted 
the spillage and have it cleaned 
up and also a means should have 
been in place to prevent the milk 
from spilling 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
 
181 SP13 
Max 
The box had not been left on the 
shop floor 
 
Another worker 
By having a safety culture and 
management controls and staff training 
and supervision that ensures safe 
culture of stock loading/unloading, 
tidiness etc 
 
The Company 
Lack of concern for safety by 
employee who left box 
 
Another worker. 
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182 AS20 
Min 
I slipped on water immediately in 
front of the ground floor escalator 
and fell backwards cracking the 
back of my hand which assistants 
heard from their counters.  If only 
one of them had noticed and 
reported the water I would never 
have slipped. 
 
 Another Worker 
 The Store Manager 
If any of the assistants had seen the 
water and reported it or if there had 
been a safety officer walking around 
the store. 
 
Another worker 
Water on Floor 
 
None of these 
(I would think a child had passed 
water) 
 
183 AS22 
Min 
The box was in the right place and 
the Health and Safety Officer was 
doing his/her job properly; 
checking to look for hazards and 
carrying out the Supermarkets 
health & Safety Policy at all times. 
 
Safety Officer 
By ensuring that no obstacle (the Box) 
was placed where an accident could 
happen 
 
The Safety Officer 
The box I fell over, it should,nt 
have been where it was, this was 
a hazard waiting for an accident 
to happen. 
 
The Safety Officer 
I hadn’t gone shopping that 
night,  as normally my husband 
does all the shopping and I 
hadn’t really no need to shop 
184 AS19 
Max 
They had put warning signs up as 
soon as the spilt milk was brought 
to the supervisor’s attention.  Also, 
if only the cleaner had been able to 
clear the milk up sooner this would 
not have happened.  This would 
have been one less accident. 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
The Store Manager 
The Cleaner 
If the supervisor had taken action 
straight away, to get the warning signs 
by himself or another member of staff.  
They should then have stood by the 
spillage until they were sure the signs 
were put up and the cleaner would be 
cleaning up as soon as possible. 
 
Bill The Supervisor 
The action to clear the spillage up 
was not dealt with quick enough.  
Had everyone had all the health 
and safety training needed to 
work to the standard need for this 
environment. 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
The Store Manager 
Safety Officer 
The Company 
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185 AS17S 
Max 
The spillage had been dealt with 
sooner and a warning sign had been 
placed at the spot. 
 
Safety Officer 
If swift action had been taken by all 
concerned. 
 
Safety Officer 
Lack of awareness on Mary’s part 
and spillage not been dealt with 
quickly. 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
 
186 SP15 
Max 
Other people were made aware of 
the dangers and likely 
consequences of poor 
housekeeping 
 
The Company 
By good safety management systems, 
awareness training and if necessary 
enforcement 
 
The Company 
Poor management of 
housekeeping including 
insufficient training and 
enforcement.  Poor overall safety 
awareness attitudes and 
management. 
 
The Company 
 
187 SP15 
Max 
The box had been put away 
 
Another Worker 
By good housekeeping and proper 
supervision 
Another worker 
The fact that a box had been left 
in the aisle 
Another Worker 
 
188 SP16 
Min 
The box had not been there it 
would not have happened 
Safety Officer 
By a safe system of work being in 
place.  Employees and supervisors 
being trained.  Management having a 
sound safety culture in place. 
 
Safety officer 
That  
 She did not keep a 
proper lookout 
 Supervisors were 
inadequate in 
supervising 
 Unsafe system of work 
 
189 SP16 
Min 
They implemented their safe 
system of work 
 
The Company 
By implementing a safe system of 
work 
 
The Company 
Failure to provide a safe system 
of work. 
 
The Company 
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190 SP16 
Max 
We had a system where boxes are 
not left unattended by staff, all 
boxes are cleared away 
immediately and regular 
inspections of the workplace are 
carried out by the manager 
 
The Store Manager 
By training staff not to leave boxes 
unattended and carrying out regular 
inspections 
 
The Store Manager 
Poor management procedures, 
poor training 
 
The Store Manager 
 
191 AS23 
Max 
The box had been placed in the 
correct place by the person who left 
it there.  It should never have been 
left there in the first place. 
 
Another Worker 
If the box hadn’t been left there in the 
first place. 
 
Another Worker 
Tripping over the box 
 
Safety Officer 
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192 SP15 
Max 
They had looked at the risk of 
tripping hazards in the risk 
assessment-using information from 
the accident book he would have 
realised there was a risk and should 
have implemented the necessary 
control measures to prevent such 
tripping incidents by staff training, 
audits of the workplace etc 
 
The Company 
See previous answer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Company 
 (Direct cause) The cause was 
due to a member of staff 
leaving a box out 
 
(Indirect causes were)–  
 Lack of management control 
 Lack of information 
instruction and training 
 Lack of monitoring 
 
Another worker 
 
193 SP15 
Max 
Procedures of housekeeping in the 
store had been followed and the 
supervision on receiving the report 
had taken personal prompt action. 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
The Company 
Supervision of housekeeping all 
following procedures. 
 
The Company 
Lack of application of procedures 
poor housekeeping. 
 
Another worker 
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194 SP15 
Max 
Bill had removed the box and 
marked the area where milk had 
spilt 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
By the supervisor taking action other 
than informing the cleaner 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
Bad Housekeeping 
 
 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
 
195 AS19 
Max 
If only I had not come into work 
today, a Thursday, or if the cleaner 
had cleared it up straight away or 
put signs out 
 
Mary 
The Cleaner 
The spillage being cleaned up straight 
away and signs put out. 
 
The Cleaner 
Wet floor from the spilt milk, 
whoever spilt the milk.  The 
supervisor did’nt ensure the milk 
was cleaned up straight away. 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
The Cleaner 
If only the cleaner had’nt been 
cleaning the floor whilst people 
were working there, and if only 
she had put some signs out 
warning of the wet floor I 
would not have slipped over 
dislocating my knee. 
196 AS19 
Max 
I’d not been talking to my friend 
may be I would have seen the milk 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
If the supervisor had made sure 
himself there were a sign saying wet 
floor or slippery surface. 
 
Bill The Supervisor 
Wrong attitude 
 
Another worker 
If only they had emptied the 
tank in to a dolaf and not onto 
the floor there may not have 
been Mayo or Debbie on the 
floor if the job had been done 
correctly. 
197 AS20 
Min 
I had cleaned the milk up straight 
away 
 
The cleaner 
Better supervision of staff 
 
 
The Store manager 
Careless handling of poor quality 
container 
 
A Customer 
The van driver who knocked 
me over had not driven 
recklessly out of a lay-by and 
had looked where he was 
going!  He was not insured and 
had no MOT 
198 AS23 
Max 
The cleaner had left all other duties 
and removed the box when told to 
 
The cleaner 
See previous column 
 
The cleaner 
Carelessness of the person who 
left the box there. 
 
Safety Officer 
Left blank 
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199 AS23 
Max 
I had’nt waited for my friend I 
would’nt have been talking and 
taken more notice of where I was 
walking 
 
Mary 
Rubbish (including boxes) should 
never be left around where people are 
moving 
 
Safety Officer 
The person who left the box there 
 
Another worker 
If only they checked at the 
bowling alley that three were no 
knots in the laces it wouldn’t 
have come undone.  I should 
have taken it back immediately 
and changed the shoe for one, 
which could have been securely 
fastened. 
200 AS20 
min 
 
Not completed properly 
If only I had went the other way  
Not completed properly Not completed properly If only I had went the other way  
 
201 AS20 
min 
Not completed properly Not completed properly Not completed properly The floor had been dry  
202 AS 20 
min 
Who ever spilt the milk had 
cleaned it up or reported the spill to 
supervisor so it could be cleaned up 
Another worker 
By the person cleaning up after 
themselves and not leaving the place in 
a state 
Another worker 
 
The person who spilled the milk 
not cleaning or referring the 
incident to supervisor 
Another worker 
The oil had been cleaned up /or 
not been allowed to build up in 
the first place 
 
 
203 AS21 
max 
Not completed properly 
 
Not completed properly 
 
Not completed properly 
 
I had not got on the escalator 
with my son in a buggy 
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204 As21 
max 
Not completed If the obstruction had been moved its 
not up to the individual, it should be 
management they should check for 
safety 
Supervisor 
People placing things in the 
wrong place not thinking how 
stupid they are 
Supervisor 
The idiot that took away 
extensions lead, thought a bit 
more, especially putting the fan 
in a confined space , because 
without lead did not stretch to a 
more suitable  space , to make 
safe 
205 AS23 
max 
The box had been cleared  away 
immediately 
Cleaner 
If she hadn’t waited for her friend to 
go on her break with. She would 
therefore not have been chatting or 
distracted and would probably been 
more aware and more likely to notice 
the box 
Mary 
The box being left on the floor 
None  
I hadn’t gone to box-a-cise 
today. I hadn’t felt in the mood 
but pushed myself anyway 
206 AS20 
min 
The customer had informed a 
member of staff about the spillage, 
it could have been wiped up 
Customer 
If one of the people on the other side 
of the cash point had reported the spilt 
liquid 
customer 
The unreported spillage 
Customer 
I hadn’t been in such a hurry to 
finish . If only I had realised 
that the floor was wet. If only I 
had left filing the work until 
later  
207 SP15 
Max 
Person who spilled the milk had 
stayed at the area and called for 
another member of staff to get  a 
cloth to clean and dry the area.  So 
that they could have warned Mary 
not to walk there. 
 
Safety Officer 
None of these 
By implementing staff to cover areas 
and inform the public of boxes/spills 
whilst another member of staff clears 
the area, boxes could be taken out 
individually or stock could be put on 
shelves at night. 
 
The store manager 
Box being unpacked/left alone 
Spilt milk  customer/staff 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
Her accident could have been 
prevented if the box and milk 
was cleared 
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208 SP17 
Max 
There had been some way of 
notifying people there was a 
problem with the floor. 
 
Safety officer 
If, when notified of the spillage, 
someone was allocated to the spot 
immediately to warn away customers 
to the danger.  Also, the customer who 
caused the spillage should have 
notified someone who works in the 
store. 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
Due to not enough H & S 
procedures and a lack of response 
to the spillage & responsibility  
 
Safety Officer 
My company had provided me 
with the correct product when I 
first went to the job I would not 
have had to return to customer 
for a second visit.  Therefore I 
would not have fell. 
209 AS23 
Max 
They had a room for the chairs and 
the step was clearly marked 
 
Bill - The Supervisor 
If they had more room to store the 
chairs 
 
The Company 
 
The step was not clearly marked 
 
None of these 
Not completed 
210 AS24 
Min 
 I had looked where I was 
going 
 That box had not been left 
there 
 Housekeeping rules were 
properly followed/enforced 
 Someone else had tidied up 
when they saw the box 
 I’d not offered to cover for 
my friend 
 
All listed  - “Sorry you will 
have to make sense of this”. 
House keeping rules should be in 
place, communicated, followed and 
enforced 
 
Staff should also be aware that they 
have a duty themselves to prevent 
accidents 
 
 
 
 
 
All listed but if had to choose one – 
chose “Safety Officer”. 
Poor Housekeeping 
 
 
Safety Officer 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
I had followed my own advice 
about lifting techniques 
I had remembered how weak 
my own back is since my 
original lifting accident 
I had remembered how unfit I 
had become since being the 
manager 
I had been somewhere else 
doing something else 
211 AS24 
Min 
My friend hadn’t gone on holiday 
 
Another Worker 
If the box had not been left in the 
wrong place 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
The box being left in the wrong 
place 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
Not completed 
 Appendix 5 Respondents Completed Sentences 
 
Page | 888  
 
212 AS24 
Min 
The person who left the box in a 
non-visual place had used their 
common sense and left some form 
of warning to advise of a potential 
hazard 
 
Whomsoever left the box 
If regular checks were made for 
potential hazards by staff and if regular 
safety meetings were held to alert all 
staff of potential dangers and to teach 
vigilance on the shop floor 
 
Safety Officer 
Complete thoughtlessness by a 
third party in leaving the box in a 
hazardous place where Mary was 
unlikely to see it, hence tripping 
over it. 
 
Whomsoever left the box in a 
hazardous and potentially 
dangerous place 
Our insurance manager who 
should know better had not left 
a first aid box behind my chair 
without telling me that he had 
put it there…… 
213 AS24 
Min 
I had looked where I was going and 
the box hadn’t have been in such a 
dangerous place 
 
Mary 
If the box had been placed where it 
was supposed to be 
 
Another Worker 
Absent mindedness, not looking 
where Mary was going 
 
Mary 
My Grandson and I hadn’t been 
happily playing tennis together 
214 SP15 
Max 
Blank – not completed 
 
Not completed 
By removing the problem 
 
Mary 
Blank – not completed 
 
Bill The Supervisor 
 
215 AS19 
Max 
If I had not turned around, after 
leaving the swimming pool to 
acknowledge the cleaners remark 
about me in a no go area 
 
The Cleaner 
If I had on proper shoes in that area 
 
 
 
Not completed 
Water on the floor 
 
 
 
 
Not completed 
I should have been wearing 
suitable clothes in that area 
216 AS19 
Max 
If the spill was by the checkout and 
they are quite frequent then maybe all 
the checkouts should have wet floor 
sign, as it only takes a minute to put 
one out and then the cleaner could do 
the cleaning and then maybe 
…..Things could have been different 
 
The Company 
Because it is everyone’s responsibility 
to enforce health and safety so you 
should be aware of common problems 
in your work.  I think that all the 
checkouts should have warning signs 
to make other people aware of the 
situation 
 
The Company 
Lack of Health and Safety 
awareness by all staff as they 
were informed by a customer 
 
The Company 
I was watching what I was 
doing and I should have been 
made aware that the floor was 
wet with no warning sign. 
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217 SP15 
Max 
The supervisor had insisted the 
box was removed immediately or 
a good housekeeping regime was 
in place it would not be left there 
in the first place 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
By a proper housekeeping regime/not 
allowing boxes to be abandoned on the 
floor 
 
The company 
Inadequate safety policy or 
housekeeping and ignorance by 
management of previous 
accidents 
 
The Company 
 
218 AS20 
Min 
The person who had spilt the milk 
had informed someone – it could 
have been cleaned up very easily 
and I would not have hurt myself 
 
Mary 
By contacting a member of staff to 
clean the spillage or by Mary looking 
where she was walking 
 
Mary 
Laziness, who ever spilt the milk 
did not clean it up or tell anyone 
and Mary was not looking where 
she was going. 
 
None of these 
The bar that I hit my head on 
had been fixed after it had been 
reported on several occasions 
before.  Why did it have to wait 
for someone to have an accident 
before it got fixed? 
219 SP15 
Max 
The member of staff who had 
reported the box had acted to warn 
persons of tripping hazard, or 
clear it up himself or herself. 
 
Another Worker 
Training staff to make health and 
safety more their business and being 
participative 
 
The Company 
Staff Training 
 
The Store Manager 
 
220 SP16 
Min 
There had been a procedure for 
dealing with boxes, e.g. if empty 
the procedure would be to collapse 
box and place in cardboard 
recycling point 
If staff had been trained in safety 
ethos and safety needs met.  If 
management had instituted a 
better design/layout for the area in 
question to allow safe storage and 
pedestrian areas were marked out. 
The Company 
By implementing safe handling/storage 
procedure – set location for flattened 
boxes for recycling.  By ensuring staff 
receive H & S awareness training.  By 
ensuring pedestrian walkways were 
clearly determined with signage to 
indicate that walkways should be kept 
clear. 
 
The Store Manager 
 A lack of a safe system of 
work 
 A lack of defined walkway 
 A lack of signage and 
training supervision 
 
The Store Manager 
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221 SP16 
Min 
 
1. Mary had not agreed to cover 
for a friend on that day 
 
2. The box had not been left on 
the floor 
 
3. Mary had not gone for her 
break when she did – the box 
may not have been on the 
floor then. 
 
 
4. Bill the Supervisor 
 
1. The box not being left on the 
floor by 
 
2. Better staff training and 
awareness 
 
3. Better management 
check on housekeeping on shop floor 
 
 
 
The Store Manager 
 
 
 
Inadequate staff training and 
awareness and lack of supervision 
on the shop floor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Store Manager 
 
222 SP16 
Min 
They had done a more thorough 
risk assessment 
 
Safety Officer 
Not completed Likely a lapse in clearing a 
walkway following restocking of 
shelves or a delivery leaving a 
box in an unsuitable place. 
 
Could be any of these really:- 
Mary 
Bill the Supervisor 
The Store Manager 
Safety officer 
The Company 
Another Worker 
 
 Appendix 5 Respondents Completed Sentences 
 
Page | 891  
 
223 SP16 
Min 
The box had’nt been there and had 
been emptied and thrown away or 
stores in the appropriate place 
 
Bill The Supervisor 
Not completed Poor organisational controls over 
leaving boxes around when they 
should have been emptied and 
thrown away or stored in 
warehouse until needed on shop 
floor. 
 
The Store Manager 
 
224 SP16 
Min 
The Box had not been there 
 
Mary 
By the box not being there 
 
Mary 
A box in a position to cause an 
accident 
 
Mary 
 
225 SP15 
Min 
The box had not been left there in 
the first place, or even removed 
straight away when noticed, or 
Bill insisted the cleaner remove it 
 
The Company 
By not having the box there in the first 
place 
 
The Company 
The box left on the floor because 
Procedure not followed 
Poor supervision 
Lack of communication 
 
The Company 
 
226 SP16 
Min 
??Different size of the box was 
there she will be badly injured. 
If there was any other object such 
as shelf or tools or brush etc then 
she might be falling on them and 
cause major injury hurting her 
back or neck or any part of her 
body – especially she is an old 
female??? 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
Well housekeeping and proper 
arrangements of all items in the 
supermarket was main reason.  
Supervisor responsible about the area 
didn’t take risk assessment.  
Management as well must assume that 
all HSE Rules and Regs are applied 
 
The Store Manager 
Basic Cause – Inattention – 
carelessness by the manager, 
supervisor, cleaner to clear up 
access and egress.  No audits or 
safety inspections were done 
where the box was placed and not 
removed. 
 
The Company 
 
227 SP16 
Min 
The housekeeping was better 
 
The store manager 
By proper storage being a requirement 
 
The Store Manager 
The poor standard of 
housekeeping 
 
The Store Manger 
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228 SP16  
Min 
The staff at all levels in the store 
were aware of the seriousness of 
slip trip and fall hazards and the 
importance of good housekeeping 
 
The store manager 
By the staff being trained in good 
housekeeping practices and in safety 
awareness so that they would look out 
for their own safety and the safety of 
others 
 
Safety officer 
Poor housekeeping by the staff, 
poor supervision and 
management, lack of safety 
culture in the organisation, failure 
of duty of care by everyone 
 
The Company 
 
229 AS24 
Min 
There had been someone else 
there to help break down the 
delivery. Then the work load 
would have been easier or the 
boards weren’t over strained 
 
Incomplete 
Because the staff should not have left 
stuff on the floor. When staff are 
trained they are advised to work off 
trolleys so that neither customers nor 
themselves are hurt. 
 
Mary 
 
Another Worker 
Mary rushing to her break, not 
looking at where she was going, 
and the staff member was at fault 
for not clearing his department, 
leaving any stock or rubbish in 
customers’ way. 
 
Mary  
 
Another worker 
I had taken someone else with 
me to break down the delivery, 
which was about 8 – 9 boards. 
Because it was near Christmas 
they had stacked as high as they 
could.  Some were collapsing 
because they had been stacked 
badly. 
 
230 SP16 
Min 
The box had not been left there. 
 
Safety Officer 
Ensure that no boxes are left in the 
vicinity of the checkout 
 
The Store Manager 
Poor Housekeeping 
 
Safety Officer 
 
231 17AS 
Max 
 
I had not agreed to cover for my 
friend whilst she was on holiday, 
then I wouldn’t have been here as 
I never work on Thursdays 
 
Another Worker 
By the supervisor cleaning up the 
spillage when it was first reported, or 
at least putting a sign around the 
spillage if it could not have been 
mopped up straight away. 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
A milk bottle leaking 
 
The Company 
I was not in such a hurry 
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232 17 AS 
Max 
The wet floor sign had been put 
out( bill) or  
 
If only I’d been looking where I 
was going.  Mary 
1)Wet floor sign had been put out 
2)Spillage cleared up as soon as 
reported 
3)Floor checked regularly for spillages 
as it is a common occurrence. 
 
The Store Manager 
The spillage not being cleared up 
 
The cleaner 
We’d had a wet floor sign 
 
If only someone had told me the 
floor was wet 
233 17AS  
Max 
I had been looking where I was 
going 
 
Mary 
If Bill the Supervisor had instructed a 
cleaner to deal with the spillage as 
soon as it happened. 
 
Bill The Supervisor 
Lack of vigilance by store staff 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
We had installed a child safety 
barrier and kept a closer eye on 
her. 
234 SP11 
Min 
Preventative measures were taken 6 
months ago as to why people were 
injured in slipping accidents.  Why 
was there no measures taken when 
it was known spillages around the 
checkouts were common.  Why 
there wasn’t a safety sign or a staff 
member assigned to safeguard the 
area until such time it was cleaned 
up. 
 
The Company 
Preventative measures in place six 
months ago.  It was common for spills 
around the counter.  Elimination or 
control. 
 
The Company 
Carelessness – poor safety 
training. 
 
The Company 
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235 SP9 
Max 
She had gone on her break and not 
waited for her friend she may have 
paid more attention to her 
surroundings 
 
Mary 
If this area was attended more 
frequently by a cleaner 
 
The Store Manager 
Area not cleaned up quick 
enough. 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
 
236 SP9 
Max 
Slippy floor signs had been put in 
place until such time as the spill 
could be cleaned. 
 
Bill The Supervisor 
If proper procedures had been put in 
place.  To ensure that as soon as a spill 
occurred that it was cordoned off or 
protected in some way so as to prevent 
customers or staff from walking on or 
over the spill 
 
1) Safety Officer – Put in place the 
procedures 
1) The Company – Back up the 
procedures 
2) The Store Manager – Train and 
enforce, 
3) Bill The Supervisor – Train and 
monitor 
Down to lack of training and 
supervision – the spill should 
have been dealt with or made 
safe. 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
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237 SP9 
Max 
There had been greater emphasis put 
on the necessity to clean up the 
spillage and the cleaner had been 
more aware of the severity of the risk 
involved.  If only the accident book 
had been heeded and its results acted 
upon, this type of accident occurred 
quite frequently therefore a rigorous 
control system of prevention and 
action should have bee put in place 
 
The company 
Had there been better staff awareness 
and attention to safety.  Responsible 
staff e it at management level or not 
have a duty to ensure the safety of 
others 
 
Bill – The Supervisor 
A lack of care, obviously the spilt 
milk caused it, however, the way 
in which this very basic and 
controllable hazard was dealt with 
showed a lukewarm attitude to 
safety. 
 
Bill – The supervisor 
 
238 SP13 
Max 
The box had been moved (may not 
have tripped) 
 
Bill – the Supervisor 
Ensuring employees are given 
responsibility for ensuring boxes and 
other items are removed and that area 
around checkouts kept tidy by giving 
somebody this responsibility.  This 
would ensure it is done. 
 
Bill the Supervisor 
The Company 
The lack of a robust system for 
ensuring tripping hazards are 
dealt with after being identified or 
reported. 
 
The Company 
 
239 SP11 
Max 
The supervisor insisted on the 
spillage being wiped up 
immediately.  The supervisor 
should have placed a warning sign 
up around the spillage or warned 
his staff of the spillage 
 
Bill – The Supervisor 
By the spillage being cleaned up when 
it happened 
 
The cleaner 
The failure of he floor supervisor 
to get the spillage cleaned up, by 
not placing a warning sign around 
it and by failing to inform staff of 
the spillage 
 
Bill – The supervisor 
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240 SP11 
max 
Bill had ensured a hazard sign had 
been placed over the spillage 
immediately it was reported 
 
Bill – The supervisor 
By immediate action by the supervisor 
 
Bill – The supervisor 
A lack of correct immediate 
preventative action 
 
Bill – The Supervisor 
 
241 SP9 
Max 
We had a system for ensuring that 
checks are carried out to ensure 
walkways are cleaned and free of 
any hazard. 
 
Safety Officer 
By ensuring work areas are inspected 
at regular intervals and staff to be 
made aware of what needs to be done 
to rectify any problem areas 
 
Safety Officer 
‘Not completed’  
242 SP9 
Max 
Methods were in place (e.g. H & S 
awareness training) to ensure 
spillages were made safe/cleaned 
up immediately 
 
Safety Officer 
By processes being in place to:- 
 
-Ensure everyone (staff) is aware of 
risks of spillages. 
 
-Spillages treated with some urgency – 
to make safe or clear. 
 
-Training in health & safety, 
supervision and monitoring 
 
 
Safety Officer 
Lack of importance placed on the 
risks of injury from spillages 
 
 
The company 
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243 SP9 
Max 
The cleaner had treated it as a 
priority and Bill had erected 
warning signs. 
 
Bill – The supervisor 
By having warning signs readily 
available at the checkout 
 
The store Manager 
The substantial condition of the 
milk being on the floor, the basic 
contributory cause was not having 
adequate response to a liquid 
spillage.  Also the design of the 
milk containers may have been a 
factor. 
 
The Company 
 
244 SP10 
Min 
Someone within the organisation 
had arranged for the spillage to be 
cleaned up immediately. 
 
Another worker 
If staff followed safety advice and 
cleaned up spillages immediately 
 
Another worker 
Failure of someone within the 
organisation to identify and deal 
with the spillage. 
 
The store manager 
 
245 SP10 
Min 
Management failing had been 
better then Mary wouldn’t be in 
this situation.  Shop floor workers 
and supervisors should have 
spotted the milk before she slipped 
on it 
 
The store manager 
Better inspections of floor area by 
management/supervisors 
Better signage 
Better information/instruction and 
training 
 
 
The store manager 
As before 
 
The company 
 
246 SP11 
Max 
Bill the supervisor had actioned 
the report of spillage immediately 
and staff were more vigilant to 
slipping hazards, temporary 
warning signage could have been 
put in place until a cleaner could 
have attended the spillage site. 
 
Bill – The Supervisor 
If staff at the checkouts were more 
vigilant to spillages and the supervisor 
acted immediately the accident could 
have been prevented. 
 
The Company 
Due to poor information 
instruction and training by the 
employer 
 
The Company 
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247 SP11 
Max 
We had better communications 
between departments and more time 
to train part-time employees in basic 
health and safety awareness 
 
The Company 
Quicker response by a cleaner.  Use of 
portable caution sign put in place by 
bill as soon as he was aware of the 
hazard.  Better staff awareness & 
reporting of hazards 
 
The Company 
Failure to isolate a potential 
hazard once highlighted 
 
Bill – The supervisor 
 
248 SP9 
Max 
Bill had ensured that the spillage 
was cleaned up immediately 
 
Bill – The Supervisor 
If there was a procedure in place to 
make sure that spillages are dealt with 
immediately and the shop floor 
regularly inspected. 
 
The Company 
Not ensuring that the shop floor is 
kept clean at all times 
 
The Store Manager 
 
249 Man 6 
min 
I had insisted that the boxes were 
removed from the floor as soon as 
they were emptied 
 
Manager 
By “good housekeeping2 on the shop 
floor. Training shop floor workers to 
tidy up as they go and supervisor to be 
more aware of safety issues and 
hazards 
Supervisor  
Sloppy housekeeping on the shop 
floor 
 
Manager 
N/a 
250 Man 6 
min 
The box had not been left there. If 
only I had implemented stronger 
safety procedures. 
 
Manager 
By ensuring boxes are not left on shop 
floor 
 
Manager 
The box left on the shop floor 
 
manager 
N/a 
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251 AS 21 
max 
Not completed properly Not completed properly Not completed properly A trained person had looked at 
and identified the resulting 
muscle tear which leaked blood 
into the left foot. 
252 AS21 
max 
If it was only just one box why 
didn’t the supervisor pick it up 
himself straight away 
 
supervisor 
Again supervisor should of acted as 
soon as customer informed him about 
the box 
 
Supervisor 
The person who left the box on 
the floor 
 
Other worker 
The person who loaded the cage 
should have loaded correctly by 
putting heavy goods on the 
bottom and not on the top, 
which caused the cage to 
collapse 
253 AS 21 
max 
A trolley was used to lift the 
scanner 
Not completed properly 
Not completed properly Lifting a heavy scanner with a 
colleague from the ground to the 
back of my car 
Not completed properly 
I used the correct lifting 
equipment or calling for more 
help 
254 Man 6 
min 
We had someone with the sole 
function of keeping the place tidy 
 
Manager 
Not completed properly A box not in its proper place 
 
None 
N/a 
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255 
 
SP 13 
max 
The supermarket had a system in 
place to ensure boxes are removed 
from the shop floor immediately 
after use 
 
Employer 
By ensuring staff handling boxes had 
sufficient training supervision to be 
aware of potential hazards and to 
operate a safe system of work 
 
Manager 
Poor awareness of risk posed by 
box left on shop floor. Poor 
training and supervision 
 
Employer 
N/a 
256 
 
SP15 
max 
The warning sign had been put out 
and the company had adhered to a 
cleaning schedule and supervision 
had been done properly 
Bill 
Reference to a Company risk 
assessment should have revealed 
discarded boxes as a tripping hazard 
and highlighted controls to minimise 
the risk  
 
Bill 
Lack of supervision to ensure 
implementation of procedures , 
which are designed to prevent  
accidents  
 
Bill 
N/a 
257 SP 15 
max 
The box had been moved or if 
only Mary was watching where 
she was walking or removed the 
box from the shop floor herself 
 
Mary 
If she had picked up the box or moved 
the box to one side away from any 
problem of tripping 
 
Mary 
Insufficient movement of the box 
both by safety officer cleaner 
customer and Mary 
 
All  
N/a 
258 SP15 
max 
Walkways were kept clear of 
obstructions 
 
Manager 
Not answered  Box not removed 
 
Bill 
N/a 
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259 SP15 
max 
The box had been cleaned away or 
it should have been may be she 
would not have had this accident 
If only Mary had been watching 
where she was going 
 
Mary 
 
Not answered  Awareness on both parties . Each 
individual worker has a duty to be 
aware of risk or hazards and that 
includes Mary  
 
Another worker 
N/a 
260 SP9 
Max 
Action had been taken after the 4 
previous incidents than the present 
one could have been avoided 
 
Manager 
Action had been taken after the 4 
previous incidents than the present 
one could have been avoided 
 
Manager 
Management negligence 
 
Manager 
N/a 
261 AS23 
max 
The cleaner had come earlier and 
cleaned the mess 
 
Cleaner 
If the cleaner had come quicker the 
accident wouldn’t have happened 
 
Cleaner 
Nobody was standing next to the 
box, no sign, no back up from the 
floor supervisor, checkout 
manager, safety officer , cleaning 
company supervisor and cleaner 
Cleaner (you cannot say its one 
person 
The corridor had not been 
blocked with cages the corridor 
would have  been twice as wide 
as the cage and if the cage door 
had been secured properly at 
the store due to fault 
262 Man 7 
max 
Signs had been put out to make 
Mary aware of the box or the box 
had been moved straight away or 
the box had not been left there in 
the first place 
 
Bill 
Same as CFT That a  box had been left in a 
walk way 
 
Cleaner 
na 
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263 Man 6 
min 
The box had not been where is 
was. The member of staff who 
placed it there had been more 
aware , or had at least pointed out 
its position to others members of 
staff. 
 
Mary had been looking where she 
was going and was more aware 
Another worker /Mary 
Through better health and safety 
training . Better awareness  of staff 
 
Mary / Manager / Employer /. other 
worker 
Not enough information to 
answer 
Na 
264 Man 6 
min 
I had checked that the checkout 
floors were clear 
 
Other worker but also fits Mary 
and bill 
Good housekeeping, clear as you go. 
Supervisor workplace monitoring and 
inspection. Mary having reported box, 
co-worker not having left it there. 
Training in good housekeeping 
 
manager 
Poor housekeeping was the cause, 
with contributory factors such as 
inadequate monitoring of 
housekeeping in the workplace. 
 
Bill 
na 
265 As21 
max 
Bill the supervisor had moved the 
box himself or ensured it was 
moved immediately 
 
Bill 
By Bill insisting immediate action by 
cleaner or safety officer 
 
Bill/ Safety Officer/ Cleaner 
Neglect 
 
Bill 
More anti-slip material 
positioned in entrance together 
with notice warning wet surface 
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266 SP 9 
max 
The cleaner had attended as soon 
as he /she was asked and if not 
then Bill should have put a 
warning sign up immediately 
 
Bill  
As spilt milk is common in this area 
Bill should be aware of the need to 
ensure that the milk is cleared up as 
soon as possible and in the meantime 
the area cones off . there should also 
have been some follow up on the other 
slips that were shown in the book 
 
Safety Officer 
Staff not being vigilant in 
checking that milk had been spilt 
and then acting on this 
immediately and warning people 
in the area to take care. 
 
Bill 
N/a 
 
 
 
 
 
  
267 Sp 16 
MIN 
The box hadn’t been left on the 
floor Mary wouldn’t have tripped 
over  it 
Company 
By better supervision and training of 
all supermarket staff to ensure better 
housekeeping and tidiness within the 
store 
 
Company  
Poor housekeeping due to 
managements failure to ensure 
such tripping hazards are avoided 
 
Company  
N/a 
268 AS 24 
min 
I had noticed that box earlier  
I had not covered for my friend 
 
Mary and Safety Officer 
Not answered  ABC Supermarkets  
 
The Company 
Not answered 
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269 SP 12 
min 
Someone had realised some milk 
had been spilt and done something 
to clear it up. 
 
Another worker 
If the spillage had been cleared up / 
highlighted straightaway  
 
Another worker 
Not clearing up / highlighting the 
spillage 
 
Another worker 
N/a 
270 Man 6 
min 
I had ensured that the 
departmental manager had 
enforced store procedures and 
identified and arranged the 
obstruction to be removed before 
the event occurred 
 
Bill  
By ensuring that all staff at every level 
in the store are aware of such issues 
and even if it is not their responsibility 
to ensure the removal of boxes and 
cardboard from the shop floor 
 
Another worker 
 A lack of general awareness 
across the store about such issues 
and the exercising of authority at 
every level (particularly at lower 
level) to remove the box 
 
Another worker 
 
271 SP 11 
max 
There were lessons learnt from 
previous accidents and a system 
put in place for the clean up of 
spillages around the checkouts / 
around the supermarket 
 
Safety Officer 
By cleaning up immediately , warning 
of the danger. Preventing the slipping 
hazard in the first place regular 
reminders of hazards to staff 
 
Safety Officer 
There was no safety system in 
operation in the supermarket . 
lessons were not learnt from 
previous incidents 
 
Safety Officer 
N/a 
 
 
 
272 SP 13 
max 
There had been in place a positive 
view to all matters relating to 
safety from senior management to 
shop floor men 
Employer 
Proactive hazard spotting 
Risk assessment regime 
Training in to practice programme 
Visible management commitment  
 
Employer 
Lack of safety management 
system 
 
Employer 
N/a 
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273 SP 16 
min 
The box hadn’t been seen  
 
Employer 
By better organisation and 
housekeeping. Space to put things , 
instructions procedures. A safety 
culture 
 
Manager 
The b ox being on the floor and 
unexpected 
 
Bill 
N/a 
274 Man 7 
max 
The cleaner had removed the box 
when told , the accident may not 
have happened 
 
Cleaner 
By Bill the Supervisor ensuring that 
the till points are tidy and clear of 
boxes 
 
Bill 
Not answered N/a 
275 SP 13 
max 
The customer had reported the box 
to a checkout operator , it could 
have been moved immediately  
 
Bill 
By one of several people taking 
responsibility for moving the box 
including customers and staff 
 
Another worker  
Lack of appreciation of the 
significance of an apparently 
innocent hazard compounded by 
“its not my problem” 
 
None 
N/a 
276 SP 10 
min 
Safety signs were used to 
highlight the spilt milk and 
precautions were taken by Mary’s 
fellow staff to maintain safe 
access and egress 
 
Mary/ Bill/Manager/Safety 
Officer/ Employer 
By safety signs and staff informing 
cleaner of incidents 
 
Manager / Safety Officer 
Non-compliance by Staff with in-
store safety procedures , and with 
management in not enforcing 
such 
 
Safety officer 
N/a 
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277 AS 21 
min 
Not answered  Not answered Not answered Not answered I had realised the 
path way was icy as well as the 
road. 
278 AS24 
min 
Not completed properly Not completed properly Not completed properly If the lifting hoist was put away 
in its rightful place and not 
tucked behind a wall in the hall 
I wound not have tripped over 
the legs which stick out further 
than the rest of the hoist. 
279 AS 23 
max 
I did not have to cover for my 
friend this Thursday .  That box 
was not there on Wed and I dint 
know where it came from all of a 
sudden today. I could have picked 
it up and placed it elsewhere but it 
did not seem to pose a great 
danger as  it was only a foot high , 
but if I or the staff involved with it 
moved it before… 
 
Mary report to Bill report to 
Safety Officer 
If she reported the box to her 
supervisor to report to the Safety 
officer to remove it or going directly to 
see the Safety Officer. Even if she 
picked it up herself to put on a table in 
the staff room out of the way. 
 
Mary/ Bill/ Safety Officer 
Herself and other colleagues at 
work . Other workers who may 
have a relaxed attitude to taking 
the box to its destination and may 
think why should I move it as it is 
not my job and I did not put it 
there 
 
Mary / Other worker  
The young lady pushing the 
high stack of trays reduced the 
height of the stack before 
moving it across the floor into 
me. Plus it would have helped if 
she was looking to both sides 
when pushing.    
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280 AS 21 
max 
I had not been chatting to my 
friend I would have been more 
aware of the box on the floor 
although it should have been 
moved earlier 
 
Bill  
If the box had not been left on the floor 
, or at least moved sooner 
 
Cleaner 
The store did not carry out safety 
procedures quickly enough 
Manager 
The supermarket had checked 
the floor before I walked on it 
and slipped 
 
 
281 AS 21 
max 
All staff were made aware of 
possible dangers and were 
required to avoid / correct them as 
soon as they were noticed 
 
Employer 
If all staff were trained to be vigilant of 
possible causes of accidents and were 
instructed to draw attention to them as 
soon as observed 
 
Bill 
Sloppy working practices 
 
Manager 
I had looked where I was 
putting my feet 
 
 
 
282 AS 18 
min 
I was more aware and had noticed 
the spillage stay next to it and 
called for Bill (supervisor) to get 
cleaner to mop up 
Bill  
I was more aware and had noticed the 
spillage stay next to it ad called for 
Bill (supervisor) to get cleaner to mop 
up 
Bill 
Customer and staff awareness . 
One seen it should have been 
reported and not ignored 
 
Another worker 
I look more time and used more 
appropriate equipment 
283 AS18 
min 
I had looked where I was going  or 
whoever spilt the milk had 
ensured it was cleaned up 
 
Mary 
By Mary being more careful and the 
person who spilt the milk taking 
responsibility for cleaning it up 
 
Mary  
Whoever spilt the milk and didn’t 
get it cleaned up but also Mary 
for not seeing the milk 
 
Mary 
I had moved a little slower and 
more carefully 
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284 As 19 
max 
Bill the supervisor had warned 
staff or waited until the cleaner 
had arrived 
 
Bill 
if warnings were given or if the clean 
up had been quicker 
 
Bill 
The spilt milk not being cleaned 
up as soon as it was noticed or 
reported or warning signs told 
people 
 
#bill 
The cleaners had not soaked the 
floor with so much water. They 
had not put up warning signs in 
the aisle I was walking down 
and they should not do this type 
of cleaning when customers are 
in the store  
285 AS21 
max 
The cleaner did his/.her job 
properly 
 
Cleaner 
If the cleaner had gone and moved the 
box when asked Mary would not have 
tripped as there have been  6 
accidents maybe they need a new 
cleaner 
 
Cleaner 
Tripping over a box that the 
cleaner should have moved 
 
Cleaner 
I had walked on the pavement 
and not on the grass 
 
  
286 AS21 
max 
Someone had moved the box 
 
Bill / Manager / Employer Cleaner 
Due to past accidents management 
should have doubled checked if the 
box was moved or warning signs put 
up. 
 
Bill / employer / cleaner 
Neglect on stores health and 
safety rules. Shop is very 
hazardous. 
 
Manager / Employer 
Whoever dropped box was too 
lazy to pick it up and could 
have been a worse injury than it 
was 
 
Not completed properly  
287 AS 19 
max 
I had not come in to cover my 
friends shift 
 
Mary 
If the cleaner had cleared the milk up 
sooner or even if someone had just 
put up a warning sign or if I had paid 
more attention , or not gone on my 
break then.  
 
Cleaner 
The fact that nobody had actively 
done anything to worn people 
about the spilt milk 
 
Bill 
I had not gone home by that bus 
or if I had not used that bus stop 
… or if the driver had been 
going a bit faster /slower or if I 
had been hit at a slightly 
different angle , or if I had not 
crossed the road then or if 
nobody had been around , or if 
it had not been raining  
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288 AS19 
max 
I didn’t cover for my friend on 
Thursday 
 
Mary 
The cleaner had acted immediately / 
signs 
 
Cleaner 
Lack of cleaning and action of 
manager 
 
Bill Manager Cleaner 
Not completed 
 
 
289 As 19 
max 
The milk had been mopped up as 
soon as it was spilt  
 
Cleaner 
If the cleaner had mopped it up when 
asked by the supervisor and if Bill 
had made sure it had been done 
 
Cleaner 
The fact that the floor was 
slippery due to the milk that had 
been spilt on it. 
 
Customer 
Not completed 
290 AS 23 
max 
There was more than one cleaner; 
we had gone on our break earlier 
therefore missing the box due to it 
not being there. I hadn’t covered 
for my friends shift on the 
Thursday 
Cleaner 
Better organisation generally within 
the store, people checking the 
accident book and highlighting any 
problem areas 
Employer 
Carelessness on the shops behalf 
(including managers , supervisors 
etc) , My (Mary’s) fault for not 
paying enough attention 
 
Employer 
Certain things out of my control 
hadn’t happened  
291 AS22 
min 
I had seen the box on the floor, 
someone had not left the box 
there. If only someone had picked 
it up before I arrived at work. 
If only I had not been able to work 
this extra shift 
Mary 
Staff training about the dangers of 
leaving things on the floor 
 
Employer 
Staff assuming it was other 
peoples responsibility to pick up 
the box . lack on companies 
behalf , not communicating 
danger /risk assessment 
 
Employer 
The company had replaced the 
torn floor covering when first 
reported 5 months earlier, the 
EHO had forced the company 
to take action, the company 
thought more about the safety 
and welfare of its staff and less 
about cutting costs 
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292 AS 24 
Min 
I would have watched where I was 
going and the person who left the 
box lying around put it away 
 
Mary 
Paying more attention 
 
Mary 
Not paying attention to health and 
safety at work 
 
Mary 
blank 
293 As24 
min 
Not answered Not answered Not answered A small piece of wood 
dislodges itself from my load 
which was visible in the mirror. 
I parked the lorry where 
convenient to do so , then 
climbed up to reposition it 
when I tripped on one of the 
straps securing my load. If the 
small piece of wood had not 
come adrift 
294 AS23 
max 
Bill had moved the box as soon as 
reported to him 
 
Bill 
By the area around the checkouts being 
clear 
 
Manager 
Another member of staff leaving 
a box where  it shouldn’t have 
been left 
 
Another worker 
The pallet of items had not been 
left in the wrong place 
295 AS23 
Max 
Not completed Not completed  Not completed There was not so much rubbish 
about , this is the third time I 
have had a fall , because of all 
the mess and both times I have 
broken or cracked bones, and I 
do take care since the first time 
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296 AS23 
max 
Some idiot had not put the box 
there in the first place. 
 
Another  worker 
If the box had been put in the correct 
place , or dealt with immediately, 
 
Another worker 
The box left in the wrong place 
and not being dealt with  
 
Another worker 
Someone had not removed the 
lower section of the vegetable 
rack , the base arm would not 
have been exposed for me to 
trip over, having still had access 
to the upper level to select veg. 
297 AS 23 
max 
In order of importance 
1. The store manager had 
instituted a policy of keeping the 
whole store constantly tidy and 
checked that his various junior 
managers applied the policy. 
2. the supervisor had learned from 
past accidents and been more 
vigorous in getting obstructions 
removed - even to the extent of 
doing it himself if other priorities 
precluded the cleaner doing it 
immediately. 
   
In order of importance 
1. The store manager had instituted a 
policy of keeping the whole store 
constantly tidy and checked that his 
various junior managers applied the 
policy. 
2. The supervisor had learned from 
past accidents and been more vigorous 
in getting obstructions removed - even 
to the extent of doing it himself if other 
priorities precluded the cleaner doing it 
immediately. 
Poor management Not completed 
298 As 23 
max 
The manager of the store listened 
to customers and had the cleaner 
do his/her job and clear rubbish 
which should not have been there 
and looked in the accident book to 
see how many previous accidents 
there were 
 
Manager  
If there were more awareness on the 
shop floor. and a better housekeeping 
standard 
 
Safety officer 
Failure to  put into practice 
housekeeping :- the manager of 
the store who had several 
complaints from customers plus 
previous accidents of same nature 
 
Store manager 
The rubber mat were laid 
together with another mat 
correctly 
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299 AS23 
max 
Not answered correctly   Not answered correctly Not answered correctly They had washed the floor 
earlier or they had put up 
notices stating the floor was wet 
300 As 20 
min 
The milk had been cleaned up at 
once 
 
Cleaner 
If the milk had been reported and 
cleaned up 
 
Bill 
The cleaner 
 
Cleaner 
The spill had been cleaned up at 
once and a sign put there 
301 AS20 
min 
The person who spilt the milk had 
put a danger sign on the floor 
 
Employer 
If all the staff were trained to look for 
hazards at all times 
 
Employer 
Nobody took responsibility for 
alerting the hazard of spilt milk 
 
All 
The person who left a wet floor 
unattended had thought about 
other people’s safety  
302 AS 20 
min 
Someone had cleaned it up and 
put a sign there or , if only I had 
cleared it up or stepped over it 
 
Cleaner . other worker 
By whoever spilt the milk should have 
cleaned it up straight away 
 
Another worker / cleaner 
Not looking where I was going 
and if I had seen it I should have 
clean it up 
 
Mary / other  
By moving / lifting equipment 
carefully 
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303 AS20 
min 
The milk was cleared up straight 
away and a hazard sign put in 
place I would not have slipped 
 
Bill/manager/cleaner 
If it had been cleaned up straightaway 
and signs put in place 
 
Cleaner 
Down to training of staff and 
putting health and safety first 
 
Manager 
The person who spilt the cream 
cleaned it up straight away and 
put a hazard sign in place I 
would not have fallen 
304 AS19 
max 
Not completed properly Not completed properly Not completed properly There had been a security guard 
around , perhaps my colleagues 
and myself would not be in the 
situation we were in  
305 AS 21 
max 
The box had not been left at scene 
in the first place and removed 
when first noticed 
 
Bill 
By staff being trained in safety issues 
and enforced by store 
 
Safety officer 
The box being left where it was 
 
Bill 
Not completed 
306 AS23 
max 
I was concentrating instead of 
waiting for other check out 
operator then I wouldn’t have 
been distracted 
 
Mary 
The box should have been cleared 
away immediately  
 
Cleaner 
The person who left the box there 
 
Another worker 
I had looked more closely the 
vehicle would not have hit me . 
it was entirely my fault 
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307 As 22 
min 
I hadn’t decided to go for a fag 
 
Mary 
If she had been a non-smoker 
 
Mary  
In a hurry to light up 
 
Mary 
I had not come to work today 
308 As19 
max 
The supervisor had arranged for 
warning signs to have been put 
around the spilt milk immediately 
he heard from the customer 
 
Bill 
If she had noticed the spilt milk if there 
were warning signs 
 
Mary 
The fact that spilt milk had been 
left on the floor without any signs  
 
Bill 
I had not attempted to carry too 
many objects when going out of 
the door which had a hinge 
which caused it to close on me 
309 AS17 
max 
I had seen the milk before slipping 
. if only it had been cleaned up 
earlier by someone 
 
Bill 
By the spillage being cleaned up 
immediately –not waiting for a 
“cleaner”. Anyone can pick up and 
clean a spillage 
 
Bill 
Failure of the person who spilt the 
milk to clean it up straight away – 
if it was a customer and they 
reported it then it was the failure 
of the manager who it was 
reported to clear it up 
 
Bill 
I had seen the spillage ( it was a 
clear liquid from the trifle) I 
would have cleaned it up and I 
would not have slipped 
310 AS 18 
min 
Bill the supervisor had made sure 
the spillage was cleaned up as 
soon as it happened the accident 
would not have happened 
 
Bill 
Bill the supervisor had made sure the 
spillage was cleaned up as soon as it 
happened the accident would not have 
happened 
 
Bill 
The milk not being spotted earlier 
 
Bill 
Not completed 
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311 As 20 
min 
I’d had time to watch where is was 
going I may have seen the milk 
 
Mary 
If she’d noticed the milk , if any other 
staff member / customer had noticed 
it and reported it 
 
Mary 
Whoever spilt the milk and did 
not report it / mark it for others to 
see 
 
Another worker  
It wasn’t a back strain and 
someone had found me earlier. 
The 1
st
 aiders had not moved 
me and mainly that I hadn’t 
fallen at all 
312 Man 1 
max 
A warning sign was put out by bill 
until the cleaner got to the spillage 
to clean it 
 
Bill 
A warning sign was put up. This area 
is checked regularly as it has a history 
of spillages 
This area becomes a priority area for 
the cleaner 
Manager 
This situation was not dealt with 
quickly enough 
 
Bill 
N/a 
313 Man 1 
max 
A warning sign had been placed 
by the spill if it could not be 
cleared up straight away 
 
Bill 
If the person responsible for the spill 
had reported it to a member of staff 
and that member of staff had placed a 
warning at the scene and then cleared 
it up 
 
Bill 
Staff should have been made 
aware of dealing with (placing 
warning) incident immediately 
 
Safety officer  
N/a 
314 Man 1 
max 
The warning signs were put out 
 
Bill 
Warning signs 
Bill 
Not putting the signs out 
 
Bill 
N/a 
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315 Man 1 
max 
 This area had carpet laid 
 It had supervised the cleaner 
correctly and got this 
problem resolved 
immediately 
 This problem was managed 
properly 
 Bill/manager/safety 
officer/employer/ 
another/cleaner  
Because the person spilling the milk 
should have responded immediately 
and used signs provided by the 
company that should have been there  
- the person who dropped the milk 
could have used them 
 
Bill/manager/safety officer/ employer/ 
another/ cleaner 
Incompetence 
 
Bill/ manager/ safety officer 
N/a 
316 Man 1 
max 
They had cleaned the spilt milk 
immediately 
 
Manager 
If the spillage had been cleaned 
immediately 
 
Manager 
Not responding quick enough to 
spillage 
 
Manager 
N/a 
317 Man 1 
max 
Bill had put warning signs out 
immediately and stood b y the 
spillage until dealt with. 
The milk had not been spilt in the 
first place 
 
bill 
If she had been more aware. We have 
developed a nanny state with 
monetary compensation for 
carelessness 
Mary 
Milk spillage N/a 
318 Man 1 
max 
Bill had ensured the cleaner had 
gone to mop it up or taken 
responsibility himself and had at 
least put some paper towels down 
 
Bill 
Not completed The cleaner not responding quick 
enough and bill not ensuring that 
it had been followed up 
 
Bill 
N/a 
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319 Man 1 
max 
The cleaner had cleaned the milk 
up straight  away 
 
Cleaner 
1. warning signs could have been put 
out 
2. the milk could have been cleaned 
up earlier 
bill 
Slow reaction of staff on duty to 
deal with the incident 
 
Bill 
N/a 
320 Man 1 
max 
Bill had put warning signs up at the 
time the customer had reported it 
 
Bill 
Warning signs should have been put 
up immediately and a member of staff 
should have overseen the clean up 
 
cleaner 
Insufficient communication 
between staff 
 
Bill 
N/a 
321 Man 1 
max 
The cleaner had removed the 
spillage or if bill had put up 
warning signs this may not have 
happened 
 
Bill 
If bill had acted with more authority 
 
Bill 
Due to the spill not being cleared, 
no warning signs being put up 
and Mary not looking where she 
was going 
 
Mary 
N/a 
322 Man 1 
max 
Warning signs had been put out 
 
Bill 
Not completed Milk not being cleaned up right 
away 
 
Cleaner 
N/a 
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323 Man 1 
max 
Bill has put clear warning signs 
around the spillage when it was 
first reported to him.  
 
Bill 
If clear warning signs informing 
people had been put around the 
spillage therefore making people 
aware until the cleaner could clean up 
the mess 
 
Bill 
Procedures in place for this 
situation were inadequate. Risk 
assessments must be completed 
and monitored regularly, training 
needs to be looked at 
 
Manager / safety officer 
N/a 
324 Man 1 
max 
The cleaner had acted more 
promptly  
Bill had put up warning signs  
Standard procedures had been 
applied or existed 
 
Bill/ manager/ safety / employer 
/cleaner 
The cleaner had acted more promptly  
Bill had put up warning signs  
Standard procedures had been applied 
or existed 
 
Bill/ manager/ safety / employer 
/cleaner 
Negligence and lack of 
procedures 
N/a 
325 Man 1 
max 
Bill had immediately placed 
warning signs and remained at the 
site until the cleaner had arrived 
 
bill 
By better reaction and protocols to 
guide the floor supervisor 
 
Bill 
Inappropriate action by bill 
 
Bill 
N/a 
326 Man 1 
max 
I hadn’t come in on Thursday to 
cover 
 
Mary 
If the cleaner had responded straight 
away or bill had put a sign up 
 
Cleaner 
Safety procedures not applied 
immediately 
 
Manager 
N/a 
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327 Man 2 
min 
The person spilling the milk had 
mopped up the spillage or arranged 
for it to be cleaned and the yellow 
spillage /wet floor signs displayed. 
 
If only the floor supervisor had 
procedures in place for dealing 
with spillages that his staff were 
aware of! 
 
Bill / cleaner 
By an appointed /designated cleaner or 
floor staff to clear up all spillages and 
display the appropriate hazard signs 
 
Bill/manager/safety/another/cleaner 
The wet slippery floor caused by 
spilt milk 
 
Bill/ manger/safety/another/cleaner 
N/a 
328 Man 6 
min 
The boxes had been cleared out of 
the way . 
 
Safety officer  
If the person who had left the boxes on 
the floor had moved them out of the 
way 
Bill 
Not clearing away empty boxes 
 
Bill 
N/a 
329 Man 6 
min 
All the shelves / freezers could be 
refilled overnight or early morning 
it would drastically reduce the 
possibility of such accidents 
 
Employer 
If the store was refilled with goods 
when the store was closed staff would 
then be more aware of boxes around 
the store and take more care whilst 
walking around 
 
Employer 
Another staff member leaving the 
box instead of flattening and 
disposing of it 
 
Another worker 
N/a 
330 Man 6 
Min 
That box\ hadn’t been there Mary 
wouldn’t have had an accident 
 
None 
By box storage /placement being better 
managed 
 
Manager 
Due to a box being left in a 
walkway by an unknown person 
and not being spotted as a hazard to 
be removed by staff 
 
Employer 
N/a 
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331 AS24  
min 
Not completed properly Not completed properly Not completed properly If knew I was falling I would 
have tried to save myself. 
332 As24 
min 
I had done my normal day at work 
and hadn’t covered for my friend 
 
Mary  
If whoever left the box in an 
apparently dangerous position had 
been more thoughtful as to what they 
were doing 
 
Another worker 
The member of staff who placed 
the box in a dangerous position and 
caused by the lack of advice on 
doing this being given by a 
supervisor 
 
manager 
The person causing the accident 
had been more careful, which 
would have come from being 
suitably advised as to the need 
for care. 
333 AS19 
max 
I had been looking where I was 
going and not talking to my friend I 
would have seen the spillage on the 
floor 
 
Bill 
If the milk had been cleared up 
immediately or a warning notice had 
been put in place 
 
Bill 
The spillage on the floor 
 
bill 
The fitments had been further 
apart in the store I would not 
have tripped up . 
 
If I had stayed at home 
334 As17 
max 
Warning signs had been put up 
immediately. cleaner had been 
more available , or supervisor 
covered overspill until cleaner 
arrived 
 
bill 
Bill the supervisor taking immediate 
action – could have cleaned the spill or 
put up signs in the time taken to call 
for the cleaner 
 
Bill 
The milk 
 
None 
Not completed 
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335 AS23 
max 
Bill had put out a warning sign I 
would have seen the box , but if the 
cleaner hadn’t left something so 
dangerous unattended 
 
Bill / cleaner 
If the cleaner had at least looked at the 
box to see the danger. If bill had put up 
a warning notice. If the area around the 
checkouts is always messy then the 
health and safety officer has a lot to 
answer for 
 
Safety officer 
Negligence 
 
Safety officer 
The rubbish bags I fell over 
should not  have been left 
blocking the path and as I am 
forbidden to move rubbish bags 
due to health and safety 
regulations I should not have 
attempted to deliver the mail 
336 AS 19 
max  
Not completed Not completed Not completed Not completed 
337 As 17 
max 
I had not worked on that day  
 
Mary 
If the cleaner had cleaned up the spill, 
if bill had made sure she had and if 
Mary had been more careful 
 
Cleaner 
She slipped on milk which should 
have been cleaned up 
 
Bill 
It had not been raining outside 
the floor had not been smooth 
wood laminate and I had not 
been wearing leather soles 
338 AS18 
min 
I hadn’t offered to cover my friend 
who was on holiday, this would not 
have happened 
 
Mary  
Had the spillage been clearly marked 
or cleaned up 
 
Bill 
Someone spilling the milk and not 
reporting it to a member of staff 
 
Bill 
The other member of staff been 
more careful whilst sorting out 
the lengths of wood. 
 Appendix 5 Respondents Completed Sentences 
 
Page | 922  
 
339 Man 6 
min 
The box had not been left in an 
area where it caused a possible 
hazard 
 
Bill 
By all of the shop staff and their 
supervisors being more vigilant and 
ensuring there was clear access ways 
to all areas and rubbish was disposed 
of quikley and properly 
 
Bill 
Negligence on behalf of whoever 
left the box where it would cause a 
risk to someone 
 
Bill 
N/a 
340 Man 5 
max 
There was a policy for all empty 
boxes to be flat packed and put in 
appropriate storage area as soon as 
that are emptied. 
 
All walk ways should be clear of 
debris 
 
If Mary had not been talking to her 
friend she may have noticed the 
box  
 
manager 
By having adequate health and safety 
policies and ensuring staff adhere to 
them 
 
Safety officer 
 
An object sitting /cluttering a 
walkway 
 
Another worker 
N/a 
341 Man 5 
max 
I had paid more attention to past 
accidents I could have 
implemented new guidelines 
 
Manager 
If I had implemented new guidelines 
and procedures after the first accident 
 
Manager 
Not having the right guidelines and 
procedures in place 
 
Manager 
N/a 
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342 Man 5 
max 
The area round the checkout had 
been kept tidy . 
 
If only bill had ensured that the 
cleaner had either cleared 
 
Bill up or marked the area as 
dangerous 
bill 
The checkout area and other areas are 
constantly kept tidy and clear of any 
obstruction . also the cleaner must be 
aware of this 
 
Safety officer 
Lack of diligence by staff with 
regard to keeping aisles clean and 
tidy 
 
Manager 
N/a 
 
 
  
343 Man5 
max 
The staff had been doing their jobs 
correctly 
 
Bill 
The box should not have been there. It 
could not put itself there, so somebody 
did wrong putting and leaving it there. 
It should have been removed as soon 
as it was spotted. 
None 
Carelessness 
 
None 
N/a 
344 Man 5 
max 
I had been more insistent on the 
area being kept tidy and bill had 
stayed by the box until the cleaner 
removed it 
 
Manager 
Better housekeeping 
 
Manager 
Slack management ignoring the 
risk 
 
Manager 
N/a 
 Appendix 5 Respondents Completed Sentences 
 
Page | 924  
 
345 Man 5 
max 
The cleaner would have done as he 
was told and cleaned up the box 
this could have been prevented 
 
Also  
If only we would have acted in a 
proactive way instead of reactive 
this accident could have been 
prevented 
Bill 
If the cleaner would have cleared up 
the box and if we would have 
investigated the previous near misses 
 
Bill 
Not following up to ensure the 
cleaner removed the box and for 
the manager on duty not clearing 
up the box when he was notified. 
 
Bill 
N/a 
346 Man 5 
max 
I had acted more positively to the 
earlier accidents 
 
Manager 
By accident investigation and proper 
investigation and remedial action.  
 
Manager  
Failure to learn from experience 
 
Manager 
N/a 
347 Man 5 
max 
We had kept the area round the 
checkouts tidy 
 
Manager 
If the area round the checkouts was 
kept tidy 
 
Bill 
The fact that the area round the 
checkouts was not kept tidy 
 
Manager 
N/a 
348 Man 5 
max 
Staff were trained correctly and 
fully understand that everyone is 
responsible for health and safety 
 
manager  
Box should never of been left on the 
floor and if so billy had it reported to 
him but ignored follow up , billy 
should of picked it up himself instead 
of given it to the cleaner, and all staff 
being trained on health and safety 
 
Manager  
Lack of training on health and 
safety. 
 
Manager 
N/a 
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349 Man 5 
max 
Bill had taken immediate action 
himself if he knew the cleaner was 
elsewhere or even when if  went to 
assess the situation before finding 
the cleaner 
 
bill  
Not completed That knowing boxes were a 
problem on one had either the 
responsibility or initiative to tidy 
them up. As store manger I 
should have a) given someone 
responsibility b) ensure that other 
staff also take the initiative 
 
Manager 
N/a 
350 Man 5 
max 
Bill had responded to the 
customers report by dealing with 
the “hazard” himself or ensured 
that “warning signs” had been 
displayed as appropriate  
 
If only there was a store policy 
about clearing untidy areas on a 
regular basis 
 
Bill 
If there had been regular checks of 
untidy areas and raising staff 
awareness of potential hazards 
 
Manager 
Poor or no safety procedures to 
deal with known hazardous areas 
 
Safety officer 
N/a 
351 Man 5 
max 
She had looked where she was 
going 
 
Mary 
If the b ox had been picked up 
 
Bill 
Untidy work place 
 
Manager 
N/a 
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352 Man 5 
max 
I had put a warning sign in position 
as soon as the box was reported or I 
had moved the box myself 
 
Bill 
By an immediate reaction to the 
customer reporting the box 
 
Bill 
Lack of a good safety regime and 
slow response to a reported 
hazard 
 
Manager 
N/a 
353 Man 5 
max 
We had established safety policy 
regarding leaving of boxes 
unattended in walkways 
 
manager 
By having the aforementioned safety 
policy in place together with a proper 
mechanism for ensuring its compliance 
 
Manager 
In failing to have monitored 
safety policy in place 
 
Manager  
N/a 
354 Man 7 
max 
The box had been removed sooner 
 
Cleaner 
By checking the floor for hazards 
 
Employer 
The floor was not kept clear of 
hazards 
 
Safety officer 
N/a 
355 Man 
1max 
Someone was specifically in charge 
for dealing with all potential 
accidents ie spillages then perhaps 
an accident could be prevented 
before it has the chance to occur 
 
None   
As soon as the spillage has been 
noticed ( in this instance the customer) 
a member of staff could be stood there 
to warn customers until the spillage is 
cleaned up 
 
none 
She could have been looking 
where she was going. All 
individuals are responsible for 
themselves (its common sence) 
but at the same time as a retail 
outlet you must always do your 
best to minimise potential hazards 
 
Mary 
N/a 
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356 Man 1 
max 
A cleaner was positioned nearer to 
the incident and more importantly , 
bearing in mind the previous 
frequency of incidents of spillage 
in the check out area that cones had 
not been more readily available in 
order to divert potential hazards 
away 
 
employer 
By proper attention to the hazard and 
prevention measures taken to isolate 
the affected area 
 
Bill 
Initially a spillage but due to the 
lack of forward thinking,  
negligence was the cause 
 
Employer 
N/a 
357 Man5 
max 
The previously reported incidents 
had been acted on and preventative 
action taken 
 
Manager 
If I had ensured that after the 
previously reported incident the area 
was checked regularly and 
responsibility given to bill to ensure it 
was kept clear at all times 
 
bill 
The irresponsible person who 
placed the box in such a way as to 
cause an accident 
 
another 
N/a 
358 AS 20 
min 
The person who spilt the milk had 
cleared up or reported it so others 
could clean it up 
 
Mary had kept her eyes open for 
dangerous situations she could 
have avoided the accident 
 
Another / mary 
1. by cleaning up the spilt milk 
immediately the milk would not 
have been there to slip up on. 
2. other worker could have taken the 
responsibility to clean up 
3. Mary should have been aware of a 
potentially dangerous situation 
 
Another / mary 
Failure of somebody to accept 
responsibility to clean up the spilt 
milk when it happened 
 
another 
I had checked the area for 
potential danger before the 
accident 
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359 man 
5max 
The box had been tidied away 
immediately 
 
Bill 
1.tidying the box away immediately 
better tidiness in the check out area 
training awareness to deal with above 
bill/manager 
Poor tidiness due to poor 
procedures and training 
 
Manager 
N/a 
360 As 19 
max 
 
 
The person who had spilt the milk 
had reported it and it had been 
cleaned sooner the accident could 
have been prevented 
 
Not completed 
If a member of staff had stayed at the 
site of the spilt milk to warn people 
until it was cleaned up 
 
bill 
Failure among all  parties (except 
Mary) to recognise with speed the 
importance of the results that an 
accident of this nature could have 
caused 
 
Bill/manager/safety officer/ 
cleaner 
I too slipped on an unknown 
substance in a supermarket. In 
the 15 minutes that elapsed 
between my witnessing the 
event and slipping on the floor, 
nothing had been done. The 
shop staff had put a large piece 
of cardboard over the spill, 
although nobody actually 
realised that putting cardboard 
on a patch of oil is not really 
effective . no warning signs 
were placed.  
361 As 20 
min 
The person who spilt the custard on 
the floor had cleaned it up properly 
 
Manager  
If the person who spilt the custard had 
cleaned the floor and taken 
appropriate action to warn colleagues 
the floor was wet 
manager 
The spilt custard 
 
Another worker 
The person responsible for 
spilling the custard had cleaned 
it up properly 
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362 As24 
min 
Not completed properly Not completed properly Not completed properly I had avoided the pallets and 
unattended pump truck which 
should not have been left there 
and I had gone round the pallets 
the other way 
363 SP 15 
max 
The shop floor supervisor had 
picked up the box when the 
customer had reported it , he could 
have (a shown a positive attitude to 
the customer and b) the accident 
would not have happened c) he 
could have asked the cleaner to be 
vigilant at the same time leading  
by example 
Bill 
If a culture involving all staff 
operating a clean as you go system  
was incorporated into the daily safety 
routine 
 
Employer 
The failure on the part of the 
organisation to establish a holistic 
safety culture 
 
Employer 
N/a 
364 SP15 
max 
The cleaner had moved the box to a 
safe place immediately 
 
Cleaner 
If the box had been moved to make 
safe 
 
Cleaner 
Failure of the cleaner to act 
immediately to advice 
 
Cleaner 
N/a 
365 SP 15 
max 
I had looked where I was going 
 
Mary 
Better communication 
 
Bill 
Lack of communication , nobody 
taking responsibility for removing 
the box 
 
Bill 
N/a 
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366 SP14 
min 
Someone had thought to  move the 
box out of the traffic route and 
mary was watching where she was 
walking 
 
Employer  
By staff thinking about safety hazards 
and doing something about it when 
they see it and removing box from 
traffic route 
 
employer 
That there is not a safety culture 
in the businesses  
 
Employer 
N/a 
367 SP 14 
min  
The box hadn’t been placed there 
and if only Mary had paid more 
attention 
 
bill 
If the box hadn’t been placed there 
and if mary had been concentrating 
better 
 
Bill 
A lack of safety awareness 
 
Employer 
N/a 
368 SP 14 
Min 
Housekeeping standards had been 
better 
 
Employer 
By ensuring empty boxes are 
promptly removed to an appropriate 
place 
 
Employer 
 
Poor housekeeping 
 
Employer 
N/a 
369 SP 14 
min 
The person using the box 
previously had emptied it or not 
left it in such a hazardous position 
then the accident would not have 
occurred 
 
Another worker 
Better housekeeping 
 
Another worker 
Inadequate awareness and poor 
housekeeping and lack of 
supervision and reinforcement of 
supervision 
 
Safety officer 
N/a 
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370 SP 14 
min 
General housekeeping round the 
store had been better 
 
Manager 
If general housekeeping about the 
store had been better – boxes would 
have been moved out of pedestrian 
areas 
 
Manager 
Poor housekeeping about the 
store – constant supervision 
required to keep pedestrian areas 
clear 
 
Manager 
N/a 
371 SP 14 
min 
Someone had picked up the box 
 
Employer 
Better housekeeping 
 
employer 
A possible breakdown in 
housekeeping procedures leading 
to severe consequences for Mary 
 
Employer 
N/a 
372 SP14 
min 
Someone had not left the box there 
 
Mary 
If the box had been moved/positioned 
correctly. if staff had been correctly 
trained ( if it had been left in an 
incorrect place / manner) . if a 
supervisor had identified the problem 
and done something about it. 
Safety officer 
A lack of training, supervision 
and or instruction of staff in the 
correct storage /removal of boxes 
 
Safety officer 
N/a 
373 SP 14 
min 
We had better housekeeping 
 
Manager 
1. better housekeeping procedures 
2. better enforcement of procedures 
3. training, awareness and 
competence 
Manager 
Poor housekeeping 
Carelessness of Mary 
 
manager 
N/a 
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374 SP14 
min 
People would put things away 
properly in the right place 
 
Safety officer 
If section 7 HSW act had been 
observed 
 
Manager 
The box was in a position that 
was not normally in that location. 
Had the box been stored correctly 
this would not have caused the 
accident 
 
Safety officer 
N/a 
375 SP 13 
max 
I had supervised the cleaner and 
ensured that the box was cleared 
straight away 
 
Bill 
Not sure  Poor housekeeping within the 
store. 
 
manager 
N/a 
376 Man 4 
min 
The cashier by the spillage had 
reported it 
 
Another worker 
Staff training on how to react to spills 
 
Manager 
Staff ignoring the spill 
 
None 
N/a 
377 Man 4 
min 
The milk spillage had been 
immediately cleaned up and/or area 
cordoned off to prevent an accident 
until it was cleaned up 
 
Another worker / cleaner 
By urgent cleaning up milk spillage 
after it had occurred or cordoning off 
area until action had been taken 
 
Another worker/ cleaner 
Either the customer or shop 
employee who witnessed the 
spillage not undertaking urgent 
action 
 
Another worker /cleaner 
N/a 
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378 Man 4 
min 
The person who spilt the milk had 
notified someone so that the milk 
could have been cleaned up or a 
danger sign put out 
 
None 
By a danger sign being placed over 
the milk 
 
Another  worker/ cleaner/customer 
The milk being left on the floor 
after it was spilt 
 
Bill 
N/a 
379 Man 4 
min 
General hygiene had been better 
 
Manager 
By following good hygiene / cleaning 
practice 
 
Manager 
As before poor hygiene 
/cleanliness 
 
Manager 
N/a 
380 Man 4 
min 
The milk  had been cleared up as 
soon as it was spilt or marked as 
spilt 
 
Bill 
Mary being more aware of the 
spillage or prompt cleaning of the 
milk 
 
Bill 
The milk being spilt and not 
being cleaned up or marked 
quickly 
 
bill 
N/a 
381 Man 3 
max 
I had cleaned up the spilt milk asap 
 
Manager 
Put sign up to warn people 
 
Cleaner 
Negligence from the shop floor 
supervisor for not supervising the 
clean up of the spilt milk 
 
bill 
N/a 
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382 Man 4 
min 
Marys friend had not gone on 
holiday. Mary was to busy to work 
an extra day  
The milk had been cleared away 
quickly 
 
Manager 
With the spilt milk clearly notified 
with the relevant slip sign or cleared 
away by the domestic staff. 
 
Safety officer 
The spilt milk which had not been 
cleared away 
 
Safety officer 
N/a 
383 Man 3 
max 
The cleaner had responded 
immediately instead of 5 minutes 
Cleaner 
By immediate response from cleaner 
or cordoning off the area. 
 
Cleaner 
Spilt milk not being cleaned in 
time or area cordoned off 
 
Cleaner 
N/a 
384 Man 3 
max 
The milk had been cleaned up 
earlier 
 
Cleaner 
If the milk had been cleaned up 
earlier 
 
Bill 
Lack of response to customer 
complaint 
 
Bill 
N/a 
385 Man 3 
max 
A warning sign had been put out as 
soon as the spillage had been 
discovered 
 
Bill 
By a slip sign being put out quickly 
 
Bill 
Not having a proper policy for 
dealing with accidents 
 
Safety officer 
N/a 
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386 Man 3 
max 
We could have put warning signs 
out immediately  
We had better system for keeping 
people away from slippages 
Clear instructions had been given 
to cleaners to prioritise spillages 
Manager 
Better systems for dealing with 
spillages 
 
Manager 
Failure to have effective systems 
in place to deal with spillages 
Failure to communicate with staff 
 
Manager 
N/a 
387 SP 11 
max 
Warning signs had been erected 
more quickly 
Bill / cleaner 
Quicker response to spill 
 
Bill/cleaner 
Failure to clear up the spillage 
quickly enough / placement of 
signs 
 
Bill/cleaner 
N/a 
  
388 SP 11 
max 
Warning signs had been put out 
immediately instead of passing the 
responsibility to someone else  
If only staff actually took seriously 
the possibility of slips and made 
more of an effort to clean spills up 
quickly 
Bill 
Warning signs had been put out 
immediately instead of passing the 
responsibility to someone else  
If only staff actually took seriously the 
possibility of slips and made more of 
an effort to clean spills up quickly 
Bill 
General disregard to health and 
safety in the work place , the “I 
am not paid to…” attitude (quite 
reasonable when your on a 
minimum wage though)  
 
Bill 
N/a 
 
 
 
 
  
389 SP 11 
max 
Bill had put a warning sign out 
immediately to spillage had been 
reported, this accident probably 
would not have happened.  
 
Bill 
In short the companies system did not 
ensure that spillages were cleared up 
immediately or if that was not possible 
adequately signed 
 
Employer 
Either the shop did not have an 
adequate policy re spillages or 
bill was not following it. 
 
employer 
N/a 
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390 SP 11 
max 
The spillage had been cleaned up 
as soon as staff were aware of it. 
 
.. they had a system in place at the 
checkouts to either clean up or 
prevent access to the immediate 
area until milk cleared up 
 
bill/ employer 
By having means to deal with spillages 
ie paper towels, signs etc at the 
checkout to address the matter as soon 
as become aware of the problem 
 
Manager / employer 
Failure of safety management 
- system of controlling hazard 
inadequate , reliant on cleaner 
being available 
- lack of concern on the part of 
the manager- failure to 
appreciate potentially serious 
consequences 
- possible lack of proactive 
routine checks 
- employer 
 
N/a 
391 SP 11 
max 
Bill , on hearing of the spilled milk 
from a customer had put out a 
warning sign  stating there was a 
spillage until the cleaner had dealt 
with it.  
Bill 
If a safety sign stating there was a 
spillage was erected as soon as the 
spillage was brought to the attention of 
the supervisor. 
 
Bill 
Past slipping accidents should 
have indicated a high risk area. 
Training on safety should have 
been provided such as the risks 
involved with spillages, 
importance of cleaning up same 
ASAP , the erecting of signs to 
warn people of the danger 
Bill / manager/ safety officer/ 
employer 
N/a 
392 SP 11 
max 
Bill had put out a warning sign 
immediately and got a cleaner to 
clear up the milk straight away 
 
Bill 
If a member of staff could have stood 
by the spillage warning people until 
further action could be taken 
 
Another worker 
Inappropriate action by the staff 
asked to clear the milk, by bill. 
And the company for not having 
covered this in their risk 
assessment 
 
employer  
N/a 
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393 SP11 
max 
Someone had waited by the 
spillage of milk whilst someone 
else obtained a warning sign and 
cleaning kit 
 
Bill  
Someone had waited by the spillage of 
milk whilst someone else obtained a 
warning sign and cleaning kit 
 
Bill 
The milk not being cleaned up 
properly 
 
Bill 
N/a 
394 SP11 
max 
The supervisor had put up a 
warning sign when the spillage was 
reported and ensured the cleaner 
carried out their duties in cleaning 
the spillage then mary might not 
have slipped. 
The supervisor should also have 
checked up that the spillage had 
been removed bearing in mind that 
4 other similar accidents had 
occurred  
Bill 
By bill putting out warning signs and 
telling the cleaner to clean it 
immediately 
 
Bill  
Poor management system to 
ensure that the spillage was 
cleaned up adequately after it was 
reported. There should be regular 
shop floor inspections to detect 
such hazards. This again is the 
fault of management 
 
manager 
N/a 
395 SP11 
max 
Adequate procedures had been put 
in place to ensure that swift 
reporting and prompt action is 
taken as the result of spillages 
 
Manager  
Adequate procedures implemented at 
store level to ensure that any spillage is 
reported as soon as it is noted and 
immediate action taken to make the 
area safe 
 
Manager 
Inadequate safety procedures 
implemented at store level to 
ensure swift and decisive action is 
taken to clear spillages ASAP 
Manager 
N/a 
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396 SP 11 
max 
Warning signs were easily 
accessible close to the checkouts 
and staff instructed to put them out 
immediately if a spillage 
.. a risk assessment had been 
carried out to show this as required 
and possibly mops available to 
checkout staff to clean up easy 
spillages 
an accident investigation procedure 
was in place that could have 
highlighted the pattern before the 
accident 
 
Employer 
Warning signs were easily accessible 
close to the checkouts and staff 
instructed to put them out immediately 
if a spillage 
.. a risk assessment had been carried 
out to show this as required and 
possibly mops available to checkout 
staff to clean up easy spillages 
an accident investigation procedure 
was in place that could have 
highlighted the pattern before the 
accident 
 
Employer 
Lack of system , training and 
supervision to put out warning 
signs /clear up spillage promptly 
 
Employer 
N/a 
397 SP 
11max 
Regular checks were made for slips  
Warning signs had been put out 
The cleaner had reacted 
immediately 
 
Safety officer 
Better safety procedures in place and 
trained staff 
 
Safety officer 
Poor safety procedures and poor 
implementation 
 
Safety officer 
N/a 
398 SP 11 
max 
The proper procedures were in 
place to handle spillage and also if 
the supervisor had either cleaned 
up the spill himself or at least put a 
warning sign by the milk 
 
Bill 
Implement procedures to have the spill 
roped off and the spill cleaned up 
immediately 
 
Employer 
Managements failure to recognise 
this accident as a recurring 
incident and should have been 
addressed earlier 
 
Employer  
N/a 
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399 SP11 
Max 
It was policy to put up warning 
signs as soon as a spillage was 
noticed then it would not be such a 
likely occurrence to step in the 
spillage even if the cleaner was 
delayed 
 
None 
Supervisor putting out warning as soon 
as spillage was reported , but this 
would require it to be policy 
 
Bill 
A customer dropping milk on the 
floor 
 
Customer 
N/a 
400 SP 11 
max 
We had acted more promptly to the 
to the customers report 
 
Bill 
By a faster response to the reported 
spill 
 
Bill 
Poor response to the reported spill 
of  
bill 
N/a 
401 SP 10 
min 
The spill had been brought to 
everyone’s attention eg “danger 
slippery floor” sign , the spill had 
been cleared up as soon as 
practicable , the floor was laid with 
a non slip surface, she had been 
warned of the potential dangers of 
spillages and protective non slip 
footwear had been provided  
manager 
By adopting safe systems of work , 
providing adequate supervision, 
instruction and training and reviewing 
procedures in store 
 
Employer 
Spilt milk. No procedures seem to 
in place for prompt clearing and 
warning regarding spillages 
 
Employer 
N/a 
402 SP 10 
min 
I had reported the spillage by a 
customer to bill the supervisor 
 
Another worker 
If the staff had been clearly instructed 
in and followed the laid down 
procedures which requires spillages to 
be mopped up quickly 
 
Safety officer 
Failure by the supermarket as 
represented by the management 
chain ( manager, supervisor) to 
instruct and train staff in the 
importance of reporting spillages 
quickly to the cleaner 
 
manager 
N/a 
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403 SP 12 
min 
The person spilling the milk had 
cleaned it up or informed the 
cleaner 
 
Bill / manager / safety officer 
With more vigilance on her part  
Bill 
No one cleaned up this spillage  
 
Bill 
N/a 
404 SP 10 
min 
Someone had cleaned it up 
 
Manager 
If the store had a robust programme of 
inspection and maintenance of floors 
with a defect reporting system 
supported by vigilant staff 
 
Manager 
Lack of or failure of floor 
cleaning / monitoring system 
which would detect and rectify 
spillages 
 
Manager 
N/A 
405 SP 10 
min 
The spill had been cleaned up 
immediately or cordoned off 
 
Employer 
By the company having a strictly 
enforced policy of dealing with spills 
immediately .. this means cloths 
/sponges are available at checkouts and 
all staff have a duty to soak up and dry 
spills, if extent of spill makes this 
impracticable then to call for cleaner 
and protect area until cleaner arrives 
 
Employer 
Lack of a strict policy and 
enforcement by the company that 
everyone in the store has a duty to 
clear spills immediately. 
 
Employer 
N/a 
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406 SP 10 
min 
Someone had cleared up the 
spillage 
 
Mary 
By ABC having a policy that deals 
with spillages and details how they 
should be dealt with and for staff to be 
trained and instructed on the policy. 
 
Employer 
Immediate cause the milk 
 
Secondary cause “presumable” 
not enough info to determine – 
failure to identify and remedy( 
but depends on whether 
management system in place or 
not) 
 
Employer  
N/a 
407 Man 1 
max 
An immediate warning should have 
been placed , possibly area 
cordoned off. Liquid spillages 
should have immediate clearing 
 
Bill / cleaner 
Greater awareness of spillages by 
checkout staff . prompt warnings  / 
cleaning 
 
Cleaner 
Negligence 
 
Cleaner 
N/a 
408 Man 8 
min 
Those boxes had not been left 
where they were 
 
Bill 
By the prompt removal of boxes from 
their potentially hazardous position 
 
Bill 
Negligence in not removing the 
boxes promptly 
 
Bill 
N/a 
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409 Man 3 
max 
Bill the supervisor had put the 
slippy signs by the milk 
immediately and ensured that the 
cleaner was aware that the spillage 
was a priority 
 
Bill 
By the slippery sign being put out 
immediately  and the spillage being 
cleared up as soon as possible. 
 
Cleaner 
An inappropriate response time to 
a priority, with no precautions 
taken to advise of danger 
Bill 
N/a 
 
 
 
 
410 SP 10 
min 
The spilt milk would have been 
cordoned off using hazard signage 
immediately on being noticed and 
then cleared up as a matter of 
priority 
 
Bill /manager 
Not completed Poor supervision because the milk 
was not noticed and cleaned up 
 
Bill 
N/a 
 
 
 
411 Man 10 
min 
I had put more emphasis on safety 
at ground level and created an 
ongoing awareness of the potential 
for minor hazards occur 
 
Bill 
By a quick in-house response to the 
spillage and the awareness of the 
person who caused the spillage to 
notify a responsible person 
 
It could have been prevented if the 
procedures /safe system of work were 
in place 1 mop up 2 place signage 
 
Safety officer 
The lack of reporting the spillage 
and the inadequacy in having the 
area cleaned as soon as possible 
 
Bill  
N/a 
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412 SP 13 
max 
There was a system in place for 
dealing with obstructions 
immediately. Had the supervisor 
dealt with the complaint…. 
 
bill 
Had there been in place a system for 
dealing immediately with trip hazards 
on the floor. Typically “clean as you 
go” adopted by all members of staff 
 
Employer 
Failure of staff to deal with 
obstructions  on the shop floor 
immediately 
 
Bill 
N/A  
413 sp 13 
MAX 
Bill had removed the box when 
reported to him… 
 
Bill 
If general housekeeping provisions 
were better ( ie the areas round the 
checkout kept tidy and free from 
obstacles / tripping hazards) if the 
cleaner or supervisor had tided the box 
up when first reported  
 
If Mary had been more observant as to 
where she was walking 
manager 
Bad management housekeeping 
practices with staff being unaware 
of dangers from tripping hazards ( 
ie it should not have been there in 
the first place) 
 
manager 
N/a 
414 SP 13 
max 
A near miss reporting system had 
been in use 
 
Employer 
By regular active monitoring of the 
housekeeping 
 
Manager 
A failure in the safety 
management system 
 
Employer 
N/a 
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415 SP 12 
min 
Whoever spilt the milk had cleaned 
away the mess or gave notice of 
spillage 
 
Whoever spilt the milk had 
effected a wet area notice 
 
Mary had been more alert to the 
spillage.. 
 
customer 
By whoever caused the spillage 
reporting it immediately ,  
 
Proper signage indicating the spillage 
should be erected immediately  
 
The spillage had been cleaned up 
properly 
 
Another worker 
Unsafe practices 
 
Employer / another worker 
N/a 
416 SP 12 
min 
The supermarket had employed 
someone to clean up spillages as 
soon as they occurred 
 
Employer  
By clearing up the spillage as soon as 
it occurred 
 
Not stated 
Inadequate procedures for 
reporting and cleaning up 
spillages 
 
Employer 
N/a 
417 SP 12 
min 
I had assessed the risk of this 
happening and eliminated or 
controlled the foreseeable hazard 
 
Safety officer 
1. 1 look at how the milk is handled- 
can it be safer 
2. where is it stored-can it be better 
placed 
3. if there is a spillage risk – non slip 
flooring / mats better facilities to 
respond to cleaning up etc 
 
safety officer 
Not assessing what was a 
reasonably foreseeable situation 
 
Safety officer 
N/a 
 Appendix 5 Respondents Completed Sentences 
 
Page | 945  
 
418 SP 11 
max 
There had been a docket system in 
place to ensure that the cleaner had 
been instructed and that bill , 
having been informed, had put 
some barriers up to divert people 
 
Manager 
There had been a docket system in 
place to ensure that the cleaner had 
been instructed and that bill , having 
been informed, had put some barriers 
up to divert people 
 
Manager 
Lack of immediate action 
 
Bill 
N/a 
419 SP 11 
max 
The spillage had been cleared up 
immediately . procedure need to be 
put in place to ensure the area is 
made safe immediately when this 
type of incident occurs and this 
need to be supervised effectively to 
ensue it is adhered to. 
Manager 
If the previous similar accident had 
been investigated properly and control 
measures put in place 
 
Manager 
The lack of controlled procedure 
being in place and adhered to  
 
Manager 
N/a 
420 SP 11 
max 
The spill had been detected and 
cleaned up at the time it was done 
 
Another worker 
Instructions to personnel to deal with 
spillages (in person) immediately they 
occur 
 
Employer 
Management failure 
 
employer 
N/a 
421 SP 12 
min 
Someone had noticed the spill and 
reported it 
 
Mary 
If routine floor checks made or 
cashiers report spillages for clearance 
 
Manager 
Failure of systems to identify 
spillage incidents 
 
Safety officer 
N/a 
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422 SP 12 
min 
Warning cones had been placed out 
until the spillage had been mopped 
up and the floor was dry 
 
Another worker 
By any member of staff who saw the 
spillage either warning staff or by 
cleaning up the spillage 
 
Another worker 
Lack of staff awareness – poor 
staff communication 
 
Employer 
N/a 
423 SP 12 
min 
Reminded staff to take immediate 
action regarding spillages eg sign – 
clear up spillage 
 
Safety officer 
Ensuring spillage procedure is 
followed in all cases 
 
Manager 
Not following procedures 
 
Manager 
N/a 
424 SP 12 
min 
The spillage had been properly 
cleaned and people made aware of 
the wet floor via a sign then mary 
would still be at work 
 
Bill   
The spillage should have been reported 
, cleared and properly signed as a wet 
floor or slippery floor 
 
Bill 
Lack of attention given to the 
place of work by both 
management and employees. 
Nobody identified or acted on a 
hazard 
 
Employer 
N/a 
425 SP 12 
min 
Someone had cleaned up the milk 
Manager 
By not leaving spillages 
 
Manager 
The spilt milk 
 
Manager / employer 
N/a 
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426 SP 12 
min 
 
 
Not completed properly 
Not answered properly Slipping on milk N/a 
427 SP12 
min 
The person who caused the milk 
spillage had cleared it up or 
highlighted the area as being 
slippery (customer or worker) 
 
Another worker 
If the person who had caused the 
spillage had cleaned it up . if a 
customer had caused the spillage then 
the floor manager should regularly 
instruct his staff to look out for 
spillages and arrange for them to be 
cleaned up or identified by a sign 
 
Bill 
The stores policy on the cleaning 
up and inspection for spilt milk. 
The supervisor should regularly 
be reminding his staff of this 
likelihood . 
 
Bill  
N/a 
428 SP 13 
max 
I had looked where I was going 
 
Mary 
She should have paid more attention to 
her walkway 
 
The walkway should have had a 
warning sign or someone advising to 
be careful 
 
Cleaner should have picked the box up 
sooner 
 
Safety officer 
 
The box should have been 
removed one the reason for it 
being there initially had vanished  
 
Bill 
N/a 
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429 SP 13 
max 
The box had been disposed of 
correctly 
 
Another worker 
If the cardboard had been removed 
from the shop floor during 
replenishment 
 
Cleaner had responded when directed 
 
Bill had taken direct immediate action.  
Mary/bill/manager/safety officer 
The physical hazard was the box  
 
Causal factors are unknown but 
one assumes : the action of the 
staff member who discarded the 
box on the floor 
 
Another worker 
N/a 
430 Sp13 
max 
I had removed the box and had 
identified a trend from previous 
accidents and had instigated a 
procedure training to keep 
checkout  areas clear of obstruction 
 
Bill 
Conditions round the checkouts were 
well known and there had been other 
accidents . Also the hazard on this 
occasion was reported and insufficient 
action taken. 
 
Bill 
The immediate cause was the box 
left lying around , the underlying 
cause is a lack of management 
systems for dealing with hazard 
identification and rectification 
coupled with lack of training. 
 
Employer 
N/a 
431 SP 12 
min 
The spillage had been made aware 
to any person who could have 
slipped on it.  
Another worker 
If the spillage had have been made 
aware to any person , whilst another 
member of staff went to make 
arrangements to get the spillage 
cleaned up 
 
Manager 
Not in place a suitable procedure 
for such an incident occurring , 
spillages of any kind should not 
be left unattended or un barriered 
 
manager 
N/a 
432 SP 13 
max 
The cleaner had sorted it out 
straight away 
 
Cleaner 
By immediate removal of the box 
 
Better still by not outing the box there 
in the first place. 
 
Another worker 
Dumping of box in an area with 
high human traffic 
 
Another worker 
N/A 
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433 SP 13 
max 
Not completed Had the company and all concerned 
asked itself 
 
What can cause harm 
What is in place to control /prevent the 
harm occurring 
Is it enough 
 
Employer 
Failure on  the part of the 
company to put in place /enforce 
a system for defining and 
ensuring a positive outcome to all 
their work operations 
 
Employer 
N/a 
434 SP 13 
max 
The box had been tidied away and 
moved out of the isle 
 
Mary 
By removing the box from the floor 
 
Manager 
The box being left in the gangway 
and Mary wasn’t aware of the 
obstruction 
 
Safety officer 
N/a 
435 SP 10 
min 
Not completed By better company practice on the 
floor , if something is wrong mark it 
with a cone or rail round. 
 
Bill 
Not completed N/A 
436 SP 10 
min 
Cleaned up the milk 
 
Bill 
By whoever spilled the milk should 
have got it cleaned up right away 
 
Bill 
The staff were not trained right to 
clean up 
 
Employer 
N/a 
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437 SP 12 
min 
Someone had cleaned the spillage 
 
Cleaner 
Staff should be informed to clean up or 
arrange for cleaner to clean up spillage 
immediately 
 
Manager 
Management failure in not 
dealing with the spillage . staff 
should be informed to clean up 
spillages immediately 
 
Employer 
 
N/a 
438 SP 12 
min 
The spillage had been noticed and 
cleared up immediately 
Employer 
Not sure – not completed Failure to have a system for 
detecting and removing spillages 
 
Employer 
N/a 
439 SP 12 
min  
The milk had been cleared up as 
soon as it was spilt 
 
Safety officer 
If whoever spilt the milk or anyone 
else who had seen the milk should 
have cleared / had it cleared up 
 
None 
Someone not taking responsibility 
for ensuring the milk was not 
cleared up and a system was not 
in place to check it had been done 
 
Employer 
N/a 
440 SP 12 
min 
Someone had reported the spillage 
immediately and cleaned up the 
spillage or marked the affected area 
clearly until cleaned with a 
“caution” sign 
 
Employer 
If the spillage was cleaned or marked 
immediately. a customer could have 
informed staff or staff responsible 
could have cleaned or marked with  
“caution”  until cleared 
 
Another worker / cleaner / customer 
Slipping on the milk because no 
one had reported the spillage or 
clear the spillage / mark it to 
inform people 
 
Employer 
N/a 
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441 SP 11 
max 
The slippery floor sign had been 
put out next to the milk spillage 
when the spillage had been 
reported  Mary would have seen 
the sign and walked around the 
spillage and not slipped 
 
Bill 
If the spillage had been cleared up 
straight away or if Mary had been 
warned of the spillage ie sign in place 
or of the spillage had been cleared up 
as soon as someone was aware of it 
 
Safety officer 
The spillage wasn’t cleared up as 
soon as it was reported. No 
warning sign was put in place 
whilst arrangements were made to 
clear up the spillage 
 
Safety officer 
N/a 
442 SP 11 
max 
A warning sign had been put out 
 
Employer 
By putting signage at the spillage 
 
Employer 
Spilt milk left and not reported by 
customer causing it 
 
Employer 
N/a 
443 Man 8 
min 
We had a better system of storing 
boxes in place and had been 
monitoring compliance and 
checking housekeeping standards 
 
Manager 
If we had a better system of work in 
place and were tighter in controlling it 
and enforcing it 
 
Manager 
Bad housekeeping, lack of safety 
awareness by staff and lack of 
enforcement 
 
Mary 
N/a 
444 Man 8 
min 
I had walked the shop floor with 
bill before the shop opened . we 
would have spotted the hazard and 
removed it 
 
Manager 
Management and staff awareness of 
constantly walking the shop floor and 
checking for hazards – if all the team 
did this and not just management it 
would have been prevented 
 
None  
Poor management control , lack 
of staff training and awareness 
 
Manager  
N/a 
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445 Man 8 
min 
The box hadn’t been on the floor 
 
The delivery staff put the boxes in 
the right place and not across the 
gangway 
 
Mary was more aware of deliveries 
on Thursdays 
 
Another worker 
Boxes not left in gang ways, staff to be 
trained not to leave boxes  in such 
places 
 
Another worker 
Lack of staff training / awareness 
to the potential hazards of boxes 
left in gangways 
 
Safety officer 
N/a 
446 SP 15 
max 
The box had been moved when it 
was first reported 
 
Cleaner 
By looking at why the box was left 
there in the first place and why it 
wasn’t moved after it was noticed 
 
Employer 
A lack of awareness amongst all 
staff that a box has the potential 
to be a tripping hazard 
 
Employer 
N/a 
 
 
 
 
447 SP 16 
min 
Advised on day to day operation. 
 
Bill 
Not completed 
 
N/a 
Either Company Policy or Mary 
not being aware of the box, no 
signs, another worker leaving the 
box in the gangway 
 
Bill  
N/a 
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448 Man 8 
min 
I had ensured that Mary was aware 
that the rules and regulations 
affecting applying on Monday 
Tuesday and wed were just as 
relevant on other days 
 
Mary 
By ensuring that the floor supervisor 
and safety officers between them had 
checked the area where Mary tripped . 
the checkout is a high risk area for 
customers and staff 
 
Bill 
Carelessness on the part of the 
person leaving the box in an 
obstructing position 
 
Cleaner  
N/A 
449 Man 8 
min 
The box had not been left there or 
someone else moved it when they 
saw it was in the way 
 
Bill 
By due diligence 
Safety officer 
Staff   not being aware of health 
and safety regulations 
 
Manager 
N/a 
 
 
  
450 Man 8 
min 
There had been a company policy 
in place to ensure that no boxes or 
parcels or packages or any 
obstacles in any area where public 
or staff walk 
 
Employer 
If better staff training had been 
provided and implemented where by 
no trip hazards were left unattended 
 
Manager 
Improper staff training and bad 
company policy 
 
Employer 
N/a 
451 SP 15 
max 
ABC supermarkets had a proactive 
approach to housekeeping instead 
of a reactive  
 
Employer 
Supervisors having responsibilities to 
undertake physical inspections / audits 
of the store 
 
Employer 
Poor housekeeping , possibly 
inadequate space poor 
organisation of work station 
 
Employer 
N/a 
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452 SP 13 
max 
Bill had ensured that the box had 
been lifted or a hazard warning 
sign placed at it 
 
Bill  
By bill ensuring the that the box had 
been lifted 
 
Bill 
There was reports of checkouts 
being generally untidy. This 
would be due to management not 
ensuring that the cleaners job is 
done properly 
 
manager 
N/a 
453 SP 11 
max 
A warning sign had been put up. 
 
Milk not spilt 
Cleaner responded earlier 
Spillage reported earlier 
 
Bill 
By giving bill tools to take immediate 
preventative action and responsibility 
e.g. hazard signs located near 
checkouts 
 
Employer 
Spillage not dealt with quickly 
enough 
 
employer 
N/a 
454 SP11 
max 
A warning sign was put out as soon 
as the spillage was noted and 
cleaned up immediately 
 
Bill  
By putting in place a procedure to deal 
with spillages which details the use of 
warning signs and immediate cleaning 
of the spillage 
 
Employer 
Spilt milk at the checkout area 
which had no warning and had 
not been cleared 
 
Employer 
N/a 
455 SP 11 
max 
Bill had waited by the spillage until 
the cleaner came or else got one of 
the floor staff to wait there 
 
Bill 
If bill had cordoned off the area or had 
someone stand to direct people from it 
 
Bill 
The lack of a procedure to deal 
with spillages at checkouts 
 
Bill 
N/a 
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456 SP 11 
max 
Management had implemented a 
safe system of work for the work 
place especially after so many 
accidents this would never had 
happened. Also “caution” signs 
should have been put in place to 
remind workers of spillage 
 
Manger 
By using better safety practices with 
all workers including temporary staff 
and by making sure all workers were 
aware of the danger 
 
Safety officer 
Management for not hiring a 
safety officer what was competent 
enough to do his job 
 
employer 
N/a 
457 SP 11 
max 
There had been a proper policy in 
place and it had been implemented 
Mary would not have slipped 
because as soon as the hazard 
appeared the hazard ous area would 
have been isolated , hence no fall 
 
Manager 
By procedures being in place to isolate 
such an area in the event of a spillage . 
should have been done because of  
previous accident history – risk 
assessments 
 
Employer  
The immediate cause was the 
spilt milk but the underlying 
cause was a lack of a safe system 
of work or general measures for 
dealing with identified hazard 
 
employer 
N/a 
 
 
 
 
 
458 SP 16 
min 
The box had not been there and 
Mary had checked her route 
carefully 
 
Safety Officer 
By removing the box or not putting it 
there in the first place or by making  
Mary more aware of her surroundings  
 
Safety Officer 
Lack of control over storage  
Lack of supervision, staff 
awareness training and lack of 
management control 
 
Safety officer 
N/a 
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459 SP 10 
min 
We had a safety policy and 
procedures in to deal with such 
eventualities 
 
Employer 
By ensuring all duty staff take 
responsibility for actioning cleaning up 
processes 
 
Employer 
A failure to ensure the safety of 
people using the premises 
Employer 
N/a 
460 SP 15 
max 
The box issue was addressed by the 
cleaner once the customer had 
reported it  and reported it to the 
supervisor . 
The last 4 accidents were addressed 
at the time  
Public walkways were cleared of 
obstructions 
 
Manager 
By monitoring the last 4 accidents  
Tidying up around the checkouts – 
ensuring this was done by bill 
Clearing the walk ways 
 
Manager 
Poor housekeeping in the area 
 
Manager 
N/a 
461 SP 16 
min 
The box was not there. If there was 
a procedure to ensure trip hazards 
were eliminated  
Staff training and awareness 
 
Safety officer 
Staff awareness through training, 
control systems and procedures for 
packing shelves and ensuring aisles are 
left free from such hazards  
Checklists by staff and manager 
 
Safety officer  
Improper procedures before shelf 
packing, supervision was also 
lacking. Marys awareness may 
have played a part but most 
importantly the lack of or 
breakdown in the supermarkets 
safety management system 
 
Safety officer 
N/a 
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462 Sp 16 
Min 
The trainee or supervisor moved 
the box  
 
Manager 
The store manager had moved the box 
this would not have happened 
 
Manager 
Someone leaving the box 
unattended 
 
Another worker 
N/a 
 
 
463 SP 16 
min 
Someone had removed the box and 
put it in a safe environment where 
it was out of Mary’s way and 
everyone else’s as well. 
 
Bill 
If people are made more aware of 
“accidents” and a little more common 
sense. People will think next time they 
leave something lying around. 
 
Safety officer 
someone leaving a  box 
unattended on the floor 
 
another worker 
N/a 
 
 
  
464 SP 16 
min 
I was watching where I was going 
 
bill 
Moved it . they knew it was a hazard 
 
Bill 
Box not being moved by anyone 
knowing it was a hazard 
 
Manager 
N/a 
465 SP 16 
min 
Boxes were stored properly when 
not in use 
 
Employer 
If management put proper controls 
monitoring and supervision in place 
 
Employer 
Lack of proper instruction, 
supervision and monitoring of use 
of boxes and other tripping 
hazards 
 
employer 
N/a 
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466 SP 16 
min 
Staff had been better trained in 
good housekeeping procedures 
 
Manager 
If staff were trained in good 
housekeeping procedures 
 
Manager 
Inadequate housekeeping 
 
Manager 
N/a 
467 SP 16 
min 
Housekeeping in the store was 
more efficient  
An established storage location and 
procedure for empty boxes had 
been set in place 
Staff / management had been more 
vigilant 
 
Mary 
High levels of housekeeping 
 
All staff aware where empty boxes to 
be deposited immediately after 
becoming empty  
 
Vigilance of all staff  
 
Manager 
A foreseeable tripping hazard 
being left in a walkway 
compounded by inadequate 
housekeeping procedures to 
prevent such an occurrence 
 
Mary 
N/a 
468 SP 16 
min 
Someone had been more careful 
and safety conscious of their 
colleagues and not left that box in a 
passageway, mary would not have 
tripped over and hurt her arm 
 
Another worker 
By her fellow workers and 
management being more safety aware 
and preventing tripping and falling 
hazards in their place if work 
 
Employer 
The organisation not being aware 
of the hazards of tripping  
Lack of safety training and 
awareness 
Employer 
N/a 
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469 SP 14 
min 
I had inspected that walk way 
 
Safety officer 
A safety culture involving the whole 
company by training . continual 
monitoring of staff and stats , regular 
safety awareness talks 
 
Employer 
Failure of a safety culture. 
 
Employer 
N/a 
470 SP 10 
min 
Someone had taken action at the 
time of the spill ie cordon off area  
, clean up spill 
 
Another worker 
If action had been taken at the time of 
the spill. Cordon area , display wet 
floor signs and clean up the spill 
 
Bill / another worker 
Due to the spill not being 
controlled by ABC personnel 
 
Employer 
N/A 
 
 
  
471 SP 14 
min 
The box had been put away 
 
Bill 
By good housekeeping, supervision 
 
Bill 
Lack of training and supervision 
 
Bill 
N/a 
 
472 SP9 
max 
We could reduce the number of 
spillages we would have less 
accidents 
 
Employer 
Not answered Mary not seeing the spillage, the 
lack of speed in which the 
spillage was dealt with 
 
Safety officer 
N/a 
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473 SP 14 
min 
Mary had not been in that day 
If only the person had left the box 
in an appropriate place 
Mary had been looking where she 
was going 
 
Safety Officer 
By training on manual handling and 
teaching the person on lifting and the 
seriousness of leaving the box on the 
floor 
 
Safety officer 
Incorrect placement of the box on 
the floor. No due care and 
attention by either the safety 
officer or another member of staff 
for not seeing and moving the box 
before the accident 
 
Safety officer 
N/A 
474 Sp 16 
min 
Her friend had not been on holiday 
, so she wouldn’t have been at 
work. 
She had seen the box and stepped 
over it  
Mary 
Better storage of box 
 
Employer 
Not looking where she was going 
 
Mary 
N/a 
 
 
475 SP 14 
min 
We had good housekeeping and the 
box was removed from the floor 
 
Manager 
By ensuring all aisle ways were clear 
 
Not specified 
Aisle ways not clear. 
Housekeeping poor  
Mary did not see the box 
 
All specified  
N/a 
476 SP 14 
min 
We had good housekeeping 
practices and all employees took 
accountability and we had  set 
scheme to help promote good 
housekeeping practices 
 
Manager 
If we had adopted a systematic system 
of maintaining housekeeping in which 
every employee was accountable for 
the overall shops performance 
 
Employer 
Poor housekeeping 
 
Bill 
N/a 
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477 SP11 
max 
A warning sign had been put out by 
the person (bill) the spillage had 
been reported to 
 
Bill 
By putting systems in place and 
supervising / monitoring compliance  
 
Employer 
Safe system of work not being in 
place 
 
Employer 
N/a 
478 SP11 
max 
Signs had been put out warning of 
the danger Mary would have 
concentrated more on where she 
was stepping 
 
Employer 
By ensuring systems were in place to 
ensure that spillages of all kinds were 
dealt with immediately 
 
Employer 
Slipping on  a product which like 
fruit and dairy products cause this 
sort of accident frequently 
therefore it was foreseeable and 
systems should have been in 
place to deal with the spillage 
more effectively and more 
quickly 
 
Employer 
N/a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
479 SP 12 
min 
Somebody cleaned up the spillage 
 
Cleaner 
By the milk being cleaned up 
 
Cleaner 
Spilt milk which wasn’t cleaned 
up 
 
Bill 
 
Example of causal presence 
=milk or absence of behaviour by 
not cleaning 
N/a 
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480 SP 15 
max 
Bill had removed the box as soon 
as he was informed  
 
The checkout staff had removed the 
box 
 
The supermarket had a policy on 
all tripping hazards and removed 
them as a priority 
 
Bill 
If the supermarket had a policy for the 
removal of hazards as soon as notified 
 
Employer 
Spilt milk 
Employer 
N/a 
481 SP 15 
max 
Bill had isolated or  removed the 
box when he was told 
 
Bill 
By undertaking a comprehensive risk 
assessment, identifying that boxes are 
in abundance in the supermarket and 
must be controlled, also by ensuring 
that the hazard was highlighted 
immediately whilst remedial action 
was instigated 
 
Employer 
Failure for number of people to 
take effective remedial action  
 
The company for failing to 
identify the rsik 
 
Bill for not highlighting the box  
 
Mary for not paying attention 
 
Bill 
N/a 
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482 SP 15 
max 
We had a procedure in place 
(following previous accident 
investigation) whereby all areas of 
the store including areas not 
accessible by the public are 
checked on a regular basis by the 
person responsible for removing 
obstructions so that obstructions 
wont be allowed to build up in the 
first place. Signs should be posted 
to relay to all staff the importance 
of the removal of obstacles.  
 
Employer 
By having a policy in place where all 
obstructions are removed as soon as 
possible and a policy whereby all 
access ways are kept clear 
 
Supervision is required to ensure that 
this policy is upheld on a day to day 
basis 
 
Employer 
Complacency and lack of 
leadership. If there were policies 
in place they were not followed or 
staff were not made aware of the 
procedure to follow or were not 
made to follow them 
 
Not specified 
N/a 
483 Sp 15 
max 
Someone had moved the box as 
soon as they noticed it or was told 
about it 
 
Another worker 
By all employers being aware of their 
surroundings and taking responsibility 
to remove all hazards 
 
Another worker 
The person who left the box there 
and anyone who did not move it 
 
Another worker 
N/a 
484 Sp 15 
max 
Something had been done 
following the previous events 
 
Manager 
Provision of better instruction / 
training 
 
More effective supervision 
 
Prohibit poor and promote better 
housekeeping 
 
Employer 
Poor housekeeping standards or 
lack of storage 
 
Employer 
N/a 
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485 Sp 15 
max 
 
 
The cleaner had responded to the 
request to clear the box earlier 
 
Employer 
If the poor housekeeping round the 
checkout area had been identified and 
precautionary measures put in place to 
keep the area clear of miscellaneous 
items 
 
Employer 
Failure of safety management 
system for the company 
 
Employer 
N/a 
486 SP 15 
max 
Staff were more vigilant and 
management enforced company 
rules 
 
Bill 
Clear floor policy 
Training of all staff on the policy 
Regular and frequent workplace 
inspections 
 
manager 
Lack of clear management focus 
on causes of common accidents  
 
Failure of management to 
implement company safety rules 
 
Employer 
N/a 
 
487 SP15 
max 
 
 
 
 
We had a system in place checking 
on housekeeping thought the store 
at regular intervals and staff had 
been trained to respond to 
problems arising immediately 
 
Employer 
A good system of monitoring 
standards of housekeeping, properly 
supervised would reduce the risk of 
such accidents significantly 
 
Employer 
The lack of a system that ensures 
regular checks on housekeeping 
are made including proper 
supervision 
 
Employer  
N/a 
488 SP 15 
max 
The box had been returned to the 
storeroom where it belonged the 
accident would not have happened 
 
Manager 
Adherence to management procedures 
on housekeeping 
 
manager 
Poor housekeeping and a failure 
of management systems 
 
Employer 
N/a 
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489 MAN 7 
max 
The problem had been dealt with 
immediately 
 
Bill 
By the removal of the box immediately 
if it was reported or not left there in the 
first place 
 
Safety officer 
Lack of supervision 
 
Bill 
N/a 
490 MAN 7 
max 
The staff of ABC Supermarket had 
not left the box on the floor 
(reckless staff) and if only Mary 
was looking where she was going. ( 
not  very observant) 
 
Another worker / mary  
By ensuring that the box was not left 
on the floor by the person who left it 
there and teaching (training) staff to 
observe and remove boxes from the 
floor. 
 
Another worker 
The irresponsibility of the person 
who originally left the box on the 
floor not exercising due care and 
attention in performing his work 
properly and satisfactorily 
 
Another worker 
N/a 
491 Man 4 
min 
A team member had been aware of 
the spill and put out a wet floor 
sign 
 
Another worker 
By team members being more aware or 
trained if they hadn’t been by the store 
manager on shop floor hazards 
 
Manager 
Carelessness 
 
mary 
N/a 
 
492 Man 6 
min 
 
 
She hadn’t come in on Thursday 
 
None 
More attention to keeping walkways 
free from obstacles 
 
Safety officer 
Inappropriate storage of boxes 
 
Safety officer 
N/a 
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493 Man 7 
max 
The floor had been cleaned 
 
Bill 
Following set procedures 
 
Bill 
Negligence 
 
cleaner 
N/a 
494 Man 7 
max 
The checkout areas were tidied 
regularly after the 1
st
 person tripped 
over a box “x” months ago 
 
Manager 
By keeping boxes off the floor , 
regularly inspecting areas – having 
more hazard signs available 
 
Bill 
Not keeping floor area clear of 
obstructions 
 
Bill 
N/a 
 
 
 
495 Man7 
max 
They had done their job properly 
like we had trained them 
 
Cleaner 
If the cleaner had cleared up or if the 
person who put the box there disposed 
of it properly 
 
None 
Due to a lack of responsibility 
and staff not doing their job 
properly 
 
None 
N/a 
 
 
 
 
496 Man 7 
max 
Bill had himself moved the box to 
a less hazardous position and /or 
put up warning signs before asking 
the cleaner to remove it 
 
Bill 
If the stores policy was to ensure boxes 
or other hazards are not left around and 
that supervisory staff implement this 
vigorously 
 
Employers 
Insufficiently vigorous 
procedures to ensure the floor of 
the supermarket is kept free of 
hazards 
 
Manager 
N/a 
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497 Man 3 
max 
A warning sign had been displayed 
and prompt action was taken to 
clean up 
 
Manager 
Warning signs or a quicker response 
 
Bill 
Failure to remove a potential 
hazard 
 
bill 
N/a 
 
 
498 Man 3 
max 
She watched where she was going 
 
Mary 
If she had watched where she was 
going 
 
Mary 
Inattention 
 
Mary 
N/a 
499 Man 2 
min 
The mess had been cleared up 
 
Manager 
If the mess had been cleared up 
Manager 
Inefficiency 
 
Manager 
N/a 
500 Man 7 
max 
1. bill had moved the box 
himself instead of waiting for 
the cleaner to do it. 
2. Mary’s colleague had seen 
her about to trip and called 
out 
 
Bill 
Bill removing the box as soon as he 
was aware of it or mary and her 
colleague taking more care 
 
Bill 
A tripping hazard not being 
removed after it was identified by 
supervisor 
Bill 
N/a 
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501 Man 7 
max 
Not completed Staff training and ensuring potential 
risks dealt with immediately, better 
management and supervision 
 
Manager 
Poor management and 
supervision and lack of attention 
to health and safety issues 
 
Employer 
N/a 
 
 
 
 
502 Man 7 
max 
People would take note of what 
they are told and understand its 
importance. 
In the light of previous happenings 
people would prioritise tasks better 
 
cleaner 
By making changes in tidiness 
following previous accidents 
 
Bill 
Untidiness of boxes 
 
Cleaner 
N/a 
503 Man 
8min 
Staff member had followed health 
and safety procedures / protocol on 
tripping etc perhaps accidents 
wouldn’t happen 
 
Mary 
If staff members followed protocol 
 
Mary / other workers 
Failure of following strict 
protocols  
 
Mary 
N/a 
 
 
 
504 Man 8 
min 
Someone had removed the box or 
reported it as a hazard 
 
Another worker /customer 
Id safety regulations were followed . 
the box should have been removed or 
at least reported as a hazard 
 
All  
Breach of health and safety rules 
 
Another worker 
N/a 
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505  Man 8 
min 
The box hadn’t been left there by 
someone whose thoughtless action 
has made Mary have ab accident 
 
Another worker 
By the box not being left there  
 
Another worker 
The box 
 
Not completed 
N/a 
506 Man 8 
min 
Staff would follow the simple 
health and safety guidelines and 
keep all gangways clear. Need 
more training 
 
Manager 
Keep gangways clear 
 
Manger 
Staff not following h&S policies 
and procedures 
 
Another worker 
N/a 
507 Man 5 
max 
The previous accidents had been 
reported to me 
 
The supervisor had ensured the 
checkout area was always kept tidy 
 
Supervisor should have put a 
warning sign up 
 
Bill 
The supervisor and cleaner wee aware 
of their  responsibilities 
 
Safety officer 
Mary not watching where she was 
going 
 
The cleaner not doing what he 
was asked 
 
Bill 
N/a 
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508 Man 8 
min 
The box hadn’t been in the way 
 
Another worker 
Proper storage  of the box 
 
Another worker 
Box left unexpectedly in pathway 
to canteen 
 
Another worker 
N/a 
509 Man 8 
min 
I had checked the area 
 
Manager 
By making sure those responsible for 
box safety had checked the area and 
removed any offending or hazardous 
boxes 
 
Safety officer 
Carelessness and box 
 
Safety officer 
N/a 
510 Man 8 
min 
Bill made sure the staff were 
placing the boxes in the right spot.. 
then mary would not have slipped 
 
Mary.   
Placing boxes in safe / .correct position 
 
Another worker 
Incorrect /unsafe placement of 
box  and marys inattention 
 
Another worker 
N/a 
511 Man 2 
min 
Someone had been told or taken the 
initiative to mop the floor and dry 
it then…. 
 
cleaner 
By prompt action – possibly mary 
herself should have spotted the hazard 
-  unless she was sleepwalking and 
called the cleaner 
 
Mary 
Negligence, stupidity, 
carelessness apathy 
irresponsibility  
 
Mary 
N/a 
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512 Man 2 
min 
The proper procedures were in 
place to prevent this. Had someone 
earlier noticed the spilt milk – is 
anyone delegated responsibility of 
keeping an eye out for this . how 
often is there spilt fluids on the 
floor. 
 
Bill 
If the milk was cleaned up 
immediately by whoever spilt it. 
 
Bill 
Milk on the floor 
 
Who ever spilt the milk 
 
 
N/a 
513 Man 2 
min 
People knew how to deal with a 
potential hazard earlier 
 
Bill 
By ensuring that a risk assessment was 
undertaken and reviewed and a 
procedure implemented to reduce the 
risk . preventing the spillage , dealing 
with the spillage and good reporting 
systems could have helped 
 
Employer 
Either not following procedures 
for the safe handing of milk, not 
developing a safe environment , 
not dealing with the spillage 
appropriately or sooner , not 
alerting people to the hazard 
 
Employer 
N/a 
514 Man 2 
min 
A member of staff either mopped 
the spillage of milk up or at lease 
put some hazard signs mary might 
not have had the accident 
 
Another worker 
If the spillage of milk had been 
reported and action taken to prevent 
anybody slipping 
 
None 
Due to the incident of spillage not 
being reported 
 
none 
N/a 
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515 Man 3 
max 
The spillage had been identified 
earlier and immediate action taken 
 
Bill 
Not answered Failure to deal quickly with the 
spillage 
 
Bill 
N/a 
516 Man 7 
max 
We had kept the area tidy we may 
have avoided this accident 
 
Employer 
By improving tidiness around the 
checkouts 
 
Manger 
General untidiness around the 
checkout 
 
Manager 
N/a 
517 Man 7 
max 
We placed more importance on 
cleaning and tidiness 
 
Safety officer 
Not sure Mary not looking where she was 
going – there will always be 
hazards to be avoided 
 
Mary 
N/a 
518 Man 8 
min 
I had enforced the clear walkways 
policy more forcefully and the 
shelf packers had been more 
careful where they out poxes 
 
Manager 
Clear enforcement of “clear 
walkways” policy. More care taken by 
shelf stackers and training and 
supervision 
 
Manager  
Poor management /supervision of 
shelf stacker 
 
Bill 
N/a 
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519 Man 2 
min 
The person who spilt the milk had 
the confidence and awareness to 
report the spillage to a member of 
staff immediately 
 
A member of staff had been more 
vigilant when walking about the 
store and followed appropriate 
procedures in relation to spillages. 
 
Customer 
By re-emphasising h&s awareness 
amongst staff and customers ie 
spillages to be reported immediately ; 
all staff to be more vigilant. 
 
Not completed 
A customer spilling milk on the 
floor and failing to bring it to the 
attention of staff, also failing on 
the side of the store manager and 
supervisor to notice the spillage 
as they carry on with their 
responsibilities 
 
Customer 
N/a 
520 Man 2 
min 
We had worked to safety 
procedures re cleaning up / hazard 
signs 
 
manager 
Surrounding spillages with hazard 
markers immediately before cleaning 
 
Bill 
The manager failing to ensure the 
supervisor implemented safety 
procedures immediately via safety 
officer 
 
Manager 
N/a 
521 Man 8 
min 
Someone had moved the box 
 
Bill 
If all passages corridors etc are kept 
clear 
 
Safety officer 
Due to non compliance with 
company safety procedures 
 
Safety officer 
N/a 
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522 Man 8 
min 
I have looked where I am walking 
and not gazing beyond 
 
Mary 
By the supervisor checking the area 
frequently 
 
Bill 
Mary did not look where she was 
going and the supervisor has not 
been making regular checks 
 
Bill 
N/a 
523 Man 2 
min 
The person who spilt the milk left a 
sign to say wet floor , the milk was 
washed away . the person had 
borough it to his/her colleagues 
 
Bill 
By her watching where she was 
walking and appropriate floor signs 
 
Cleaner 
Spilt milk being unintended 
(unattended?) 
 
Bill 
N/a 
524 Sp 14 
min 
The box had not been left in the 
way and the supervisor had noticed 
the problem and arranged for its 
removal 
 
Bill 
By good housekeeping procedures that 
are understood and implemented by 
staff and if the supervisor had noticed 
the hazards and arranged for the boxes 
removal 
 
Employer 
Poor housekeeping and 
supervision 
 
Employer 
N/a 
525 Sp 12 
min 
The customer who dropped the 
milk had reported it. 
 
Customer 
If someone had noted and cleaned up 
the milk 
 
Another worker 
Failure to note and clear up 
spillage properly 
 
Bill 
N/a 
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526 SP 9 
max  
A member of staff had reported the 
spillage to the supervisor 
immediately and the supervisor had 
ensured that the cleaner cleaned the 
spillage straight after it was 
reported, so there was not a delay 
in response time 
 
Bill  
By placing hazard warning signs near 
the spillage and ensuring the milk was 
promptly cleaned / floor dried 
 
Bill 
The lack of management / 
responsibility in place to identify 
and remove the hazard ie lack of 
signage and slow response time 
by cleaner 
 
manager 
NA 
527 SP 11 
max 
I had seen the spillage earlier and 
cordoned off the area prior to the 
cleaner removing the spill 
 
Bill  
By 
a) checkout supervisor should carry 
out regular checks 
b) any spillage should be cordoned 
off straightaway and cleaned up as 
soon as possible 
c) all checkout staff should be made 
aware of previous incidents and told 
to be more aware in their area 
 
Bill 
The spilt milk was not spotted or 
cleaned up quick enough 
 
Bill 
N/a 
528 Sp 9 
max 
The supermarket had had a spills 
team with a response target of a 
few minutes who had been trained 
and provided with the correct 
equipment close to spills areas 
 
Manager 
By having a rapid response spills team 
available at short notice with  the 
correct spills clean up kit and signs at 
hand 
 
Manager 
A known hazard was not dealt 
with properly in time to prevent 
the accident when slips around 
checkouts were common – 
procedures were inadequate 
 
manager  
N/a 
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529 Sp 10 
min 
The spillage had been cleaned 
 
Another worker 
Training –staff aware of need to report 
spillages sp that they can be cleaned 
immediately 
 
Employer 
Poor training and information to 
employees or negligence of 
another worker / customer 
employer 
N/a 
530 Sp 14 
min 
We had trained the person who left 
the box in the position for mary to 
trip over… none of this would have 
happened. You see she should have 
seen a sign / barrier or warning 
triangle 
 
Manager 
By training the person who left the box 
.. hazards / risk assessment barriers etc. 
 
Manager 
Persons unknown left a box 
without a sign/ barrier – lack of 
training 
 
Manager 
N/a 
531 Sp 14 
min 
The box wasn’t there and 
housekeeping arrangements had 
been catered for 
 
Manager 
If housekeeping arrangements were 
catered for and the awareness of such 
trip hazards were made clear to the 
workforce 
 
Employer 
Evidence of poor housekeeping 
culture and lack of management 
commitment 
 
employer 
N/a 
532 Sp 14 
min 
A) was it necessary for the box to 
be where it was 
B) more thought had to be given 
to the placing of items which 
may cause this type of 
accident 
employer 
Procedures in palce for checking 
systems if work, risk assessment, staff 
training, instruction and monitoring 
 
Mary, bill manager, safety officer, 
employer, another. 
Not answered N/a 
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533 Sp 14 
min 
The box had not been there … is 
was not have been a hazard… 
mary would not have been injured. 
 
Manager 
If the box was stored on shelving off 
the floor or a hazard sign warning of 
the box was in place 
 
Safety officer 
Breach of duty of care to provide 
a safe place of work and 
inadequate storage 
 
Employer 
N/a 
534 Sp 14 
min 
I had not offered to cover for a 
friend 
 
Another worker 
Control measures should have been in 
place to remove all hazards , good 
housekeeping  policy. 
 
Manager 
Unsafe act, unsafe condition, lack 
of management control, no safety 
management condition. 
 
Employer 
N/a 
535 Sp 10 
min 
I’d stayed in bed 
 
Mary  
Not answered Spillage not marked or cleared up 
immediately 
 
Manager 
N/a 
536 Sp 10 
min 
There had been a safe system of 
work in place for dealing with 
spillages as they occur and 
hazards such as this which are 
common in these establishments 
could have been dealt with sooner. 
 
employer 
Effective health and safety policy – 
implementing the policy – making 
persons aware of the hazards – actions 
to take on spillages 
 
Employer  
Failure to identify the hazard – 
failure to remove the hazard, lack 
of training awareness. Failure of 
management to implement 
effective procedures 
 
Employer 
N/a 
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537 Sp 14 
min 
Someone had not left the box in a 
position where someone could trip 
over it 
 
Another worker 
With the implementation of a good 
safe system of work which would have 
prevented the box from being left in a 
position to trip someone. Ie not left 
unattended or in footway 
 
Another worker 
(most likely) the box was left in 
the footpath 
 
another worker 
N/a 
538 Sp 10 
minimu
m 
The milk had been cleaned up 
straight away or wet floor signs 
had been put around the spillage 
 
Bill supervisor 
The person who spilt the milk could 
have put warning signs regarding a wet 
floor , before actioning the cleaner to 
clean it up 
 
Another worker   
Negligence on behalf of the 
person who spilt the milk to 
report the accident, also lack of 
observation on Mary’s behalf in 
not seeing the milk on the floor. 
 
none 
N/a 
539 SP 13 
max 
The box had been removed , or a 
warning sign or barrier placed 
over it when it was first spotted 
and reported 
 
Bill supervisors 
Staff training /awareness 
1. boxes should be stored correctly 
2. boxes should be cleared away 
from work areas asap 
3. staff / supervisors should act 
promptly  
4. cleaning staff should be aware of 
the potential for harm in slow 
response 
 
Safety officer 
Poor staff training and awareness 
Lack of procedures in the 
workplace (correct use, storage 
and disposal of boxes, appropriate 
response to potential risk 
 
Safety officer 
N/a 
540 Sp 10 
min 
Mary had seen the milk  
 
Mary 
By awareness of dangers presented by 
spilt substances /materials 
 
Mary 
Lack of awareness /attention by 
mary 
 
Mary 
N/a 
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541 Sp 10 
min 
Somebody had alerted staff to the 
fact that there was spilt milk and 
the area “cordoned off” until 
mopped.  
( but I bet Mary wished she hadn’t 
come in on Thursday to cover for 
her friend!!!) 
 
safety officer 
Not answered Either a failure to have a safe 
system of work / control 
measures to effectively deal with 
spilt milk  
Or failure to implement the safe 
system of work 
Or staff had not been aware that 
milk had been spilt and therefore 
not been able to act on it. 
 
Employer  
N/a 
542 Sp 9 
max 
Bill the supervisor had cordoned 
off or put out a warning sign 
before or whilst waiting for the 
cleaner to clean it up 
 
Bill – supervisor 
If the company enforced a policy 
whereby reported spillages are dealt 
with immediately  
 
Employer 
The absence of an appropriate 
spillage policy adequately 
communicated to staff 
 
Employer 
N/a 
543 Sp 9 
max 
Not answered By the use of anti slip mat in front of 
liquid storage area 
 
Store manager  
Not enough cleaners, poor time 
management by cleaners, lack of 
supervision of cleaners 
 
Cleaner 
N/a 
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544 Sp 9 
max 
Management had used the 
accident book data to inform 
decision making the spillage 
might have been given greater 
priority  for its removal ( bearing 
in mind that spillages are said to 
be common) 
 
Manager 
Not answered  Lack of priority by staff in 
highlighting the incident site and 
failure to act an accident history 
during the previous six months. 
 
Manager 
N/a 
545 Sp 9 
max 
The spillage had been noticed and 
attended to as soon as it had 
happened 
 
Not known 
There are many  unknowns in this 
scenario but it might have been 
prevented by a whole lot of measures 
from the packaging of the milk , its 
location in the store and the procedures 
for dealing with a spillage and the 
design of the flooring   
 
Employer 
Literally speaking slipping on the 
milk and landing awkwardly 
 
Mary  
N/A 
546 Sp 9 
max 
The warning signs had been put in 
place as soon as the spillage had 
been reported 
 
Bill supervisor 
If a system of work had been in place 
once the spillage had been reported 
 
Safety officer 
A failure to provide a safe system 
/ action to prevent an accident 
when the milk had been spilt. 
Provision of barriers and signs 
immediately the matter had been 
reported to staff 
 
Employer 
N/a 
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547  Sp 9 
max 
A warning sign had been put in 
place as soon as the spillage had 
been noticed 
 
Bill – supervisors 
By an individual taking ownership of 
the spillage as soon as it was noticed 
e.g. bill the supervisor putting a sign 
up 
 
Bill supervisor 
The failure to take ownership of 
the spillage when it was reported 
ie to sign it or clean it up 
immediately 
 
Bill supervisor 
N/a 
548 Sp 14 
min 
Someone had not left that box 
there 
Mary had see the box 
Someone else had noticed it and 
removed it to the correct place 
 
Mary, bill, manager, safety 
officer, another worker 
By ensuring that staff are aware of 
what risks they pose if procedures are 
not carefully followed , like tidying up 
after them.  
By setting a good example by 
management to encourage a safe 
culture – checks carried out etc.  
  
Mary, bill, manager, safety officer, 
another worker, cleaner 
The fact that Mary didn’t see the 
box and tripped over it. There 
may have been many contributory 
factors that caused Mary to trip 
and why the box was there. 
 
Mary 
N/a 
549 Sp 9 
max 
Someone had acted promptly and 
put up warning signs 
 
Another worker 
Regular checking procedures in the 
areas where staff work so that spills 
are dealt with promptly 
 
Another worker 
A failure in the procedure for 
dealing with spills 
 
Manager 
N/a 
550 Sp 14 
min 
The box was removed 
 
Employer 
The box removed 
 
Employer 
Somebody not checking that the 
floor was clear of boxes. Not in 
someone job description not 
carrying out their duties 
 
Employer 
N/a 
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551 Sp 14 
min  
The box had not been there 
 
Another worker 
By the box not being left on the floor 
 
Another worker 
Failing to see an obstruction ( a 
box ) on the floor left by another 
person (or even Mary) 
 
Another worker 
N/a 
552 Sp 11 
max 
The friend was not away on 
holiday Mary would not be there. 
Mary did not wait for her friend 
The cleaner had got round to 
clearing it up 
 
Mary 
If procedures had been followed  
Warnings had been put out 
The cleaner had cleaned up 
Bill the supervisor acted quicker 
 
Bill 
Not answered N/a 
553 Sp 11 
max 
The company spillage procedure 
had been followed, staff alert to 
spillages on the floor and the area 
monitored for spillages and the 
spillages dealt with as soon as it 
was reported. Bill should have put 
out a safety sign as soon as he was 
aware if the spillage 
 
Bill 
By a monitoring system around the 
tills , checking for spillages and 
spillages treated as priority.. a warning 
sign should have been put out as soon 
as the spillage was spotted 
 
Employer  
Failure to have a safe system of 
work for monitoring and dealing 
with spillages 
 
Employer 
N/a 
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554 sp 11 
max  
The spillage had been cleaned up 
immediately 
 
Manager 
By management having a robust policy 
of isolating spillages and immediate 
action on clearing up  
 
Manager 
Failure of another worker to 
report spillages to supervisor 
immediately and alert others to 
the hazard 
 
Another worker   
N/a 
555 Sp 11 
max 
Bill had done xxxx to make the 
area safe or highlight the hazard 
 
Bill 
By ensuring that spillages were 
highlighted with warning signs or kept 
attended by staff and the cleaner cleans 
up immediately 
 
Bill 
Inadequate safety management 
system 
 
Safety Officer 
N/a 
556 Sp 11 
max 
A member of staff was asked to 
wait where the milk had been spilt 
and warn people pending arrival 
of the cleaner or warning signs 
 
bill 
By Bill waiting by the milk or asking 
another member of staff to do so until 
the cleaner arrived 
 
Bill  
Slipping on spilt milk 
 
Mary 
N/a 
557 Sp 11 
max 
The spillage gad been reported 
earlier the checkout operator 
nearest should have known about 
it 
 
Another worker 
Staff could have reported spillage 
quicker and put a sign out (or ensured 
one was put out) almost immediately 
until a cleaner was available    
 
Bill 
Carelessness, too few cleaners, 
lack of reporting 
 
Employer 
N/a 
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558 Sp 14 
min 
The box had been moved 
 
Manager 
By ensuring that boxes were not left in 
walkways 
 
Safety officer 
Failure to ensure that walkways 
are clear of tripping hazards 
Safety officer 
N/a 
559 Sp 14 
min 
There had been an appropriate 
system in place for the correct 
storage of empty boxes which was 
applied and monitored. Employer 
Not answered Breakdown or lack of a system 
for dealing with empty boxes 
 
Employer 
N/a 
560 14 sp 
min 
The box was stored correctly away 
from pedestrian areas 
 
 
Not answered  
Communication within the store 
should have been effective. This would 
ensure that the person that left the box 
in a pedestrian area would have 
understood it presented a hazard 
 
Not answered 
Probably communications. In my 
experience all supermarket 
managers are under pressure to do 
anything other than ensure H&S . 
they are usually busy trying to 
make money.  
 
manager 
N/a 
561 Sp 14 
min  
The box had been picked up in the 
first place 
 
Bill 
By better housekeeping 
 
Bill 
 
It would appear that the accident 
was caused by a box being left on 
the floor through poor 
housekeeping 
 
Bill 
N/a 
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562 Sp 9 
min 
The spillage had been cleaned up 
as soon as reported or signs 
available to alert people to hazard. 
Area was cordoned off until 
spillage cleaned up 
 
Bill 
  
The spillage was cleaned up as soon as 
reported or the area cordoned off until 
area made safe 
 
Bill 
The spillage was not cleaned up 
or cordoned off immediately it 
was reported 
 
Bill 
N/a 
563 Sp13 
max 
There was a proper system in 
place for ensuring that work areas 
were kept clear of clutter 
 
Manager 
By systems and procedures to ensure 
that clutter was checked and removed 
and by a culture of keeping the 
workplace tidy 
 
Manager 
Lack of system and procedures to 
check and remove clutter and a 
culture within that part of the 
store which accepted the building 
up of such clutter 
 
Manager 
N/a 
564  sp 14 
min 
I had carried out a site inspection 
today or had instructed that a site 
inspection of all checkout areas 
was carried out prior to the 
checkout being open 
 
Safety officer 
By better housekeeping , inspection of 
work areas regularly throughout the 
day given the nature of this industry. 
Making someone responsible for the 
checkouts and ensuring all areas are 
clear at all times 
employer 
Poor housekeeping 
 
manager 
N/a 
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565 Sp 14 
min 
The night staff had finished 
stocking the shelves to ensure the 
floors were clear before shop 
opened 
 
Manager 
By ensuring that staff completed the 
tasks that they are assigned before 
moving on to the next area of work, 
and to ensure that single boxes are not 
left in aisles 
 
Safety officer  
Poor organisation within the 
premises with regard to shelf 
stocking and distribution of goods 
on the shop floor, which has not 
been packed onto shelves 
 
Manager 
N/a 
566 Sp 11 
max 
The milk had been cleared up at 
the time of it being reported. 
 
None 
By the supervisor ensuring that 
spillages are cleared up quickly and 
hazard signs be put out until waiting 
for cleaner to arrive. 
 
Bill 
Poor management and 
communication. 
 
 
Employer 
 
N/a 
567 Sp 10 
min 
A member of staff had dealt with 
spillage when it happened 
 
Another worker 
If identified procedures had been 
followed to deal with spillages 
promptly 
 
Another worker 
Failure to deal with spillage 
promptly  
Failure by Mary to take due care 
and attention 
 
Another worker  
N/a 
568 Sp 10 
min 
Staff within the store had followed 
procedures for dealing with 
spillages as soon as they are 
noticed 
 
Another worker 
By ensuring all staff are adequately 
trained to clean up spillages of this 
type as soon as they are noticed. 
 
Safety officer 
Poor staff training re cleaning of 
spillages  
 
Safety officer 
N/a 
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569 Sp 15 
max 
Staff kept checkouts more tidy , if 
only the box had been moved to a 
safe place by bill 
 
None (all staff) 
Ensuring staff keep their workstations 
tidy. Acting promptly to remove 
hazards 
 
All staff 
Poor housekeeping and staff 
training 
 
Manager 
N/a 
570 Sp 16 
min 
We had moved the box 
 
Manager 
Management controls / systems 
established 
 
Employer 
Management and systems failures 
 
Employer 
N/a 
571 Sp 16 
min 
The box was left there 
 
Safety officer 
Ensuring proper housekeeping was 
managed by the store management 
team 
 
Safety officer 
Bad housekeeping 
 
manager 
N/a 
572 Sp 14 
min 
They had stored the box in the 
correct place 
 
Bill 
By correct procedures for storage. 
By proper awareness / in house 
inspections. 
By Mary being aware of the risks of 
poor storage. 
 
manager 
A box being left on a walkway 
 
bill 
N/a 
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573 Sp 16 
min 
We didn’t have boxes 
 
Employer 
By better staff training  
 
Manager 
Lack  of thought 
 
Another worker 
N/a 
574 Sp 16 
min 
Staff had been given sufficient 
health and safety training on 
hazards and risks 
 
Another worker 
1. Better health and safety training 
2. alternative place for leaving box 
3. Supervisor picking up hazard 
4. Mary taking on board health and 
safety risk 
safety officer 
The box left lying in such a 
position for an employee to fall 
over it. 
 
Another worker 
N/a 
575 Sp 16 
min 
We had implemented the 
housekeeping procedures and had 
communicated with all staff more 
effectively 
 
Safety officer 
Not answered A combination of poor 
housekeeping in store and 
carelessness of Mary. 
 
Another worker 
N/a 
576 Sp 16 
min 
The box had not been left there. 
 
Manager 
Staff training on safety issues such as 
correct storage of boxes to avoid 
tripping hazards. 
Regular h&s audits by supervisors to 
identify problems and remove these 
/train where necessary 
 
Employer 
The immediate physical cause – 
box left by another person where 
it caused a tripping hazard 
 
Another worker 
N/a 
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577 Sp 16 
min 
Management had arranged for 
Mary to have her eyesight tested 
in line with procedures for full 
time staff 
 
Manger 
If she had been given an eyesight test 
and safety awareness training in line 
with arrangements for full time staff 
 
Manager 
Due to a lack of safety awareness 
training and possibly eye strain 
associated with checkout work 
 
Manager 
N/a 
578 Sp 16 
min 
I had looked where I was going 
…I might not have tripped over 
the box 
 
Mary 
Carry out risk assessment for trips on 
floor, putting work procedures in 
place , training, supervision of staff 
by management. 
 
Safety officer 
Somebody placed the box in the 
wrong place at the wrong time. 
Mary did not pay adequate 
attention to what she was doing. 
Insufficient action taken by 
company re trip hazards 
 
Safety officer  
N/a 
579 Sp 16 
min 
The system was set up better to 
avoid boxes being left on the floor 
 
Employer 
By a better system of housekeeping / 
h&s management 
 
Manager 
Poor housekeeping practices and 
lack of management control 
 
Manager 
N/a 
580 Sp 16 
min 
Staff tidied as they went the box 
would not have been left on the 
floor 
 
Another worker 
By improved training to all staff to 
highlight why it is important not to 
leave tripping hazards on the floor . 
also more vigilance by supervisors 
they need to ensure staff are working 
correctly and tidying 
 
employer 
Failure to identify hazard and 
clear policy and procedure as to 
immediate disposal of boxes once 
unpacked . a failure to train and 
supervise staff to follow correct 
procedures. 
 
Employer 
N/a 
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581 Sp 16 
min 
Mary would have watched where 
she was going 
 
Mary 
1. Mary watching where she was 
going 
2. people not leaving boxes in 
dangerous places 
3. supervisor making regular checks 
 
Mary / another worker / supervisor 
Mary not paying attention 
 
Mary 
N/a 
582 Sp 16 
min 
The box had not been there. 
 
Bill 
With safety training for Mary and 
other staff , supervisors and managers 
 
Safety officer 
Walkway not being cleared of 
hazards 
 
Safety officer 
N/a 
583 Sp 16 
min 
There were regular checks to keep 
the walk ways and “pinch points” 
(tight corners) clear of tripping 
hazards 
 
Manager 
By keeping walkways clear and 
instructing everyone on the shop floor 
to move tripping hazards even  if they 
haven’t put them there. 
 
Manager 
Because the other workers didn’t 
see the importance of a tidy site 
being a safe site. 
 
Employer 
N/a 
584 Sp 15 
max 
Signs had been posted and watch 
posted at location –cleaner had 
cleaned up and was supervised by 
bill. 
 
Bill 
Observation of good housekeeping 
practices. 
 
Bill 
Lack of appropriate response to 
clean up – housekeeping  
procedures 
 
Bill/manager/safety officer 
N/a 
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585 Sp 15 
max 
Bill had gone and seen the 
location of the box. He may have 
acted on his own experience and 
put the box in a safe place and the 
accident would not have 
happended 
 
Bill 
By proactive intervention 
 
Bill 
Poor communication and lack of 
immediate action on cleaners 
behalf and lack of attention on 
managements behalf. 
 
Safety officer 
N/a 
586 Sp 15 
max 
Someone took responsibility  
Procedures were in place 
Requests were acted on 
immediately 
All hazards were assessed 
Safety checks were made 
People were more aware 
 
Mary/bill/manager/safety 
officer/another worker/ cleaner/ 
customer. 
By having safety checks, inspections 
and procedures in place 
 
Mary/bill/manager/safety 
officer/another worker/ cleaner/ 
customer 
 
 
Lack of management control, no 
procedures in place and possibly 
Mary was not paying attention 
 
Mary/bill/manager/employer 
N/a 
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587 Sp 15 
max 
a. bill ensured the box was 
cleared properly 
b. warning signs were erected 
around the obstacle 
c. good housekeeping was 
implemented 
d. management had enforced 
this obvious hazard and 
identified the potential 
problem from the accident 
reports 
 
employer 
By good housekeeping or by good 
safety management. By good safety 
enforcement 
 
Mary 
Poor housekeeping 
 
Mary 
N/a 
588 Sp 13 
max 
Bill had cleared the box  to the 
store room or the cleaner attended 
to it straight away. Checkouts kept 
tidy 
 
Bill 
By maintaining a safe place of work – 
good housekeeping – tidy up all boxes 
– keep aisle clear at all times 
 
Manager 
Unsafe place of work 
 
Bill 
N/a 
589 Sp 13 
max 
The box had been removed 
 
Bill 
If the box had been removed, the area 
round the checkouts was tidier 
 
Bill  
No system for housekeeping 
around the checkout area 
 
Bill 
N/a 
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590 Sp 13 
max 
The box was removed 
immediately after it was reported. 
The area round the checkout 
where kept tidy 
 
Bill 
Firstly taking note of previous 
accidents, staff training ie 
housekeeping etc 
 
Employer 
Lack of training, supervision and 
housekeeping 
 
Employer 
N/a 
591 Sp 13 
max 
A sign had been put out alerting to 
a potential tripping hazard and if 
the box had been moved before 
Mary tripped over it. Finally 
ensuring that boxes are not left in 
this area for people to fall over 
 
bill 
Ensuring that the boxes are not left in 
a public / staff route . used boxes 
placed in a cage then appropriately 
disposed of or boxes stored in 
appropriate area. 
 
Employer  
Poor cleanliness 
 
Another worker 
N/a 
592 Sp 13 
,ax 
They had checked it had been 
moved or moved it himself 
 
Bill 
By checking the workers report and 
following up on instructions to staff to 
clear 
 
Bill 
Lack of accountability, supervisor 
not checking on instruction given 
 
bill 
N/a 
593 Sp 10 
min 
Someone had identified spillage 
and taken action to clear , cordon 
off area until dry and safe 
 
Bill 
Proper awareness and action to clear 
spillages as soon as they are 
discovered involved management 
awareness, policy on spills , training 
and supervision of staff 
 
Employer 
Failure to control and remove slip 
hazard 
 
manager 
N/a 
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594 Sp 12 
min 
Procedures to alert staff and 
cleaners to spilt products  , means 
of cordoning off to prevent 
customers / staff access 
 
Safety officer 
By better systems for information, 
control of the area and cleaning of the 
spilt product. 
 
Safety officer 
Lack of procedures for control 
and exclusion of staff from the 
hazard – management response to 
problems 
 
Safety officer 
N/a 
595 Sp 10 
min 
Other shop workers would 
instinctively clean up the spill at 
once. General public would report 
it at once 
 
Another worker 
If staff attempted to avoid the spillage 
in the first instance and clean it up 
immediately in the second 
 
Another worker 
Lack of training and 
understanding of the hazards and 
risks of spillages 
 
Employer 
N/a 
596 Sp 10 
min 
The spillage had been reported to 
a cleaner and the area guarded by 
the person causing it to occur at 
the time. The accident to Mary 
would not have happened 
 
Safety officer 
By the person causing the spillage 
staying in place and guarding it until 
the spillage was cleared up 
 
Safety officer 
Due to the people involved in the 
spillage not reporting / guarding 
until a cleaner could arrive and 
clean up the spillage 
 
Another worker / customer 
N/a 
597 Sp 10 
min 
The spilt milk had been cleaned 
up  
 
Employer 
Communication between whoever 
spilt it and a member of staff would 
have enabled it to be cleaned up  
 
Customer 
Lack of communication and 
training 
 
Employer 
N/a 
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598 Sp 9 
max 
A warning sign had been put up as 
soon as the spilt milk had been 
reported. 
 
 Bill 
If a warning sign had been put up as 
soon as the spillage had been reported 
 
Bill 
Staff not taking adequate 
precautions quickly enough 
following the report of spilt milk 
 
Bill 
N/a 
599 Sp 11 
max 
Cloths had been available to dry 
up the spillage , as well as safety 
sign around every few checkouts  
 
employer 
Spillage kit and safety signs at each or 
every few checkouts. Good 
arrangements and culture and all staff 
members responsible for dealing with 
spillage. 
 
Employer 
Inadequate arrangements to 
promptly deal with spillages 
 
employer 
N/a 
600 Sp 10 
min 
We had educated our staff to 
recognise and respond to hazards , 
we need to create a proactive staff 
who will react. Why did milk spil, 
what was the cause, we need to 
investigate fully. 
 
Employer 
By encouraging staff (all levels) to 
recognise hazards and not expect 
someone else to deal with them. 
 
Employer 
Lack of proactive health and 
safety culture – poor staff 
education of the consequences of 
not dealing with incidents 
 
Employer 
N/a 
601 Sp 12 
min 
Someone had cleaned up the 
spillage immediately 
 
Another worker 
By having a procedure for cleaning 
spillages, training staff in the 
procedure and auditing to ensure it is 
being implemented 
 
Employer  
The failure to mop up the spillage 
before the accident occurred 
 
Another worker 
N/a 
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602 Sp 15 
max 
The cleaner had done his job like 
he had supposed to and cleaned up 
the aisles and kept them clear 
 
Cleaner 
If the cleaner had done his or her job 
properly and cleaned up the boxes 
 
Not answered but must be cleaner 
Was bad supervision by the shop 
floor supervisor and a very bad 
job by the cleaner 
 
Bill / Cleaner 
N/a 
603  SP 15 
MAX 
We kept the area tidy and no 
boxes lying around as a rule and 
treated the complaint of the 
customer sooner 
 
Bill 
If housekeeping was at a higher 
standard 
 
Manager 
 
If there had been a history of 
untidiness at the checkout area , 
the manager will have to 
encourage the staff to be tidy , 
obviously there is a casual 
attitude to housekeeping but 
direction for the staff must come 
from the management.  
 
manager 
N/a 
604 Sp 15 
max 
Mary’s friend noticed the box first 
and removed it.  
Bill had not passed on 
responsibility to a cleaner, he 
should have notified or asked 
people closer to the area of work.  
If only warning signs had been put 
out 
 
Employer 
By training staff to be aware of 
anything hazardous in the workplace, 
any employee should be responsible 
for themselves and others around 
them 
 
Mary 
Carelessness, lack of training in 
safety 
 
Another worker  
N/a 
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605 Sp 15 
max 
1. the box had been moved 
earlier 
2. we had a process by which 
the box had been reported it 
would have been attended to 
earlier 
3. housekeeping was better 
4. we had looked at the other 
“trip2 incidents that had 
happened we may have been 
able to prevent this one 
 
Manager 
By analysing previous accidents and 
putting in procedures and putting in 
procedures to prevent it happening 
again. 
 
Manager 
Tripping over a box, which had 
been left in a pedestrian 
thoroughfare. It was not removed 
as soon as it had been reported. 
The supervisor did not check that 
it had been removed 
 
None  
N/a 
606 Sp 12 
min 
A system was in place to clean up 
spills immediately. 
The person spilling the milk 
reported it  
Mary was aware of her 
surroundings and saw the spillage 
The floors were soft 
Mary was wearing non slip soles 
shoes 
I was in Barbados after winning 
the lottery 
 
Manager   
A safety culture whereby hazards are 
reported and dealt with immediately  
backed up by procedures and training 
 
Mary/ supervisor / manager/ safety 
officer/ employer/ other worker / 
cleaner/ customer 
Root cause – failure to ensure 
adequate systems to clean up 
spillages 
 Initial cause – spilt milk and lack 
of awareness 
 
Employer 
N/a 
 Appendix 5 Respondents Completed Sentences 
 
Page | 998  
 
607 Sp 14  
min 
There was better housekeeping 
and hazard identification 
 
Supervisor 
Keeping the shop floor free from 
loose materials eg boxes . good house 
keeping practices 
 
Supervisor   
Bad housekeeping practices and 
lack of / poor supervision on shop 
floor 
 
Supervisor 
N/a 
608 Sp 15 
max 
There was a near miss reporting 
system . if only  accident trends 
are recorded and investigated and 
corrective action carried out 
If only a sign was put up 
straightaway 
If only it was removed 
straightaway 
If only health and safety audits 
were carried out it would have 
been picked up before 
 
Employer 
Company H&S training, near miss 
reporting 
H&s audits  
Staff awareness  
Supervisors controlling accident 
trends 
 
Employer 
Lack of supervision 
Lack of environmental awareness 
Lack of training, information and 
instruction 
 
Supervisor 
N/a 
609 Sp 16 
min 
Mary had seen the box 
 
Mary 
By Mary being aware of her 
surroundings 
 
Mary 
Mary not looking where she was 
going 
 
Mary 
N/a 
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610 Sp 12 
min 
Staff had checks for spillages 
Staff report spillage 
Signs erected 
Staff have appropriate footwear 
Staff training – awareness to 
potential hazard 
 
Employer 
It is reasonably foreseeable milk leaks 
from cartons in transit. Staff 
awareness training and procedure 
drawn up to deal with this. Regular 
safety checks in case public spill milk 
and a reporting mechanism , signs and 
someone to clean immediately a spill 
is discovered 
 
Employer  
Lack of awareness. 
Employer 
N/a 
611 Sp 12 
min 
The spill had been immediately 
barricaded and cleaned  
 
Manager 
By an established and enforced 
procedure of barricading and cleaning 
spills immediately  
 
Manager 
Store managers failure to have  or 
enforce policies on priority and of 
barricading / cleaning spills . 
probably relates  also to corporate 
failure to establish and audit 
conformance with appropriate 
accountability. 
 
Manager 
N/a 
612 Sp 12 
min  
A member of staff had dealt with 
this problem 
 
Another worker 
If the spillage had been dealt with 
immediately. 
 
Another worker  
 
Slipping on spilt milk 
 
Mary 
N/a 
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613 Sp 12 
min  
The person who spilt the milk had 
informed a member of staff 
immediately 
 
Another worker 
If appropriate and immediate action 
had been taken as soon as the milk 
had been spilt 
 
Another worker 
unclear reporting lines in order to 
reduce slipping hazards 
 
manager 
N/a 
614 Sp12 
min  
A proper management policy was 
in place to manage spillages in the 
workplace, the spillage would 
either have been prevented or 
effectively identified , highlighted 
and removed 
 
Employer 
Proper spillage management. Spillage 
identified by staff and quickly 
cordoned off or signed and effectively 
cleared up 
 
Employer 
Lack of management and training 
for effective spillage management 
therefore spillage was not quickly 
identified and removed 
 
Employer 
N/a 
615 Sp 12 
min  
The cleaner had been called 
immediately the milk was spilt 
 
Supervisor 
If the milk had been cleared up 
immediately  
 
Cleaner 
Spilt milk that no one had cleared 
up. 
 
Cleaner 
N/a 
616 Sp 10 
min 
There had been a system for 
reporting spillages and cleaning 
up immediately. 
 
Employer 
By having a system in place for 
reporting spillages immediately, 
cordoning off the area and clearing up 
asap. 
 
Employer 
Ineffective systems within the 
organisation. 
 
Employer 
N/a 
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617 Sp 10 
min 
I had not been in such a rush 
 
Mary 
By better housekeeping – cleaning up 
spillages as they occur and putting out 
a wet floor sign 
 
Manager 
Lack of housekeeping and 
training 
 
Manager 
N/a 
618 Sp 10 
min 
The spillage had been identified 
and either cordoned of or cleaned 
up 
 
Supervisor 
Procedure for identifying and 
cleaning up spillages 
 
Employer 
Lack of adequate procedure for 
identification of potential slip 
hazards , monitoring and 
supervision of the workplace and 
appropriate systems for cleaning 
up the spillage 
 
Employer  
N/a 
619 Sp 10 
min  
They had procedures in place for 
spillages, cordon off and clean 
asap 
 
mary 
If there were procedures in place to 
clean up spillages immediately  
 
Mary 
Slipping on spilt milk 
 
Mary 
N/a 
620 Sp 9 
max 
Abc supermarkets had a system in 
place for cleaning up spillages at 
certain periods throughout the day, 
this policy should have included 
information on what staff should 
do immediately after a spillage 
had been notified… 
 
Employer   
If a sign had been put up immediately 
after the spillage was notified and the 
spillage was cleaned up as soon as 
possible after notification 
 
Supervisor  
ABC supermarkets did not 
adequately assess risks from 
spillages in their stores – they did 
not have a policy in place to 
ensure that spillages are dealt 
with quickly 
 
Employer 
N/a 
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621 Sp 10 
min 
I would have acknowledged that 
Mary was 55 yrs old , do may be 
at greater risk of greater injury 
from a tripping accident given her 
age and gender. She is also a p/t 
member of staff consequently the 
workplace environment changes to 
a greater extent, and her 
familiarisation of the changing 
environment is less due to the p/t 
nature of he role. Working a 
Thursday would have been a 
strange experience, so I could 
have briefed Mary about the 
changes to the work environment 
on a Thursday 
 
Supervisor  
By briefing / training staff about the 
importance of keeping the work area 
clear of boxes. The training could also 
highlight the potential risk and 
likelihood of such an incident. 
Accident statistics could be produced 
to demonstrate the level of tripping 
accidents relative to other types of 
accident 
 
Mary/supervisor/ manager 
Caused by insufficient level of 
housekeeping . a lack of 
appreciation about the potential 
risks of placing a box on the floor 
by another worker. Lack of 
briefing about changes in the 
work routine on a Thursday 
 
Supervisor / manager / safety 
officer  
N/a 
622 Sp 16 
min  
She had not come in to cover for a 
friend. 
Box was not in the way 
She had not gone to her break 
 
Mary / other worker 
Not answered The box being left in the way 
 
Another worker 
N/a 
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623 Sp 11 
max 
If it had been cleared up 
immediately 
 
Employer 
By a better system of reporting / 
cleaning 
 
Employer 
Slippy floor 
 
Employer 
N/a 
624 Sp 10 
min 
1. the milk was stored in a safer 
location 
2. someone had noticed and 
used a slippy surface sign 
3. Someone had cleaned the spilt 
milk  
4. Mary was wearing 
appropriate footwear 
 
1 Bill 2/3 another worker / cleaner 
4 mary   
prevention of spillage of milk 
 
signage and cleaning up of spillage 
 
good h&s management culture 
 
employer 
Lack of or breakdown in the 
companies health & safety culture 
 
Employer 
N/a 
625 Sp 13 
max 
Housekeeping around the 
checkout area had been identified 
as priority and then managed  
 
The accident trend in the accident 
book had been noticed and acted 
upon as an idea for improvement 
 
Manager  
Risk assessment , better 
communication of it, staff training , 
regular checks of workplace, 
monitoring of checks, quick response 
for matters that can be resolved easily 
 
Employer 
Immediate cause – box being left 
on the floor 
 
Underlying cause – inadequate 
housekeeping and monitoring 
arrangements 
 
Employer 
 
 
N/a 
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626 Sp 11 
max 
Staff members were asked to 
check their work areas regularly 
and report any spillages, it might 
have been cleared more quickly. If 
only a sign had been placed over it 
or the shop supervisor Bill had 
waited in situ until cleaner arrived 
 
Employer  
If safer systems were in place and 
managed. 
 
Bill – supervisor 
Not having a safe system for 
spillages ie placing a sign over 
the spillage or waiting in situ for 
cleaner 
 
Employer 
N/a 
627 Sp 11 
max 
The spillage protocol required a 
member of staff to guard the 
hazardous floor area until the 
mop, bucket and signage arrived 
 
Bill – supervisor 
The spillage protocol required a 
member of staff to guard the 
hazardous floor area until the mop, 
bucket and signage arrived 
 
Employer 
Multi factorial 
Failure to implement a safe 
system of work for spillages. 
Lack of friction between shoe and 
floor surface 
 Employer 
N/a 
628 Sp 11 
max 
There was , and staff adhered to, a 
strict and prompt procedure for 
dealing with such incidents , for 
example initially by signage then 
removing the hazard 
 
Employer 
A quick response by bill providing 
signage in the area of the spillage 
before cleaning could take place 
 
Bill – supervisor  
The time it took to respond to the 
notification contributed but the 
cause was the spilt milk 
 
None 
N/a 
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629 Sp 11 
max 
There was s system in place where 
spillage notified to a member of 
staff  - immediate response to 
stand at the spillage to warn staff 
/customers of danger, until such 
time hazard signs put in place and 
spillage cleaned up 
 
Employer 
By having in place a system of 
dealing with spillages immediately 
notified to staff  Manager staff 
members takes responsibility to 
prevent slips by standing guard / 
placing hazard sign 
 
Manager 
Inadequate response to 
notification of hazard which 
presents risk of serious injury 
 
Supervisor 
N/a 
630  Sp 11 
max 
Procedures for mopping up 
spillages immediately and if all 
staff had been trained  / instructed 
to place a warning cone in the 
location where the milk had 
spilled 
 
Employer 
Good communication between staff , 
clear responsibilities for clearing up 
spillages , staff taking a pro-active 
approach to preventing hazards 
 
None 
Poor communication between 
staff and lack of awareness about 
health and safety issues 
 
Employer  
N/a 
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631 Ps 9 
max 
There had been a more rigid 
structure in place to ensure that 
because of prior knowledge and 
precedents it was reasonable to 
foresee that the accident would 
happen therefore as soon as the 
supervisor had been instructed 
about the spillage he should have 
remained there to verbally instruct 
people about the danger until it 
was adequately guarded / signed 
and cleaned up[ 
 
Supervisor 
There had been a more rigid structure 
in place to ensure that because of 
prior knowledge and precedents it 
was reasonable to foresee that the 
accident would happen therefore as 
soon as the supervisor had been 
instructed about the spillage he should 
have remained there to verbally 
instruct people about the danger until 
it was adequately guarded / signed 
and cleaned up[ 
 
Supervisor 
Poor management arrangements 
i.e. not learning from previous 
incidents , not training staff 
adequately 
 
Employer 
N/a 
632 Sp 9 
max 
Someone had stood guard over the 
spillage until it had been cleaned 
up or closed off 
 
Supervisor 
As slipping accidents are common to 
supermarkets it should have been 
identified as fairly high risk to staff 
and customers. Therefore a policy of 
reporting or direct action (who when 
what) should be in place. Risk 
assessment and preventative action 
would have prevented this accident. I 
also think that this is a training issue. 
 
Safety officer 
There must have been risk 
assessments and past history  to 
recall on. I feel with this to mind 
that poor training , lack of 
information and clear instruction 
is the underlying cause. There has 
to be positive plan of action to 
prevent further incidents. They 
must not wait for spillages to be 
reported by customers but must 
be vigilant and look for the 
hazard 
 
Safety officer   
N/a 
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633 Sp 9 
max 
A member of staff had been called 
and left at the location to warn 
people about the spillage before it 
was cleaned up … Mary would 
not have slipped 
 
Supervisor 
By having the staff who either work 
at the cash points or who walk up and 
down the aisles to arrange for the 
spillages to be mopped up 
immediately or at least signs 
displayed 
 
Employer 
The slippery surface caused by 
spilt milk , the spilt milk made the 
floor wet thereby reducing the 
grip between the show surface 
and floor surface ( friction 
coefficient)  
 
supervisor 
N/a 
634 Sp 9 
max 
Bill had acted immediately and 
had a warning sign put up 
 
Supervisor 
Bill had acted immediately and had a 
warning sign put up 
 
Supervisor 
Slow response to initial report of 
spillage 
 
Supervisor 
N/a 
635 Sp 9 
max 
We could react faster to notified 
events 
 
Manager 
By increasing staffs awareness of 
hazards 
By changing the procedure for 
dealing with spilt liquids 
 
Supervisor 
A breakdown in safety procedures 
 
Employer 
N/a 
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636 Sp 12 
min 
The milk had not been spilt , or 
had been cleared up 
 
Employer  
Ensuring containers designed to resist 
damage etc 
Ensuring that milk stacked in such a 
way to minimise risk of spills 
Ensure systems in place to ensure 
rapid clean up 
Staff only wear appropriate footwear 
 
Employer  
Poor design of milk containers 
 
employer 
N/a 
637 Sp 16 
min 
There had been a system to keep 
floors clear that was used 
 
Supervisor 
By supervision ensuring a clean and 
tidy policy was observed 
 
Supervisor 
Failure to implement ( or create 
or implement)  a clear floor 
policy 
 
Manager 
N/a 
638 Sp 11  The supervisor had seen this as an 
urgent issue and the cleaner had 
cleared it up immediately 
 
Supervisor  
By prompt clean up of the spillage 
 
Supervisor 
Lack of management action to 
clean up spillage 
 
Employer 
N/a 
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639 Sp 13 
max 
I had looked where I was going 
 
Mary 
Better housekeeping 
 
Employer 
Poor control by the employer 
 
Employer 
N/a 
640 Sp 13 
max 
Supervisor had ensured the box 
was removed immediately it was 
reported 
 
Supervisor 
By improving housekeeping and 
implementing a daily audit 
 
Manager 
A failure on the companies part to 
ensure its staff had adequate 
procedures and training to comply 
with current legislation 
 
Employer 
N/a 
641 Sp 12 
min 
She had received adequate 
information instruction and 
training, had access to the 
company safety policy and related 
procedures, finding of risk 
assessments.. her colleagues or 
cleaners followed effective 
cleaning practices and managers 
provide hazard spotting 
 
The EHO    
Could of reduced the likelihood of 
occurrence and risk of injury / 
seriousness by implementing so far as 
reasonable practicable the matters in 
box to the left  
 
None 
Unknown without full 
background information 
 
None 
N/a 
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642 Sp 13 
max 
Bill had ensured that the box had 
been removed immediately or 
removed by him .also if Mary had 
looked out for her own personal 
safety 
 
Supervisor 
If either box removed or she’d paid 
more attention to her surroundings 
 
Mary 
She should have seen the box and 
avoided it. Lack of attention on 
her part. 
 
Mary 
N/a 
643 Sp 13 
max 
The box had been removed before 
the accident 
 
Supervisor 
The box being removed more quickly  
 
Supervisor 
The box left out on the shop floor 
 
Supervisor 
N/a 
644 Sp 13 
max 
Bill Had acted immediately and 
removed the box 
 
Supervisor 
If boxes were never left in 
supermarket aisles 
 
Employer 
The box being left in the aisle 
 
Employer 
N/a 
645 SP 13 
MAX 
We had acted to prevent accidents 
and trained all staff to deal with 
unsafe conditions immediately and 
correctly. Perhaps review accident 
book monthly 
 
employer 
Information instruction and training 
on health and safety for all staff, 
better communications and reaction to 
hazards 
 
employer 
Poor management 
 
employer 
N/a 
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646 Sp 16 
min 
She had not come in on Thursday 
The box was not there 
Our procedures covered this 
Our housekeeping was better 
 
Employer 
She had not come in on Thursday 
The box was not there 
Our procedures covered this 
Our housekeeping was better 
 
Employer 
1. hazard spotting for Mary 
2. Positioning of box 
 
mary 
N/a 
647 Sp 13 
max 
The box had not been left on the 
floor by the person who put it 
there …the box had been removed 
by any member of staff to remove 
the hazard…the cleaner had 
immediately dealt with the box 
when asked...bill had ensured this 
had been done….warning signs 
were put up. 
 
Employer 
Safe system of work which is 
implemented monitored and staff are 
trained to carry out 
 
employer 
Failure to operate a safe system 
of work 
 
Employer 
N/a 
648 Sp13 
max 
Bill the supervisor dealt with the 
situation himself , as there was a 
history of untidy checkouts areas 
someone should be in charge for 
housekeeping in the area 
 
Manager 
By having a person in charge of 
housekeeping for that area 
 
Manager 
Poor housekeeping storage 
 
Manager 
N/a 
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649 Sp 15 
max 
Put a system in place that boxes 
were not allowed to build up 
around the checkout . better 
housekeeping 
 
Supervisor / safety officer 
Better housekeeping and safe system 
of work. By being proactive and 
taking account of the other accidents 
 
Supervisor / employer  
Poor system of work , 
management not ensuring that 
action was taken after the 1
st
 / 2
nd
 
accident highlighted the danger. 
 
Employer 
N/a 
650 Sp 11 
max 
Bill the supervisor had 
immediately gone to collect and 
display the appropriate safety 
notice adjacent to the spillage. He 
should then have contacted the 
cleaner 
 
Bill supervisor  
Not answered Lack of adequate store 
monitoring and remedial 
procedures to be followed in the 
case of spillage 
 
Employer 
N/a 
651 Sp 13 
max 
ABC supermarkets had ensured a 
safe system of work to ensure that 
tripping hazards were not left 
unattended by staff and that this 
was cascaded down through the 
management to staff via periodic 
instruction, training and 
supervision and disciplinary 
procedures. 
 
Employer 
A good safety culture developed by 
policies , procedures and safe systems 
of work implemented by the branch 
manager 
 
Manager 
The absence of a fully 
implemented safe system of 
work controlled / regulated by 
appropriate monitoring and 
review 
 
Employer 
N/a 
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652 Sp 10 
min 
Someone had reported the milk 
spillage in order for appropriate 
cleaning and use of cone for 
hazard awareness 
 
Another worker   
Reporting of spillage to aid cleaner ( 
or appropriate person)  to clear up. 
Better awareness of safety issues 
 
Another worker 
Incident not being reported and 
therefore not resolved by 
cleaning spillage.  Possible lack 
of training. 
 
Another worker 
N/a 
653 Sp 12 
min 
There had been procedures for 
dealing with spillages or warning 
signs placed around affected area 
 
Manager 
If there was a system of work for 
employees in relation to spillages on 
the floor 
 
Manager 
Unsafe system of work. No 
prescribed action for dealing 
with spillages 
 
Manager 
N/a 
654 Sp 14 
min 
The box had been stored 
appropriately.  
 
Other worker 
By adequate supervision of the area or 
storage of the box in the allocated 
area. 
Employer 
Failure to implement a safe 
system of work. 
 
Employer 
N/a 
655 Sp 16 
min 
The box had been stored correctly 
out of the walkway 
 
None   
By correct storage of boxes on 
racking and pallets away from 
walkways 
 
None   
Unsafe storage of box in staff 
walkway 
 
None 
N/a 
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656 Sp 9 
max 
A warning sign had been put out 
immediately to highlight the area, 
while a member of staff keeps 
watch until this has been done. 
The spillage should have been 
cleared up sooner rather than later 
and the supervisor should have 
checked this was done 
 
Supervisor 
Immediate warning sign 
Staff guarding before spill is cleared 
Supervisor making sure cleaner does 
it as soon as possible 
 
Supervisor 
Not a proper risk assessment 
taken place. Management 
procedures not adequate to 
minimise risk of someone 
slipping 
 
Manager  
N/a 
657 Sp 9 
max 
There was a procedure to ensure 
spillages were  marked properly , 
Mary would have been  prevented 
from entering the spill area and 
she would not have fallen over 
 
manager  
If the company had procedures to deal 
with spillages or the store manager 
had ensured they were implemented 
 
Manager 
Lack of procedures or procedure 
not being implemented 
adequately  
 
manager 
N/a 
658 Sp 9 
max 
There had been en effective 
system in place for dealing 
promptly with spillages 
 
Safety officer 
By having a more tightly enforced 
cleaning / inspection/ maintenance 
procedure 
 
Employer 
Slipped on the milk – however 
no / ineffectual system in place 
to help her avoid the misfortune 
 
employer 
N/a 
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659 Sp 10 
min 
The spilt milk had been cleaned 
up (absorbed) and area screened 
off ie procedures in place / 
systems in place to immediately 
identify responsibility for and to 
effect removal of hazard 
 
Manager   
Proper systems and procedures in 
place of prevention /corrective action. 
 
Manager 
Lack of proper hazard analysis 
and corrective / preventative 
action. 
 
Employer 
N/a 
660 Sp 10 
min 
A spillage alert system had been 
in place to spot clean all spillages 
as they occurred , or at least mark 
the spot where it had happened 
 
Manager  
Staff to be aware of the causes of 
slipping incidents and accordingly 
either mark the spot to warn others or 
clear the spot as a matter of urgency. 
Preferably doing both to prevent an 
incident whilst it was waiting to be 
cleaned 
 
Employer 
Due to inadequate management 
systems being adopted and 
carried out at store level. 
 
Employer 
N/a 
661 Sp 16 
min 
The person had not put the box 
there ( & had training to know not 
to do that) 
 
Another worker 
If the box had not been put there eg if 
there was more storage space in the 
store of if employee who put box 
there had been trained  
 
Another worker 
A box being put on the floor , ie 
incorrect storage 
 
Another worker 
N/a 
 Appendix 5 Respondents Completed Sentences 
 
Page | 1016  
 
662 Sp 12 
min 
I had not been at work  
 
Answered incorrectly  
Putting procedures in place to ensure 
surveillance and response to spillage's 
that could create slips and trips 
 
Employer  
Due to the floor surface being 
slippery 
 
Employer 
N/a 
663 Sp 16 
min 
I had taken the time to check the 
route and clear any obstructions 
 
Mary ( incorrectly answered 
By a personal risk assessment 
 
Mary 
Poor house keeping and failure 
to do a risk assessment 
 
Mary 
N/a 
664 Sp 13 
max 
The area round the checkout was 
tidy 
 
Supervisor 
By a clear floor policy 
 
supervisor 
The practice of allowing floor 
areas to become blocked 
 
Supervisor 
N/a 
665 Sp 9 
max 
Bill the supervisor had taken more 
appropriate action before Mary’s 
fall , knowing there was a 
previous history about people 
slipping over spilt milk . there 
should have been warning signs 
nearer to the checkout area and 
therefore Mary’s accident might 
never have happened, and maybe 
if the cleaner was there faster 
 
supervisor 
By better awareness by Bill and 
everyone else 
 
Employer  
Bad judgement by anyone 
employed by ABC Supermarkets 
 
Employer 
N/a 
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666 Sp 13 
max 
We could find an effective way to 
drive home to all staff the need to 
ensure no hazards are created 
through poor housekeeping 
 
Safety officer 
By ensuring areas such as till 
approaches and all other walkways 
are not used as depositories for goods 
packaging and /or other potential trip 
hazards – if necessary backed by 
disciplinary sanctions 
 
 
Employer 
 
Failure to clear trip hazards 
immediately or to ensure it is 
clearly marked in an appropriate 
way 
 
supervisor 
N/a 
667 Sp 9 
max 
The cleaner had cleaned it up 
when asked to.  
Mary had been looking where she 
was going  
Supervisor had checked upon the 
cleaner  
The company had an effective 
spillage policy  
Mary had non slip shoes 
 
None ( a combination of all 
people) 
Prompt action to deal with the 
spillage 
 
None ( a combination of all people) 
 
It was a chain of events 
 
None ( a combination of all 
people) 
 
N/a 
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668 Sp 9 
max 
Bill had gone straight to the scene 
and placed a warning sign  and or 
remained at the scene until the 
spillage was cleared up – after all 
data was at hand to indicate that 
the likelihood of injury being 
realised from this hazard – as a 
result of proactive action being 
taken .. 
 
Supervisor 
Not answered Vision without action 
 
employer 
N/a 
669 Sp 9 
max 
1. A safety culture existed in the 
supermarket that enabled the 
person who spilt the milk / 
first person to notice the spill 
, to take appropriate action 
2. the supervisor had taken 
action  - cleaned the area /put 
out warning triangle 
3. ensured prompt action taken 
by cleaner 
 
1. manager /employer 
2. supervisor 
3. supervisor 
By the implementation of a safety 
culture that would have encouraged 
participation by the workforce in  the 
identification of hazards and 
ownership in their area of work 
 
employer 
Primary cause – 1. spillage – 
slippery area, 2 Mary’s 
inattention 
 
Secondary / indirect cause –lack 
of safety culture 
 
Mary. 
N/a 
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670 Sp 9 
max 
The area had been isolated 
immediately or cleaned earlier. If 
only regular checks had been 
introduced following previous 
accidents 
 
Manager 
If the store manager had acted 
following previous incidents of 
spillage in the checkout area 
 
Manager 
Lack of procedures to check and 
supervise an area which has a 
proven accident  record 
 
Manager 
N/a 
671 Sp 9 
max 
Bill the supervisor took more care 
and insisted on staff cleaning up 
all spillages at once 
 
Supervisor 
 If a proactive approach was taken by 
management including bill 
 
Supervisor 
Falling on a hard surface 
 
employer 
N/a 
672 Sp 9 
max 
The supermarket had a strict 
procedure for dealing with 
spillages that all staff were aware 
of and adhered to  
 
Employer 
Written procedures for spillages .. 
when spill reported, staff member 
stands by it until sign put out. Cleaned 
up asap 
 
Supervisor 
Inadequate procedures / staff 
training 
 
Employer 
N/a 
673 Sp 16 
min 
The boxes had been put away 
somewhere out of the way 
 
Manager 
Boxes were stored in the correct area 
away from the checkouts 
 
Manager 
Poor supervision and leadership 
enforcing a clean and tidy area 
 
Supervisor 
N/a 
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674 Sp 9 
max 
Bill had arranged to remain at the 
scene of the spilt milk or for 
another member of staff to remain 
at the scene to warn customers 
/staff of the spillage and cordon 
off the area with appropriate 
signage 
 
Supervisor  
Bill / staff remaining at the scene to 
warn customers / staff and cordon off  
the area with signage. 
 
supervisor 
The spilt milk! 
 
Not being highlighted to 
customers /staff and the area not 
being cordoned off. 
 
supervisor 
N/a 
675 Sp 12 
min 
The milk had been cleared up 
immediately or a warning notice 
had been put in place until the 
spillage had been cleaned up. 
 
manager 
If the policy in place was to clear up 
spillages immediately or erect 
warning signs at the spillage until it 
was cleared up 
 
manager 
Not having a procedure for 
reporting and clearing up 
spillages immediately 
 
Manager 
N/a 
676 Sp 12 
min 
I put up a warning of slippery 
surface 
 
Supervisor 
Not answered Spillage was not reported or 
cleaned up properly 
 
Another worker 
N/a 
677  So 12 
min 
Somebody cleaned up the spill 
when it happened or if only 
somebody had put up a wet floor 
sign 
 
Another worker / cleaner 
If everybody took adequate care and 
cleaned up the spill when it occurred 
in the first place 
 
none 
Lack of understanding of the 
seriousness of not cleaning up a 
spill 
 
Cleaner 
N/a 
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678 Sp 10 
min 
The spill had been cleaned up we 
might never have had an accident 
 
Employer 
If the correct procedure was in place 
ensuring that any spillage is cleaned 
as soon as it happens 
 
Employer 
A failure of the system  / 
procedure in place that are there 
to ensure a safe working 
environment 
 
Employer 
 
 
N/a 
679 Sp 10 
min  
It had been cleaned up earlier , if 
signs had been placed around the 
spill 
 
Supervisor 
If when a spill is reported barriers are 
put up with signs and a member of 
staff to keep an eye on it till the spill 
is cleared 
 
Supervisor 
The supervisor did not ensure the 
area was blocked off and that the 
cleaning was not done quicker 
 
Supervisor 
N/a 
680 Sp 10 
min 
I had more information to work on 
 -Mary had been more aware of 
her surroundings 
- the other staff had 
spotted the problem , 
the customer had 
reported the spillage 
and so on 
 
not answered 
By not having spilt milk on the floor 
 
Not answered 
Slipping on milk N/a 
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681 Sp 10 
min 
The milk had been cleared away 
promptly 
 
Manager 
Not answered I would consider why Mary 
didn’t stop to clear up the milk 
herself , why no other member of 
staff had noticed the spillage , 
why did the milk spill , was the 
bottle leaking, where exactly was 
the spillage shop floor or staff 
area 
 
manager 
N/a 
682 Sp 10 They had cleared up the spillage 
 
Employer 
If the spillage was reported to 
member of staff or manager and it 
was either cleaned up or a warning 
sign was put up it could be cleared up 
 
Employer 
Lack of procedure to deal with 
hazards ie spillages 
 
employer 
N/a 
683 Sp 10 
min 
The milk had been cleared up 
 
Employer 
Procedures to ensure the milk was 
cleared up 
 
Employer 
Lack of action to clean up the 
milk , inadequate equipment and 
procedures 
 
Employer 
N/A 
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684 Sp 9 
max 
Bill had ensured appropriate 
action was taken and verbally 
warned Mary. 
 
The store had a policy for finding 
out why milk spilt and approached 
the manufacturer 
 
Bill supervisor 
By implementing standard clean floor 
checks and briefing staff on the 
importance 
 
Safety  officer 
Poor safety culture 
 
Not specified 
N/a 
685 Sp 9 
max 
The previous 4 accident have been 
properly and fully investigated 
and the results acted on 
 
Employer 
1. Implementing the results of 
previous accident investigations 
2. mopping up the spill immediately 
it was notified 
3. warning signs 
 
manager 
Lack of p & p re dealing with 
incidents of spillage , lack of 
previous accident investigation 
and acting on their results 
 
Employer 
N/a 
686 SP 9 
max 
The cleaner had attended to milk 
immediately 
 
cleaner 
Better system was in place for 
immediate removal of spillage – does 
it necessarily have to be done by a 
cleaner  
 
manager 
Her slipping on spilt milk which 
had not been cleaned up 
promptly ( she did not look 
where she was going) 
 
Mary 
N/a 
687 SP 9 
max 
I had seen and acted on the spilt 
milk 
 
Safety officer 
Better floor inspection 
 
Safety officer 
Spilt milk and failing to clean up 
the milk 
 
Another worker 
N/a 
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688 SP 10 
min 
There had been regular checks for 
spillages on the shop floor every 
15 –20 minutes , the accident may 
have been prevented 
 
Employer 
By ensuring that at least one member 
of staff would carry out a regular 
check on all the floors in danger areas  
ie liquids such as cooking oils bottled 
drinks and fridges  
 
 
Employer 
Due to the lack of sufficient 
training of the workforce on 
specific danger areas and 
ensuring that everyone had been 
appointed to carry out an 
inspection 
 
Employer 
N/a 
689 Sp 9 
max 
They had cleaned up the spillage 
immediately on reporting of same 
 
Supervisor / cleaner 
By ensuring a safe place of work. 
Ensuring that bill had made someone 
stand at the spillage until the cleaner 
had arrived and also left spillage 
signage for use  
 
Supervisor / manager 
Unsafe workplace and unsafe 
system of work including the 
lack of training in how to deal 
with spillage 
 
Employer 
N/a 
690 Sp 10 
min 
-The milk was cleared up / not 
spilt 
-A regular check and cleaning 
routine was in place 
- staff were fully 
trained in identifying 
hazards such as 
spills 
 
employer 
Regular checks and clear  ups 
combined with hazard identification 
training. - not 100% effective but a 
good improvement 
 
Employer  
Spilled milk on ground  - result 
of poor housekeeping  
 
Employer 
N/a 
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691 Sp 15 
max 
Preventative action had been taken 
after the previous accidents 
 
Safety officer 
Action by management - 
communication with employees 
 
Manager 
Complacency 
 
Manager 
N/a 
692 Sp 10 
min 
-Packaging was more robust 
-handling was better 
-leak /spill was detected 
-procedure in place to deal with 
spillage 
 
employer   
-Packaging was more robust 
-handling was better 
-leak /spill was detected 
-procedure in place to deal with 
spillage 
 
employer   
-Packaging was more robust 
-handling was better 
-leak /spill was detected 
-procedure in place to deal with 
spillage 
 
employer   
N/a 
693 SP14 The box hadn’t been left there 
 
Manager 
If all parties were fully aware of their 
h+S responsibilities and acted upon 
them vigorously 
 
Manager  
Apathy 
 
Employer 
N/a 
694 SP16 The store manager and supervisors 
were more informed on h+s 
matters, particular trips and had 
ensured employees were trained to 
be aware of the risks of tripping 
the box may not have been left or 
the incident avoided 
 
Safety officer 
By ensuring staff were aware of the 
risks and hazards of leaving boxes 
where they could cause an accident. 
The store checks by the supervisor / 
store manager. 
 
Safety officer 
The poor control/ housekeeping 
of the store due to a lack of 
training on h&s and supervision 
 
Safety officer  
N/a 
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695 SP 12 The milk had been cleaned up 
immediately . hazard signs had 
been put in place to indicate the 
spillage 
 
Employer 
If the spillage had been immediately 
cleaned up , safety hazard signs 
displayed “wet surface” 
 
Employer 
Lack of appropriate action to 
ensure spillages are dealt with 
immediately they occur / lack of 
suitable instructions for such 
events 
 
Employer 
N/a 
696 SP 15 The box had been removed the 
moment it was reported by the 
customer. Bill should not have 
instructed the cleaner but moved 
the box immediately with the 
cleaner. 
 
Bill  
The box should have been removed 
by the supervisor or warning signs put 
on it. The area should be kept clear at 
all times especially as accident book 
shows history of trips etc. 
 
Bill / manager / safety officer/ 
employer / cleaner  
H&s policy & commitment is 
not providing a culture where 
employees thinks about 
preventing accidents. If the 
culture was focused on h&s 
individuals from top down 
would take responsibility around 
their own area to prevent 
accidents 
 
Employer  
N/a 
697 SP15 Bill had ensured that the box was 
cleared straight away. There was 
some system for removing 
/dumping empty boxes from the 
checkout area after they were 
used. 
 
Customer 
By implementing a system for 
removing empty boxes immediately 
after their use round the checkout area 
 
Safety officer 
Poor system of work 
 
Employer 
N/a 
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698 SP 14 The box had not been placed in an 
obvious traffic route at such a 
busy time – or it had been spotted 
and rectified prior to Mary’s 
accident. 
 
Another worker 
Improved working practices and 
training may have lead to greater 
awareness from colleagues 
 
manager 
Tripping over a box placed on a 
pedestrian route. This should not 
have been placed there. 
 
Another worker  
N/a 
699 SP 14 She had been looking where she 
was walking 
 
Mary 
Improved housekeeping 
 
Another worker 
A chain of events from company 
level to store level , which 
resulted in the box not being 
removed from the floor 
 
Employer 
N/a 
700 SP 14 The supermarket could have 
followed housekeeping procedures 
more closely 
 
employer 
Would need to investigate before a 
definite answer can be given, 
although it appears that improved 
housekeeping, staff awareness may 
have prevented the accident 
 
Employer 
Without further investigation the 
actual cause of the accident 
cannot be definitely identified 
 
Employer 
N/a 
701 SP 16 Mary had watched where she was 
walking and the box had not been 
left sitting on the floor. 
 
Mary 
By good housekeeping , awareness of 
employees , better training relating to 
housekeeping. 
 
Manager 
Poor housekeeping leading to 
walkways being untidy 
 
Manager 
N/a 
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702 SP 15 People would take action 
themselves when notified about a 
potential hazard 
 
bill 
Because action could have been taken 
to immediately remove the box or 
secure the area from access. Training 
and awareness appear to be required 
 
Employer 
Placing of the box on the floor in 
an accessible walkway / location 
by persons unknown - failure to 
maintain systems  
 
Manager 
N/a 
703 SP 15 Bill had moved the box himself or 
if only there was someone to 
regularly check the area to ensure 
boxes did not accumulate in 
hazardous places 
 
employer 
By preventing the accumulation of 
boxes in a traffic route through 
regular inspections and clean ups 
 
employer 
Poor management of trip hazards 
 
Employer 
N/a 
704 SP 15 The supervisor had done his job 
properly and the cleaner had acted 
on this , Mary would not of 
tripped  
 
Supervisor  
If the supervisor / cleaner had done 
their jobs properly 
 
Supervisor 
There was a lack of leadership. 
The supervisor should have 
brought the cleaner to where the 
box was and the job should have 
been done there and then 
 
Supervisor 
N/a 
  
 
 
